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Khan, Haider

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**Africa as Part of a New Non-neocolonial Global South: A Strategy for African Development
beyond the East Asian Model in the 21st Century : Integrating Markets and the Enabling
Developmental State**

Haider A. Khan

John Evans Distinguished University Professor

JKSIS

University of Denver

Denver, Co. 80208

hkhan@du.edu

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Abstract:

The main purpose of this chapter is to explore African Development Strategy as part of a non-neocolonial Global South. For this purpose, I propose a fairly comprehensive strategy for development as freedom for Africa. Accordingly, I try to find a way to integrate useful markets with the key characteristics of the Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century in order to build a growing ecologically sustainable economy with equity in terms of capabilities. This is both for theoretical clarification and for aiding the strategies of popular democratic movements. A few tentative steps are taken here to serve this dual purpose. Proceeding from a critical capabilities perspective that is fully grounded in social reality of deepening *structural and ecological crises* of the World Capitalist System, we discover that such a perspective leads to the need to include among the characteristics of the *Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century* its capacity to build *an ecologically sustainable egalitarian development strategy* from the beginning. The specific theoretical approach I follow has been developed during the last few decades by ecological scientists and social scientists. My own particular version can be called Evolutionary Ecological Global Political Economy or EEGPE for short. In addition, *democracy must be deepened* from the beginning. For Africa in particular, a new cooperative community of African nations following their own rhythm to reach their own dynamic trajectories towards development as freedom will be possible if they cooperate regionally on the basis of equal sovereignty and mutual respect. One precondition is to pragmatically unite for a common economic strategy. For this a decolonization of the African mind is also necessary.

I conclude with some further thoughts on extending the model to an information theoretic based fractal model of development. A mathematical model of integrated financial and real sectors on abstract function space is presented in the appendix that can be extended for this purpose.

Keywords: Non-neocolonial Global South, Enabling Developmental State for Africa, Egalitarianism in African Development, Ecological Crisis in Africa, World Capitalist System, Counterhegemonic movements, Nonlinearities, Multiple equilibria, Entropy and Information Theory

1. Introduction:

How can neocolonialism and imperialism of the Global North be left behind in a new Africa under multipolar world order? The starting point for the African countries is a critical assessment of the capabilities theory and its extension to what I have called the *Socially Embedded Intersectional Capabilities Theory or SEICT* (Khan 2021a,b,c; 2020a,b).

My earlier critical assessment of human development and capabilities exercise in Africa includes the following areas for achieving capabilities enhancement (i) *Macroeconomic framework component*: Analysis of the evolution and nature of macroeconomic policies and their inter-relationships with trade policy and their effects on SDGs and human development; (ii) *Fiscal component*, the effects of trade reform and policies on the fiscal position of the countries and its relation with SDGs' expenditures needs and potential constraining effect on the application of flanking policies; (iii) *Institutional component*: assessing institutional capacity and performance of trade- and finance-related institutions in particular and their effect on economic, social and political outcomes; (iv) *Dynamic effects component*, undertaking specific studies to assess spillovers and externalities brought about by various policies, particularly trade, financial and investment policies; and; (v) *Intellectual property rights component* assessing the effects of more stringent protection of IPRs on SDGs and human development indicators. I have evaluated critically the neoliberal approach to these aspects of development and capabilities in Africa generally and with a special case studies of Kenya and South Africa (Khan 1989, 1887, 2005, 2021a,b,c; 2020a,b;;2011).Khan and Sonko(2020) contain several relevant studies of similar nature with emphases on the financial development.

Amartya Sen's pioneering contributions contra utilitarian welfarism and more recent extensions including the controversial listing issue are discussed in appendix one as part of a partial historical background to capabilities approach.¹ I put particular emphasis on social and political

¹ Major references to the capabilities literature---particularly Sen's pioneering contributions--- are also given separately as references to the appendices at the end of Khan(2011). See also in particular about the thin and thick conceptualizations of capabilities--- M. Quizilbash, Interpreting the Capability Approach: Thin and Thick Views" *Human Rights Defender* 19 (1): March 2010 pp. 5-7. See also the special issue of *Journal of Human Development*, Vol.7, No.3, Nov. 2006 on capabilities and Quizilbash's introduction. Appendix 4 of the present paper shows the links between a fully social concept of capabilities and the building of movements for deep democracy in the MENA region . Also see, Haider A. Khan, *Technology, Development and Democracy*, Edward Elgar, 1998, chs. 6 and 7 in particular and Khan (2003a). *Technology and Modernity: Creating Social Capabilities in a POLIS*. In Misa T ed. *Technology and Modernity*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, Chapter 12. A recent piece linking human development and Arab spring is by Kuhn(2012). On SEICT, see (Khan 2021a-c) and Khan(2020a,b).

aspects of capabilities both because of their general relevance and also because of their particular relevance to Africa in light of political and social upheavals, particularly in South Africa which exemplifies many of the common problems of the African countries. Of course each country and the region as a whole exemplify in their own specific ways the law of uneven development within an uneven world capitalist system. Therefore, for Africa as for other geographical regions in the Global Political Economy (GPE), there is no substitute for specific country studies and sub-national regions studies within this WCS using the framework of Evolutionary Ecological Global Political Economy (EEGPE). In the second, third, fourth--- and particularly in the fifth---parts of this paper, I endorse a country-by-country model approach advocated by Amsden and others by discussing some lessons from the East Asian development experience in creating structures of learning and capabilities enhancement. However, I also discuss the limitations of the East Asian Model and identify further conditions for development as freedom that should be part of one's analytical apparatus in studying the regions and countries within Africa. In my previous empirical work I have focused critically on assessment of human development and capabilities exercise in Africa in the five broad areas mentioned in the first paragraph here--- and their components--- concretely in order to highlight the ambiguities of the neoliberal approach and its real costs for the African economies in human capabilities terms. Out of this exercise and my further thinking on development I have extended Sen's approach described later to include both social embeddedness institutionally and historically with further emphasis on intersectionality--- particularly the intersectionality of class, race/ethnicity and gender.

My approach integrates poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) techniques, economic and technical tools of ex-ante and ex-post assessment, and monitoring and evaluation methodologies in a comprehensive approach. Accordingly, the strategic features highlighted here can be concretized in empirical applications and tactical questions can be posed by identifying interested stakeholders and asking questions regarding facilitating and coordinating their participation as well as building institutional arrangements that will assure sustainability of the human development process through concrete multi-dimensional SEIC enhancement. A related aspect is the need for documenting and analyzing local historical settings. Finally, progress towards collecting data and building a database of relevant indicators, and developing tools of monitoring and evaluation along with the development of the institutional and technical capability of stakeholders are examined. Building on other experiences of participatory assessment of different policies, the approach I advocate, besides producing empirical analysis, is intended to engage all actors involved (government, business, labor, and civil society institutions representing different segments of the population, in particular women) in active participation.

At Doha in the 2012 meeting of UNCTAD, a fight broke out with respect to language in the final document that actually echoed back to a paragraph in the final document of UNCTAD XII in Accra in 2008. More specifically, paragraph 115 of that document read:

Developing countries should pursue development strategies that are compatible with their specific conditions within the framework of an enabling State, which is a State that deploys its administrative and political means for the task of economic development, efficiently focusing human and financial resources. Such a State should also provide for the positive interaction between the public and private sectors.

In the conflict at Doha over the ratification of the Accra accord four years ago the idea of an enabling State became a contentious issue. The neoliberals from the global North wanted a more neoclassical view, calling for an “effective State”. Such a state would work with private and NGO sectors in order to “help forge a coherent development strategy and provide the right enabling environment for productive economic activity”.

As is usually the case under such circumstances, the final document was a compromise. The relevant part of the Doha document read:

Each country has the primary responsibility for its own economic and social development, and national development efforts need to be supported by an enabling international economic environment. The State, having an important role to play, working with private, non-profit and other stakeholders, can help forge a coherent development strategy and provide an enabling environment for productive economic activity.

(Doha Mandate, Paragraph 12)

In retrospect, it does appear that the major achievement was the unity of G77 and China and despite the confusing incorporation of both sides, the idea of an enabling state survived the political storm. It is up to the progressive scholars to give the idea a more coherent conceptual shape so that it can guide social movements and policies for progressive change in the 21st century. This paper can be seen as an attempt to do this. The main purpose of this paper is to explore a fairly comprehensive strategy for development as freedom. Accordingly, I try to find a way to integrate useful markets with the key characteristics of the Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century in order to build a growing ecologically sustainable economy with equity in terms of capabilities in Africa.

In what follows, I first try to define development a bit more precisely. In particular, I ask what people-focused development means. It turns out that answering this question rigorously requires elaboration of Sen’s concept of freedom as capabilities in an explicitly social and political direction. Then I proceed to ask what are some of the strategic questions we must ask when we wish to enhance capabilities over time. This leads us to a view of an enabling developmental state that includes many features from the East Asian Developmental State model; but it is crucially augmented by considerations of deepening of democracy during the developmental process. Building on other experiences of participatory assessment of different policies, the approach I advocate, besides producing empirical analysis, is intended to engage all actors involved (government, business, labor, and civil society institutions representing different segments of the population, in particular women) in active participation. Appendix 4 on deepening of democracy deals with some of the deeper theoretical issues involved in this process.

2. Development as a Complex Social- Economic- State Systemic Process:

Writing in 1926, in a biographical essay on Edgeworth, Keynes underlined some of the problems of complex human systems:

We are faced at every turn with problems of organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity--- the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity fail us, small changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied.²

If anything, the developing part of the world economy today shows to even a greater degree the kind of complexity captured in Keynes's words above. Fortunately, systems theory and economic theory have both made some progress since those dark days. Although we are far from a genuinely complete theory of complex economic systems, efforts are underway that have already borne some interesting fruit in several limited areas.³ A review of even partially successful set of country experiences such as are contained in Fosu(2013) can be seen as case studies that reveal many facets of complex developing economies --each with its own sub-systemic characteristics to be sure, but also sharing some common strategic features. The purpose of this paper is to synthesize from a strategic perspective--- to the extent it is possible to do so--- the development experiences of the East Asia in particular and draw some appropriate lessons. The claim is that such an approach can lead to a theoretical view of an enabling developmental state that includes many features from the East Asian Developmental State model. But in our theory, we go beyond that model. In particular, it turns out that the theoretical basis of the East Asian Developmental State model must be crucially augmented by considerations of deepening of democracy during the developmental process. Furthermore, the systemic crises of accumulation and the deepening ecological crisis impose new challenges that the old East Asian Model did not address(Arrighi 1994, 2007, 2010; Khan 2010;2003b);Khan and Liu 2008; Li 2008)

However, at this point in our discussion, some clarification of the key term "development" is necessary in order to avoid ambiguities and confusions. In the rest of this paper, I will be referring to three concepts of development that are implicit in much of the discussion in the political economy of development literature. The first is the idea of development as growth with some structural change or at least the idea that this type of growth is the most crucial necessary condition for development. The second concept is derived by adding explicit distributional elements to growth--- particularly inequality and poverty. Both these ideas are shared by many development economists---- for example, many of the authors of the chapters in Fosu(2013) ---at least implicitly. Fields was one of the earliest in being explicit in discussing all three---growth, absolute poverty and inequality--- and his thoughtful model in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Fields 1979) article alerts the reader to the performance of a developing economy in all three areas and derives-- at least partly--- a logic of further necessary reforms following from his cogent analysis of the three aspects of development in this sense. Warr(2008) is a more recent example for the case of Thailand. He concludes:

² Keynes(1971-9), Vol. X, p. 261

³ See for example, Khan(2004a,b, 2003a,, 1998,1997) and the references therein.

