Fotis, Panagiotis and Polemis, Michael (2026): Cartel Recidivism and Innovation Activity in the US.
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Abstract
In this study, we present the first systematic evidence of the impact of cartel recidivism on innovation. Combining data from an international price-fixing cartel database with the structural characteristics of the US manufacturing sectors at the six-digit NAICS level, we analyze how cartel recidivists influence subsequent innovation outcomes. Using a staggered difference-in-differences (DiD) framework for 110 US cartel cases over the period 1979-2016 and a novel heterogeneous estimator, we find that cartel recidivists lead to a significant and sustained decline in innovation progress. We argue that cartel recidivists, rather than single offenders, drive the negative impact of collusion on innovation. The results of this study are vigorous to several robustness tests, justifying the absence of pretreatment effects and endogeneity.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Cartel Recidivism and Innovation Activity in the US |
| English Title: | Cartel Recidivism and Innovation Activity in the US |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Cartel; Recidivism; Innovation; Antitrust; Difference in Differences |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
| Item ID: | 128115 |
| Depositing User: | Panagiotis Fotis |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Apr 2026 07:32 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Apr 2026 07:32 |
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| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/128115 |

