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Access Inequality

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October 2023

Online at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/123253/>
MPRA Paper No. 123253, posted 17 Jan 2025 14:31 UTC

Chapter 3

Access Inequality

The previous chapter concluded with a discussion of the role of luck in providing some embryonic sportspersons with the facilities to progress their careers while simultaneously thwarting the advancement of others by denying them these advantages. The distribution of luck, in terms of the conferment or denial of advantage, could be systemic, favouring certain well-defined groups of people and disfavours others who do not belong to this magic circle. This is one form of access inequality. More generally, access inequality exists if there is disproportionality between the representation of various subgroups in the population and their representation in a particular ‘activity’. For the purposes of this book, ‘activity’ is used to mean presence in a team or a squad of cricketers selected for a tournament; in a more general context, it could refer to representation in different fields of endeavour. This chapter examines access inequality with respect to representative cricket, particularly in India and England.

In India, an important determinant of social cleavage is the caste into which Hindus (80% of India’s population) are born, since this determines forever their position in society and plays an important role in shaping their life prospects (Thorat and Newman, 2010). In terms of the subject matter of this chapter, the relevant question is whether certain castes are ‘overrepresented’, while others are ‘underrepresented’, in professional cricket in India. Similarly, in the English context, social position and life prospects are greatly influenced by the school — private or state — attended (Green and Kynaston, 2019); the relevant question here is whether representation among men and women professional cricketers is uneven across the two types of schools.

3.1 The Caste System and Indian Cricket

India’s caste system stratifies Hindus into mutually exclusive caste groups, membership of which is determined entirely by birth. Very broadly, one can think of four caste groups: *Brahmins*, *Kshatriyas*, *Vaisyas*, and *Sudras*.¹ *Brahmins*, who were traditionally priests and teachers, represent the highest

¹ These four castes are said to have come from the mouth (*Brahmin*), arms (*Kshatriya*), thighs (*Vaisya*) and feet (*Sudra*) of Brahma, the Creating deity. This is termed the *Purusasukta* legend which appears in an appendix to the *Rig Veda*.

caste; lying below them are the *Kshatriyas* (traditionally, warriors and rulers) and *Vaisyas* (traditionally, moneylenders and traders); below these three groups are the *Sudras* (traditionally performing menial jobs) who are commonly referred to by their administrative name — the ‘other backward classes’ (OBC), the term ‘other’ meaning ‘in addition to those who are “outcastes”’ (see below).²

Lying at the bottom of the caste hierarchy are those persons (mostly Hindu by religion, but some who have converted to Buddhism or Christianity) whom Hindus belonging to the four caste groups (listed above) regard as being outside the caste system because they are ‘untouchable’ in the sense that physical contact with them — most usually the accepting of food or water — is polluting or unclean.³ They are referred to as the *Ati-Sudras* or by their preferred name, *Dalits* (meaning ‘broken’ or ‘oppressed’).⁴

For the rest of this chapter, *Brahmins*, *Kshatriyas*, and *Vaisyas* are collectively referred to as *Forward Caste Hindus* (FCH) while the OBC and *Dalits*, as a collective, are referred to as *Backward Caste Hindus* (BCH).⁵ According to the 2017–18 Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) for India, 53% of India’s population was BCH (as defined above) of whom 18% were *Dalits* and 35% were from the OBC; 24% was FCH (as defined above);⁶ 14% were Muslim; 7% were from the Scheduled Tribes;⁷ and 2% were mainly Christians and Sikhs.

² The caste subgroups that are included under the OBC umbrella varies from state to state. For example, the subgroup of *Jats* is regarded as part of the OBC in seven states (Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand) but not in Punjab and Haryana where they are particularly numerous.

³ This stems largely from the fact that, in occupational terms, they performed — and continue to perform — the dirtiest and lowliest of tasks: burials and disposal of carcasses; scavenging; the removal of excreta.

⁴ Guru (2009) observed that untouchability was a preoccupation of the upper castes. Shah *et al.* (2006, p. 14) noted that, ‘many Hindu upper-caste households maintain separate drinking water glasses for domestic workers, especially cleaners and scavengers. Many will not allow scavengers into certain areas of the house, especially the kitchen, on the grounds that they are “dirty” people’. Further examples of the practice of untouchability as it exists in modern India are: the ‘two tumbler’ system of Tamil Nadu, by which tea-stalls and restaurants offer their ‘untouchable’ customers separate plates and tumblers from those offered to general customers (Nadar, 2008); the fact that upper caste Hindus sometimes forbid their children to eat school meals when these are cooked by ‘untouchable’ cooks (Ilangovan, 2012); and the system whereby ‘untouchable’ school pupils have to wear specially coloured wrist bands to identify their lowly caste (Janardhanan, 2015).

⁵ For a more detailed description of caste in India see Borooah *et al.* (2015).

⁶ The Indian Human Development Survey for 2011–12 gives a breakdown of the FCH numbers as 23% *Brahmin* and 77% *Kshatriyas* or *Vaisyas* (see Desai *et al.*, 2015).

⁷ These are the tribes whose members are entitled, like *Dalits*, to affirmative benefits they are referred to to as the ‘Scheduled Tribes’ (hereafter abbreviated to ST). There are about 85 million Indians classified as belonging to the ST. Of these, *Adivasis* (meaning original inhabitants”) refer to the 70 million who live in central India, in a relatively contiguous hill and forest belt extending across the states of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra,

An analysis of the castes of Indian cricketers who were included in the 18-man Test squad for the Australian Tour of 2020–21 shows that only two (11% of the squad) were BCH even though, as noted above, this group comprises 53% of India’s population; on the other hand, 12 members (67%) were FCH, who comprise 24% of the national population. Moreover, although only about 6% of Indians are *Brahmins*, four members of the 18-man squad (22%) were of this caste. In total, of the 18-man party, only six (33%) were not FCH: two BCH, two Muslims, and two Sikhs.

A corresponding examination of the castes of Indian cricketers who were included in the 15-woman squad for the T20 World Cup competition played in Australia over February–March 2020 showed that, here too, only two of the 15-woman squad (13%) were BCH.⁸ On the other hand, FCH women (of whom three were *Brahmins*) claimed 10 of the 15 places (67%).⁹

To guard against the possibility that, by focusing exclusively on inclusion in the national teams, the analysis was providing an excessively narrow picture of access, the caste composition of the cricket squads of the eight Indian Premier League (IPL) men’s teams and its three women’s teams were also studied. Since its inception in 2007, the IPL has become, through its system of buying players in open auction, a major source of income for Indian cricketers and it would be no exaggeration to say that securing a place on one of its squads is today a major aspiration of Indian — and, indeed, overseas — cricketers.¹⁰

The caste groups of domestic players in the eight men’s and three women’s IPL teams mirror the dominant presence of FCH in the national teams. Of the total of 125 Indian men in the IPL squads, 16 (13%) were BCH, 13 (10%) were Muslim, eight (6%) were Sikhs, and three (2%) were Christians, with the other 84 players (67%) being FCH.¹¹ The number of *Brahmins* in the squads (34) was a little less than the total of non-FCH players (41) and was more than twice the number of BCH players. The

Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, and West Bengal (Guha, 2007). The remaining 15 million or so live in the hills of North-East India.

