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# The transmission of preferences on immigration from the first to the second generation of immigrants: an analysis of the European Social Survey

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**Abstract:** This article studies the immigrants' attitude towards immigration with special emphasis on the transition from the first to the second generations. We use European Social Survey data for the 2002-2020 period, which include many questions on the attitude to immigration, in order to estimate the impact of the immigrant status through ordered probit models. We find that first-generation immigrants support immigration more than natives. We also find that evidence of generational convergence towards natives' opinions is limited. This result suggests that the effect of the immigration experience on preferences is persistent across generations.

**Keywords:** immigrants, immigrant integration, attitudes/view towards immigration, intraEU migration

**JEL Classification** J11, J61, Z13.

## 1. Introduction

A vast literature deals with the attitudes of natives toward immigration (see, for instance, Mayda, 2006; Hainmueller & Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007, Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). However, we know still little about the immigrants' own view about immigration. The expanding share of immigrants in the population (about 12% in the US, and 6.5% in the EU)<sup>1</sup> has made this issue relevant not only in traditional destination countries, but also in a growing number of new destinations. Thus, knowing the immigrants' attitudes about immigration is interesting not only because eventually they will be enfranchised with voting rights, but also because their opinion is an outcome of their interaction with the receiving society.

This paper studies several facets of the immigrants' attitudes about immigration *across different generation of immigrants*. Using European Social Survey (ESS) data, we can analyze not only views about the expected benefits and costs from immigration, but also about socio-cultural issues that are quite relevant in the public debate, like the potential immigrants' impact on the receiving country's

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<sup>1</sup> See Trevelyan et al., (2016); Eurostat, (2014).

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culture. More importantly, we can explore how these attitudes change from the first to the second generation.

Most of the research concerning the attitudes of immigrants towards immigration covers the US (see, for example, Binder, Polinard & Wrinkle, 1997; Hood, Morris & Shirkey, 1997; Polinard, Wrinkle & de la Garza, 1984). The literature concerning Europe is less developed, albeit some contributions have been recently proposed. Just and Anderson (2015) analyze data on the first 5 waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2011) in 18 West European democracies. Empirical evidence reveals that, in general, foreigners support immigration more than natives, but the acquisition of the host country citizenship is associated with a reduction in the support for immigration. Braakmann, Waqas and Wildman (2017) use the 2007-2010 Citizenship Survey of the UK to investigate the thoughts of immigrants regarding immigration and compare them with those of natives. Results show as well that immigrants tend to favor immigration more than natives, but those who have been in the UK for longer (5 years or more) have opinions closer to natives. Notably, these authors do not find any robust evidence that anti-immigration views of natives, earlier and recent immigrants alike, can be attributed to labor market outcomes. Mustafa & Richards (2019), use ESS data (Round 7) on eight European countries to explore attitudes towards immigration from the perspective of Muslim Europeans. Results show that income has a significantly weaker effect on Muslim attitudes compared to the secular majority, that Muslims tend to hold more favorable attitudes towards migrants from poorer countries and that their attitudes towards Muslim immigrants are contingent upon religiosity. Finally, Meeusen, Abts and Meuleman (2019) focus on Belgians of Turkish and Moroccan descent, using data from the Belgian Ethnic Minorities Election Study (BEMES). They compare attitudes to immigration of first- and second-generation immigrants. Interestingly, they find that the latter do not display more negative attitudes than more recent immigrants, proving some intergenerational transmission of preferences regarding immigration (see Bisin and Verdier, 2011, for the intergenerational transmission of preferences).

This work aims to contribute to the literature on the European context by carrying out an empirical analysis that extends to all the countries included in the ESS over the whole chronological coverage of the survey to date (namely, 10 waves from 2002 to 2020). These data enable us to examine different generations of immigrants. An important advantage is that, in addition to the first and second generation, we study a particularly interesting category, the so-called "generation 1.5", which is made of immigrants who entered the destination country before they were 10. These individuals initiated the process of identity formation in their origin country but were soon familiarized with the culture of the destination country. Consequently, it is particularly interesting to compare them with the second generation, to

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verify the possible differences between an *early exposure* to the destination country and *being born* in the destination country.

The paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, section 2 describes our data, section 3 reports our empirical analysis, and section 4 contains our conclusions.

## 2. Data and variables

We used waves 1-10 (2002 to 2020) of the European Social Survey (ESS). The survey is a repeated cross-section conducted in a large number of European countries including a wide range of standardized questions addressed to first- and second-generation immigrants concerning various aspects of their interaction with the host country society. We consider 39 European countries available in the survey. Table 1 reports the sample numerosity of the ten biennial rounds of the survey, while table 2 presents the sample size for each country. It is worth remarking that not all countries participate to the ESS in every round, as reported in columns 4 and 9 of table 2. In the statistical analysis below, the different ratio of samples to population were used to reweight the estimates.

Table 1. European Social Survey (ESS) rounds.

ESS round	Year	Observations	Percent
1	2002	39,041	8.73
2	2004	43,975	9.83
3	2006	39,724	8.88
4	2008	52,824	11.81
5	2010	48,745	10.9
6	2012	50,667	11.33
7	2014	37,006	8.27
8	2016	41,080	9.18
9	2018	45,795	10.24
10	2020	48,403	10.82
Total		447,260	100

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*Table 2. Countries in the sample*

Code	Country	Observations	Rounds	Code	Country	Observations	Rounds
AL	Albania	1,183	1	IT	Italy	9,841	5
AT	Austria	13,837	7	LT	Lithuania	10,757	6
BE	Belgium	14,756	9	LU	Luxembourg	2,717	2
BG	Bulgaria	13,009	6	LV	Latvia	2,433	2
CH	Switzerland	15,052	10	ME	Montenegro	2,260	2
CY	Cyprus	4,954	5	MK	Macedonia	1,346	1
CZ	Czech Republic	18,538	9	NL	Netherlands	17,081	10
DE	Germany	31,657	10	NO	Norway	15,095	10
DK	Denmark	11,616	8	PL	Poland	17,009	10
EE	Estonia	14,424	9	PT	Portugal	16,992	10
ES	Spain	18,836	10	RO	Romania	2,050	1
FI	Finland	18,930	10	RS	Serbia	3,137	2
FR	France	17,135	10	RU	Russia	11,311	5
GB	United Kingdom	18,307	9	SE	Sweden	16,830	10
GR	Greece	11,983	5	SI	Slovenia	12,101	10
HR	Croatia	5,894	4	SK	Slovakia	10,612	7
HU	Hungary	15,983	10	TR	Turkey	4,206	2
IE	Ireland	18,776	9	UA	Ukraine	8,541	5
IL	Israel	13,133	6	XK	Kosovo	1,232	1
IS	Iceland	3,706	5		<b>Total</b>	<b>447,260</b>	<b>100</b>

## 2.1. Individuals and immigrant status

For our purposes, we classify the individuals as follows:

- Natives: individuals born in the country, with both parents born in the country.
- First-generation immigrants (*gen1*): foreign-born individuals with both parents born abroad, who entered the country *after* the age of 10.
- One-point-five-generation immigrants (*gen15*): foreign-born individuals with both parents born abroad, who entered the country *before* the age of 10.
- Second-generation immigrants (*gen2*): Individuals born in the country, with both parents born

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abroad.

Individuals with only one foreign-born parent and individuals born abroad with parents born in the host country were discarded, as they do not fit in our distinction between natives and immigrants. Table 4 reports the number of interviewed immigrants and natives by country.

It is worth remarking that, due to different formulation of the corresponding questions in the survey, the precise age at which immigrants first entered the host country can only be computed in rounds 5-10. For rounds 1-4 we compute an approximate age considering the midpoint of time intervals that ranged from 1 to 10 years.

