A Foot in the Door: Seller Preferences for Surcharges

Haruvy, Ernan and Heinrich, Timo and Walker, Matthew J. (2026): A Foot in the Door: Seller Preferences for Surcharges.

Abstract

This paper studies hold-ups in markets where sellers may impose undisclosed surcharges. While prior work has examined price transparency’s role in market outcomes, the distinct effect of a transparency norm—separate from a fairness norm—remains unestablished. We formulate a simple model that separates these norms and characterizes their equilibrium implications across different market settings. The model shows that price competition yields higher buyer surplus than ultimatum bargaining and that this surplus increases with transparency concerns but decreases with fairness concerns because of softened competition. Compulsory surcharges cannot be higher in bargaining, as sellers prefer a higher price to a higher surcharge as long as it does not change the buyer’s probability of acceptance. Experimental results confirm the transparency norm’s influence: Total prices are lower with price competition, and surcharges are lower with ultimatum bargaining. Additionally, surcharges rise when pricing is outside of the seller’s control. Estimates of the behavioral parameters reveal that sellers weigh transparency at least as heavily as fairness. The results imply that firms fearing hold-ups should still procure goods and services in competitive market structures.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: surcharge, transparent pricing, fairness, social norm, hold-up, procurement
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D47 - Market Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M55 - Labor Contracting Devices

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