Pollution, partial privatization, and the effect of ambient charges

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2021): Pollution, partial privatization, and the effect of ambient charges.

Abstract

This paper examines a mixed Cournot duopoly model comprising a private firm and a partially privatized public firm to reassess the effect of an increase in ambient charges. The paper demonstrates that the result is about the same as that obtained from private Cournot duopoly competition.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: ambient charge; Cournot duopoly; environmental regulation; partial privatization; pollution
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy

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