Captive Supervisory Regimes

Suñas, Zygphryd (2026): Captive Supervisory Regimes.

Abstract

I develop a simple theory of supervised training under multitask incentives in which participation is valuable independently of completion. When completion-inducing effort is not contractible and supervisors allocate time across competing activities, equilibrium completion effort may be pinned to the minimum required for participation. The model yields two regimes: an alignment regime, where effort is determined by marginal incentives, and a captive regime, where it is pinned by the participation constraint. Comparative statics are regime dependent and can be counterintuitive: higher completion payoffs and participation benefits may reduce effort under a captive regime, while portable benefits and competition can mitigate this distortion by raising outside options. I discuss this mechanism as an explanation for low completion rates and extended time-to-degree in graduate education in developing contexts.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: multitask incentives, supervision, participation constraints, graduate completion, higher education, human capital, development
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics

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