Not all aspects of the Thai development strategy have been similarly successful. Inequality has increased at the same time as absolute poverty has declined. The underlying causes of this increase in inequality are still not well understood. (Warr 2008, p.)⁴

The third--- and the broadest approach to development discussed here--- is in terms of Sen's idea of capabilities and its further extensions. In this view, development is really an extension over time and space of freedom, particularly the positive freedom to lead a certain type of life an individual has reasons to value. Sen and his coauthors have, of course, used this idea, and following Sen, many others have done so as well (Sen 1992, 1999, 2009; Nussbaum 1995, 2000; Khan 1998, 2014). Yet, in so far as there is a normative aspect about development being a "(public) good" that is a premise for the whole project such a view is consistent with the analyses of the East(and to some extent Southeast) Asian Development. Warr's essay on Thailand again is quite explicit in mentioning both the positive achievements and the shortcomings of Thailand's record and its strategy which can fit into this broad systemic capabilities approach. For Korea, Keun Lee has gone further. In fact, Keun Lee's perceptive comments on the possible role of democracy in development extends considerably the terrain of discussion in the direction of the "development as freedom" perspective when he writes:

We see obvious advantages in democracy, amongst which is the convenient feature that citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest and torture. Truly strong states get it wrong more often than they get it right. Thus the military dictatorships of Latin America left little in the way of legacy , whereas the military dictatorships in Korea and Taiwan (while not on anything like the same scale of brutality) left a powerful legacy of development. The difference lies clearly in strategic orientation and in institutional capacity in formulating and implementing a program of national industrial development. Our point is that this is an option available to the political leadership of any developing country today. On top of this, the key to the Korean or Asian success was institutional longevity. (Lee 2008, p. 13)

It would seem, therefore, that there is an implicit agreement that development is "growth plus" other things (Khan and Weiss 2006). While the list of "other things" may vary somewhat, none of the thoughtful scholars of development would want to equate growth and development. Yet, as the East Asian experience shows, generating high growth may be a useful means towards development. But one must also pay careful attention to what can be called "the political economy and the well-being consequences of growth". Consideration of these factors leads inevitably to the role of state. The East Asian experience suggests that the role of states in their developmental process was "enabling" but the transition from an authoritarian to more democratic forms of state was slow. In terms of class character, these states are still bourgeois with accommodations for popular interests that are the results of long and hard struggles by the masses from below.⁵ This suggests a change in strategic orientation for the progressives in the 21st century. Such an approach necessarily will need to take differences---particularly class, gender, racial-ethnic differences ---seriously in a critical theory of equalizing capabilities (Khan 2009, 2012a,b, 2014).

What precisely can be the character and role of such an "enabling" developmental state in the 21st century? We try to answer this question in the next section.

⁴ See also Warr(1993,1999,2005) for nuanced analyses of the various aspects of Thailand's development experience and Jomo(2007,1995) for Malaysia..

⁵ Prashad(2014) presents a history of the global South. More importantly, the last chapter of Prashad(2014) discusses critically the details of the emerging movements in the global South and their transformational potential.

3. An Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century

What is the trajectory of building a developmental state, and what can Africa learn from this experience as it attempts to discard neocolonialism?

At least since the classic work by Johnson (1982) on MITI and the Japanese economy, the role of the developmental state has received much attention. Woo-Cumings (1999) is a good collection of papers that explore various aspects of Developmental States. Meredith Woo-Cumings (1999: 1) presents the theory of developmental state as the explanation for the East Asian industrialization. Earlier, Chalmers Johnson had stated: ‘it is a shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia’ (Johnson 1982). Johnson in his book *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, had coined this term for analyzing Japanese industrial policies. According to Woo-Cumings, the concept of the developmental state was originally used to analyze a plan-rational capitalist system like Japan, ‘conjoining private ownership with state guidance’ (Woo-Cumings 1999: 2). Johnson explains in his contribution to the history of the developmental state debate that ‘one of [his] main purposes in introducing the idea of capitalist developmental state [...] was to go beyond the contrast between the American and Soviet economies’ (Johnson 1999: 32). At least one part of the theory is drawn from the history and the theory of mercantilist intervention of the state in the economy. But in the fashion of Hamilton and List, the developmental state theory is applied to late capitalist development in the sense of building industrial capitalism within a World Capitalist System(WCS) where early starters are already in a more advanced stage of industrialization. Historically, in Bismarck’s Prussia and in Japan during the Meiji era the developmental states carried the burden of starting and then sustaining the industrialization process. Scholars such as Reinert have traced the history of interventionist states all the way back to the Renaissance (Reinert 2007)

After World War II, Japan, Korea and Taiwan were particularly successful in building both the developmental state and industries that were export-oriented. The debate picked up speed after the work of Amsden (1989) and the World Bank Study of 1993. Wade (1990) studied the Taiwanese economy in detail from a “governing the market” perspective. Chang’s study of Korean industrial policies were important to develop the thesis further. Khan (1983, 1997) discussed the technology policies of Korea and advanced a variant of a theory of state-market interaction in multiple dualisms within a developing economy. Khan and Thorbecke (1988, 1989) had applied a similar theory to study the choice and diffusion of technologies for Indonesia by using a social accounting matrix. Khan(2002,2003a,b,2004a, b) developed nonlinear models of “governing the market” and innovation and applied these to both Korea and Taiwan.

As many have emphasized (Amsden 1989; Chang 2008, 2007, 2003, 1994; Evans 1995, 1998, 2007; Ghosh 2009, 2010;Jomo 2007;Khan 1983, 1985, 1997a,b, 2002, 2003a,b,2004a,b, 2012a,b, 2013; Wade 1990;Weiss 1998), a set of encompassing institutions where the state is both an initiator of development policies and builder of development institutions is a crucial determinant of development success. The state is also a settler of conflicts before they became disabling as in many African countries(Khan 2005; Kelechi and Kim 2021). This enabling state shows “embedded autonomy”(Evans 1995). It also analyzes state capacity as a special form of infrastructural

power(Mann 1988; Weiss 1998) and states can use this power to lead structural transformation of the economy. Weiss calls such a state-business class relationship one of governed interdependence. In East Asia such interdependence has been important.

More specifically, a dynamic picture of the leading role of the enabling state emerges. Over time. The state provides disciplined support for export-oriented sectors through directed credit and other subsidies. The state also coordinates investment across sectors and within industries . It invests itself in areas where private risk absorption capacity is too low. This is important in building up a national system of innovation in particular. The state also steps in to manage sectoral and macroeconomic crises ensuring a relatively smooth accumulation process to proceed. However, the distributive conflicts were lessened for Japan, Korea and Taiwan through US-imposed land reforms after the war. In China on the other hand, an egalitarian society with a Gini coefficient between .25 and .28 in the 1970s became highly unequal from 1990s onward with Gini index over .45.

Given our capabilities perspective in section 2, we need to include among the characteristics of the Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century its capacity to build an egalitarian development strategy from the beginning. In addition, democracy must be deepened also from the beginning. Khan(1998, 2008a,b,2009,2010, 2012a,b) has attempted to build a theory where *egalitarian distribution and deepening of democratic institutions* and practices along with the standard industrial, trade, monetary-financial and other developmentalist policy making of the state have theoretical salience. Furthermore, given the deepening ecological crisis, this type of state will have to devise policies for *at least mitigating the ecological crisis*.

It is such a state that we can call an *Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century*. Both technically and from a social perspective efficient but egalitarian innovation systems throughout but particularly after the middle income stage become crucial in terms of enhancing people's capabilities rapidly and widely. Khan(2012a) has therefore replaced the idea of a national innovation system(NIS) with that of an augmented national innovation system(ANIS). A thoroughly innovative Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century will augment both efficiency and capabilities of people in an egalitarian manner. It is clear that the state of this kind cannot be formed unless popular forces can launch movements and programs of their own. Is there any hope of this being achieved in the next few decades? Prashad(2014) discusses the complex processes underway in the global South now---particularly in Latin America. Although by no means guaranteed, the achievements of people's movements in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela and elsewhere give us some room for optimism(Peet 2007:Peet and Hartwick 2009). But the project has barely been started. A new theory of an Enabling Developmental State for the 21st Century that both nurtures and is nurtured by these movements will be of a kind that can play a counterhegemonic role. We are at the beginning of this process. Such a process already shows a multidimensional nonlinear complex system of WCS breaking down with a combination of ecological-economic, political, social and ideological crises. We cannot predict the forms resistance and transformational movements will ultimately take. However, the emerging self-organization of people's movements will undoubtedly take multiple forms ranging from anti-

capitalist local resistances to national-regional-international political parties and broad-based social movements and new social formations.⁶

We now ask the question: how do we conceive of an initial strategic plan that draws from the best experiences of the East Asian Developmental States and augments these with mainly egalitarian and democratic elements for the 21st Century?

4. An Eleven Points Characterization of a Strategic Approach towards integrating useful markets with an Enabling State for African Development in the 21st Century

Synthesizing the Experiences of the East Asian countries further reveals some common strategic orientations as well as the effects of changes in external environment and shifts in policies over time. This is consistent with the characteristics of complex economic systems which are nonlinear with multiple equilibria and path dependence. Over time, one may observe the emergence of structural shifts in some cases, stagnation in other cases depending on initial conditions, strategies, policies and external environment among other things. For the cases discussed in the vast literature, there are many specific variations within each. However, they also share to various degrees many specific features listed below. It must be kept in mind that in the 21st century, ecological sustainability with justice to the poor people and their needs, will have to act as a constraint. But this applies particularly to the duty of the developed countries to curtail their consumption in general, and of nonrenewable energy consumption in particular.

