Institutionalization and Institutional Evolution: A Model of Selecting Government Officials in Ancient China

Zhou, Haiwen (2025): Institutionalization and Institutional Evolution: A Model of Selecting Government Officials in Ancient China.

Abstract

Evolution of institutions in selecting government officials in ancient China reflected efficiency considerations and increased power concentration in the hands of the ruler. Selecting government officials in ancient China became more rule-based over time, and standardization and centralization were some key features of this process. In this dynamic model, a higher volume of transactions shown as the number of candidates needed to be evaluated leads to institutionalization which has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost in processing each transaction. In the steady state, a ruler with a more encompassing interest chooses a higher level of institutionalization. The impact of a change in the level of elite power on the level of institutionalization is sensitive to the relative power of state versus society.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Institutionalization, institutional evolution, rule-based governance, Chinese history, political economy
• Subjects: N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation > N45 - Asia including Middle East; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O53 - Asia including Middle East; P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P40 - General

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