**Table 4. Natives and immigrants of different generations**

Country	gen1	gen15	gen2	natives	Total	Country	gen1	gen15	gen2	natives	Total
AL	3	2	13	1,165	1,183	IT	509	67	41	9,224	9,841
AT	1,074	105	361	12,297	13,837	LT	192	40	127	10,398	10,757
BE	1,388	145	616	12,607	14,756	LU	801	58	230	1,628	2,717
BG	58	13	91	12,847	13,009	LV	278	17	151	1,987	2,433
CH	3,265	253	844	10,690	15,052	ME	69	7	18	2,166	2,260
CY	261	3	15	4,675	4,954	MK	33	1	29	1,283	1,346
CZ	323	30	186	17,999	18,538	NL	1,120	144	384	15,433	17,081
DE	2,416	376	1,013	27,852	31,657	NO	1,046	51	105	13,893	15,095
DK	552	40	130	10,894	11,616	PL	76	11	145	16,777	17,009
EE	2,102	302	1,339	10,681	14,424	PT	678	44	121	16,149	16,992
ES	1,475	48	74	17,239	18,836	RO	7	0	6	2,037	2,050
FI	430	35	35	18,430	18,930	RS	214	33	141	2,749	3,137
FR	1,353	192	832	14,758	17,135	RU	295	21	117	10,878	11,311
GB	1,722	86	550	15,949	18,307	SE	1,720	228	450	14,432	16,830
GR	664	39	392	10,888	11,983	SI	726	62	359	10,954	12,101
HR	418	55	168	5,253	5,894	SK	117	9	80	10,406	10,612
HU	168	19	90	15,706	15,983	TR	34	1	44	4,127	4,206
IE	1,847	37	97	16,795	18,776	UA	684	41	284	7,532	8,541
IL	3,855	687	3,794	4,797	13,133	XK	38	6	10	1,178	1,232
IS	148	10	12	3,536	3,706	<b>Total</b>	<b>32159</b>	<b>3318</b>	<b>13494</b>	<b>398289</b>	<b>447260</b>
						<b>Percent</b>	<b>7.19%</b>	<b>0.74%</b>	<b>3.02%</b>	<b>89.05%</b>	<b>100%</b>

## 2.2. Control variables

Our control variables are defined as follows:

- "*female*": dummy for the gender of the respondent (1 if female).
- "*age*": age of the respondent.
- "*citizen*": dummy for citizenship of the host country (1 if citizen).
- "*minority*": dummy for positive answer to the question "Do you belong to an ethnic minority group in the country?".
- "*discriminated*": dummy for positive answer to the question "Would you describe yourself as a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?".
- "*religious*": answer to the question "How religious are you", from 0 ("Not at all") to 10 ("Very").
- "*rel\_*": series of dummies indicating the religion ("*christian*", "*jewish*", "*muslim*", "*other*").<sup>2</sup>
- "*educ\_*": series of dummies indicating the level of education from I (less than lower secondary) to V2 ("higher tertiary").<sup>3</sup>
- "*employed*": dummy for positive answer to the question: "Have you done any paid work in the last 7 days?"
- "*income*": self-reported decile of family income.
- "*retired*": dummy for positive answer to the question: "Are you retired?".
- "*essround*": series of dummies for the ESS round.
- "*country*": series of dummies for the countries where data were collected.

Table 4 reports a brief description and summary statistics for the control variables.

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<sup>2</sup> The "nonreligious" dummy was left out to avoid collinearity.

<sup>3</sup> The original ESS variable responds to the question: "What is the maximum level of education you have reached?", which indicates the level of education, as defined by the UNESCO ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education).