⁶ Thus, without falling into self-refuting relativism, there is a way to accept epistemic limits, resist imperial power-knowledge-discourse schemes and formulate positive pro-people programs that are internationalist but local and regional at the beginning and with time passing, ultimately global in scope. Prashad(2014) presents a good case for the local-regional-global sequence in the current context. I along with others have argued to accept the proposition that capitalism will not be able to solve the currently unfolding ecological crisis as well as the other crises endogenous to the WCS. If not the other crises, the ecological crisis itself, left unchecked, will destroy human civilization. Thus capitalism which is a complex exploitative system must be transformed into a more harmonious people and nature oriented system. It has to be understood that capitalism which has created the ecological and other crises, is a *global* system and ultimately can only be defeated by a *democratic global movement*. Thus although I am critical of their insufficient appreciation of the political economy of complex exploitative global capitalism, I accept much of the postdevelopment school's criticism of development as expressed for example by the work of Escobar, Rahnama and others. In fact, I have tried to make many of these cultural and ecological criticisms in addition to the critical political economy analysis of global capital, starting with Khan(1983) and continuing till now, without falling into the epistemological and ethical-political impasse of the postdevelopment school. See Khan(1998,2009) for a sympathetic critique of poststructural and postmodern turns and their application in postdevelopment thought, and an alternative critical positive construction of a dynamic democratic-participatory counterhegemonic development from below that can deepen with time. Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick (2009) present a very fair summary of the various poststructuralist and postdevelopmentalist positions, ending with a thoughtful critique and defense of "critical modernism". It may be that when the new pro-people and deeply democratic dynamic system is more visible than it is now, we could describe the emergent features more fully and find a term which is more adequate than "development". I would like to keep that possibility open. On ecological crisis and capitalism in the 21st century, see Li (2008), Khan and Lippit(1993 and 2007) and Khan (1997a,b,1998, 2010).

1.Strategic Openness to various degrees with Thailand being the most open and Viet Nam⁷ the least. But in all cases there is a strategic commitment to export promotion and further goals of moving up the value added ladder. It should be kept in mind however, that there can be a "fallacy of composition"(Cline1982, Khan 1983, Mayer 2002, Razmi and Blecker 2006) in claiming that all developing countries need to do is to pursue an export-led growth policy. Reciprocal demands may not exist sufficiently and the ensuing competition for export markets in developed countries may create winners as well as losers. Therefore, what may be needed in the future for other aspiring countries is a strategic approach including the development of national and regional markets and the creation of dynamic comparative advantage along with a number of other policies and institution building processes described below.

2.Heterodox macroeconomic policies for stability⁸--- Japan, Korea and Taiwan and many Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Viet Nam and Singapore display more of a mix of heterodox policies. It seems that the rigidity of Washington consensus particularly in this area is rejected by the experiences of developing economies like Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, and Viet Nam. In particular, use of fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rate policy together with trade and selective industrial policies can build an industrialized sustainable economy with good jobs and decent incomes for the people both in rural and urban areas. Further discussion of this last item can also be found under points 4 and 5 below ---Agricultural Development, and Industrial Development and Structural Change, respectively.

3.Creation of institutions for productive investment---this exists in all cases, but Korea seems to have gone much further than the others much earlier. Starting with the reforms in the 1960s, it moved through several successive stages and is now trying to find appropriate technological niche in a world that is moving towards a convergence of information, bio and nano- technologies by 2050. The role of state in the creation of these institutions is still very prominent. China has followed with its own plan for building an innovation system (Gabriele and Khan 2010).

4.Agricultural development--- Earlier, in the immediate post-WWII Keynesian-liberal and Social Democratic Spirit Japan, Korea and Taiwan carried out land reforms. China followed a revolutionary socialist path and land is still legally held collectively even with the current responsibility system. Among the poor Asian countries Viet Nam probably put through the most egalitarian pro-peasant development policies after its victory in the national liberation war in the 1970s. Warr(2008:p.12) describes the importance of agriculture in the Thai case:

The results of the analysis indicate that agriculture's contribution to economic growth in Thailand included impressive rates of TFP growth. But its main contribution occurred through releasing resources which could be used more productively elsewhere, *while still maintaining output*, rather than through expansion of agricultural output. It is seriously wrong to characterize Thai agriculture as 'stagnant', based merely on the fact that output growth is slower in agriculture than in other sectors. If agriculture had really been 'stagnant' economic growth would have been substantially lower because it would not have been possible to raise

⁷ However, see Thoburn et. al.(2007) for an insightful and nuanced discussion of Viet Nam's trade-orientation and policies for the textiles sector.

⁸ See Jomo and Nagaraj(2001) for a good discussion of heterodoxy in this context.

productivity significantly within agriculture or to release resources massively while still maintaining moderate growth of output

Viet Nam's reforms in Agriculture are evaluated by Thoburn(2008) in the following words:

Rice, indeed, is the great success story of the agricultural reforms. Vietnam changed from being a net importer of rice in the 1980s to the world's third largest exporter (after the US and Thailand) in the mid-1990s, though there has been little further export growth since the late 1990s, particularly compared to other products This lack of growth is not necessarily surprising or a sign of failure. In the late 1990s, when rice export growth was peaking, less than 15% of output was being exported In an economy where around 70% of households were both consumers and producers of rice, rises in rice output were important primarily for raising rural incomes and for food security, with the surplus available for export varying with fluctuations in domestic production.

The state has played a role in encouraging new crops such as cashew, and later coffee Coffee is not straightforwardly a success story, though, as the expansion of Vietnam's coffee exports in the mid-1990s was a factor in causing a substantial fall in the world price.

5. Industrial development and structural change-- the strategic perspective in this important area suggests that the successful Asian countries to various degrees pursued a continuously unfolding and dynamic set of policies with much trial and error. The retrospective attempts to tell a coherent story have often led to an overly deductive picture where good performances supposedly follow from a few, usually neoclassical economic principles. The Malaysian case study is a good and convincing counterexample.

Jomo and Wee(2008:p.10) describe some changes in strategy and policy for Malaysia within specific time-sensitive contexts:

Over the years, the government has changed its industrialization strategy. In response to problems and new priorities, the government announced the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) for 1996-2005 in December 1996 to replace the (first) Industrial Master Plan (IMP) for 1986-1995. In September 1996, the government had set up the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) to promote certain information technology investments. The government committed over RM50 billion for infrastructure development to support this initiative. At the same time, the government strengthened intellectual property laws to reassure foreign investors and provided more generous incentives for new investments in this area.

Thus, the policy changes of the mid-1980s appeared successful in reviving growth and industrialization. Confirmation of the new policy direction from the mid-1980s came with the 1991 enunciation of Vision 2020, favouring growth, modernization and industrialization. Although FDI began levelling off in the mid-1990s, increased domestic investments – inspired by greater domestic investor confidence – sustained the momentum of rapid economic growth until the 1997-1998 regional crisis. The gravity of the crisis and the difficulties of recovery were exacerbated by injudicious policy responses, compromised by cronyism, though there is little persuasive evidence that cronyism itself precipitated the crisis.

They also point out changes in the sixties and seventies as well in response to changing global economic environment:

The decline of rubber prices in the 1960s must surely have affected economic performance and policy. Malaysia's experiment with import-substituting industrialization under foreign (principally British) auspices was quite different from most other developing countries where state-owned enterprises played leading roles as well as Northeast

Asian experiences where effective protection was conditional on export promotion. Malaysia's transformation from net oil importer to exporter in the mid-1970s, when petroleum prices rose sharply, allowed the government to spend much more, while the recycling of petrodollars later allowed it to borrow from abroad at low cost until the Volcker intervention of 1980 raised real interest rates and precipitated a global recession, bringing commodity prices down. (Jomo and Wee 2008:p.14)

The case study of Viet Nam also confirms the suspicion that there is much that is improvised and *ad hoc* during the earlier phases of apparently successful development cases. The lesson here is perhaps to avoid major resource allocation distortions(as documented by the Thai case also) and constant monitoring and policy revisions when existing policies do not work well. The political preconditions for this are in the background even in the Malaysia and Viet Nam papers which are more explicit in these regards than the other two papers.

6. Creation of technological capabilities--- here the Korean case stands out as a very apt illustration of creating technological capabilities throughout the entire growth and development trajectory in definite stages.⁹

As Lee(2008,pp.4-5) points out:

Among various aspects of capacities, emphasis should be on technological capabilities because without these, sustained growth is impossible. In this era of open market competition, private companies cannot sustain growth if they rely upon cheap products; they need to be able to move up the value-chain to higher-value added goods based on continued upgrading and improvement and technological innovation. Furthermore, private companies had better be "local" companies, whenever possible, including locally controlled JVs, not foreign controlled subsidiaries of the MNCs. MNCs subsidiaries are always moving around the world seeking cheaper wages and bigger markets. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon to generate sustained growth in specific localities or countries although they can serve as useful channels for knowledge transfer and learning.

The Malaysia paper by Jomo and Wee also recognizes this essentially strategic aspect of creating technological capabilities during medium to long run development. It is also clear from the Thailand and Viet Nam cases that strategic concerns with the creation of appropriate technological capabilities have been and continue to be very important. Khan(2002 and 2004a) has discussed the interventionist role of the state in Taiwan in this area.

7. Technological learning and innovation--- creating national innovation systems in particular requires the creation of specific institutions and technological learning over time. Ultimately, if development is to continue beyond the catching up phase, this may present the most crucial set of policy challenges. Here, the paper on Korea is an admirable attempt to sum up the lessons. There are specific features here to which Lee(2008,p.5) draws our attention:

Therefore, while the ultimate goal and criterion of development is to raise the capabilities of local private companies, the process needs pilot agencies to guide and coordinate the whole process. Such needs exist because key resources are so scarce, and thus had better... be mobilized for uses in sectors or projects with greatest externalities. As understood by Gerschenkron, who analyzed the latecomer industrialization of Germany and Russia, and identified latecomer agencies, such as large state-owned investment banks to drive the process in these countries, it is such agencies that can make up for gaps or lacunae in the country that is seeking to industrialize. All the east Asian countries

⁹ See also Lee(2006) for a contrast of Korean experience with the Washington consensus and Khan(2008, 2002,1998 and 1997) for a discussion of the Korean (and Taiwanese)case(s) in the context of a distributionally sensitive growth model for positive feedback loop innovation system.

built specific state-agencies that played a role of guiding the process of industrialization. In Korea the institutions established in the 1960s under the Park regime included the Economic Planning Board to set economic plans; the Ministry of Trade and Industry to support industrial policy and export; and the Ministry of Finance to finance economic plans.

Both state and civil society have to play important roles. At an earlier stage, the state necessarily plays a large and activist role. At a later stage, however, the creation of technological capability has to rely on a private-public partnership at both the precompetitive and the competitive phases of innovation (Khan 2004a). For China, Gabriele and Khan (2010) present an analysis that points out the key role of the state in building an innovation system.

