La stabilisation monétaire en république démocratique du Congo: personnalité des décideurs et chances de succès

E. AUGA, Esdras and K. CILENGI, Augustin (2026): La stabilisation monétaire en république démocratique du Congo: personnalité des décideurs et chances de succès. Published in:

Abstract

This study examines monetary stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by highlighting the role of policymakers’ personality traits in shaping the likelihood of stabilization success over the period 1995–2024. While conventional monetary theories primarily attribute price stability to the control of monetary aggregates, this research argues that policymakers’ behavioral characteristics constitute a key determinant of policy effectiveness. The analysis focuses on integrity as a measurable dimension of personality, proxied by the ratio of monetary financing of the Treasury to fiscal revenues. Using annual data from the Central Bank of Congo and applying the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach, the results confirm the existence of a long-run relationship among inflation, money supply growth, integrity, and external balance variables. Monetary expansion significantly affects inflation in both the short and long run. However, the inflationary impact of money growth is conditional on the degree of integrity embodied by policymakers. Higher institutional discipline reduces inflationary transmission and increases the probability of successful stabilization. These findings suggest that sustainable price stability depends not only on technical monetary instruments but also on governance quality and policymaker credibility.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Monetary stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo: the personality of decision-Makers and the Chances of Success
• Language: French
• Keywords: Monetary stabilization, Policymaker personality, Integrity, Inflation, Central bank credibility.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O55 - Africa

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