Pasricha, Gurnain Kaur (2008): Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets and Capital Controls: A Model and a Test.
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Abstract
This paper explores the implications of financial repression, specifically, imperfect competition in the financial sector and capital controls for equilibrium interest rates and current account imbalances; and the implications of liberalization. I find that (1) interest differentials between home and foreign markets exist and are higher the fewer the number of domestic financial institutions (2) liberalization of the domestic financial sector - i.e. increasing the number of players - exacerbates current account imbalances in growing economies and reduces revenues from repression (3) revenues from financial repression decline when capital controls become porous (which may be a consequnce of trade liberalization), making liberalization of domestic financial sector more palatable to the domestic governments. An empirical exercise validates several predictions of the model.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets and Capital Controls: A Model and a Test. |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Financial Repression; Capital Controls; Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets; Domestic Financial Liberalization; Interest Differentials |
Subjects: | F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F32 - Current Account Adjustment ; Short-Term Capital Movements D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection |
Item ID: | 12125 |
Depositing User: | Gurnain Pasricha |
Date Deposited: | 13 Dec 2008 06:35 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2019 06:39 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/12125 |