⁸ One of the players, who is a *Jat* from Punjab, was classified as a FCH since *Jats* do not have OBC status in that state.

⁹ This contradicts Shantha (2017) who claimed that half of the Indian women’s cricket team were from a Backward Caste background.

¹⁰ IPL squads have to comprise between 18 and 25 players, and can include a maximum of eight overseas players.

¹¹ Two of the players who are *Jats* from Rajasthan are classed as BCH because, as *Jats*, they have OBC status in that state.

women's IPL tells a similar story. Of the 32 Indian women in the three squads, four were BCH (13%), one was Muslim, four were Sikhs (13%), and two were Christian (6%); the other 21 players (66%) were FCH and, of these 21 FCH players, eight were *Brahmin*. For women, as for men, the number of *Brahmin* squad members was twice that of BCH. These figures offer little doubt that both male and female BCH, notwithstanding the fact that they comprise most of the Indian population, are grossly underrepresented in cricket; by contrast, *Brahmin* men and women, notwithstanding the fact that only 1 in 20 Indians is *Brahmin*, are greatly overrepresented.

The exclusion of BCH from Indian cricket is largely a post-independence phenomenon.¹² As Majumdar (2006) has pointed out, cricket for Indians in pre-independence India depended greatly on the patronage of native rulers — to name but a few, Natore and Cooch Behar in Bengal; Dhar, Idar, and Gwalior in Central India; Jamnagar in Gujarat; Patiala in Punjab — who recruited without consideration of caste or religion, their sole aim being to show that Indian sides could beat the English at their own game.¹³

After Indian independence in 1947, the fortunes of its native leaders declined, and patronage of Indian cricket shifted to corporate bodies. The main change here was that companies recruited cricketers as their employees, at decent salaries, to play cricket for the company team but mostly preferred them to be graduates so that, after retiring from cricket, they could be usefully employed in regular company business.¹⁴ This change in patronage immediately disadvantaged players from the Backward Castes: the PLFS 2017–18 showed that 39% of FCH were graduates compared to only 23% of BCH. Consequently, the change from native ruler to corporate patronage saw employment opportunities drying up for Backward Caste cricketers while simultaneously expanding for those from the Forward Castes. It would be invidious to regard this contraction/expansion of employment

¹² Bhawnani and Jain (2018) observe that although *Dalits* comprise 17% of India's population, only four of the 289 men who played Test Cricket for India since it acquired Test status in 1932, have been *Dalit*. Even this is likely to be an overestimate. They name Eknath Solkar, Vinod Kambli, Karsan Ghavri, and Bhuvneshwar Kumar; Kumar, however, is not a *Dalit* but a member of the OBC.

¹³ For a fuller list of native rulers who patronised cricket see Cashman (1979).

¹⁴ Companies in Bombay competed in the Times of India Shield which, in 2021, had seven divisions involving over 170 teams and 3,000 players. See <https://www.eventyas.com/IN/Mumbai/599081030193534/Times-Cricket-Shield> (retrieved 13 April 2021). Another famous Bombay cricketing tournament is the Kanga League, established in 1948, which is played during the monsoon season.

opportunities as the result of a deliberate attempt by bigoted employers to exclude Backward Caste cricketers from their roster of employees (that is, *direct* discrimination).¹⁵ It might, however, be legitimate to see the ‘graduate requirement’ as an instance of *indirect* discrimination whereby the *same* requirement — which bore little relevance to the quality of a person’s cricket — imposed on all prospective employees had a *differential* impact on persons from different groups.

Barriers to entering professional cricket in India have had two effects. First, they have led BCH sportspersons to drift away from cricket and seek success in other team sports, most notably hockey and football: the 20-member Indian hockey squad for the 2020 International Hockey Federation (FIH) Pro-League hockey tournament included just two *Brahmins*. Second, the concentration of FCH in cricket has led to a homogenisation of that sport, with both male and female cricketers drawn, by and large, from the same social strata.

Homogenisation can be self-perpetuating because it magnifies the role of family, friends, and acquaintances in securing a favourable outcome with regard to, say, a job, a loan, a home rental, admission into an educational institution or hospital. This is the network concept of allocation under which it is ‘who you know’ that determines the chance of doing well. And who you know (the density of one’s network) depends critically on one’s group identity.¹⁶ Strong group identity leads to social segregation and social segregation leads to segregation in outcomes. If groups differ in their social and economic strength, they will also differ in terms of their network density and hence in terms of their chance of securing favourable outcomes. Jardina (2019, p.4) makes the argument that identity — ‘a psychological, internalized sense of attachment to group’ — provides a cognitive structure for individuals to participate in a variety of social, political, and economic activities.

Currently the most usual route to becoming a professional cricketer in India is to seek admission to a cricket training academy¹⁷ and it is not implausible that networks play a significant

¹⁵ Becker (1993) argued that bigoted employers would voluntarily relinquish profits to cater to prejudice and that direct discrimination could be interpreted as the price employers paid for indulging their prejudices.

¹⁶ See Granovetter (2005), White (1995).

¹⁷ Gupta (2013). Some of the leading cricket academies in India are: Jaipur Cricket Academy, the Sehwag Cricket Academy, the Karnataka Institute of Cricket, the National Cricket Academy in Bangalore, the Madan Lal Cricket Academy, and the Vengsarkar Cricket Academy. Monga (2021) contains a detailed account of pathways to national selection in Indian cricket.

role in securing entry. In addition to admission, there is the matter of affordability.¹⁸ The upshot is that cricket in India has become an elite sport, commanding levels of glamour and remuneration that other sports can only dream of. It has been so completely captured by the country's elites as to make it near impossible for India's deprived groups to penetrate this bastion. As a non-contact sport, it also provides FCH with the added advantage of finessing any inhibitions they might have about physical contact with the 'wrong' sort of person.

Indian cricket can, however, claim credit for the geographical dispersion of the game. Earlier, players were largely drawn from metropolitan conurbations, in particular from Bombay (now Mumbai). Today, however, a significant number of players come from small towns and from a wide range of states. Between 1958–59 and 1972–73, Bombay won the Ranji Trophy — India's premier first-class competition, played between its states and named after Sir Ranjitsinghji ('Ranji' to cricketers aficionados) — 15 consecutive times; in the 17 competitions between 2000–01 and 2018–19, Mumbai won the championship just seven times. Equally pertinently, teams which had never won the trophy in the 20th century began winning in the 21st: Railways in 2001–02 and again in 2004–05; Uttar Pradesh in 2005–06; Rajasthan in 2010–11; Gujarat in 2016–17; and Vidarbha in 2017–18 and 2019–20.