8. Direct Foreign Investment and Foreign Aid--- these factors have played a role for all East Asian economies but perhaps more so countries like Thailand, Viet Nam and Malaysia. Investment from abroad has perhaps been more significant than aid per se. However, internal generation of investible funds and public sector support have also played a crucial role---particularly in Korea. DFI in manufacturing sector can be important as the Viet Nam (and also the Thai and Malaysian cases) case shows:

Sectorally, manufacturing has been the most important area for DFI, with 51% of accumulated registered foreign capital over the 1988-2006 period, followed by transport, storage and communications (9.6%), mining and quarrying (8%) and real estate (8%). (Thoburn 2008, p.8)

Not everything has to be of the best practice genre for DFI to come in as Thoburn shows for Viet Nam:

Paradoxically, Vietnam scores badly on conventional measures of competitiveness and investment climate, yet is highly regarded by foreign investors who operate in the country. The World Bank's *Doing Business* survey ranks Vietnam as 104th out of 175 countries as a good place to do business. In contrast, the *VDR* for 2007 claims that Japanese inward investors see Vietnam as the third most attractive investment location in the world. It seems that Vietnam's stable macroeconomic environment, high quality and low cost labour, and low levels of crime are more important considerations for investors than the details of bureaucratic procedures which are often included in international surveys. (Thoburn 2008 p.9)

Foreign Aid-- particularly Japanese aid--- has played a role in the development of Thailand and Malaysia but in the Asian cases the leveraging of aid for domestic development has perhaps been more important than the actual quantity of aid.¹⁰

One must be aware that in many cases aid and DFI can also lead to external dependence. A developmental state cannot surrender its sovereignty in domestic decision making capability and flexibility to foreign experts in exchange for aid. Khan (2003a and b) points out some of the pitfalls in aid and DFI regimes. Ultimately self-reliant domestic institution building process is the key to sustainable development.

¹⁰ This is not to say that the quantity does not matter. Also for very poor countries today, aid can fill crucial financing gaps. See Khan (2003b) on these issues. However, surrendering domestic decision making capability and flexibility to foreign experts in exchange for aid is not strategically helpful. If there is such a pressure then it may be necessary to forego aid.

9. Poverty reduction strategies-- these are a varied set of policies that are necessary in addition to growth. Although growth is a very important component of such a strategic approach to poverty reduction, in all cases specific policies targeting both rural and urban poverty were undertaken. In case of Thailand and Viet Nam, it can be argued, such attention for some time to come is still a necessary part of a coherent pro-poor development strategy. This suggests a "growth plus..."(Weiss and Khan2006) strategy for development.

It must also be kept in mind that the move in 1999 by the IMF and the World Bank and other Northern Development organizations to make anti-poverty policies the core strategy for development is not credible. First, it was a political response to the crisis created by the failing and (after the 1997-98 financial crises) disastrous neoliberal policies. Second, even without this political background, without overall sustainable development, anti-poverty policies are only palliatives. Poverty can only be ended globally when exploitative accumulation by dispossession can be ended.

In addition to the nine sets of factors discussed above, there are also somewhat random, historically contingent factors. The Jomo and Wee paper on Malaysia acknowledges the presence of such factors explicitly. But even a quick look at several other cases will reveal historically contingent factors ranging from momentous events such as wars and revolutions to more usual changes in domestic and international political factors and changes in policies that depended on crucial personalities such as that of President Park in Korea in the 1960s. As Jomo and Wee (2008, p.14) indicate in summing up the lessons from at least five different policy periods in Malaysia:

It is difficult to evaluate policy success or failure simply in terms of subsequent economic performance. Malaysia's very open economy has often been subject to circumstances not of its own choosing or making.

The decline of rubber prices in the 1960s must surely have affected economic performance and policy. Malaysia's experiment with import-substituting industrialization under foreign (principally British) auspices was quite different from most other developing countries where state-owned enterprises played leading roles as well as Northeast Asian experiences where effective protection was conditional on export promotion. Malaysia's transformation from net oil importer to exporter in the mid-1970s, when petroleum prices rose sharply, allowed the government to spend much more, while the recycling of petrodollars later allowed it to borrow from abroad at low cost until the Volcker intervention of 1980 raised real interest rates and precipitated a global recession, bringing commodity prices down.

The Plaza Accord of September 1985 led to the strong yen just as Malaysia's sovereign foreign debt became yen-denominated. The mid-1980s' recession precipitated a banking crisis, which led to the 1989 banking reform to the seeming success of earlier deregulation facilitated financial liberalization, culminating in the 1997-98 crisis. The late 1980s' regulatory reforms encouraged further limited private foreign borrowings from abroad before that, limiting vulnerability on that front. The East Asian economic recovery from the last quarter of 1998, following the Russian and LTCM crises, similarly does not allow proper evaluation of the impact of Mahathir's controversial measures of early September as he moved to politically eliminate his deputy.

The above observation underlines an important strategic consideration. We formulate this aspect as a two point strategic proposal in addition to the nine points presented above. We submit that for

a capabilities enhancing enabling state of the 21st century with the multiple ecological-economic, political, social and ideological crises facing the planet, the following two items are indispensable:

10. Income and Asset Distributional Equality:

This is more of a challenge today than it was in post-WWII setting. Vibrant egalitarian anti-free market movements were widespread--even in the US. A combination of cold war policies and then a revival of Hayekian and other varieties of neoliberalism in the 1980s coinciding with the global crises of WCS made Income and Asset Distributional Equality an anathema among the mainstream. However, the greatest reversal was in China in the 1990s. Today Chinese leaders are at least partially rethinking this policy mistake.

But the greatest hope here comes from the people's movements from below all over the world and their partial successes in Latin America in particular. However, egalitarian goals need to be explicitly put on movement agenda's and concrete strategies and tactics devised. When in power, the energies of such movements then can be largely directed towards making the objectives more concrete and solving practical problems of implementation. Through learning feedback mechanisms, mistakes can then be detected and corrected and further appropriate modifications made. Such a process cannot be anything but deeply democratic. This is our final strategic point.

11. Deepening of democracy through struggle and practice:

The theory of deepening democracy is derived from a history of struggles from below. In the uneven world of 21st century described by Prashad(2014) and many others, the struggles for democracy take many forms and will differ from one place to another. But the struggles for basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, health care and education are important everywhere. With ecological destruction, movements to save the global commons are crucial. In both these movements the voices of women, minorities, workers and peasants are important. One group whose role needs to be underlined is the indigenous peoples of the world. Their increasingly progressive and leading role in places like Bolivia is exemplary. Movements everywhere can learn from them. New forms of deliberative democracy and advancing human rights for the people can be discovered only through these struggles. Even when state power is held by the minority dominant classes, such struggles can lead to some democratic deepening. Alternatively, they can lead to minority exploiting classes being forced to share some state power with the popular classes. Thus, even without complete hegemony and state power, popular movements can influence infrastructural aspects of state power in particular.

Schneider(2015) contrasts these two scenarios for contemporary India and Brazil:

India and Brazil have both emerged in the international political economy, but their paths to emergence show important variations. Indian democratic deepening incorporated a cross-cultural coalition of caste, regional and other identity-based groups, providing enhanced state capacity to embed itself in key sectors to promote their technological upgrading and international competitiveness. This type of capacity provided room for an intensive strategy of international insertion, assisting domestic firms to insert themselves into global value chains and pursue

strategies to capture more value. This type of insertion coincided with a national positioning as a voice for non-Western countries in the international system, leading to patterns of international behavior by which Indian governments sought to triangulate their position between Western and Non-Western powers, with India acting as mediator and voice of a more accountable and tolerant world system with greater respect for the sovereignty of poor countries.

Brazilian democratic deepening incorporated a cross-class coalition of working class and middle sectors, providing enhanced state capacity for public collective action borne out domestically in increased revenues and efforts to expand social protection. Internationally, this type of capacity provided room for an extensive strategy of international insertion, led by government assistance to national champions seeking to scale-up activities they dominated nationally into international markets. This type of insertion coincided with a national positioning as a voice for poor countries in the international system, leading to patterns of international behavior by which Brazilian governments sought first to build alliances among poor countries and then bargain more forcefully with rich countries, with Brazil acting as mediator and voice of the poor in favor of a more accountable and equitable world system with greater respect for the sovereignty of poor countries. (pp. 45-46)

Clearly, both in India and Brazil---perhaps particularly in India---the democratic deepening needs to go much further. But the successes, however limited in these two cases, underline the role of mass progressive movements from below. These also point to the need for organizing under a coherent transformational strategic perspective and tactical program.

5. Conclusions: Towards a Non-neocolonial Africa

At the end we must ask again the question that animates our whole analysis here: How can neocolonialism and imperialism of the Global North be left behind in a new Africa under multipolar world order ?

Two conclusions follow logically from the above identification of both the necessary as well as the more contingent factors that have played a role in East Asia, and our additional crucial strategic factors egalitarianism and deepening of democracy for the 21st century enabling developmental state and a strategy for development as freedom. The first is the need for taking a historically grounded pragmatic and diagnostic approach to the technical problems of development on the one hand. The second is that at the same time we must make democratic deepening and egalitarianism the strategic centerpieces of any progressive social movement. It is important to make these last two factors the most salient identifying criteria for an innovative Enabling Developmental State that integrates useful markets with developmental objectives to increase the capabilities. It is at least theoretically plausible that in practice opportunities for implementing such a strategy with further ongoing learning will arise as a result of struggles from below that are unfolding. Adapted to specific historical domestic conditions, along these lines, African countries can learn and apply useful lessons from the East Asian experience.

It is necessary to identify distortions from the perspective of deepening democracy and egalitarianism and correct these quickly. It is also equally necessary to identify market failures and other institutional failures. Instead of taking a grand, presumptive approach to development, the role of a mix of heterodox policies with the willingness to revise policies before the cost gets too high seems to be the best recipe for avoiding failures. However, compromising on democracy and egalitarianism will be strategic mistakes. Therefore, the people's movements must avoid these even if it means slowing down growth within acceptable limits for some time. In general, with

careful participatory planning and implementation, deepening of democracy will not conflict with growth and other goals of development.

Clearly, in order to promote equitable growth and broad development we must build institutions that can supply social insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and accountability. But there is no one-size-that-fits-all for any of these functions.¹¹ Here the role of history of popular movements and institution building will be crucial. While movements in different parts of the world can certainly learn from each other and have ties of solidarity, each part will need to have specific strategic orientation and tactical and organizational forms for both building the movement and building the egalitarian and democratic institutions in every sphere according to its particular historical trajectory. No predetermined futures for African countries are foreordained in this complex 21st Century world.

