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Optimal transfer of a quality-enhancing innovation in a vertical related market

Antelo, Manel and Bru, Lluís (2025): Optimal transfer of a quality-enhancing innovation in a vertical related market.

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Abstract

This paper examines the commercialization of an external, quality-enhancing (product) innovation within a vertically related market, comparing outright sale and licensing. Licensing may involve a royalty of per-unit or ad valorem type and potential adopters are two downstream firms that source a core input from a single upstream supplier. The analysis reveals that the patentholder’s incentive to license the innovation, particularly through per-unit royalties, outweighs that of an outright sale. This form of technology transfer, however, is shown to potentially reduce consumer and social welfare compared to the pre-innovation state, thus providing a rationale for public policy interventions aimed at restricting royalty-based technology transfer.

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