Communication channels and induced behavior

Brosig, Jeannette (2006): Communication channels and induced behavior.

Abstract

This paper reports recent findings on the effects of cheap talk communication on behavior. It exemplifies how different communication channels influence decisions in various games and information environments and addresses possible consequences for the design of real-world economic environments.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: communication, economic experiment, bargaining, public good
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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