But it must be admitted honestly that the WCS which has been crisis-ridden by its own contradictions throughout its history, has now created an additional, and under its own terms, an irreversible ecological crisis. The only sustainable future for human civilization is ultimately a noncapitalist world which is not the same as a purely nonmarket world. There is truly a race against time for creating such a world and for this reason, all movements that are potentially capable of contributing to the creation of a noncapitalist world are promising and worthy of support. Even a partial but thoughtful diagnosis of specific problems in particular regions relatively early on may suggest solutions which can be implemented before it is too late. This paper is written with the hope of making a modest contribution to the evolving counterhegemonic movements in our world by suggesting some pathways towards an egalitarian, deeply democratic and ecologically sustainable Global South.

For Africa in particular a new cooperative community of African nations following their own rhythm to reach their own dynamic trajectories towards development as freedom will be possible if they cooperate regionally on the basis of equal sovereignty and mutual respect. One precondition is to pragmatically unite to end the EU and US hegemony in Africa. For this a decolonization of the African mind is also necessary. A new nonaligned pan-African movement in Africa can then begin for dealing with the global North on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

From a mathematical point of view, the propositions developed in this essay can be formalized in a multisectoral model with integrated finance. Based on some formal work of Jumarie and others in mathematics of entropy, a dynamic relativistic information theory based systems approach to development can be developed. Although this current ongoing research preliminary, the combination of nonlinear multiple equilibria systems with entropy minimization in developing economic systems can be shown to exhibit a wide range of dynamics from stagnation to rapid growth and transformation. It is particularly applicable to BRICS economies like PRC and India. A bridge to empirics via successive Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) can be developed for empirical applications.

Appendix :

¹¹ See Chang (2007) for a number of thoughtful contributions on this topic among other things.

A Simple Model of a Complex Financial Economy with Multiple Equilibria with Possibilities of Crisis and the Role for BRICS-like Financial Facilities Applicable to Africa

In order to give the reader some idea of the problem of formalizing global and Regional complex financial cum real economic systems (GRFS and RRFS) we summarize here the basic structure of a ‘simple’ non-linear model embodying distinct financial architectures which can be applied to analyze the BRICS-like financial facilities cum real sectors, and therefore applicable to India. At any single point in time, the model can be presented as a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and flow-of-funds representation of the socio-economic system. We will indicate the first m sectors as real and the next n as financial. There are p households and q other institutions including global and regional governance institutions.

The key distinction here is the explicitly non-linear nature of the economy-wide functional relationships. The key theorem shows the existence of multiple equilibria. Some further considerations of complexity and increasing returns prospects for development show that multiple equilibria are indeed the “natural” outcomes in such models. Thus, there would seem to be some role for domestic policy in guiding the national economy to a particular equilibrium among many. Likewise, such policy space in an RRFS within a GRFS can only be possible under some hybrid GFA of which BRICS-like multi-regional financial architectures can be an integral and desirable part.

The virtue of a global economy-wide approach to technology systems is the embodiment of various inter-sectoral linkages within and across regions. In a SAM, such linkages are mappings from one set of accounts to another. In terms of GRFS and RRFS, the production activities can be broken down into a production (sub-) system and a set of institutional innovative activities leading to the creation of BRICS-like multi-regional financial architectures .

Although the existence theorems for these global cum regional multisectoral models provide some structure for the equilibria as sequences of fixed points in the socio-economic structure with evolving technology systems, it is not specified a priori which equilibrium will be reached. The problem of equilibrium selection thus remains open and depends on global, regional and national institutions. The idea behind a BRICS-like multi-regional financial architectures can now be stated somewhat more formally. It is to reach a sequence of equilibria for developing economies so that in the non-linear models of the entire economy the maximal fixed points that are attainable are in fact reached through a combination of market forces and policy maneuvers over time. It is also to be understood that path-dependence would rule out certain equilibria in the future. Thus initial choices of projects and institutions can matter crucially at times. It has been argued in the paper that BRICS-like multi-regional financial architectures matter precisely in this way.

A 1: The Model on a Lattice

Define X as a vector lattice over a subring M of the real field R . Let $x_+ = \{x \mid x \in X, x \geq 0\}$

A non-linear mapping N is defined such that $N : X_+ \rightarrow X_+, N_0 = 0$. Given a vector of exogenous variables d , the following non-linear mapping describes a simultaneous non-linear equations model of an economy, E :

$$x = Nx + d \quad (1)$$

for a given $d \in X_+$.

This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type described previously. In order to specify the model further, the following assumptions are necessary.

1. X is order complete
2. N is an isotone mapping
3. $\exists \hat{x} \in X_+$ such that $\hat{x} \geq N\hat{x} + d$

In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space of inputs to the space of the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale and technical progress over time. The 3 assumptions are minimally necessary for the existence of equilibrium. Assumption 3, in particular ensures that there is some level of output vector which can be produced given the technical production conditions and demand structure.

Existence of Multiple Equilibria:

Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists $x^* \in X_+$ so that x^* is a solution of

$$x = Nx + d$$

Proof: Consider the interval $[0, x] = \{\hat{x} \mid \hat{x} \in X_+, 0 \leq \hat{x} \leq x\}$ where \hat{x} is defined as in assumption 3. Take a mapping F .

$$F : x \in X_+ \rightarrow Nx + d$$

F is isotone and maps $[0, x]$ into itself.

Define a set $D \equiv \{x \mid x \in [0, x], x \geq Fx\}$.

By assumption 3, D is non-empty.

We now show $x^* \equiv \inf D$ is a solution to $x = Nx + d$. $x^* \equiv \inf D$; therefore $x^* \leq x, \forall x \in D$. F is isotone; therefore $Fx^* \leq Fx \leq x$ for each $x \in D$ implying.

$$Fx^* \leq x^*$$

From (2) we have $F(Fx^*) \leq Fx^*$. Thus $Fx^* \in D$; hence $x^* \equiv \inf D \leq Fx^*$ so, $Fx^* \leq x^* \leq Fx^*$. Therefore $x^* = Fx^*$.

This is an application of Tarski's and Birkhoff's theorem. The key feature to note here is that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique. It should also be noted that under additional assumptions on space X and the mapping N the computation of a fixed point can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt).

A 2: Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space:

In this section the results for multiple equilibria are extended to functionals on Banach Space. We can define the model again for monotone iterations, this time on a non-empty subset of an ordered Banach space X . The mapping $f : X \rightarrow X$ is called compact if it is continuous and if $f(x)$ is relatively compact. The map f is called completely continuous if f is continuous and maps bounded subsets of X into compact sets. Let X be a non-empty subset of some ordered set Y . A fixed point x of a map $N : X \rightarrow X$ is called minimal (maximal) if every fixed point y of N in X satisfies

$$x \leq y (y \leq x)$$

Theorem: Let (E, P) be an ordered Banach space and let D be a subset of E .

Suppose that $f : D \rightarrow E$ is an increasing map which is compact on every order interval in D . If there exist $y, \hat{y} \in D$ with $y \leq \hat{y}$ such that $y \leq f(y)$ and $f(\hat{y}) \leq \hat{y}$, then f has a minimal fixed point x . Moreover, $x \leq y$ and $x = \lim F^k(y)$. That is, the minimal fixed point can be computed iteratively by means of the iteration scheme

$$x_0 = y$$

$$x_{k+1} = f(x_k) \quad k = 0, 1, 2, \dots$$

Moreover, the sequence (x_k) is increasing.

Proof: Since f is increasing, the hypotheses imply that f maps the order interval $[\bar{y}, y]$ into itself. Consequently, the sequence (x_k) is well-defined and, since it is contained in $f[\bar{y}, y]$, it is relatively compact. Hence it has at least one limit point. By induction, it is easily seen that the sequence (x_k) is increasing. This implies that it has exactly one limit point \bar{x} and that the whole

sequence converges to \bar{x} . Since f is continuous, \bar{x} is a fixed point of f . If x is an arbitrary fixed point in D such that $x \geq \bar{y}$, then, by replacing y by x in the above argument, it follows that $\bar{x} \leq x$. Hence \bar{x} is the minimal fixed point of f in $(\bar{y} + P) \cap D$. It should be observed that we do not claim that there exists a minimal fixed point of f in D .

We can also show that if $F : x \in X_+ \rightarrow Nx + d$ is an intersecting compact map in a non-empty order interval $[x, \hat{x}]$ and $x \leq Fx$ and $F\hat{x} \leq \hat{x}$ then F has a minimal fixed point x^* and a maximal fixed point x^{**} . Moreover, $x^* = \lim F^k(x)$ and $x^{**} = \lim F^k(\hat{x})$. The first of the above sequences is increasing and the second is decreasing.

A 3: Complex Dynamics and Out-of-Equilibrium Behavior---possible entropy and information theoretic extensions:

As is well known, nonlinear dynamic systems can display a wide range of dynamic behaviors. As Keynes perspicuously pointed out in the General Theory during the great depression, the capitalist economies with complex financial systems are unstable but within limits. However, as we know, dissipative systems with a big enough perturbation can move to a new basin of attraction with much disorganization during transition. Also, even with bifurcations, we do not know for certain which path it will follow. Furthermore, catastrophic singularities are also possible.

My argument can now be summarized in terms of , dissipative systems dynamics in a world of multiple equilibria none of which may be reached. Instead, a neoliberal global economy may simply go through cycles of instabilities. A large part of my argument, therefore, has been that the recent global crisis is an example of a large accumulated perturbation that has created instabilities giving us a foretaste of what may become a pattern in the 21st century unless a new flexible hybrid GFA with sufficient liquidity and enforcement power is constructed soon. The BRICS bank and financial facilities are moves that can possibly dampen further instabilities in the global financial system and help promote growth with equity particularly in the poorer countries in the global system. With the creation of enough BRICS-like multi-regional financial architectures after the failures and crises in the 21st century, the world will have a fighting chance to pursue appropriate capabilities-enhancing development strategies along with a deepening of civilized social democratic structures in the core countries.

Finally, based on some formal work of Jumarie and others in mathematics of entropy, a dynamic relativistic information theory based systems approach to development can be developed.

Although this current ongoing research preliminary, the combination of nonlinear multiple equilibria systems with entropy minimization in developing economic systems can be shown to exhibit a wide range of dynamics from stagnation to rapid growth and transformation. It is particularly applicable to BRICS economies like PRC and India. A bridge to empirics via successive Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) can be developed for empirical applications.

Appendix 4: On Creating a Deepening of Democracy Movement in MENA Region

The main purpose here is to propose a somewhat novel theory of *deep democracy* from a political and social economy perspective which can serve as an analytical framework for setting an important part of the agenda for a movement towards such substantive democracy in the MENA region. For setting a practical agenda in the region, the cluster conditions in table 1 below and the subsequent discussion of clusters of political, economic and other conditions for deepening democratic capabilities in a network of appropriate institutions can be used.