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Table 4. Control variables

Variable	Type	Mean	Std dev
<i>female</i>	binary	0.54	
<i>age</i>	continuous	48.74	18.64
<i>citizen</i>	binary	0.96	
<i>minority</i>	binary	0.05	
<i>discriminated</i>	binary	0.07	
<i>religious</i>	discrete 1 to 10	4.71	3.04
<i>rel_christian</i>	binary	0.54	
<i>rel_jewish</i>	binary	0.02	
<i>rel_islam</i>	binary	0.04	
<i>rel_other</i>	binary	0.01	
<i>educ_I</i>	binary	0.08	
<i>educ_II</i>	binary	0.15	
<i>educ_IIIb</i>	binary	0.15	
<i>educ_IIIa</i>	binary	0.18	
<i>educ_IV</i>	binary	0.10	
<i>educ_V1</i>	binary	0.08	
<i>educ_V2</i>	binary	0.10	
<i>employed</i>	binary	0.51	
<i>income</i>	discrete 1 to 12	5.46	2.76
<i>retired</i>	binary	0.26	

### 2.3. Dependent variables

All dependent variables used in our analysis are ordinal. We recoded and renamed three ESS variables<sup>4</sup> so that, in accordance with the other variables, the support for immigration increases as their values increase. Individuals who refused to answer or answered “don't know” were considered missing values. The variables considered are the following:

- "*sameethnic*": answers to the question "To what extent do you think the country should allow people of the same race or ethnic group to come and live here?" The answers are

<sup>4</sup> These variables are *imdfetn*, *imsmetn* and *impcntr*, renamed, respectively, *diffethnic*, *poorer*, *economy*.



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assigned values from 1 (“allow none”) to 4 “allow many to come and live here”.

- "*diffethnic*": answers to the question "How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most people in the country? To what extent should they be allowed to come". The answers are ordered as the "*diffethnic*" variable.
- "*poorer*": answers to the question "What do you think about immigrants from the poorer countries outside Europe? To what extent should they be allowed to come". The answers are ordered as the "*diffethnic*" variable.
- "*economy*": answers to the question "Do you think it is good or bad for the economy that foreign people come and live in the country?" The answers are assigned values from 0 (extremely negative assessment) to 10 (extremely positive assessment).
- "*culture*": answers to the question "would you say that the cultural life of the country is undermined or enriched by people from outside?" The answers are assigned values from 0 (extremely negative assessment) to 10 (extremely positive assessment).
- "*betterplace*": answers to the question "is the country made a better or worse place by people coming to live here from outside?" The answers are assigned values from 0 (extremely negative assessment) to 10 (extremely positive assessment).

Table 6 shows the Spearman rank correlation matrix for the six measures proposed. Correlations are all positive but relatively far from 1, suggesting that using multiple variables can convey some informational content about different aspects of the support for immigration. Table 5 displays a summary.

**Table 5. Dependent variables**

Variable	Mean	Std dev	min	max
<i>sameethnic</i>	2.83	0.89	1	4
<i>diffethnic</i>	2.50	0.91	1	4
<i>poorer</i>	2.42	0.93	1	4
<i>economy</i>	4.92	2.51	0	10
<i>culture</i>	5.44	2.60	0	10
<i>betterplace</i>	4.86	2.37	0	10

**Table 6. Spearman rank correlation of dependent variables**

	<i>sameethnic</i>	<i>diffethnic</i>	<i>poorer</i>	<i>economy</i>	<i>culture</i>	<i>betterplace</i>
<i>sameethnic</i>	1.00					
<i>diffethnic</i>	0.69	1.00				
<i>poorer</i>	0.60	0.79	1.00			
<i>economy</i>	0.44	0.51	0.49	1.00		
<i>culture</i>	0.41	0.51	0.49	0.63	1.00	
<i>betterplace</i>	0.43	0.52	0.50	0.65	0.69	1.00

### 3. Empirical analysis

#### 3.1. Full sample results

The estimates in Table 7 show the effect of the immigrant status (as described in section 2.1) on the preference for immigration. Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we estimated the following ordered probit model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Observations were weighted with the suitable country and post-stratification design values provided by the ESS. Regressions include dummies for country and ESS rounds. Their estimated coefficients are available upon request.

