Logo
Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Dynamic Efficiency without Increasing Returns: Intertemporal Externalities in Competitive Economies

Singh, Jaspal (2026): Dynamic Efficiency without Increasing Returns: Intertemporal Externalities in Competitive Economies.

[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_128727.pdf]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_128727.pdf

Download (223kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of dynamic inefficiency in a competitive economy with intertemporal externalities arising from structural accumulation. Current output enhances future productive capacity, but firms fail to internalise this effect, generating a wedge between private and social returns to output. This missing intertemporal component of marginal returns is captured by a positive dynamic efficiency wedge. As a result, the competitive equilibrium is dynamically inefficient, with output systematically below the level consistent with intertemporal optimality.

The inefficiency arises under concave technologies and does not rely on increasing returns, non-convexities, or market power. The paper further shows that the optimal allocation can be decentralised through an output-contingent subsidy that internalises the dynamic efficiency wedge. The resulting policy is self-financing in present value while respecting a wage constraint, yielding an implementation that is both efficient and institutionally robust.

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.