Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The Value for Actions-Set Games

Calvo, Emilio and Urbano, Amparo (2009): The Value for Actions-Set Games.

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Action-Set games are transferable utility games where the set of players is finite, every player has a finite set of actions, and the worth of the game is a function of the actions taken by the players. In this setting a rule has to determine individual payoffs at each combinations of actions. Following an axiomatic approach, we define the set of Consistent Bargaining Equilibria.

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