Between 1952 and 1956 there were six occasions on which seven of the men's Indian Test team were from Bombay and, in the decade 1980–90, eight cricketers from Bombay made their debut for India. In the decade between 2003–13, however, only three of the 30 male cricketers who debuted for India in Test Matches were from Mumbai with Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu each supplying five, and Delhi providing four debutants.¹⁹ So, the increased geographical spread of cricket in India cannot be in doubt. The fly in the ointment, however, is that geographical diversity has not eroded Indian cricket's caste concentration and professional cricketers in India continue to be drawn largely from FCH.

¹⁸ Cricket academies in India charge fees up to ₹40,000 (US\$534) annually (<https://www.getmyuni.com/best-cricket-academies-in-india/h/430>, retrieved 18 April 2021). The PLFS for 2017–18 shows that the annual per capita consumption expenditure of FCH households was ₹37,968 (US\$507) compared to ₹26,088 (US\$348) for BCH households.

¹⁹ <https://www.firstpost.com/sports/the-state-of-indian-cricket-where-are-indias-stars-coming-from-1002451.html> (accessed 11 June 2021).

3.2 The School System and English Cricket

Schooling in England comprises two sectors: an independent (or private) sector which charges fees and a state sector in which education is free.²⁰ Of the 8.7 million primary and secondary school pupils in England in 2020, 8.1 million (93%) attended state schools — that is, schools which are fully or in part funded by government and under its control — and 577,000 pupils (7%) were educated in independent schools which, to all intents and purposes, are free of government control.²¹ There is, however, one area in which the independent sector relies on government munificence and that is in respect of its ‘charitable status’: independent schools can claim they are a charity which exempts them from paying taxes to the government. Prior to 2006, this claim could be made automatically; an amendment to the law in 2006 meant that, today, schools can only claim charitable status if they do some vaguely defined ‘community work’. Over 2017–22, charitable status will provide the independent sector with tax rebates of £522 million (Thynne, 2020).

Most state schools, educating 93% of primary and secondary pupils in England, are funded and controlled by local authorities and are non-selective. A minority of schools, however, while remaining within the state sector, deviate from this norm and have different funding and admission criteria. *Grammar schools* are selective secondary schools that admit pupils based on academic ability assessed by a test that prospective pupils take at the age of 11, the age at which they move from primary to secondary education.²² *Academies* are independently managed secondary schools set up by a group of sponsors in partnership with the Department of Education and the relevant local authority: the sponsors fund the land and buildings with the government covering the running costs. *City technology colleges* are independently managed, non-fee charging schools, focused on science and technology which, in addition to preparing pupils for conventional qualifications like GCSEs and A-

²⁰ All state schools are required to follow the national curriculum and although independent schools are exempt from this requirement they are inspected regularly by the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) to ensure that they provide a good all-round education.

²¹ Figures are from gov.uk: <https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics> (accessed 22 April 2021).

²² There are around 160 state-funded grammar schools in England educating about 167,000 pupils. Note, however, that some independent schools use ‘Grammar’ in their name (Bradford Grammar and Bristol Grammar) and, conversely, some state-funded grammar schools do not use ‘Grammar’ in their name (Bournemouth School and Dr. Challoner’s High School).

levels, also aim to provide 11–18-year-olds with vocational qualifications. *Maintained boarding schools* offer free tuition but charge for board and lodging. *Voluntary aided* schools are state funded in which a trust or foundation (usually faith based) plays an important role in the running of the school.

It is often argued that the division of schooling in England into an independent and a state sector exacerbates and perpetuates economic and social inequalities. First, as Green and Kynaston (2019) point out, attending an independent (or private) school is the prerogative of the affluent. Given the size of their fees, access to independent schools is available only to the very wealthy and most children attending independent schools are from families with annual incomes of over £120,000 (that is, at the 95th percentile of the income ladder, meaning only 5% of families had a higher income).²³

As Green and Kynaston (2019, p. 20) write, the upshot is that: ‘Through a highly resourced combination of social exclusiveness and academic excellence, the private school system has in our lifetimes powered an enduring cycle of privilege’. The benefits of a private education feed into people’s future careers. The Sutton Trust reported that the percentages in the various occupations in 2016 that were privately schooled were as follows: 74% of judges; 71% of barristers; 71% of top military officers; 61% of top doctors; 48% of senior civil servants (Kirby, 2016). Of the UK’s 27 Prime Ministers in the 20th and 21st centuries, only seven (Lloyd George, MacDonald, Wilson, Callaghan, Thatcher, Major, and Brown) went to state schools. And all this against the background of the independent sector educating just 1 in 14 pupils in England.

This imbalance is sustained by the fact that the independent sector provides a quality of education, both academic and non-academic, that state schools cannot match (Green and Kynaston, 2019). In terms of sports education, a measure of this quality is provided by Smith’s (2012) description of his *alma mater*, Tonbridge School: ‘we had a 25-metre indoor heated pool (now upgraded to a superlative Olympic version with accompanying gym and exercise rooms); we had

²³ The annual day fees for a ‘prep school’ (that is, private schools that prepare primary school pupils for secondary education) averaged £13,000 in 2018 which was about half of the average family income in England (Green and Kynaston, 2019).

twelve rugby pitches ... two hockey astro-turfs that doubled up as twenty-one tennis courts ... an Olympic standard running track ... twenty cricket nets, ten artificial and ten grass' (p. 23).

Against the backdrop of these observations, it is illuminating to examine the school backgrounds of the players in the men's English Test squad for the India tour of 2021, and the players in the women's English T20 squad for the World Cup of 2020. Of the 16-man Test squad, seven (44%) went to independent schools, eight went to state schools (50%), and one was educated overseas. So, the proportionate presence of independent schools in the English Test squad was comparable to its presence in the upper echelons of the Civil Service (48%) and more than its presence among Members of Parliament (32%).²⁴ These figures are in stark contrast with those for the English women's squad for the T20 World Cup. Of the 15 women in this squad, only two (13%) went to independent schools while the remaining 13 (87%) were the products of state schools.

To guard against the possibility that focusing exclusively on inclusion in the national teams would lead to too narrow an analysis, the school backgrounds of the cricket squads of the eight men's and women's squads for The Hundred competition that took place in the summer of 2021 were also studied. Like the IPL, the eight teams in The Hundred are city-based franchises with the difference that matches in the latter will consist of 100 balls per innings (10, 10-ball overs) instead of the IPL's 120 balls per innings (20, 6-ball overs). Analysis of the school backgrounds of domestic players in the men's Hundred teams showed that of a total of 88 franchised players, 43 (49%) attended independent schools, 42 (48%) went to state schools, and three were educated overseas. Correspondingly, of a total of 73 franchised players in the women's Hundred squads, 18 (25%) attended independent schools, 54 (74%) went to state schools, and one was educated overseas.