In deep democracy, democratic practices have to become institutionalized in such a way that they become part of normal life in a democratic society. Ontologically, deep democracy overlaps with Barber's (1984) idea of *strong democracy*. There are, however, epistemological differences as well as differences of emphasis, particularly in the economic sphere. Cluster conditions for deep democracy include both cultural-political and socio-economic conditions.

Our theory of deep democracy also fields skeptical challenges of postmodern philosophers. However, we restrict our discussion to matters as they relate to the moral agency of the democratic actors while developing the idea of moving towards deep democracy in the context of important failures of both capitalism and socialism in the last century (Frame, 2007; Khan, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007). We begin by discussing the meaning of the political and social economy approach as we use this term. Next, we discuss in greater detail the economic and political dimensions of deep democracy. Finally, we take up the crucial task of defending the subjectivity of a deeply democratic individual. Conclusions follow.

The political and social economy approach---SEICs

**Table-A4.1
Cluster conditions for deep democracy**

No.	Condition	No.	Condition
01	Ending of economic and other status inequalities;	13	Public funding of issue-oriented committees as well as parties;
02	Public emphasis on furthering democratic autonomy, internationalism, and individuality;	14	Takeover of some security and civil judicial functions by neighborhood or regional democratic associations; abolition of centralized, especially secret police powers and units;
03	Adequate incomes for all socially recognized work, as well as for children, the handicapped, the aged, and others not able to work in order to promote equality of capability;	15	Universal public service, military or community; restructuring of armed forces in a defensive, civilian-oriented direction; removal of authoritarianism of rank and status, and institution of democratic unit organization, allowing serious discussion of policy;
04	Respect for and articulation of differences in public life and within parties;		
05	Downward democratic congruence of and within ordinary social institutions, including work place democracy;	16	Proportional representation of parties;
06	Debate over the history and future of the movement- the nature of deep democracy – in	17	Abolition of patriarchy;

	neighborhood assemblies and schools;		
07	Cultivation of respect for civil disobedience, strikes, and other acts of protest on major public issues;	18	Adoption of democratic child-rearing practices;
08	Integration of local and national leaders into features of ordinary economic and political life and creation of arenas for criticism;	19	Full freedom of social intercourse of diverse groups;
09	Curtailed of all direct political intervention in the arts, religion, and personal life;	20	Full freedom of diverse cultural expression;
10	Establishment of independent judicial, policy, communication and electoral review bodies;	21	Encouragement of the arts and varying modes of expression so that every individual can experience and struggle with the challenge of non-dominating discourse;
11	Diversity of perspective in communications and education;	22	Practice of radical forms of individual and group subjectivity leading to what Guattari has termed the molecular revolution;
12	Use of differential, serial referenda on central issues;	23	Adoption of technology and innovation systems, which will reinforce the conditions above, rather than undercutting them.

Source: Khan (1998: 101).

By *political economy* we mean the classical state and civil society and its interactions. By *social economy* we mean the underlying social basis of the political economy including the family structure. Khan (1994, 1998, 2007) presents deep democracy as a structure in addition to formal democratic apparatus, such that the practice of democratic life can be reproduced with the basic values intact. Change is not precluded. But all such changes should deepen democracy, not weaken it. Deep democracy in this sense is intimately connected with economic and social

justice. In order to make economic justice tenable, however, at least a cluster of conditions connected with deepening democracy must be realized (Khan 1994, 1998). Table-1 lists such cluster conditions.

Table-A4.2

Summary of social capabilities* from a SEIC framework perspective

No.	Condition	No.	Condition
01	Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, as far as possible.	15	Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction.
02	Being able to be courageous.		
03	Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction.	16	Being capable of friendship.
04	Being able to move from place to place.	17	Being able to visit and entertain friends.
05	Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-	18	Being able to participate in the community.

	useful pain and to have pleasurable experiences.		
06	Being able to use the five senses.	19	Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice.
07	Being able to imagine.	20	Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature.
08	Being able to think and reason.	21	Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
09	Being acceptably well-informed.	22	Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's.
10	Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves.	23	Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and context.
11	Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude.	24	Capability to have self-respect.
12	Being able to form a conception of the good.	25	Capability to appear in public without shame.
13	Capability to choose; ability to form goals, commitments, values.	26	Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural possibilities.
14	Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life.	27	Ability to achieve valuable functionings.

Source: Sen & Nussbaum, as cited by Khan (1998: 95).

*Here the controversies regarding listing should be kept in mind. But this list without being definitive can nevertheless offer some guidance regarding the kinds of capabilities that are necessary for a deeply democratic society in MENA region keeping in mind the history and cultural specificities of the region as well.

It may be useful to elaborate upon the idea of social capabilities. We have summarized a list in Table-2, following Sen & Nussbaum (1993) However, we have tried to give a fully social interpretation of all the capabilities as in Khan (1998). Having summarized our approach to deep

democracy from the political and social economy perspective, we now turn to the crucial problem of deepening democracy as a set of practices over time.

Towards a deeply democratic society in Various Regions of Africa: Reciprocal and Dialectical Relationships

The aim of any sane, progressive socio-economic system must go beyond the blind accumulation of capital or development at all costs. The goal of a just political and social economy is to guarantee each individual's freedom or ability to live the kind of life he/she chooses. *Capabilities* can be construed as the general powers of human body and mind that can be acquired, maintained, nurtured and developed.¹ Capabilities are economic, but they are also political, social, psychological, and spiritual. A comprehensive development as freedom strategy for the MENA region countries will require us to pay particular attention to the social, political and economic foundations for democracy in these countries taking into account their uneven development. Particularly, in Africa there are many regional path dependencies along with the common colonial and postcolonial factors. There will be no one size fits all model---least of all superficial models exported by the US think tanks. Each regional or country model in Africa must be home grown without being provincial. To be sure, there are deep general principles to follow but these must be developed and grasped within the African geo-historical political context. It is in this spirit the rest of this essay should be viewed.

A deeply democratic society must take into account all forms of capabilities without the sacrifice of some over others. Further, no one capability can be substituted for another. All are irreducible. As Frame (2007) illustrates, there are significant challenges to this aim under the capitalist system. For all members of a society to develop freely, an individual's capabilities cannot infringe upon the capabilities of another. Any form of exploitation in society, no matter how legally construed, should infringe upon an individual's freedom. In addition, radical change without actual participation is impossible.

Economic aspects for deepening democracy---a dialectical approach: For a deeply democratic society to exist, it must contain political and social conditions that foster the full development of individual capabilities. It must also contain economic conditions that provide the material base for egalitarian political and social participation as well as physical and psychological health. In economic systems that promote or sanction significant inequalities and/or alienating divisions of labor, deep democracy is impossible. Proponents of deep democracy must examine, therefore, which specific values and institutions within an economic framework would support or hinder democratic practices from taking root and flourishing.

We will first consider the principal values upon which an economic system conducive to deep democracy must strive to adhere to and second, possible institutional changes that would abet the concrete realization of a deep democratic society. Can the economic ever be ranked before social?

Such a fundamental question must be addressed if a humane economic system is to be constructed which is not merely sustained by the blind drive to accumulate, as in capitalism, or develop without regard to social relations, as in more vulgar forms of economic determinism.

Sen (2000) argues that in contrast to the utilitarian approach of maximizing GDP growth, the fundamental goal should be the development of substantive freedoms – capabilities – to choose a life one has reason to value. Thus, the aim of economic growth should be to enhance the freedom of the individual to choose the kind of life he/she desires. The question that needs further examination is: precisely *what* values must drive, shape, and ultimately determine an economic system so that the full capabilities of each individual are developed? What values must be given primary consideration so that the system itself does not perpetuate a feedback loop in which inequality, hierarchy, and eventually exploitation and alienation come to dominate?

Albert & Hahnel (1991) suggest the evaluation of economic institutions based upon five moral and logical criteria: equity, efficiency, self-management, solidarity, and variety. To this list, we add transparency in dealings with all those affected in respect of full social (and ecological) costs of every economic transaction. Capability deprivation can only be eliminated if the economic system is fundamentally equitable. Albert & Hahnel (1991) chose to define equity as based upon effort alone rather than accumulated private property or fortuitous individual talents. Gilbert (1990) suggests equal incomes for all socially recognized work.

The capabilities enhancing viewpoint might maintain, in slight contrast, that equity is desirable only to the extent that it fulfills the individual's ability to partake socially on equal footing with other members of society. Such a viewpoint might break with the maxim equal pay for equal effort; in the case of the physically ill or mentally handicapped, for example, greater pay above the effort expended may be necessary. In any case, it would seem that the most vital components of equity would be the elimination of surplus value extraction and compensation for the disadvantaged. This would include the elimination of all forms of surplus-value extraction currently found under the wage labor system of capitalism.

An economic system that eliminates the extraction of surplus value would greatly abet abolishing exploitation and hierarchy, and to some extent, class disadvantages. The increasing self-management of workers would further erode hierarchy, division of labor, and class, as all members would gain experience in organizing and decision-making. Through self-management alone can the dilemma of alienation in either hierarchal capitalist systems or top-down command structures of centralized planning be alleviated.

If we consider Sen's (2000) capabilities approach, which advocates the freedom to choose a work environment suitable to individual needs, it is hardly likely that any individual would choose less self-management over increased self-management. If the goal of deep democracy is indeed capabilities enhancement, the development of freedom and choice must not be excluded from the

sphere of work. Solidarity through team effort, rather than competitiveness, is also crucial in the return of the individual to his/her social essence as envisioned by Marx and overcoming the alienation of *species-being* where economic transactions are a zero-sum game.

Work as a variety of tasks rather than repetition would help develop and unite the currently disparate emotional, physical, mental and spiritual aspects of the individual. Through a variety of tasks the breakdown of the invidious division between manual and mental labor, which centralizes authority within the hands of the elite, could be eroded. Finally, a transparent, eco-friendly economic system that allows citizens full awareness of the social and environmental costs of economic transactions within that system is vital to full citizen participation and decision-making.

Is such a seemingly utopian economic system possible? Numerous authors have written on alternative economic systems. Khan (1998) suggests furthering democratic practices through citizen participation in oversight, design, governance, and evaluation processes of technological development; in a deep democratic society, research and development expenditures, for example, be publicly debated, and some asset redistribution so that the poor can have access to markets would be necessary. Albert & Hahnel (1991) explored the theoretical feasibility of creating highly decentralized democratic economic model with a radically different system of production, consumption, and allocation.

