Taking Stock of Research on Regional Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Contents

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................. 1

2. Historical Overview ...................................................................................................................... 1
   Anthropology of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa ................................................................. 2
   Colonial interferences .............................................................................................................. 4
   Underlying theory and empirical approaches of migration research in Africa ..................... 6
   Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 7

3. Scale, Structure, and Regional Trends of Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa ....................... 8
   West Africa ................................................................................................................................. 9
   Central Africa ........................................................................................................................... 10
   East Africa ............................................................................................................................... 11
   Southern Africa ...................................................................................................................... 11
   Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 12

4. Migration and Labor Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa ............................................................. 13
   Migration and labor markets in receiving countries .............................................................. 13
   Migration and labor markets in sending countries ............................................................... 15
   The case of agricultural labor ............................................................................................... 17
   Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 19

5. Migration and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa ......................................... 20
   Migration and remittances ....................................................................................................... 20
   Remittances and development ............................................................................................... 21
   Migrants in receiving countries: development partners or development parasites? ............ 24
   Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 26

6. Institutions, Policies, and Regional Migrations ..................................................................... 27
   National regulatory frameworks ........................................................................................... 27
   Regional integration, economic grouping, and migration .................................................... 29
   Migration, democratization, and rebellion .......................................................................... 30
   Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 32

7. Migration and Social and Gender Issues ............................................................................... 33
   Migration, health, and HIV/AIDS ......................................................................................... 33
   Women in migration .............................................................................................................. 35
   Migration and ethical issues: trafficking and child labor .................................................... 36
   Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 38

8. General Conclusions and Implications .................................................................................. 38
   Complexity of labor movements ......................................................................................... 38
   Data gaps ............................................................................................................................... 39
   Underlying forces .................................................................................................................. 39
   Remittances ........................................................................................................................... 40
   Regional responses ................................................................................................................ 41

Annexes ........................................................................................................................................ 42
   Annex 1 Tables on migration in Sub-Saharan Africa .......................................................... 42
   Annex 2 Maps on flows and scales of international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa ........ 50

References ....................................................................................................................................... 50
1. Introduction

This study reviews a host of issues related to international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa and presents an overview of the state of the art of research and knowledge. Its aim is to identify policies and research areas that will improve understanding and management of migration in Sub-Sahara Africa and help maximize the potential benefits of migration, especially for poor people, while minimizing its risks and costs. The study covers a broad range of issues in the migration literature, but is not exhaustive.

This report first provides a historical overview of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa and then examines the scale and regional trends of migration. It explores the intersections between migration and labor market and the links between migration and development. It also looks at institutions and policies and investigates issues related to politics, ethics, and migration before exploring implications for further investigation.

2. Historical Overview

Geographic mobility has always been an integral part of the social processes of groups around the world (Bilger and Kraler 2005). Facilitated in recent years by improved transportation and communications and stimulated by large economic and social inequalities in the world, people are increasingly moving across international borders in an effort to improve their well-being and that of their family.

Migration of human populations is generally recognized as an integral part of socioeconomic development. It ensures the mobility of labor and its associated human capital between regions and occupations. In a competitive economy migration helps to bring factor markets in different geographical areas into equilibrium (Byerlee 1972). The economic development of Western Europe and the United States was closely associated with the movement of labor from rural to urban areas (Todaro 1977).

No generally accepted typology of migration flows exists, but the literature commonly classifies contemporary migration flows in Sub-Saharan Africa in temporal and spatial dimensions. The temporal aspect of migration relates both to the distance traversed and the duration of residence at the destination. In Sub-Saharan Africa migrations include seasonal migration, short-term migration for two to five years, and long-term or permanent migrations. Spatially, migrations may be rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to rural, or urban to urban (Amselle 1976).
Other less common typologies break migration into survival migration, in which push factors (economic, political, natural, or social distress) are largely responsible for the exit of people, and opportunity-seeking migration, in which pull factors (better opportunities) are largely responsible for the attraction of migrants. Chain and group migration are other types in Sub-Saharan Africa. In chain migration migrants rely on a network of social relations (friends, relatives, townfolk) to provide accommodations on arrival and assist in securing employment. Unlike voluntary migration, which derives mainly from economic factors, the reasons for mass or group migration within and across international borders in Sub-Saharan Africa are noneconomic and are related to political and religious factors and sometimes to natural disasters.