Race and English Cricket

Although access inequality in English cricket has, so far, been framed in terms of independent versus state schools, there has emerged, over 2021, another barrier to access and that is based on the race of cricketers. This barrier is erected by the racial abuse and discrimination suffered by non-white players in English county cricket, most specifically at the Yorkshire County Cricket Club (YCCC),

²⁴ Kirby (2016).

but also elsewhere: a survey of professional cricketers found that nearly one-third of non-white cricketers had experienced racism in the game.²⁵

For years, the YCCC had brushed aside complaints by one of their players, Azeem Rafiq, of racial abuse by his teammates, as little more than banter. Following an article on the ESPN Cricinfo website, exposing YCCC's attempts to sanitise racism, and its refusal to release the full contents of a report investigating Rafiq's allegations, there grew a tide of anti-racist protest in the UK culminating in a meeting on 16 November 2021 of the UK Parliament's Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Select Committee.²⁶ At this meeting, details were provided by Rafiq - who was able to make his allegations under the protection of parliamentary privilege - of the racist abuse that he (and other non-white cricketers) was subjected to by his YCCC colleagues.

The more general and serious point that emerges from this sorry episode is not so much the casual racism expressed by individuals in the YCCC dressing room but the cavalier attitude of the YCCC towards such racism – refusing to take it seriously by dismissing it as banter and declining to take any action against the offending persons. This raises the further question of whether the YCCC, is institutionally racist by which is meant that, as an organisation, it tolerated a culture of racist behaviour among its players, in the dressing room and outside and it continued to employ staff who made racist comments until, under public pressure, they were forced to leave.²⁷

The upshot of institutional racism is that cricketers of Asian origin are discouraged from professional cricket. South Asians in the UK comprise 30% of recreational cricketers but only 4% of county cricketers.²⁸ There is also the inflammatory combination of schooling and race. The throwing together in the same team of upper class, privately educated, white cricketers and working class, state-

²⁵ Paul MacInnes, "Players' Union Survey Claims Widespread Racism in English Cricket", The Guardian, 27 January 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/jan/27/players-union-survey-claims-widespread-racism-in-english-cricket> (accessed 4 December 2021).

²⁶ George Dobell, "Yorkshire Racism Report Ruled Azeem Rafiq being called 'P**i' was 'banter'", 1 November 2021. <https://www.espnricinfo.com/story/yorkshire-racism-report-ruled-azeem-rafiq-being-called-p-i-was-banter-1286449>

²⁷ Jonathan Liew, "For me Yorkshire CCC are Institutionally Racist: there is no other conclusion", The Guardian, 1 November 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2021/nov/01/yorkshire-cricket-are-institutionally-racist-for-me-there-is-no-other-conclusion> (accessed 5 December 2021).

²⁸ The Economist, "Just Not Cricket", 20 November 2021, <https://www.economist.com/britain/2021/11/20/azeem-rafiq-claims-anti-asian-abuse-is-widespread-in-english-cricket> (accessed 5 December 2021).

school educated, Asians is a recipe for sneering condescension by the former towards the latter which could spill over into racist taunts. So, while English cricket already has a narrow catchment base in the independent school system it constrains itself further by not doing enough to encourage Asian and other non-white cricketers to play the sport at high levels.

3.3 Measuring Access Inequality

The most usual concept of ‘unfair access’ by a group to a particular ‘activity’ — the activity here being inclusion in a squad of players — is that there is disproportionality between its representation in the population and its representation in that activity. The important question, however, is how to merge these group disproportionalities into a summary measure of *access inequality*? Such a measure should satisfy a very important property (known in the inequality literature as the ‘Pigou-Dalton condition’) which, applied to the present study, requires that an increase in the number of deprived persons in the activity, at the expense of an equal reduction in the number of non-deprived persons, should reduce access inequality; conversely, inequality would be increased by a reduction in the number of deprived, with a simultaneous increase in the number of non-deprived, persons in the activity.²⁹

Suppose that the country’s population is divided into several well-defined subgroups. The first step in measuring access inequality (set out in detail in a technical box) is to compute each group’s representation in the activity (hereafter, the squad) with its representation in the population. With two groups *A* and *B*, suppose group *A* has a 70% representation in the squad (that is, 70% of the squad comprises persons from group *A*) alongside a 40% representation in the population (that is, 40% of the country’s population are persons from group *A*), while group *B* has a 30% representation in the squad alongside a 60% representation in the population. So, the ratio of squad to population representation (SP ratio) is $1.75=7/4$ for group *A* and $0.5=3/6$ for group *B*. The next step is to aggregate these group disproportionalities, as reflected by the SP ratios, into a single measure of inequality. This is done by computing a weighted average of the SP ratios for groups *A* and *B*, the weights being their population shares. One final twist: it is the weighted average of the (natural)

²⁹ In the language of inequality analysis this transfer from (to) an ‘access-rich’ group to (from) an ‘access-poor’ group constitutes a progressive (regressive) transfer and, by virtue of this, is inequality reducing (increasing).

logarithm of the SP ratios that is computed: that is, $0.56=\log(1.75)$ and $-0.69=\log(0.5)$. With this refinement, the inequality index (the single measure of inequality) is:

$$J = -[0.4 \times \log(1.75) + 0.6 \times \log(0.5)] = 0.192$$

When each group's share in the squad equals its representation in the population there is no inequality and $J=0$: group A's SP ratio = group B's SP ratio = 1 and $\log(1)=0$. The value of J rises with increasing levels of inequality reaching a maximum when the entire squad is composed of persons from (say) group A and there is no one in the squad from group B: the SP ratio of group A = $2.5 = 1/.4$ and the SP ratio of group B is $0 = 0/0.6$. However, since $\log(0)$ is not defined, the maximum value of J will also be not defined. One can, nonetheless, get as close to the maximum value as one wishes by approximating that (say) 99% of the squad is from group A and 1% is from group B. Then the SP ratio of group A is $2.48 = 0.99/0.4$ and the SP ratio of group B = 0.167 yielding an approximation, $J_{max} = 0.713$. From this one can infer that that the actual level of inequality, $J=0.192$, is 26.9% of the maximum level of inequality, $J_{max} = 0.713$. The details of the derivation of the inequality index are set out in the box below.

Box 3.1: Mathematical Derivation of the Inequality Index

Suppose that a population of N persons is divided into M mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups with N_m ($m=1\dots M$) persons in each group such that N_m and H_m are the numbers in *each* group in,

respectively, the overall population and in the selected squad. Then $N = \sum_{m=1}^M N_m$ and $H = \sum_{m=1}^M H_m$ are,

respectively, the total number of persons in the overall population and in the squad.

One way of measuring inequality in a variable is by the natural logarithm of the ratio of the arithmetic mean of the variable to its geometric mean. As Theil (1967) and Bourguignon (1979) demonstrate, such a measure satisfies *inter alia* the Pigou-Dalton condition. This idea translates very naturally from its usual application to income inequality, to measuring the degree of inequality associated with selection outcomes in which people belonging to different population groups meet with different degrees of success of being selected for the squad.