The first evidence provided by the estimation output is that immigrants of every generation are more open to immigration than natives.<sup>5</sup> Actually, the dependent variables capture different aspects of the attitudes towards immigration, and all the coefficients of *gen1*, *gen15* and *gen2* are positive and highly significant. Thus, the immigrant status increases the preference for immigration with respect to the natives. Since the magnitude of the coefficients declines over generations, at first sight one may think that there exists a kind of “convergence trend” towards the natives. Yet, the existence of this trend

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<sup>5</sup> As usual, the dummy for the natives is excluded to avoid perfect collinearity, and the results must be interpreted as the difference with respect to the natives.

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appears less concrete when we formally test for its significance. Table 8 presents the p-values of a series of test of the following restrictions:

- i) all generations have the same coefficients;
- ii) *gen1* has the same coefficient as *gen15*;
- iii) *gen15* has the same coefficient as *gen2*.

In most instances, the hypothesis of equality of coefficients cannot be rejected, suggesting either that all immigrant generations share the same views on immigration or that the sample size is not large enough to correctly evaluate the difference among generations. This result is in line with the findings by Meeusen, Abts and Meuleman (2019).

Interestingly, the equality of the coefficients is rejected for *economy* and *betterplace*. In these cases, there is evidence of a convergence to the natives' preferences when we move from *gen1* to *gen15*.

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Table 7. Ordered probit regressions

	sameethnic	diffethnic	poorer	economy	culture	betterplace
gen1	0.208*** [0.0191]	0.164*** [0.0193]	0.138*** [0.0199]	0.339*** [0.0195]	0.263*** [0.0189]	0.365*** [0.0191]
gen15	0.170*** [0.0388]	0.147*** [0.0386]	0.164*** [0.0396]	0.186*** [0.0389]	0.209*** [0.0413]	0.199*** [0.0407]
gen2	0.159*** [0.0219]	0.140*** [0.0214]	0.147*** [0.0227]	0.191*** [0.0219]	0.226*** [0.0226]	0.214*** [0.0223]
female	-0.0180** [0.00733]	-0.00662 [0.00710]	0.00765 [0.00714]	-0.123*** [0.00664]	0.0153** [0.00663]	-0.0317*** [0.00666]
age	-0.00397*** [0.000295]	-0.00609*** [0.000288]	-0.00710*** [0.000289]	-0.00160*** [0.000266]	-0.00312*** [0.000267]	-0.00411*** [0.000270]
citizen	-0.101*** [0.0229]	-0.100*** [0.0234]	-0.105*** [0.0232]	-0.180*** [0.0232]	-0.136*** [0.0231]	-0.183*** [0.0230]
minority	0.000821 [0.0219]	0.113*** [0.0207]	0.0872*** [0.0218]	0.0668*** [0.0185]	0.117*** [0.0191]	0.110*** [0.0199]
discriminated	0.0524*** [0.0149]	0.0465*** [0.0143]	0.0497*** [0.0149]	-0.0370*** [0.0138]	-0.00685 [0.0145]	-0.0879*** [0.0140]
religious	0.00663*** [0.00153]	0.00651*** [0.00148]	0.0151*** [0.00149]	0.0128*** [0.00145]	0.00925*** [0.00146]	0.0230*** [0.00144]
rel_christian	-0.0363*** [0.00976]	-0.0991*** [0.00920]	-0.117*** [0.00928]	-0.0673*** [0.00860]	-0.120*** [0.00857]	-0.123*** [0.00859]
rel_jewish	0.857*** [0.0711]	0.138** [0.0553]	0.137** [0.0581]	0.247*** [0.0580]	0.222*** [0.0587]	0.391*** [0.0648]
rel_islam	-0.0369 [0.0310]	0.119*** [0.0310]	0.0798** [0.0313]	0.141*** [0.0281]	0.202*** [0.0277]	0.178*** [0.0278]
rel_other	0.0360 [0.0432]	0.141*** [0.0423]	0.101** [0.0443]	0.0226 [0.0412]	0.118*** [0.0425]	0.0329 [0.0429]
educ_I	-0.279*** [0.0181]	-0.286*** [0.0184]	-0.245*** [0.0183]	-0.272*** [0.0175]	-0.193*** [0.0174]	-0.196*** [0.0177]
educ_II	-0.130*** [0.0166]	-0.140*** [0.0167]	-0.107*** [0.0166]	-0.125*** [0.0161]	-0.0439*** [0.0161]	-0.0629*** [0.0162]
educ_IIIb	-0.0979*** [0.0160]	-0.129*** [0.0161]	-0.130*** [0.0158]	-0.121*** [0.0155]	-0.0286* [0.0155]	-0.0755*** [0.0156]
educ_IIIa	0.0816*** [0.0161]	0.0945*** [0.0162]	0.0485*** [0.0160]	0.0801*** [0.0153]	0.166*** [0.0155]	0.107*** [0.0155]
educ_IV	0.127*** [0.0180]	0.120*** [0.0176]	0.0720*** [0.0175]	0.144*** [0.0166]	0.234*** [0.0167]	0.165*** [0.0167]
educ_V1	0.298*** [0.0173]	0.322*** [0.0171]	0.255*** [0.0171]	0.322*** [0.0163]	0.427*** [0.0168]	0.351*** [0.0166]
educ_V2	0.346***	0.364***	0.312***	0.405***	0.484***	0.378***

