A Non-Activation Theorem for Platforms

Hamada, Yuhei (2026): A Non-Activation Theorem for Platforms.

Abstract

We identify the conditions under which every economic field (including platforms) is behaviorally equivalent to a pure field. The conditions hold if and only if every searcher either has complete information, or has incomplete information with an infinite attention budget (λ j = ∞) and zero opportunity cost (K j = 0) (Non-Activation Theorem).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Platform Economics, Mechanism Design, Search Theory, Information Economics, Matching Theory, Pure Field, Economic Field
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D00 - General; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D47 - Market Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness

References

None