The relative importance of each of these types of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa has varied historically. Seasonal migration between rural areas is important in areas of Sub-Saharan Africa with a pronounced dry season. Historically, seasonal migration to the forest during the dry season has been the most important and widespread in semi-arid areas (Byerlee 1979). Generally, migrants leave their farms in the savannah zone immediately after harvest in November–December and return for planting in April–May. Short-term migration between rural and urban areas was important throughout Sub-Saharan Africa during the colonial period. Typically, men migrated from their village for two to five years to work in mines, plantations, and factories, sometimes at considerable distance from their home. Often men would make such trips several times during their lifetime, giving rise to a circular pattern of migration. With increasing unemployment, the competition of a growing body of school leavers, and the closing of international boundaries, the short-term migrant has gradually phased into a permanent migrant, leading to rapid rates of urbanization accompanied by serious problems of urban unemployment.

**Anthropology of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Early analyses concluded that migration began in many Sub-Saharan African countries as a result of colonial policies and practices (Eicher and Baker 1984). This simplistic view ignored the possible role of the pre-colonial environment (box 1). Today, it is increasingly accepted that understanding migration in Sub-Saharan Africa requires placing it within the anthropological context in which it originated.

Africa has long been described as an extremely mobile continent. For example, European travelers in the nineteenth century deplored the “elusiveness” and instability of African settlements and villages, which were easily created and easily abandoned (Bilger and Kraler 2005). Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa has long been characterized by slash-and-burn systems, with long fallow to restore soil fertility. Facing declining land productivity, farmers have adjusted by expanding cultivation into marginal land and
colonizing new forest areas, giving rise to the shifting cultivation practice (Nkamleu and Manyong 2005; Nkamleu 1999). Past movements were triggered by a variety of factors, though most were associated with the prevailing sociopolitical and ecological conditions, especially internecine warfare, natural disasters, slavery, and the search for farm land (Adepoju 1998; Adedokun 2003). It has been suggested that the contemporary phenomenon of massive outmigration from the rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa may represent a continuation in a different guise of earlier migratory movements provoked by slavery and the slave trade on the continent (Mabogunje 1990).

Migration within and between regions in Africa therefore reflected the general global pattern in which a set of push factors (a deteriorating economy, political instability, droughts, and wars) were largely responsible for the exit of people from the sending areas, and a set of pull factors (relative economic prosperity, peace, stability) were responsible for the attraction of migrants to the receiving areas. As a result, the movements were unstructured and occurred in groups; the migrants were demographically undifferentiated.

This pre-colonial migration in Africa was basically oriented toward trade, labor, and religion (for pilgrimages) and occurred without legal restraints and barriers. The absence of strict legal restrictions made it possible for nomads, farm workers, seamen, traders, and preachers to migrate freely and frequently across international borders, even during the colonial era (Adedokun 2003). These movements were generally circular, seasonal, and of short duration. Pastoral nomads moved across countries in response to seasonal climate change. Pastoralists moved between Somalia and Ethiopia, between Kenya and Tanzania, and between northern Nigeria and Cameroon, for example (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006). Sedentary farmers also moved seasonally in search of supplementary income during the slack dry farming season, moving from the drier interior into the plantations (cocoa and coffee) of West Africa and also to the coastal farm estates (cotton and tea) of East Africa (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006).

**Box 1. Pre-colonial migration context**

- Africa has long been described as an extremely mobile continent.
- Villages were easily created and easily abandoned.
- Movements were basically oriented toward trade, labor, and religion (for pilgrimages) and were without legal restraints and barriers.
- Movements were associated largely with prevailing sociopolitical and ecological conditions, especially internecine warfare, natural disasters, slavery, and the search for farm land.
- Little organized, these movements were generally circular, seasonal, and of short duration.
Colonial interferences

The evolution of migration in the post-independence period since 1960 reflects the colonial strategies of the time (box 2). Various policies and activities in Sub-Saharan Africa during both the colonial and post-colonial eras induced considerable rural labor movements at early stages in the development process (Mabogunje 1990).

Rural migration began in many African countries as a result of colonial policies and practices that superimposed a monetized economy on peasant production (Eicher and Baker 1984). Starting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the mechanisms displacing migrants from their rural homes were many and varied. A high degree of coercion was needed.

