From Satire to Policy: An Interdisciplinary Economic Analysis of Gulliver’s Travels and Its Insights for Institutional and Behavioural Reform in Developing Economies

Asuamah Yeboah, Samuel (2026): From Satire to Policy: An Interdisciplinary Economic Analysis of Gulliver’s Travels and Its Insights for Institutional and Behavioural Reform in Developing Economies.

Abstract

Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726) is widely recognised as a literary satire, yet its economic insights have received limited systematic analysis. The study presents a novel interdisciplinary examination, applying institutional and behavioural economic frameworks to Swift’s four voyages, Lilliput, Brobdingnag, Laputa, and the land of the Houyhnhnms, to illuminate enduring economic and governance principles. By interpreting Swift’s allegorical societies through the lenses of rent-seeking, moral governance, resource misallocation, and bounded rationality, the paper demonstrates that his satire anticipates core concepts of modern economics, including public choice theory, welfare economics, institutional economics, and behavioural economics. Uniquely, the analysis extends beyond literary critique to draw contemporary policy implications for developing economies, with a particular focus on Ghana. The study shows that political patronage, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and behavioural biases observed in these contexts mirror those in Swift’s fictional societies, underscoring the relevance of ethical leadership, rational institutions, and behaviourally informed policy design. By bridging literature, economic theory, and practical governance, this research contributes to the emerging field of “literary economics” and provides a novel framework for understanding how cultural narratives can inform economic reasoning, institutional reform, and sustainable development.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Gulliver’s Travels, institutional economics, behavioural economics, governance, moral economy, literary economics, policy reform.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements; P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies

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