The variable of interest is the *access rate* to the squad of persons from group m — defined as $h_m = H_m / H$, the proportion of persons from that group who are selected — and it is inequality in the distribution of this rate between the M groups that is sought to be measured. This inequality is referred to as 'access inequality'.

Box 3.1 (continued)

And the measure of access inequality is:

$$J = \log(\bar{e} / \hat{e}) = \log(\bar{e}) - \sum_{m=1}^M n_m \log(e_m) > 0 \quad (3.2)$$

since, by the property of means, the arithmetic mean is greater than or equal to the geometric mean.

Now from the definition of e_m , above:

$$e_m = H_m / N_m = (H_m / N_m)(N / H)(H / N) = (H_m / H)(N / N_m)(H / N) = (h_m / n_m)\bar{e} \quad (3.3)$$

where: $h_m = H_m / H$ and $n_m = N_m / N$ are, respectively, group m 's share in the squad and in the population. Substituting equation (3.3) in equation (3.2) yields:

$$J = \log(\bar{e} / \hat{e}) = \log(\bar{e}) - \sum_{m=1}^M n_m \log(e_m) = \log(\bar{e}) - \sum_{m=1}^M n_m \log\left[\frac{h_m}{n_m}\bar{e}\right] = -\sum_{m=1}^M n_m \log\left[\frac{h_m}{n_m}\right] \quad (3.4)$$

From equation (3.4), inequality is minimised when $J=0$. This occurs when $n_m = h_m$, that is when each group's share in the "population" (n_m) is equal to its share in the squad (h_m), and higher values of J are associated with greater levels of inequality.

Now from the definition of e_m , above:

$$e_m = H_m / N_m = (H_m / N_m)(N / H)(H / N) = (H_m / H)(N / N_m)(H / N) = (h_m / n_m)\bar{e} \quad (3.5)$$

where: $h_m = H_m / H$ and $n_m = N_m / N$ are, respectively, group m 's share in the squad and in the population. Substituting equation (3.3) in equation (3.2) yields:

$$J = \log(\bar{e} / \hat{e}) = \log(\bar{e}) - \sum_{m=1}^M n_m \log(e_m) = \log(\bar{e}) - \sum_{m=1}^M n_m \log\left[\frac{h_m}{n_m}\bar{e}\right] = -\sum_{m=1}^M n_m \log\left[\frac{h_m}{n_m}\right] \quad (3.6)$$

From equation (3.4), inequality is minimised when $J=0$. This occurs when $n_m = h_m$, that is when each group's share in the 'population' (n_m) is equal to its share in the squad (h_m), and higher values of J are associated with greater levels of inequality.

3.4 Access Inequality Results

The analysis for India was conducted in terms of four social groups: *Brahmins*, comprising 6% of the population; non-*Brahmin* FCH, comprising 18% of the population; BCH, comprising 53% of the population; and ‘Others’, consisting of Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and the Scheduled Tribes, comprising 23% of the population.³⁰

<Table 3.1>

Table 3.1 shows the J values, as defined by equation (3.4) for men and for women: first, for those selected to play for India and then for those selected for the IPL teams. The values of inequality, defined by J in equation (3.4), suggest that the highest inequality was associated with the men’s Test squad (59.5) and the lowest inequality was with respect to the women’s T20 squad (52.0).

Sandwiched in between these extremes were the men’s and women’s IPL with near identical J -values of 55.1 and 54.5, respectively.

<Table 3.2>

The analysis for England was conducted in terms of schooling: independent or state. Table 3.2 shows the J values, as defined by equation (3.4) for men and for women: first, for those selected to play for England and then for those domestic players, educated in the UK, selected for the Hundred teams. The values of inequality, defined by J in equation (3.4), suggest that, in terms of representing England, the highest inequality was associated with the men’s Test squad (38.4) and the lowest inequality was with respect to the women’s T20 squad (2.0). The men’s Hundred teams (which are city-based franchises) collectively showed a higher level of access inequality than the men’s Test team (47.1 versus 38.4) and the women’s Hundred teams, too, showed higher level of access inequality than the women’s T20 World Cup team (11.1 versus 2.0).

A Comparison of Caste-based and School-based Access Inequality in Cricket

To compare caste-based access inequality in cricket in India with school-based inequality in England, the analysis for India was recast in binary terms comprising just two groups: FCH and non-FCH. This meant, firstly, that *Brahmins*, who were shown separately in Table 3.1, were now included among the

³⁰ Muslims, 14%; Sikhs and Christians, 2%; and Scheduled Tribes, 7%.

FCH and, secondly, that the non-FCH group now comprised BCH and the ‘other’ — Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs — players.

<Table 3.3>

Table 3.3 shows the J values that result when the analysis of access to cricket in India was based on a binary divide of FCH versus non-FCH. Under this amalgamation, FCH and non-FCH comprised, respectively, 24% and 76% of India’s population.³¹ Using these proportions, in conjunction with the figures shown in Table 3.3, in equation (3.4) yielded the J values shown in the last column of Table 3.3. Comparing the J values from the schools divide in England (Table 3.2) with the caste divide in India (Table 3.3) showed that: (i) for the men’s Test squads, access inequality based on caste was nearly the same as that based on schooling ($J=38.1$ versus $J=38.4$); (ii) for the women’s T20 squads, access inequality based on caste was 19 times that of access inequality based on schooling ($J=38.1$ versus $J=2.0$); (iii) for the men’s IPL squads compared with the men’s Hundred squads, access inequality based on caste was less (83%) than that based on schooling ($J=39.2$ versus $J=47.1$); and (iv) for the women’s IPL squads compared with the women’s Hundred squads, access inequality based on caste was more than thrice that of access inequality based on schooling ($J=36.2$ versus $J=11.1$).

The central message from these results was that in the men’s Test squads, FCH’s 67% share in the Indian squad (12 out of 18), when the FCH comprised 24% of India’s population, yielded the same level of access inequality as the independent schools’ 47% share in the English squad, when those attending independent schools comprised 7% of England’s primary and secondary school population. Another way of expressing this is to say that for the men’s Test squads, caste-based inequality and schools-based inequality were *welfare equivalent* — that is, they yielded the same amount of social welfare.

To appreciate this, suppose that group A and group B had identical utility functions which depended on the proportion of their members who found a place in the squad — the groups’ ‘success rate’. The higher the success rate of a group, the higher its level of utility. A further assumption was

³¹ For the non-FCH, the detailed breakdown was: 53% BCH, 14% Muslim, 7% Scheduled Tribe, and 2% Christian and Sikh. For the FCH, it was: 6% *Brahmin* and 18% non-*Brahmin* FCH.

that the utility increased with a rise in the success rate but at a diminishing rate: this is the property of diminishing marginal utility.