Colonial tax systems, for example, required cash payments and therefore necessitated wage work. The colonialists also introduced cash crops. In Eastern and Southern Africa white settlers monopolized this production; in West Africa (where climate and malaria discouraged white settlers), tax and labor policies were used to induce Africans to produce cash crops for European markets. In many areas peasant cash crop production led indirectly to outmigration because cash crops disrupted the production of food crops, resulting in a need to engage in wage labor to pay for foodstuffs. In some areas cash cropping competes with subsistence crops for land, labor, and resources. While often more lucrative than food crops, cash crops also entail more risk; when prices fall, or are kept down by government policies, household income flows may be threatened, resulting in the need to migrate (Amselle 1976).

Both the pattern of rural migration and the evolving character of the agrarian response to it can be viewed as a consequence of the restructuring of local economies of Sub-Saharan Africa into the prevailing capitalist modes of production. In Sub-Saharan Africa restructuring involved the establishment of modes of agricultural production within what came to be identified as the colonial territories of various European nations (Mabogunje 1990). These colonial modes of production, beyond their more obvious effects on such matters as race relations, the land tenure system, and land availability, generally exerted a traumatic and momentous impact throughout the rural social structure. In

<table>
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<th>Box 2. Colonization and migration</th>
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<td><strong>Tax policies coupled with unbalanced investment in the interior regions mobilized short-term laborers, who met their cash needs by migrating to work in mines and plantations.</strong></td>
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*French colonial policy*
- French policy adopted forced labor recruitment as a means of mobilizing workers.
- This policy was later regarded as unsatisfactory and replaced by tax levies on native population.

*British colonial policy*
- British policy introduced head taxes to encourage small farmers to produce cash crops and to sell their labor to European plantations and mines.
Sub-Saharan Africa labor rather than land has always been the factor of production in short supply. The mechanisms of procuring labor for these various modes of colonial production had far-reaching consequences for traditional institutional arrangements and rural class formation and provoked diverse responses to ensure the continued viability of agrarian economies in most parts of the region (Amselle 1976; Mabogunje 1990).

Colonial strategies varied widely throughout Africa, making it difficult to generalize about the impact of these strategies. British colonial policy in Kenya, for example, promoted extensive European settlements. Much of the best land was reserved for Europeans starting in the late 1890s. Head taxes were introduced to encourage small farmers to produce cash crops and to sell their labor to European plantations and mines. By contrast, British colonial policy in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone sharply restricted plantation development and settlement by white farmers. In fact, British colonial policy in Nigeria prevented private plantations from gaining long-term control over land (Eicher and Baker 1984).

In contrast to British policy, which restricted settlers and plantations in Nigeria, French policy encouraged Europeans to establish plantations to grow coffee and cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire. Initially, the French colonial administration in West Africa adopted some processes of forced labor recruitment. Until 1946 all men in French West Africa between the ages of 18 and 60 was subject by law to an annual corvée, requiring them to contribute a certain number of days’ labor to whatever enterprise the administration assigned them.

Gradually, forced labor came to be regarded as unsatisfactory and was replaced by taxes. Officially, this system was justified on the grounds that the colonized people should contribute to the cost of their administration. In reality, the tax compelled the local populations to find ways of raising money and hence to participate in the emerging monetized capitalist-oriented economy (Mabogunje 1990). Gradually, Ivorians started to grow coffee and cocoa on small plots scattered throughout the forest, but since they used European techniques, they were called planters.

In a study of rural outmigration in Mali, Mazur (1984) reported that the French undermined local craft production with cheap imported goods and imposed head taxes to mobilize the Malians as laborers, who met their cash needs by migrating to work on peanut farms in Senegal and cocoa plantations in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. This massive migration was exacerbated by the French strategy of contrived stagnation and unbalanced investment in the interior regions of West Africa. Vastly disproportionate investment occurred throughout this period, particularly between 1945 and 1960, in the coastal areas (Mazur 1984).
In Eastern and Southern Africa migrants were not directly coerced. Rather, strong economic policies were used to induce men to work in the mines and plantations (Adepoju 1998). In South Africa, in particular, workers’ families have been prevented from living with them at work sites since 1963 (Adepoju 1998). This prohibition, coupled with low pay and poor working conditions, initially led to high labor turnover. These conditions were designed to maintain low subsistence wages and promote a temporary and targeted pattern of migration.

**Underlying theory and empirical approaches of migration research in Africa**

Research on migration and population mobility has long been an important subject in African studies. From a large review of the literature Eicher and Baker (1984) argue that there are three broad and interrelated schools of thought on migration: structural-functionalist, neoclassical economics, and political economy.

