中小投资者保护、股权结构与公司价值

Chen, Yan (2007): 中小投资者保护、股权结构与公司价值.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection and corporate valuation. “Tunneling effects” which means that the controlling shareholders enrich themselves by expropriating the rights and interests of minor shareholders are usually referred in recent literatures of corporate finance. In this paper, we build a simple model which combines the firm’s inside ownership structure with outside law and regulation surrounding in order to inhibit “Tunneling effects”, and then we analyze their effects on corporate valuation. Finally, we test the hypothesis obtained from the model using a sample of 110 firms listed in Chinese stock market. The empirical results show that better protection of minority shareholders and appropriate ownership structures can help to elevate the valuation of firms.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Protection of Minority Shareholders, Ownership Structure and Corporate Valuation
• Language: Chinese
• Keywords: Investor protection, Law and regulation, Ownership structure, Corporate valuation, Panel data estimate
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K22 - Business and Securities Law; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill

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