Platforms, information asymmetry and leakage: why disintermediation may not hurt (so much) after all

Christmann, Robin and Rösch, Jürgen (2025): Platforms, information asymmetry and leakage: why disintermediation may not hurt (so much) after all.

Abstract

Asymmetric information in markets puts economic transactions at risk, but it may also provide the opportunity for value creation through digital platforms. This paper develops a typology of digital platforms based on the specific information asymmetries they address. We distinguish three archetypes (search platforms, enforcement platforms, and full-service matchmakers) each substituting for different missing market functions. This typology reveals that platforms do not uniformly reduce information asymmetries but rather substitute for specific missing market functions, and that these substitutions determine both their value proposition and vulnerability to disintermediation. Using a formal model of expert service markets, we show how diagnostic and enforcement roles interact when users can bypass the platform after matching. The analysis demonstrates that disintermediation can increase platform value by expanding the user base and strengthening network effects. Subscription fees outperform transaction fees when diagnostic uncertainty dominates, as they monetize matching value while tolerating selective leakage. Platforms’ strategic responses to disintermediation thus depend not on creating artificial lock-in but on addressing the market failures that justify their existence.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: disintermediation, leakage, platforms, credence goods
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79 - Other; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D49 - Other; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D89 - Other; L - Industrial Organization > L0 - General > L00 - General

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