The *structural functionalist* approach has a long history. It examines the individual decision to migrate within a broad pattern of social relationships and social-structural conditions, including some economic variables. This approach generally presents a positive view of migration.

*Neoclassic economics* treats migration as an economic phenomenon in which the migrant weighs the costs and returns from current and future employment opportunities. A turning point in migration research by neoclassical economists came with Todaro’s (1977) “expected incomes” model of migration. Todaro’s seminal contribution has provided a framework for much of the econometric work on migration in the past decade.

The *political economy* approach views the historical expansion of capitalism as the main explanation for migration. It is assumed that while migration may improve the private economic return of individual migrants, the net short- and long-term social and economic effects of migration may be negative in the source area and positive in the receiving area.

Some researchers (Miro and Potter 1980) argue that theory of international migration has not acquired any meaning in the field. The pattern, determinants, and consequences of international migration seem to vary enormously between regions and often between countries, as well as over time.

Until recently, migration research in Africa was almost exclusively the domain of anthropologists, sociologists, and geographers. Byerlee (1972) reviewed several hundred migration studies in Africa and reported that the bulk of the research over the 1950–70 period was carried out by sociologists, geographers, and demographers relying on census data and cross-sectional surveys of migrants in urban areas. Much of the early research on migration tended to focus on social, cultural, and psychological factors, while recog-
nizing, but not carefully evaluating, the importance of economic variables that influence migration (Todaro 1977).

The factors influencing the decision to migrate are varied and complex. People who are considering changes in residence take into account many factors, including the monetary costs and returns from migration, the services and amenities available in the region of origin and destination, and the intangible costs of adapting to a new environment. Since migration is a selective process affecting individuals with certain economic, social, educational, and demographic characteristics, the relative influence of economic and noneconomic factors may vary not only between nations and regions but also within defined geographic areas and populations.

Recent studies in Sub-Saharan Africa have concluded that economic motives are the primary determinant of the quantity and direction of migration flows between rural and urban areas (Byerlee 1972; Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). They use as a point of departure the theoretical work of Todaro, with migrants basing their decision on the discounted present value of the difference between urban expected income (taking into account the probability of finding a job) and rural expected income, less the cost of moving (Todaro 1977; Stier 1982). Age and level of education greatly influence the expected income differential. Artificially high wages in the urban formal sector (because of minimum wage laws, for example) increase the differential between expected rural income and expected urban income and can induce increased rural-urban migration, even where urban unemployment is already substantial. Under this model, efforts to increase formal sector employment often induce migration and result in higher unemployment rates than in the source location. Invariably, every migration study in Africa concludes that the immigrants were mostly males in the young working ages and better educated than the average rural resident (Eicher and Baker 1984; Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980).

Most recent work focuses on both migration and development. Increasing attention is being given to remittance flows, a major source of foreign capital for dozens of countries in the region (Ozden and Schiff 2006).

**Conclusion**

Rural-rural migrations have become common only since the first decade of the twentieth century, in response to demand for wage-earning labor of an emergent capitalist economy. Since the end of the Second World War the number of rural areas that attract migrant farmers has increased, as has the number of migrants into the cities.

Colonial rule paved the way for peace and political stability, so that movements previously associated with internecine warfare ceased or were reduced. However, these movements have resurfaced in the form of refugees, as independent nations have engaged
in war (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone), internal conflict (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan), or political discord (Zimbabwe). Natural disasters such as the drought in the Sahel region of West Africa and parts of East Africa have dislodged many thousands of people. The search for new and fertile land continues, and the number of landless poor has increased considerably, notably in East Africa.

The economic theory of migration is similar to the theory of trade, but migration is a much more complex phenomenon. Like trade, migration is likely to enhance economic growth and the welfare of both native inhabitants and migrants, and restrictions on migration are likely to have economic costs. However, people move for a variety of reasons, by no means all economic. There are significant externalities—both social and economic—to migration. Further economic conceptualization is needed to integrate all these aspects into a realistic migration framework.

3. Scale, Structure, and Regional Trends of Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

Measuring migration is difficult, and commonly estimated migration rates pose special problems of interpretation. For example, the definition of international migrant residents differs from country to country and from survey to survey, sometimes being defined as foreign-born and sometimes as a foreign national. Some classifications are based on the ethnicity of the parent; others on the place of birth. To complicate matters, much of the international migration in Africa occurs outside of a regulatory framework (ECA 2005; Kanyenze 2004; Adedokun 2003). In addition, the usual estimate for net urban growth due to migration (urban growth rate less national growth rate) may be inflated by the reclassification of rural areas as urban areas.

