Loureiro, Paulo Roberto Amorim (2025): Can Criminal Symbiosis Explain the Persistence of Violence in Brazil?
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Abstract
This paper develops the concept of “criminal symbiosis” to explain the persistence of violence in Brazil. Using official historical series, we document a systematic co-movement between serious crimes and minor offenses, suggesting a process of mutual reinforcement. When minor crimes increase, policing costs rise and the expected punishment for severe offenses declines, enabling escalation into homicide and organized crime. Conversely, targeted repression of minor infractions helps restore social norms and generates measurable deterrent effects. We formalize this mechanism through a dynamic system linking offender stocks, institutional responses, and intergenerational transmission of crime. The framework provides clear testable implications and supports integrated crime-prevention strategies that combine enforcement, rehabilitation, and community resilience.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Can Criminal Symbiosis Explain the Persistence of Violence in Brazil? |
| English Title: | Can Criminal Symbiosis Explain the Persistence of Violence in Brazil? |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Criminal symbiosis; Crime dynamics; Minor offenses; Homicide; Deterrence; Brazil |
| Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty > I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law |
| Item ID: | 126627 |
| Depositing User: | PhD Paulo R.A. Loureiro |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Dec 2025 07:31 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Dec 2025 07:31 |
| References: | Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. Ehrlich, I. (1973). Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 521–565. Felson, M. (2006). Crime and Nature. Sage Publications. Funk, P., & Kugler, P. (2003). Dynamic Models of Crime: Evidence and Theory. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 49(3), 343–369. Groff, E., & McCord, E. S. (2012). The Role of Neighborhood Parks as Crime Generators. Security Journal, 25(1), 1–24. Kelling, G. L., & Wilson, J. Q. (1982). Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety. The Atlantic Monthly, 249(3), 29–38. Rodriguez, C. (2022). Justice and Institutional Resilience in Latin America. Oxford University Press. Williams, P., & Godson, R. (2021). Crime, Corruption, and Security: Challenges for the 21st Century. Journal of Strategic Studies, 44(4), 513–536. |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/126627 |