The participants in the planning process are worker councils and federations, consumer councils and federations, and an Iteration Facilitation Board (IFB). The IFB announces *indicative prices* for all final goods/services, capital goods, natural resources, and categories of labor. Consumer councils and federations respond with consumption proposals. Worker councils and federations respond with production proposals listing the outputs they propose and the inputs they need to make them. The IFB then calculates the excess demand or supply for each input and output and adjusts the indicative price up or down. Using the new indicative prices, consumer and worker councils and federations revise and resubmit their proposals until other councils accept them.

The economic processes of production, consumption and allocation are determined by production, consumer, and IFB councils, reaching from the micro-level of the workplace, the meso-level of the community, to the macro-level of the nation. Democratic participation in all the councils is carefully regulated. Equal status inhibits centralization of power, which occurs in central planning. Workers' councils allow for democratic deliberation, and self-management. Solidarity is promoted through cooperation in decision-making and non-hierarchical positions in the workplace, while variety of tasks circumvents the ossification of traditional divisions of labor and hierarchy.

Concerning equity, Albert & Hahnel's (1991) economic model strikes at a very central issue. Can money as an exchange system remain as *capital* and not promote competitiveness, acquisitiveness, and exploitation? Equity, in the radical economic model, is insured through *payment* for effort, which is ultimately no more than equal exchange through effort for consumption goods as opposed

to capital accumulation. However, the real problem is to go beyond treating labor power as a commodity. In terms of value theory, we need to go beyond the value form itself. This requires going beyond what Marx calls *bourgeois rights* (Khan, 2006). This would indeed call for a radical restructuring of the current economic system.

Political dialectical aspects for deep democracy: Rights that enhance the ability of each individual to participate politically, equally and fully constitute a vital component of a deeply democratic society. The extent to which political rights are relevant can be argued from a variety of perspectives. From the Marxist perspective, political rights are reflective of the extent to which citizens are not alienated from the political processes. Our theory of deep democracy does not separate political processes from all other forms of power (social, economic, or ideological) in society.

Deep democracy criticizes the divisive characteristic of the state. Although citizen created, the state dominates its creators. Individuals have no direct control over the instruments they are being governed by. The processes of legislating, administering, and governing are often beyond the reach of the average citizen. Hence, with the increasing power of the state, alien forces increasingly govern public life of the individual. Hence, political rights must be given priority.

Barber argues for political rights from a somewhat different but no less important vantage point. He criticizes liberal democracy as inherently limited in its conception of both the individual and the social contract between individual and state. The individual in liberal theory is no more than, "...a creature of appetite, or of reason indentured to appetite.... incapable of bearing the weight of his ideals" (Barber, 2003). The role of the state in liberal democracy, Barber claims, is no more than that of a zookeeper.

The conundrum which liberal democracy finds itself unable to resolve is the tension between the freedom of the individual and the power of the state. The state, a necessary apparatus to protect the freedom of the individual, ends up usurping the freedom of the individual itself. This dilemma arises because liberal democracy does not truly regard the citizen's role as a participatory one; hence the characteristic of the state as usurper of the citizen's natural freedom arises. Only a political system 'with a civic culture nearer to the themes of participation, citizenship, and political activity,' (Barber, 2003) remedies political alienation and apathy found in formal democracies.

From the developmental and capabilities approach, Sen offers three different perspectives as to why political rights are necessary. First, political rights are inalienable rights. Self-determination, liberty, and democracy are capabilities to be developed as any other. Second, the instrumental role of political rights is crucial in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing their political and economic needs. Last, political rights are necessary in the constructive role that they play in the conceptualization of *needs* in a social context. Public debate, discussion, and the civil liberties to engage in them shape how people conceptualize their own needs. (Sen, 2000).

The question which one must engage with then is not so much whether or not political rights are necessary. The question, then, is what hinders political rights as capabilities, whether it is the capability to engage politically on equal footing as another member of society, or the capability to engage in a political setting which fosters self-governance, fellowship of civic association, or mutual deliberation, decision and work (Barber, 2003).

Progress in this direction, like the question of economic capabilities, must consider the complex issue of political alienation which arises, as radicals note, from the disparate capabilities of individuals caught in a class based society. In the call for liberty and democracy, the difference between formal rights, which are possessed by both the poor and the rich, and effective rights, which are profoundly affected by hierarchy, division of labor, economic inequality, political elitism, cannot simply be ignored. In addition to the social and economic structures that hinder the political rights of individuals, deeply democratic societies must evaluate the institutional structures of formal democracy and critique their effectiveness in providing real political capabilities to citizens.

As Barber (2003) argues, liberal democracy is too limited both in its concept of the individual, and lacks the necessary political institutions for truly participatory democratic processes. A deeply democratic society must strive to implement concrete institutions that promote democracy. Accountable institutions of representation and leadership, participatory political processes enjoined by a highly informed citizenry, and progressive legislation are three areas of focus here.

A deeply democratic society seeks to enhance the political capabilities of each citizen in respect to self-governance, freedom, equality, and justice. Certain features of formal democracy appear unable to fully provide political capabilities to citizens. The first feature that stands out prominently is the issue of representation. In cases of small communities, direct democracy may allow for equal representation and participation of each citizen; however, large regimes or nation-states necessitate some form of political representation. Yet formal democracy, or representative democracy, can be criticized as the political rule of electorally chosen elites, who are often biased with partisan interests.

Benjamin Barber criticizes the concept of representation itself as fundamentally flawed, ‘...men and women who are not directly responsible through common deliberation, common decision, and common action for policies that determine their common lives are not really free at all....citizens become subjects to laws they do not truly participate in making; they become the passive constituents of representatives who, far from reconstituting the citizens’ aims and interests, usurp their civic functions and deflect their civic energies’(Barber, 2003). To a great deal this can be attributed to the problem of class and economic inequalities.

With a more equitable socio-economic system, such as the participatory economic system envisioned by Hahnel and Albert, which decentralizes economic decision making and checks the usurpation of resources by elites, the partisan interest of politicians representing class-bias and political alienation of ordinary citizens would be greatly reduced. However, some institutional changes to formal democracy would be necessary that would limit the purely political power of representatives and leaders.

Gilbert recommends institutionalized possibilities of recall, criticism, and restriction on pay of representatives (Gilbert, 1990). Representatives at the local, state, and national level could be subject to public evaluation and/or criticism and in cases of transgressions recall, allowing for greater accountability. Restrictions on pay comparable to salaries of other workers (in a society wherein roughly equal incomes are the norm) would discourage individuals from political involvement for monetary gains. In addition, measures taken to guard against the growth of a 'political elite' – wherein certain individuals become professional politicians for life and can thereby manipulate political power for their particularistic interests – would be necessary.

Such measures would include a limit to one's time in office and a limit to one's involvement in politics overall. Additional measures might have to be implemented to avoid the development of political familial dynasties. The establishment of independent judicial, policy, communication and electoral review bodies would maintain a system of checks and balances. To check the monopoly of one or two powerful parties, Gilbert (1990) also recommends proportional representation of parties in accordance with the percentage by which the party is elected.

Beyond institutional checks and balances of representatives, a deeply democratic society must be as highly decentralized as possible. This would entail both a highly informed, active citizenry combined with institutions that delegate decision-making power directly into the hands of the people. Barber's (2003) strong democracy advocates unmediated self-governance through local, state, and national institutions that allow for discussion, decision-making and action at all three levels. At the local level, Barber (2003) recommends a national system of neighborhood assemblies of from one to five thousand citizens with deliberative eventually local legislative competence as well as selective local elections to local office by lottery with pay initiatives. At the national level, he recommends a national initiative and referendum process that permits popular initiatives and referenda on congressional legislation.

In contrast to current trends of political apathy, self-governance would call for a highly informed citizenry. Barber (2003) recommends such programs as a civic videotext service and civic educational postal act that would promote full civic education, and a program of universal citizen service. Khan (1998,2007) and Gilbert (1990) call for the establishment of a universal public service that would involve either military or community service. Similar to the democratic, civilian based ideals of the Chinese People's Liberation Army practiced during the Chinese Revolution, Khan (2005) and Gilbert (1990) call for the restructuring of armed forces in a 'defensive, civilian-

oriented direction' along with the 'removal of authoritarianism of rank and status, and institution of democratic unit organization, allowing serious discussion of policy' (Khan 2005).

In addition, deeply democratic governance would necessitate abolishing of all centralized, secret police powers and units as well as secret military interventions in foreign governments. Deep democracy, and the possibility of internationalism and solidarity, cannot exist when many foreign policies, some of a more nefarious nature, are regulated to elite decisions, as in the case of the U.S.A., when many foreign military interventions circumvent both congressional and public oversight (Johnson, 2004). The appendix offers a full reprise of Barber's strong democratic program for revitalizing citizenship.

Finally, the adoption of progressive legislation similar to the U.N. Charter on Human rights that calls for both the protection of individual rights as well as the explicit rights of women, minorities, or other disadvantaged groups would ensure, beyond deeply democratic decentralized deliberation, a standard of human rights. Even if a decision settled through democratic deliberation, it must be invalidated in cases where that decision oppresses particular groups in society, or upholds exploitative norms. A deeply democratic society in all cases must seek to uphold the equal economic and political rights of all citizens.

Social capabilities from an intersectional dialectical perspective: Beyond economic and political preconditions, for a deep democratic society to be both sustainable and fully human, we need to question more deeply the meaning of well-being. The development of 'social capabilities' is no less crucial but perhaps more difficult to define. Social capabilities are capabilities that can only be developed in relation to others. They consist of positive relations to other members of society as well as a healthy relationship to oneself. Sen & Nussbaum (1992) list the capabilities to think and reason, to imagine, to be able to form a conception of the good, to be capable of having self-respect, to be able to participate in a community, among others.

If we conceive of social possibilities in the context of legislation, Khan includes as part of the set of cluster conditions for a deeply democratic society the abolition of patriarchy, the adoption of democratic child-rearing practices, the full freedom of social intercourse of diverse groups, and the full freedom of diverse cultural expression (Khan 1998). A progressive legislation that ensures these basic rights would be the first step for the establishment of social capabilities.

Beyond progressive legislation, truly deep democracy would call for a breakdown of the monopoly of intellectual, artistic, scientific, and spiritual elitism. It is as impossible to judge scientifically, given this historical elitism, the extent to which the majority are capable of developing in these areas as it would have been to determine the intellectual/spiritual potential of women two hundred years ago under patriarchy. The bias of class based societies towards these social capabilities has pervaded social norms to such a profound extent that only an elite few are able, or even believe they are able, to develop in any of these areas.

The elite produce art and culture, the many simply consume it. At the same time, overwhelmingly art and culture portray a lifestyle and culture alien and inaccessible to lower classes. Science or other intellectual endeavors are equally inaccessible to the majority both due to the gulf between mental and manual labor, as well as the price of education. It may be argued that under the current capitalist society education is more widespread and accessible than ever before. Yet this, too, comes at a price. As already discussed extensively under the section on alienation, in a consumerist society, even the limited artistic, scientific, intellectual and spiritual fields are commodified, infringing upon the individual's ability to perceive anything without a price.

