Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2009): On the existence of monotone selections.
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Abstract
For a correspondence from a partially ordered set to a lattice, three sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of a monotone selection are obtained. (1) The correspondence is weakly ascending while each value is chaincomplete. (2) The correspondence is ascending while the target is a sublattice of the Cartesian product of a finite number of chains. (3) Both source and target are chains while the correspondence is generated by the maximization of a strongly acyclic interval order with the single crossing property. The theorems give new sufficient conditions for the existence of (epsilon) Nash equilibria.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  On the existence of monotone selections 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Monotone selection; (weakly) ascending correspondence; interval order; single crossing; (epsilon) Nash equilibrium 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  14451 
Depositing User:  Nikolai S. Kukushkin 
Date Deposited:  04 Apr 2009 16:08 
Last Modified:  29 Sep 2019 04:36 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/14451 
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