The most common sources of information for migration research are national census reports on the numbers of foreign-born or foreign nationals. But census data are not available for many countries, and even when they exist, there are several sources of potential bias. However, census data provide a fairly solid, conservative baseline estimate of the numbers of migrants and the general directions of their movement (Page and Plaza 2005; Lucas 2005). This section relies on estimates of migrant stocks compiled by the United Nations Population Division and some scattered data from various other sources to identify trends in migration in different regions of Sub-Saharan Africa.

In Sub-Saharan Africa migration is extremely unstable over time. Among the countries in the world with the highest coefficient of variation in the net migration rate in the past 50 years, the top 4, and 22 of the top 50, are in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lucas 2005).
West Africa

In a survey of research on the migration stock in West Africa, Stier (1982) argues that the volume of emigration was light until 1923 and then increased from 1924 to 1932 (box 3). Forced recruitment for work increased in the plantations of Côte d’Ivoire, but Ghana remained the principal destination until 1932. The partitioning of Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso) among Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger in 1932 facilitated conscription, and the flow of workers to Côte d’Ivoire increased. Forced labor was officially abolished between 1936 and 1939, but administrative pressure increased the amount of semivoluntary emigration to Côte d’Ivoire from roughly 4,000 to 9,500 people. Forced labor was reinstated in 1940, and the number of Voltaic (now Burkinabe) workers in Côte d’Ivoire reached roughly 71,000 by 1942. With the abolition of forced labor and the reconstitution of Upper Volta, emigration to Ghana increased for a few years, but Côte d’Ivoire became the principal destination after 1950. In Togo there was little investment during the colonial period, and many public sector jobs were held by Dahomeyans. Many Togolese emigrated. By 1925–30 there were at least 75,000 Togolese nationals in Ghana, and by 1960 there were 280,000 (Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980).

In Soudan Français (Mali) the motivation for young men to take up seasonal work in the groundnut regions of Senegambia was, as in Upper Volta, mostly to escape recruitment for forced labor and to earn money to pay taxes (Stier 1982). The number of Sudanian workers in the groundnut areas may have reached 25,000–30,000 by 1920–21 (Stier 1982). The numbers fell sharply in the early 1930s as earnings fell with the drop in the world groundnut price, but rose to 34,000 by 1938 and continued to fluctuate between roughly 7,000 and 25,000 through 1960 (Stier 1982).

Migration from Guinea (particularly the Fouta Djallon) followed a similar pattern. Before the First World War the major groups to migrate were recently freed slaves (Stier 1982). Emigration increased in volume in the years after the war as military recruitment and forced labor conscription intensified and as households found themselves unable to

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<th>Box 3. Chronology of migration in West Africa</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Migrations were light until 1923.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• From 1924 to 1932 there was increasing forced recruitment for work in the plantations of Côte d’Ivoire. But Ghana was still the principal destination until 1932.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There were at least 75,000 Togolese nationals in Ghana by 1925–30. By 1960 the number had risen to 280,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forced labor was officially abolished from 1936–39, but Côte d’Ivoire became the principal destination only after 1950.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The number of Voltaic (now Burkinabe) workers in Côte d’Ivoire reached roughly 71,000 by 1942.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The number of Malian workers in the groundnut areas of Senegambia reached roughly 30,000 by 1920 and fell to around 20,000 by 1960.</td>
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cultivate sufficient cash crops (rubber and coffee) to pay their taxes. By 1956 roughly 10,000–15,000 Guineans had emigrated to Kedegou in eastern Senegal, and approximately another 14,000 had settled in the Casamance (Baldé 1975).

Seasonal migration from Guinea to the groundnut areas of Senegambia began in the early 1920s (Stier 1982). By 1932, 10,000 Guinean seasonal workers were registered in Senegal; the number of seasonal emigrants from Guinea had increased to 35,000 by 1936. Most came from the Fouta Djallon. As of 1975 the principal sending areas for emigrants, by decreasing order of importance, were Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Togo (see Annex table A.1). Together, these countries supplied almost 73 percent of the region’s total foreign nationals. The most important receiving area, by far, was Côte d’Ivoire, followed by Ghana and Senegal.