If social welfare was expressed as the sum of the group utility functions, then welfare would be maximised when each group had the same success rate or, in other words, there was no inequality ($J=0$). To see this, suppose that the success rate of a deprived group, B , was raised with a corresponding decrease in the success rate of an advantaged group, A . Then the utility of group B would rise, and the utility of group A would fall but, by the property of diminishing marginal utility, the rise in group B 's utility would exceed the fall in group A 's utility in consequence of this egalitarian transfer. Consequently, social welfare would rise and would be maximised when no further egalitarian transfers were possible: this would occur when both groups, A and B , had the same success rate.

Now suppose that the utility functions of the groups were represented by the natural logarithm of their success rates. Then $J = \log(\bar{e}) - \sum_1^M n_m \times \log(e_m)$ of equation (3.4) represents the distance

between the maximum level of social welfare, $\log(\bar{e})$, and the actual level of social welfare,

$\sum_1^M n_m \times \log(e_m)$. So, on this interpretation linking inequality to welfare, for the English women's T20

squad, with $J=2$, the distance between the maximum and actual levels of social welfare was only two 'welfare points' compared to 38.1 points for Indian women's T20 squad. For the Indian and English men's Test squads the distance was, respectively, 38.1 and 38.4 points. For the men's IPL and Hundred squads the distances were, respectively, 39.2 and 47.1 points while for the women's IPL and Hundred squads it was, respectively, 36.2 points and 11.1 points.

These results suggest that, for the men's international squads, access inequality in India based on caste was not different from England's school-based inequality while, for the men's franchises, access inequality in the IPL based on caste was less than that of school-based inequality in the Hundred. On the other hand, in respect of women, caste-based inequality in Indian international and IPL cricket was far more pernicious than school-based inequality in English international and Hundred cricket.

3.5 How to Ameliorate Access Inequality

The above analysis of access inequality in Indian and English cricket raises the question of what, if anything, those in charge of the game should/could do to ameliorate such inequality. To appreciate the range of possible policies it is important to understand the origins of such inequality by framing the issue in terms of economic analysis.

Suppose that there are two groups, A and B , such that players from groups A and B practise, respectively, H_A and H_B hours per week in conjunction with ancillary facilities (coaches, diet, equipment etc.). These facilities are referred to as the capital stock of groups A and B and are represented by K_A and K_B , respectively, for the two groups. Further, suppose that N_A and N_B players from groups A and B are chosen for the squad.

If the cricketing output (runs, wickets) of the two groups is represented by, respectively, Y_A and Y_B , then the ‘production functions’ of cricketers from the two groups would depend on the total number of person-hours (number of players times hours practised by each player) of the two groups and on their respective capital stocks.

Suppose that players from the two groups are equally dedicated and are willing to practise for the same number of hours ($H_A = H_B = \bar{H}$) but that group A has better facilities available to it than group B ($K_A > K_B$). Consequently, for an input of the same number of person-hours by each group, the output of group A will exceed that of group B . However, by the law of diminishing returns, the *additional* output (referred to as the marginal product) resulting from the addition of another player from either group, falls.

<Figure 3.1>

These ideas are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The horizontal axis in Figure 3.1 represents from left to right the number of players in the squad from group A (N_A) while from right to left it represents the number of players in the squad from group B (N_B) where $N_A + N_B = N$, N is the fixed number of players in the squad. The vertical axis represents marginal product. The lines RR and SS in Figure 3.1 represent, respectively, the marginal products of groups A and B (MP_A and MP_B , respectively). Both lines slope downwards indicating that the marginal product for each group diminishes for additional

players from that group. The line RR lies higher than the line SS because group A has better facilities to support its players than group B ($K_A > K_B$). Output, Y , is maximised at the point X where RR and SS intersect meaning that the marginal product of the two groups is equal: $MP_A = MP_B$. At X , the squad comprises N_A^* players from group A and N_B^* players from group B . For points to the left of X , $MP_A > MP_B$ and output could be increased by including more players from group A and concomitantly fewer from group B ; for points to the right of X , $MP_A < MP_B$ and output could be increased by reducing the number of players from group A and increasing the number from group B .

In policy terms, there are three ways of regarding the equilibrium at X in which the makeup of the squad of N players is N_A^* and N_B^* from, respectively, groups A and B . If policy makers regard the proportion of players from groups A and B in the squad, relative to the proportionate presence of the groups in the general population as, respectively, too high and too low, then the *South African* solution imposes quotas on the number of players from the two groups with the threat of sanctions imposed on teams which flout these quotas. In terms of Figure 3.1, a quota which requires the number of players from group A to not exceed \bar{N}_A would be consistent with this model. The *English* model involves building capacity among persons from group B by increasing the capital, K_B available to them. In terms of Figure 3.1, this shifts the marginal productivity curve for group B from SS to ST . The new equilibrium point is Z and the number of group B players increases from N_B^* to \hat{N}_B with a corresponding reduction in the number of group A players from N_A^* to \hat{N}_A . The *Indian* model pretends that the problem does not exist. Each of these models is discussed in more detail below.

The South African Response to Disproportionality

The background to the South African cricketing picture is that, until 1970, only white players could represent South Africa with cricketers of colour (Black African, Coloured, and Indian) excluded from the national cricket association. Apartheid policies in South African cricket led to its exclusion from international cricket in 1970. With its readmission into the international cricket family in 1991, and the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, Cricket South Africa (CSA) and the South African Government saw it as a priority to make the composition of the national team more representative of the country's population (Dove, 2018). The instrument chosen by CSA, under pressure from the government, was

to impose racial quotas at the senior provincial and professional level.³² In October 2015, this required having a minimum of six cricketers of colour, of which three had to be Black African, for every match. In July 2016, the national team was required to average, over a season, a minimum of six players of colour of which at least two needed to be Black African.³³

The imposition of quotas (or, in the terminology of CSA, ‘targets’) has met with mixed reactions. Those in favour — which included the 2019 Rugby World Cup winning captain, Siya Kolisi — felt this would increase opportunities for players of colour who had previously been excluded by prejudice and/or socio-economic circumstances. Those against — and this included the South African opening bowler, Makhya Ntini — felt that those picked under targets would be perceived (perhaps wrongly) as being in the team only because of the colour of their skin. So, notwithstanding the desirability of diversity, the road to achieving it also matters a great deal (Urofsky, 2020).

Most cricket observers agree that quotas in themselves provide at best a short-term solution to the absence of cricketers of colour in South African cricket. Longer-term solutions need to be underpinned by a strategy which focuses on developing the game among children of colour at the grassroots level in terms of effective coaching, sympathetic player management, taking cognisance of players’ individual circumstances, allied to good facilities and equipment. Building such grassroots infrastructure for cricket lies at the heart of the English solution.

The English Response to Disproportionality

Another pathway to playing cricket in England is club cricket. Below the 18 professional county clubs in England and Wales are a raft of clubs competing in leagues such as the Bradford League, the Lancashire League, and the Central Lancashire League. These games, mostly featuring amateurs, embrace a variety of formats: ‘serious’ cricket on Saturdays of limited overs (usually 40) contests; ‘friendly’ games on Sundays involving a declaration usually at tea; and evening games of 20 overs per innings in which each bowler is limited to two overs and batsmen retire when they have scored 25.

