Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2025): Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor.
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Abstract
An existing study examines an international mixed duopoly involving a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm, focusing on their timing choices for quantities and showing that the state-owned public firm should act as the leader. This result differs from that for an endogenous-timing mixed duopoly model where a state-owned public firm coexists with a domestic private firm. We study the order of moves in a mixed duopoly with a state-owned public firm and a partially foreign-owned private competitor. We extend our analysis to a Cournot duopoly model that includes a non-linear demand function. Specifically, we explore the desirable role of the state-owned public firm, either as a leader or a follower, and present the equilibrium outcome of the model. Our findings indicate that, when the private firm’s foreign ownership is high, the public firm consistently assumes a leadership role in output decisions. Conversely, if the private firm’s foreign ownership is relatively low, the public firm may act either as the leader or as the follower in the market.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor |
| English Title: | Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Endogenous timing; Mixed oligopoly; Partial foreign ownership; Stackelberg |
| Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F23 - Multinational Firms ; International Business L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L32 - Public Enterprises ; Public-Private Enterprises |
| Item ID: | 126677 |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Kazuhiro Ohnishi |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Nov 2025 02:45 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2025 02:45 |
| References: | Amir, R., De Feo, G., 2014. Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly. International Journal of Game Theory 43 (3), 629-658. Deibono, F., Scarpa, C., 1995. Upward-sloping reaction functions under quantity competition in mixed oligopolies. Bulletin of Economic Research 47 (4), 341-346. Fernández-Ruiz, J., 2009. Managerial delegation in a mixed duopoly with a foreign competitor. Economics Bulletin 29 (1), 90-99. Fjell, K., Pal, D., 1996. A mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms. Canadian Journal of Economics 29 (3), 737-743. Hamilton, J. H., Slutsky, S. M., 1990. Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1), 29-46. Kawasaki, A., Ohkawa, T., Okamura, M., 2020. Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs. Australian Economic Papers 20 (2), 1-17. Lu, Y., 2006. Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with foreign private competitors: the linear demand case. Journal of Economics 88 (1), 49-68. Lu, Y., 2007. Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and foreign competitors. Economics Bulletin 12 (2), 1-7. Matsumura, T., 2003. Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a foreign competitor. Bulletin of Economic Research 55 (3), 275-287. Matsumura, T., Ogawa, A., 2010. On the robustness of private leadership in mixed duopoly. Australian Economic Papers 49 (2), 149-160. Matsumura, T., Ogawa, A., 2017. Inefficient but robust public leadership. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 17 (4), 387-398. Nett, L., 1993. Mixed oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 64 (3), 367-393. Nett, L., 1994. Why private firms are more innovative than public firms. European Journal of Political Economy 10 (4), 639-653. Ohnishi, K., 2012. Domestic and foreign ownership of private sector in mixed duopoly. Microeconomics and Macroeconomics 1 (2), 24-27. Ohnishi, K., 2021. Mixed duopoly, privatization, subsidization and partial foreign ownership. International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics 8 (9), 707-714. Pal, D., 1998. Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly. Economics Letters 61 (2), 181-185. |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/126677 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor. (deposited 02 May 2025 14:52)
- Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor. (deposited 07 Nov 2025 02:45) [Currently Displayed]

