Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment

Kamei, Kenju and Tabero, Katy (2025): Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment.

Abstract

It is well-known that efficiency often fails to improve in public goods games with peer-to-peer punishment when counter-punishment is possible. This paper experimentally demonstrates, for the first time, that the effects of sanctioning institutions are modest, regardless of the decision-making format (individual or team). In the “team” conditions, subjects are randomly assigned to teams of three, and make joint decisions through communication. Their dialogue provides valuable insights into the motivations behind (counter-)punishment, as well as the resulting behavioral effects. A coding exercise reveals that first-order punishments (and counter-punishments) are primarily emotional responses to peers’ low contributions (and first-order punishments, respectively).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: C92, D01, H49
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H49 - Other

References

Cason, T., Mui, V. 2015. Rich Communication, Social Motivations, and Coordinated Resistance against Divide-and-Conquer. European Journal of Political Economy 37:146-159.

Charness, G., Sutter, M. 2012. Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 26:157-176.

Chen, D., Schonger, M., Wickens, C. 2016. oTree - An Open-source Platform for Laboratory, Online and Field Experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 9:88-97.

Cohen, J. 1960. A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales. Educational and Psychological Measurement 20:37-46.

Cox, C., Stoddard, B., 2018. Strategic Thinking in Public Goods Games with Teams. Journal of Public Economics 161:31-43.

Denant-Boemont, L., Masclet, D., Noussair, C. 2007. Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment. Economic Theory 33:145-167.

Fehr, E., Gächter, S., 2000. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review 90(4):980-994.

Fehr, E., Schmidt, K., 1999. A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3):817-868.

Gächter, S., Renner, E., Sefton, M., 2008. The Long-run Benefits of Punishment. Science 322(5907):1510-1510.

Kamei, K., 2019. Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma. Oxford Economic Papers 71(3):600-622.

Kamei, K., Putterman, L., 2015. In Broad Daylight. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 120:145-159.

Nikiforakis, N., 2008. Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Really Govern Ourselves. Journal of Public Economics 92:91-112.