New approaches to crisis resolution: Weighing the options (A comment)

Reinhart, Carmen (2003): New approaches to crisis resolution: Weighing the options (A comment). Published in: Brookings Trade Forum 2003 (2003): pp. 338-348.

Abstract

Comments on: Barry Eichengreen, Kenneth Kletzer, and Ashoka Mody who describe the debate over collective action clauses, which have been considered by the G-7,G-10, G-20, G-22, G-30, Institute of International Finance (IIF),International Monetary Fund, International Monetary and Financial Committee(IMFC), Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), Emerging Markets Credit Association (EMCA), a variety of finance ministries, and others no doubt—although not, to my knowledge, the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). For those who have not received a merit badge in the language of internationalbureaucrats, collective action clauses allow a specified majority of bondholders to represent the interests of the totality of issuers in renegotiations with the issuer.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: debt, restructuring, collective action, moral hazard
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G15 - International Financial Markets; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation

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