Las señales no desaparecen, evolucionan: erosión informativa y señalización adaptativa bajo shocks exógenos de costo

Ladera, Ivan (2026): Las señales no desaparecen, evolucionan: erosión informativa y señalización adaptativa bajo shocks exógenos de costo.

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic conceptual framework that extends classical signaling theory (Spence, 1973) to analyze the informational consequences of exogenous reductions in signaling costs. The informational content of a signal is operationalized through the Signal Informational Content (SIC), a measurement construct directly linked to the separating equilibrium condition that enables the evolution of a signal's informational value to be tracked following exogenous cost shocks. The paper also introduces the Separating Capacity Conservation Principle (SCCP), according to which competitive selection markets tend to restore differentiation whenever a signal loses informational content. In response to technological, institutional, organizational, or social shocks that reduce the cost of emitting a signal, receivers may adapt through internal signal stratification or substitution toward alternative signals. The framework identifies four conditions under which informational erosion is likely to occur, derives three empirically testable propositions, and integrates these mechanisms within the Dynamic Signal Erosion Framework (DSEF). Unlike the literature on credential inflation, screening, educational devaluation, and dynamic signaling, the proposed framework explicitly models exogenous cost reductions as the causal mechanism underlying informational erosion and extends the analysis to both formal and informal signals in educational and labor markets. Finally, the paper presents illustrative applications involving selective educational programs, international scholarships, generative artificial intelligence, digital technical certifications, and youth leadership credentials.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Signals Don't Disappear, They Evolve: Informational Erosion and Adaptive Signaling under Exogenous Cost Shocks
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: teoría de la señalización; erosión informativa; inflación de credenciales; equilibrio separador; señalización dinámica; inteligencia artificial
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I26 - Returns to Education; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity

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