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Behavioral Earmarking and Capital Drag: The Macroeconomics of Green Subsidies

Rawat, Rohit (2026): Behavioral Earmarking and Capital Drag: The Macroeconomics of Green Subsidies.

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Abstract

Standard fiscal theory treats green subsidies as income transfers whose allocation is governed by rational optimization. We embed Thalerian mental accounting into a two-period overlapping generations model, formalizing subsidy earmarking as a binding psychological constraint. The model yields a closed-form result: earmarked transfers elevate the marginal propensity to consume the targeted good while crowding out aggregate savings. When the subsidy is sufficiently large relative to the preference weight on standard consumption, the behavioral friction generates a permanently lower steady-state capital stock relative to the neoclassical benchmark—a hidden long-run cost of green fiscal policy. We derive the precise threshold condition and show that Pigouvian carbon taxation dominates earmarked subsidies in the capital-accumulation dimension.

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