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	[0.0187]	[0.0181]	[0.0180]	[0.0168]	[0.0170]	[0.0171]
<b>employed</b>	-0.0180* [0.00999]	-0.00994 [0.00958]	-0.0215** [0.00968]	-0.0295*** [0.00898]	-0.0151* [0.00891]	-0.00611 [0.00895]
<b>income</b>	0.0209*** [0.00156]	0.0195*** [0.00150]	0.0152*** [0.00152]	0.0311*** [0.00140]	0.0203*** [0.00142]	0.0211*** [0.00142]
<b>retired</b>	0.0644*** [0.0140]	0.0274** [0.0135]	0.0234* [0.0136]	0.0377*** [0.0127]	0.0110 [0.0127]	0.0249* [0.0128]
<b>ESS round dummies</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>country dummies</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>N</b>	326255	325756	325676	323965	324375	323549

Ordered probit regression with robust standard errors in brackets. P-values of tests on parameter restrictions are presented. Significance shortcuts: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 8. Tests for equality of interest parameters

	sameethnic	diffethnic	poorer	economy	culture	betterplace
Hypothesis	p-value	p-value	p-value	p-value	p-value	p-value
<b>gen1=gen15=gen2</b>	0.1353	0.6226	0.8017	0***	0.2225	0***
<b>gen1=gen15</b>	0.3396	0.6546	0.522	0.0002***	0.203	0.0001***
<b>gen15=gen2</b>	0.7927	0.882	0.6844	0.9099	0.7126	0.7399

It might also be interesting to have a look at the effect of the control variables. It is worth remarking that, except for the citizenship status, these variables apply to all individuals in the sample, so they inform us on the preferences of natives and immigrants alike. Therefore, the results are likely to be driven by the natives, who are the large majority in the sample (89%, as in table 4). A general result is that effect tend to have the same sign, and often significance, for all the dependent variables considered in the study.

- Age has significant negative effect on attitudes to immigration. This outcome confirms well-known findings in the literature (see, for instance, Mayda 2006)
- Citizenship, the only variable that applies only to immigrants, has a significant negative impact on support to immigration. This result is in line with the findings of Just and Anderson (2015).
- Except for a few cases where the effects are insignificant, being part of a minority or feeling discriminated against increase the support for immigration.
- While feeling religious has a positive and significant effect on the views about immigration, different religious affiliations have different impacts. Christians tend to favor immigration less than non-religious respondents, while Muslims and followers of other cults -especially Jews- tend to support immigration.