³² Senior provincial teams act as feeder teams to their respective franchise teams. A franchise team is a regionally based professional cricket team equivalent to English county teams (Dove, 2018).

³³ Moonda (2016); Dove (2019).

Within the context of club cricket, friendly games played are particularly important in fostering the game because ‘serious’ club and league cricket can exclude those who do not have the skills to deserve a place in the club’s playing eleven.

Club cricket, in its ‘serious’ form, does not, however, directly address the core problem of a lack of diversity in cricket. As Smith (2012) points out, the social composition of men’s cricket in England, in terms of national and professional representation, has narrowed as state schools have stopped playing cricket. As Table 3.2 showed, 47% of England’s Test squad to India in 2021 went to independent schools, which represent just 7% of England’s school population, while the remaining 93% of the school population had to be content with 53% of places. The English response to this disproportionality has been to attempt to popularise cricket by generating interest and building capacity in the game in state schools. An important institution performing this role has been the charity *Chance to Shine*.

This national charity aims to give children the opportunity to ‘play, learn, and develop’ through cricket. It works with the 39 County Cricket Boards across England and Wales to send specialist coaches into schools, once a week for six weeks, to support cricket coaching. A subgroup of the charity, *Chance to Shine in the Street*, seeks to bring cricket to some of the poorest areas of the UK by giving young adults in inner-city areas the opportunity to play cricket through 20-minute matches using tennis balls and plastic bats.³⁴ The main aim of the programme, which embraces both sexes, is educational: to use cricket as a means of developing values and standards of conduct in the children involved rather than simply trying to identify cricketing talent.

The impact of the charity’s work has been impressive. Between September 2019 and March 2020 – when the COVID lockdown began - nearly 204,000 children, evenly divided between girls and boys, and nearly 3,200 state and special needs schools, representing 17% of all such schools in England and Wales, took part in *Chance to Shine* school programmes; over the same period, a further 5,000 children, mostly from ethnically diverse communities, took part in coaching and competition in its 2021 *Shine in the Street* programmes (Chance to Shine, 2021)

³⁴ <https://www.chancetoshine.org/about-us> (accessed 9 June 2021).

The Indian Response to Disproportionality

Caste disproportionalities in Indian cricket are evidenced by the fact that most players in Indian teams are FCH (who comprise less than a quarter of India's population), with *Brahmins* especially prominent, and that BCH, who comprise over half the Indian population, constitute a small minority in the national teams. These imbalances did not cause either concern or embarrassment to India's cricketing establishment, or to its satellite of cricket commentators, until, in July 2017, the Union Minister for Social Justice set the cat among the pigeons by suggesting that 25% of places in the Indian team should be reserved for *Dalits* and persons from the Scheduled Tribes.³⁵

Such a demand was neither novel nor untoward in the Indian context. Lying at the heart of the Indian Constitution is a deep concern about ameliorating caste injustices and inequalities. In response to the social exclusion and the economic backwardness of persons of the (formerly) untouchable castes (*Dalits*) and the Scheduled Tribes (and latterly, persons from the Other Backward Classes), the Indian Constitution mandated the government to give preference to applicants from these groups by reserving a certain proportion of places for them in certain specific areas. These areas were: seats in the national parliament, state legislatures, municipality boards and village councils (panchayats); jobs in government or in publicly funded or publicly assisted organisations; and places in public higher educational institutions. Taken collectively, such policies are referred to in India as 'reservation policies'.³⁶

Although reservation policies applied only to public bodies it is a moot point as to whether the Board of Cricket Control in India (BCCI) should not be so regarded. Although the Indian Supreme Court has accepted that that the BCCI is not controlled by the government — which would have immediately made team selection subject to reservation policies — it has ruled that it performs 'public duties'.³⁷ These duties include team selection and, as such, are subject to Article 226 of the Constitution which empowers Indian high courts to issue, to any person or authority, including the

³⁵ <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/ramdas-athawale-demands-reservations-for-scs-sts-in-indian-cricket-team-4731325/> (accessed 9 June 2021).

³⁶ See Borooah (2019) for details of India's reservation policies.

³⁷ *Zee Telefilms versus Union of India*, 2005 <https://indianlawportal.co.in/case-analysis-zee-telefilms-ltd-v-union-of-india/> (accessed 1 December 2021).

government, orders to perform a public or a statutory duty. The upshot of these legal discussions is that the prospect of reservation policies being applied to the BCCI's team selection is not as far-fetched as some might imagine.³⁸

Yet, notwithstanding the unambiguous evidence that selection in Indian cricket is heavily skewed in favour of FCH — with the concomitant threat of reservation policies being extended to team selection — there remains an obdurate insistence on the part of Indian cricket administrators and their acolytes that professional cricket in India is, and always has been, caste-blind and based solely on merit. 'We must look beyond surnames', declared one senior BCCI official; another eminent commentator, seeing virtue in ignorance, claimed he didn't even know what the proportion of *Brahmins* in Indian society was; a senior coach, himself a *Brahmin*, saw the preponderance of *Brahmins* in the Indian team as 'just coincidence'.³⁹

Not a single person involved in the running of, or commentating on, Indian cricket was prepared to acknowledge that current caste imbalances were derived from historical wrongs emanating from a culture of excluding the lower castes from education, and *ipso facto* all the benefits that flowed from education, and corralling them, instead, into occupations that FCH would regard as dirty and demeaning. It is remarkable that none felt obliged, following the lead set by the Indian Constitution, to express sympathy, much less concern, about past injustices which, by denying opportunities to the backward castes, created these imbalances. Instead, they played caste imbalances with a dead bat: we choose on merit. As Sandel (2020, pp. 13, 14) observed:

In an unequal society, those who land on top want to believe their success is morally justified. In a meritocratic society, this means the winners must believe they have earned their success through their own talent and hard work ... the more we think of ourselves as self-made and self-sufficient, the harder it is to learn gratitude and humility. And without these sentiments, it is hard to care for the common good.

3.6 Conclusions

³⁸ See Bhawnani and Jain (2018) for a discussion of these legal points.

³⁹ Lobo (2020).

The narrative of this chapter has been one of opportunities offered, missed, and denied. It is very easy to underestimate the importance of opportunities in sculpting sporting success by, instead, ascribing success to a sportsperson's talent and natural gifts. As Syed (2010) writes: 'the delusion lies in focusing on individuality without perceiving — or bothering to look for — the powerful opportunities stacked in their favour ... practically every man or woman who triumphs against the odds is, on closer inspection, a beneficiary of unusual circumstances' (p. 11). As a former English table tennis champion, Syed acknowledges the singular childhood and adolescent circumstances which worked in his favour and launched him as a future champion. As he himself modestly acknowledges:

I was the best of a small bunch ... what is certain is that if a big enough group of youngsters had been given a [international standard] table tennis table at eight, had a brilliant elder brother to practise with, had been trained by one of the top coaches in the country, had joined the only twenty-four hour club in the country, I would not have been number one in England. I might not even have been number one thousand and one in England. (Syed, 2010, p.10)

But how are such opportunities to be created? The easy solution is to impose quotas. These have existed in South African cricket since 2015. In India, the reservation of jobs, places in education, and representative positions in politics is an accepted part of life and it has become somewhat of an automatic response of Indian politicians, when confronted by instances of disproportionality in representation, to whip their supporters into a frenzy by suggesting that the reach of reservation be extended to cover such cases — hence the demand by an Indian Minister that 25% of places in the national cricket team be subject to reservation.

