Disinformation, Benefit of Group Membership, and Conscience: An Economic Model

Harashima, Taiji (2025): Disinformation, Benefit of Group Membership, and Conscience: An Economic Model.

Abstract

Mutual trust and confidence are important to succeed not only in business but also in many other activities, which means that people do not necessarily behave totally selfishly, even in profit-maximizing activities. Non-selfish behaviors, in other words, behaviors induced by conscience and guilt, are particularly important to actualize the benefit of a group, team, organization, nation, or society as a whole. In this paper, I examine the role of conscience for the benefit of group membership and construct an economic model of conscience. Combining this model with a model of disinformation and mutual trust, I show that the level of conscience in an economy (society) is positively correlated with its efficiency and productivity. Furthermore, on the basis of this model, I discuss the political impact of conscience on, and argue that it will not be easy to establish, a democracy in a nation of low average conscience.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: The benefit of group membership; Conscience; Democracy; Disinformation; Economic efficiency
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General

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