- Income and education have a positive and significant effect on attitudes toward immigration. Unemployment has a positive effect as well, but its significance is limited.

### 3.2. Results considering only immigrants

So far, we have explored the variation in attitudes to immigration between natives and immigrants of different generations. It can be interesting to explore how the controls used in our regressions are related to the immigrants' own support for immigration. To this aim, we repeat our analysis restricting our sample to immigrants and removing the *gen1*, *gen15* and *gen2* regressors.

Results of the ordered probit regressions on these limited samples (roughly one tenth of the original) are presented in table 9. Some coefficients change their sign compared to those of the whole population, where natives are expected to drive the results. This suggests that some determinants of attitudes to immigration can have very different effects, depending on the native-immigrant status. In particular:

- Age always has a negative effect on the taste for immigration, as it happens for the whole population. This result is often found in the literature. Education has a positive effect, which is also in line with the literature (see, among others, Mayda, 2006; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007 and 2014).
- The coefficients of *minority* and *discriminated* keep the same sign but increase in magnitude, suggesting that these conditions might be more sensitive for immigrants than for natives.
- While being religious still has a positive effect on attitudes to immigration (albeit smaller and not always significant) the religious affiliation has different impacts for natives and immigrants. In particular, Jewish and "other religion" immigrants have a lower preference for immigration, contrary to the whole population. Christian immigrants show a slightly higher distaste for immigration than Christians in general.
- While income in the whole population is positively correlated to support for immigration, when we restrict our analysis to immigrants the coefficients are mostly insignificant. This also suggests that immigrants are not concerned by labor market competition.
- In the whole population, being employed has a negative effect on the attitude to immigration. This effect is reversed when only immigrants are considered, indicating that employed

immigrants seem to have more favorable views about immigration and, apparently, confirms that they are not concerned about labor market competition.

#### **4. Conclusions**

In Europe, many countries known for being once a source of emigration are rapidly turning into destination countries (see, for example, Přívarová, Rievajová, Galstyan & Gavurová, 2022). This crucial social transformation involves the settlement of new minorities and the birth of a large second generation. Actually, in many aging countries, only immigrant communities contribute positively to the demographic balance (Naumann & Hess, 2021) Consequently, it is inevitable that their opinions are going to shape policy decisions of the host countries. Knowing these opinions can shed some light on the future of the destination societies: are they going to be isolated and protectionist, or more open and inclusive? Are they going to be a melting pot or, on the contrary, an aggregation of stratified and segregated communities? It is well-known that first-generation immigrants are relatively more open to immigration. However, little is known on the second generation, which is even more important since it is going to exercise voting rights. Using a large database, we have shown that there exists a robust transmission of attitudes to immigration from the first to the second generation. As a consequence, it is likely that, in the future, the destination societies will be more open and inclusive as a result of current immigration.

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Table 9. Ordered probit regressions, immigrants only

