Logo
Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Sales tax evasion: The case of monopolists

Sato, Hideki (2025): Sales tax evasion: The case of monopolists.

[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_127426.pdf]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_127426.pdf

Download (282kB) | Preview

Abstract

This study addresses the following two questions focusing on state sales tax and the behavior of a monopolist: (1) Under what conditions would a monopolist evade state sales tax even if evasion is costly? and (2) Can tax rates and enforcement be effective deterrents against evasion? The analysis reveals that, under certain conditions, a monopolist facing enforcement may underreport sales rather than not report them at all, even if evasion incurs costs. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that reducing tax rates and strengthening enforcement can effectively prevent tax evasion and that such preventive measures can lead to increased tax revenue.

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.