Kangsik, Choi (2009): Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization.
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Abstract
By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into an extended game with observable delay, this study provides new insight into the trade-off between the government and the public firm's payoff in a government's optimal policy of privatization. The results show that: (i) regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues, the government does not have an incentive to privatize in an endogenous timing context even though there are conflicts of interest between the public firm and the government and (ii) under a mixed duopoly, each sequential-move equilibrium varies with the level of the government's preference for tax revenues.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Government's Preference, Extended Game, Tax, Privatization |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets |
Item ID: | 13844 |
Depositing User: | Kangsik Choi |
Date Deposited: | 07 Mar 2009 06:59 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 02:02 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/13844 |