	sameethnic	diffethnic	poorer	economy	culture	betterplace
<b>female</b>	-0.0290 [0.0224]	-0.0357 [0.0218]	-0.0329 [0.0215]	-0.147*** [0.0206]	-0.0251 [0.0208]	-0.0678*** [0.0206]
<b>age</b>	-0.00687*** [0.000940]	-0.00937*** [0.000923]	-0.0102*** [0.000916]	-0.00329*** [0.000868]	-0.00319*** [0.000872]	-0.00459*** [0.000881]
<b>citizen</b>	-0.117*** [0.0254]	-0.108*** [0.0248]	-0.0981*** [0.0235]	-0.189*** [0.0229]	-0.118*** [0.0232]	-0.187*** [0.0230]
<b>minority</b>	0.0422 [0.0299]	0.0729** [0.0283]	0.0789*** [0.0280]	0.122*** [0.0269]	0.153*** [0.0271]	0.134*** [0.0273]
<b>discriminated</b>	0.0911*** [0.0309]	0.142*** [0.0306]	0.128*** [0.0300]	0.0823*** [0.0295]	0.121*** [0.0297]	0.0311 [0.0295]
<b>religious</b>	0.00583 [0.00431]	0.00355 [0.00412]	0.0114*** [0.00425]	0.00437 [0.00401]	0.0120*** [0.00414]	0.0227*** [0.00414]
<b>rel_christian</b>	-0.0746** [0.0308]	-0.110*** [0.0291]	-0.135*** [0.0290]	-0.0397 [0.0270]	-0.130*** [0.0274]	-0.102*** [0.0267]
<b>rel_jewish</b>	0.124 [0.0963]	-0.183** [0.0776]	-0.198** [0.0876]	-0.129* [0.0779]	-0.287*** [0.0768]	-0.152** [0.0753]
<b>rel_islam</b>	-0.0522 [0.0389]	0.114*** [0.0388]	0.0765** [0.0388]	0.101*** [0.0358]	0.195*** [0.0366]	0.194*** [0.0362]
<b>rel_other</b>	-0.237*** [0.0618]	-0.0627 [0.0590]	-0.132** [0.0598]	-0.0994* [0.0561]	-0.0657 [0.0576]	-0.0530 [0.0597]
<b>educ_I</b>	-0.134** [0.0581]	-0.175*** [0.0578]	-0.0578 [0.0548]	-0.0597 [0.0530]	-0.0879* [0.0517]	0.00736 [0.0538]
<b>educ_II</b>	-0.0853 [0.0521]	-0.116** [0.0507]	-0.0708 [0.0504]	-0.0155 [0.0496]	-0.0221 [0.0492]	-0.0272 [0.0493]
<b>educ_IIIb</b>	-0.189*** [0.0515]	-0.258*** [0.0501]	-0.208*** [0.0487]	-0.0828* [0.0470]	-0.0899* [0.0479]	-0.0962** [0.0481]
<b>educ_IIIa</b>	0.00318 [0.0523]	0.0259 [0.0506]	0.00586 [0.0496]	0.126*** [0.0463]	0.0981** [0.0480]	0.0891* [0.0468]
<b>educ_IV</b>	-0.00222 [0.0568]	-0.0239 [0.0539]	-0.0411 [0.0523]	0.139*** [0.0493]	0.130*** [0.0494]	0.103** [0.0509]
<b>educ_V1</b>	0.130** [0.0549]	0.150*** [0.0520]	0.103* [0.0535]	0.303*** [0.0498]	0.260*** [0.0542]	0.288*** [0.0499]
<b>educ_V2</b>	0.183*** [0.0560]	0.156*** [0.0539]	0.145*** [0.0525]	0.373*** [0.0486]	0.348*** [0.0486]	0.319*** [0.0493]
<b>employed</b>	0.0549** [0.0269]	0.0476* [0.0265]	0.0251 [0.0262]	0.0612** [0.0249]	0.0510** [0.0252]	0.0862*** [0.0256]
<b>income</b>	0.00543 [0.00464]	0.00456 [0.00454]	0.00126 [0.00449]	0.00701* [0.00419]	0.00615 [0.00440]	-0.00135 [0.00422]
<b>retired</b>	0.129*** [0.0474]	0.0771 [0.0471]	0.0419 [0.0472]	0.0186 [0.0437]	-0.0487 [0.0432]	-0.0150 [0.0446]
<b>ESS round dummies</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>country dummies</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>N</b>	35699	35566	35461	35436	35518	35242

Ordered probit regression with robust standard errors in brackets. P-values of tests on parameter restrictions are presented. Significance shortcuts: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



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