The two most cited reasons for reservation/quotas are, firstly, to correct historical wrongs and, secondly, to achieve diversity. Quotas, however, are a blunt instrument for several reasons. Firstly, they can be emasculated unless they are accompanied by facilities to support persons who are the beneficiaries of quotas. Since it is the quotas and not the ancillary facilities that are legally mandated, there is the temptation on the part of those implementing policy to leave quota-beneficiaries to their own devices to manage without any support. A case in point are educational institutions in India. Reservation policies do give backward caste students opportunities for engineering and medical education in the country's premier institutions but, once admitted, many of them struggle to cope with

the twin pressures of high-level academia and institutional neglect.⁴⁰ In the context of the United States, Sander (2004) argued that affirmative action harmed black students by admitting them to courses with which they were unable to cope; the obverse of this mismatch is that it could also harm white and Asian students by denying them places in courses and academic institutions for which they were well qualified and prepared.

Secondly, the cost of reservation/quotas is borne by persons who did not have any role in perpetrating past wrongs and whose careers, hopes, and aspirations are sacrificed in the name of greater diversity. Consequently, quotas as an instrument of inclusion becomes simultaneously one of exclusion. Thirdly, the fact that quotas are intended to benefit those that are disadvantaged sets up a system of perverse incentives: ‘backwardness’ becomes a desirable label and groups seek ‘downward’ not ‘upward’ mobility. Indian politics is replete with agitations by groups of FCH seeking to be reclassified as BCH.⁴¹ Lastly, the worth of quota-based appointments is often devalued on account of how they were acquired, with ‘affirmative action hire’ an increasingly pejorative term on American campuses.

To be critical of quotas, however, is not to deny that the problems that they are intended to address are genuine. There is little doubt that the exclusion of persons from the higher echelons of life — of which professional cricket is a small part — based on colour in South Africa, caste in India, and schooling in England is a pressing issue that needs to be addressed and that, while quotas might provide a short-term fix, a longer-term solution requires capacity building among the neglected, along the lines of England’s *Chance to Shine* programme. The choice facing countries is whether to abjure diversity and maintain the *status quo* by preserving things as they are or to actively seek change through, perhaps long-term, policies aimed at spreading the jam of success more evenly over the national bread.

These choices echo Berlin’s (1969) distinction between negative and positive liberty. Negative liberty is the absence of interference by other parties in one’s actions. It is this notion of

⁴⁰ <https://www.firstpost.com/india/90-percent-of-iit-roorkee-dropouts-are-backward-caste-a-case-against-affirmative-action-2379964.html> (accessed 12 June 2021).

⁴¹ For example: the *Patels* in Gujarat, the *Marathas* in Maharashtra, and the *Jats* in Haryana.

liberty that motivates those who resist change: people who think selection should be colour-blind, or casteless, or pay no heed to the type of school attended. Positive liberty, on the other hand, is the possibility of acting to take control of one's life and realising one's potential. Political conservatism supports negative liberty by claiming that the preservation of individual liberty requires strong curbs on the activities of the state;⁴² proponents of positive liberty, on the other hand, argue that the concept of liberty includes citizens' self-fulfilment, and this may require a degree of state intervention. In the context of cricket, the choice, as this chapter has shown, is between negative liberty for the few or positive liberty for the many.

So, why do so many in the cricketing world resist change through diversity? It cannot be because performance standards will fall: increased geographical diversity in cricket in India has led its team of small-town players, after successive series wins against Australia and England, to the final of the 2021 World Test Championship, in contrast to the regular humiliations suffered by Bombay-centric Test teams at the hands of overseas opponents; quotas notwithstanding, the South African team inflicted an innings defeat on the West Indies in the Gros Islet Test on 12 June 2021; and England's men's Test side, an independent-school heavy team, crashed to a 3–1 series loss to India in March 2021 and, following that, to a 1–0 series defeat to New Zealand. In contrast, England's women cricketers, almost all of whom are state-school products, head the International Cricket Council's (ICC) World Cup rankings. The obdurate belief of cricket's supremos that nothing is wrong, when clearly something is, evokes John le Carré's description, in his novel *The Perfect Spy*, of the English establishment: 'Not bad men by any means. Not dishonest men. Not stupid. But men who see the threat to their class as synonymous with the threat to England' (le Carré, 1986, p. 374).

⁴² It should be noted that those who oppose interference are against the 'wrong', but perfectly happy to accept the 'right', sort of interference: private schools in England are happy that government 'interference' gives them charitable status, with all its attendant tax benefits, and would be unhappy if the government stopped so interfering.

Table 3.1: Access Inequality in Indian Cricket: *J* Values

Team	Number of Players in Squad	Number of <i>Brahmins</i> in Squad	Number of non-<i>Brahmin</i> FCH in Squad	Number of BCH in Squad	Number of 'Others' in Squad	<i>J</i> Value
Indian Men's Test Squad for Australia 2020-21	18	4	8	2	4	59.5
Indian Women's T20 Squad for 2020 World Cup	15	3	7	2	3	52.0
Men's IPL (Domestic Players only)	125	34	50	16	25	55.1
Women's IPL (Domestic Players only)	32	8	13	4	7	54.5

Source: Own Calculations

Table 3.2: Access Inequality in English Cricket: *J* Values*

Team	Number of Players in Squad	Number of Players from Independent Schools	Number of Players from State Schools	<i>J</i> Value
English Men's Test Squad for India 2021	15	7	8	38.4
English Women's T20 Squad for 2020 World Cup	15	2	13	2.0
Men's Hundred (Domestic Players only)	85	43	42	47.1
Women's Hundred (Domestic Players only)	72	18	54	11.1

*Excluding domestic players who were educated overseas

Source: Own Calculations


Table 3.3: Access Inequality in Indian Cricket Between FCH and non-FCH Players: *J* Values*

Team	Number of Players in Squad	Number of FCH in Squad	Number of BCH in Squad	<i>J</i> Value
Indian Men's Test Squad for Australia 2020-21	18	12	6	38.1
Indian Women's T20 Squad for 2020 World Cup	15	10	5	38.1
Men's IPL (Domestic Players only)	125	84	41	39.2
Women's IPL (Domestic Players only)	32	21	11	36.2

*non-FCH players comprise BCH, Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs

Source: Own Calculations

Figure 3.1: Optimal Representation in Squads by Members of Groups A and B



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