A deeply democratic society would both have to disentangle the elitism which typically surrounds these areas as well as distance material means from the decision to participate or not in these areas. This could be done by free, accessible, lifelong adult education with the reduced working hours available under participatory economics.

Within social institutions such as education, greater democratic practices are also necessary. Alternative systems of education have experimented with such practices with considerable success. Education centers built upon the philosophy of the Indian thinker Krishnamurti attest to this. His educational philosophy protests against the typical use of reward/punishment, competition and fear and hierarchy which, according to him, condition the individual so deeply that real self-discovery, questioning, and creative thought is impossible. Instead, more emphasis is placed upon self-inquiry around such vital life questions as: Why do we fear? Why do we feel the need for power? What is love? Only by such expansive questioning free from authority, Krishnamurti, maintains, can we become whole human beings. Only through understanding of issues such as the ego and separateness can the deeper aspects of the human psyche be developed healthily.

Democratic practices within the educational system could be expanded to include more spiritual institutions with similar democratic practices of non-elitism and non-hierarchy, and full participation in both thinking and interpreting spiritual script. Important studies by Frankl (1985) reveal that 'will to meaning,' the ability to find meaning in one's life, is an essential necessity to living. The capability to discover one's 'will to meaning' is an irreducible social capability as much as proper clothing or political participation. Logotherapy helps patients find meaning in any given situation in their life, even in suffering. Therapy such as logo therapy, along with community, spiritual support and deeper education, would help provide members of a deeply democratic society with the psychological wherewithal to possess this capability.

While Frankl's (1985) logotherapy is primarily individualistic, Khan (1998) recommends continuous therapy available for all members of a deeply democratic society, which would include forms of group therapy. This would be an affirmation of the necessity of social healing in class based societies where disparate groups are, by and large, alienated from one another. Most importantly, this could allow the development of empathy between individuals from disparate

backgrounds. The point here is not to emphasize one form of education or social institution above all others, but to draw attention to the variety of alternative institutions that could help to positively develop the social capabilities of members in a deep democratic society.

The problem of moral agency in creating social capabilities for deep democracy

If indeed there were no real subjectivity for humans, as many postmodernists have claimed, then the task of theorizing about deep democracy and economic justice would seem completely hopeless. This is really the problem of agency or – as it is well known in the French postmodernist and poststructuralist circles – the problem of the subject. In France it was made popular by Althusser's discussions of ideology.² However, the deeper philosophical and psychoanalytic motivations for considering the subject problematic have been articulated by Lacan (1975). In Lacan's (1975) view, the subject has both conscious and unconscious motivations. The unconscious part is the source of the problem.

Lacan (1975) claims that the structure of the unconscious is the same as the structure of repressed. This chain of repressed signifiers hides the actual incoherence of the subject's subjectivity. However, the leap from a nuanced analysis of the unconscious aspects of the psyche to the conclusion that there is no subject with a moral capacity for action is illegitimate for several reasons.³ First, the idea of a subject can have a limited warrant even if the unconscious motivations are discerned as contradictory. The potential for moral capacity of such a subject is weaker. Nevertheless, even weakly constituted, quasi-juridical subjects can serve as putative agents of moral actions.

The second and more important objection to the Lacanian fallacy is that Lacan's position can actually be used to reformulate the view of a subject effectively. Recognizing the inevitable unconscious contradictions allows one to distinguish between two kinds of subjecthood in a dynamic sense.⁴ On the one hand we have the (relatively) unaware subject who is the ideologically constructed individual. Such a person may be shored up by all the reassuring dogmas and ideologies of our contemporary society. The crack in the mirror where such a person observes himself is invisible as long as he is ignorant of his own inner turmoil at the conscious level. This is not to say that archaic thought-processes or emotions do not invade the person from time to time.

Cohen (1994) argues that a trained analyst can perceive both the moral capacities and moral failures of subjects. Conceptually, the argument simply establishes the possibility of the subjecthood of a person. The precise content of the subjectivity may indeed be unhealthy in a clinical sense. But such characterization only reestablishes the moral potential of the person as an agent. Denying this potential is itself an act of ideological repression.

Such considerations lead us to think of a second type of moral agent. This is a subject whose awareness has unfolded to such an extent that he/she is able to *conceive* of himself/herself as a moral agent. However, such awareness also encompasses the repression that accompanies our insertion into the symbolic. Thus his/her moral insights about himself/herself and the world also include a recognition of human vulnerability, epistemic shortcomings and the need for a *twofold dialogue*. This dialogue is, on the one hand, a conversation within oneself⁵ and, on the other, a dialogue with the outside world.

Depending on the state of the individual psychoanalytic therapy may or may not be necessary for such subjectivity to occur. However, Khan has argued elsewhere (Khan, 1992, 1993a,b; 1995), in a just and democratic society, the resources for such therapy will be available to all. Here a further source of confusion may arise. There is a widespread view both within and outside of psychoanalysis that analysis ‘shrinks the realm of the moral responsibility.’ As Sherman puts it, ‘there is the surface paradox that while morality is ubiquitous, the clinical hour boasts of time and space that is morally neutral...’(p. 1).

But as Wallwork (1991) has argued, psychoanalysis is uncompromisingly situated within an ethical perspective. Sherman follows and develops Aristotle’s critique of the Socratic denial that one can know what is good and fail to act on it. Aristotle, of course, claimed that Socrates’ denial of *akrasia* was simply ‘against the plain facts’ (*ta phainomena*). However, Aristotle views *akrasia* as an *intellectual* failure rather than a failure of desire. In discussing Freud’s own case of being afflicted by the ‘blindness of the seeing eye’ in his struggle to understand the case of Miss Lucy R.’s knowing and not knowing her love for her employer, Sherman explains:

The Socratic dogma that knowledge can't be tyrannized by desire has long been abandoned. But against Kant, it is not simply the inner tribunal of conscience and moral judgment that will track down secret but motivating desires. Conflictual and concealed mental contents need a therapy of self-knowledge that does something other than continue to disavow them. They need to be heard from, in parliamentary fashion, and given their own voice as a part of coming to be united with avowed and endorsed interests. Therapeutically working through what is disavowed or repressed requires freedom from the stance of moral appraisal, even if the decision to submit to the analytic process might be thought of as a morally praiseworthy act in the most general sense of taking charge of one's character, and pursuing that project with courage. (Sherman, p. 13) But the outcome of the therapy when it succeeds is to produce a new type of agency. No longer split off from emotion's testimony, agency takes on a newer and bolder form. Psychoanalysis transforms the notion of moral agency by bringing the emotions to the center. In an ironic way, the "talking therapy" seems to be able to bring to moral agency those potential allies that moral theory, so often on its own, does not quite know how to train or enlist. (Sherman, pp. 22-23, emphasis ours).

Therefore, for both types of subjects, it should be emphasized, the possibility of acting justly (or otherwise) remains open. In an unjust economy and society, most people are victims of oppression and injustice. In a nearly just society, such institutionalized injustice disappears, but there could still be unjust actions by individuals for which they should be culpable. However, in a well-ordered society, the view towards crime and punishment may be very different from ours. Instead of responding to issues of guilt with conventional punishment, a more compassionate, therapeutic approach may be taken.

The point of this paper, of course, is not to produce a blueprint for a future just society, but to open up the possibility of such a discourse even under the postmodern conditions of epistemic uncertainty and anti-foundationalism. Enough has been said to show that even a radical epistemic uncertainty is consistent with the two kinds of subjects discussed. The previous discussion of a Hegelian approach to foundationalism was intended to show that anti-foundationalism is also consistent with asystemic approach to economic and social justice. Thus, both at the level of large-scale social and economic structures and at the level of the individual's epistemological uncertainties, anti-foundationalism need not lead to skepticism, relativism and ultimately nihilism.

Conclusions

We have offered a somewhat novel theory of deep democracy from a political and social economy point of view. The theory of deep democracy presented here makes a distinction between formal aspects of democracy and the deeper structural aspects. In order for democracy to be deep, democratic practices have to become institutionalized in such a way that they become part of normal life in a democratic society. In this sense, ontologically, deep democracy overlaps with Barber's idea of strong democracy. There are, however, epistemological differences as well as differences of emphasis, particularly in the economic sphere. Cluster conditions for deep democracy include both cultural-political and socio-economic conditions.

Our theory of deep democracy also answers important skeptical challenges of postmodern philosophers. Epistemologically, the postmodern dilemma arises from a correct critique of metaphysics and transcendentalism. However, the critique is partial and negative. It is partial in the sense that it does not take the challenge of Kant to develop normativity seriously enough to explore alternatives as Hegel did. It, therefore, pursues entirely the negative critical path leading to thoroughgoing skepticism and nihilism.

In our approach, a concrete set of institutions consistent with the development of self-determination can be seen as necessary for the idea of deep democracy and economic justice to have meaning. In the spheres of production, distribution, exchange, law and contracts among others, the development of appropriate political, economic and social institutions allowing this inter-subjective idea of freedom to unfold becomes the thematic development of economic justice and democracy.

An important problem in this context is the coherence of the concept of the moral subject. By carefully considering poststructuralist psychoanalytical theory of Lacan and others a dynamically oriented approach to the question of the subject becomes possible. Pre-Freudian thinkers such as Hegel or Marx did not see the formation of the individual in all its deeply problematic aspects. However, the ‘speaking subject,’ though not innocent (as Hélène Cixous wittily put it), is nevertheless capable of agency under specific social and economic conditions. A continuum of subjectivity ending with the fully liberated individual offers various possible levels of moral agency. In an economically and socially unjust setting radical analytic and social interventions will be necessary for these possibilities to materialize.

Deep democracy and economic justice, therefore, can be presented as a coherent set of positive requirements. It is part and parcel of the need for rational autonomy in our world. The cluster conditions we give together with the social capabilities perspective offer a way of defending and advancing the justification for deepening democracy.

Notes:

1. As interpreted by Khan (1998: 95). Here, Khan emphasizes the irreducibly social nature of certain capabilities.
2. See, for example, Althusser's essays on ideology in *For Marx and Lenin and Philosophy*. Althusser seems to misconstrue Lacan's concept of the *imaginary* (and implicitly, the mirror stage) in the former.
3. It is not clear if Lacan himself would go so far, but most postmodernists, French and non-French alike (e.g., Foucault and Rorty), have taken this position.
4. We hope it will become clear in the following discussion that actually there is a continuum of subjects within this dynamic setting.
5. Or, to be more precise, an ‘interior monologue’ where the unconscious processes are symbolized, interpreted and conceptualized.

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