On the existence of monotone selections

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2009): On the existence of monotone selections.

Abstract

For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of a monotone selection are obtained. (1) The correspondence is weakly ascending while each value is chain-complete. (2) The correspondence is ascending while the target is a sublattice of the Cartesian product of a finite number of chains. (3) Both source and target are chains while the correspondence is generated by the maximization of a strongly acyclic interval order with the single crossing property. The theorems give new sufficient conditions for the existence of (epsilon) Nash equilibria.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Monotone selection; (weakly) ascending correspondence; interval order; single crossing; (epsilon) Nash equilibrium
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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