The proportion of West Africa immigrants in the total population varied widely as of 2005, ranging from a low of 0.3 percent in Mali to a high of 15.3 percent in The Gambia (Annex table A.2). Immigrants constituted almost 3 percent of the total population in West Africa in 2005. Many countries in the region alternate between being net immigrant and net emigrant areas.

**Central Africa**

In Central Africa movements of refugees have been a major—and in some cases the main—component of international migration flows among mainly neighboring countries. On average, refugees constituted 38.8 percent of the international migrants of the region (Annex table A.3). Together with East Africa, Central Africa is the main host of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa. The larger country sources of refugees are Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. In addition however, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Mauritania each generated more than six refugees per thousand of the population. Several major countries of refugee origin were also important countries of asylum, including Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Lucas 2005). Distinctions between refugees and other migrants are not always apparent because of ethnic similarities across borders.

For the 2000–05 period Cameroon and Democratic Republic of Congo had a net loss of migrants, while the other countries in Central Africa experienced a net gain (Annex table A.4). The migration growth rate is particularly noticeable in Chad, largely because of the vast movement of refugees from Sudan and voluntary immigrants seeking jobs in oil companies. The share of migrants as a percentage of the population is particularly high in Gabon. Almost 18 percent of the population of Gabon are immigrants.
Dealing with forced displacement continues to be an important issue in Central Africa. There is considerable scope to facilitate regional networks to support recent initiatives focusing on developing a regional framework for refugee protection.

**East Africa**

East Africa has a long history of labor migration between and within countries to plantations (cotton and coffee in Uganda), to mines (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda), and with the seasons (pastoralist communities in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) (DFID 2004a). Workers from Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, and Rwanda were recruited to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda for employment on agricultural estates. In the post-colonial era these movements have been supplemented by substantial forced displacement and increasing rural-urban migration within countries for employment or to earn a livelihood. However, both urbanization rates and levels of international migration generally remain lower than in other parts of Africa.

The proportion of East African immigrants in the total population fell from 3.5 percent in 1975 to 1.6 percent in 2005, due mainly to return migration after the end of military strife in countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Annex table A.5). Some countries in this region host a relatively large number of immigrants. More than 18 percent of the population in Réunion in 2005 was immigrant, for example.

Labor circulation forms a particularly important part of migration within East Africa. Many countries in the region have experienced substantial movements of refugees and internally displaced people (DFID 2004a). In particular, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda host substantial refugee populations. It is not unreasonable to expect that the return flow of refugees will increase in the coming years. The region needs to begin development of a regional policy framework to address this future shift.

**Southern Africa**

In Southern Africa, labor migration historically took the form of circular migration guided by specific legal frameworks and state policies. Workers from Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland regularly engaged in short-term circulatory migrations to work in the mining areas and tobacco farms of the

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**Box 4. Chronology of migration in Southern Africa**

- The history of migrant labor in Southern Africa is tied to the capitalist development of plantations and mining and dates from the 1850s. But the mining sector played the dominant role.
- The mines and plantations in Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe attracted many migrant laborers, mainly for temporary work.
- South Africa was the most important destination. In 1870 around 50,000–80,000 migrants came to work in the diamond mines in Kimberley.
- Witwatersrand Native Labor Association has been effective in establishing recruitment stations and moving labor from neighboring countries.
Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (DFID 2004b; box 4). Transborder migrations during the colonial period occurred largely between neighboring countries, which were separated by arbitrarily drawn boundaries that sometimes cut across the homelands of ethnic and language groups.

South Africa has been at the center of the migration process in the region. Official policies in South Africa directly recruited workers or indirectly induced Africans to seek employment as mine or agricultural workers (through taxes, for example). State policies also deliberately created labor reserves. The transformation of rural South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as of Lesotho and Swaziland, into labor reserves for the South African economy had tremendous social and political impacts and also lay at the heart of South Africa’s Bantustan policy (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006; Bilger and Kraler 2005).

From 1980 to 1985 countries such as Lesotho and South Africa received a high influx of migrants (Annex table A.6). These migrants came from various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda (Adepoju 2006). Migrants constituted a particularly high share of the population in most of the countries in that region during that period. Since 1985 the migrant stock has fallen steadily in Lesotho and South Africa, while continuing to increase in other countries of the region.

Some source countries of migration have become destination countries, while in others economic and political events have led to large fluctuations in migration trends. Although South Africa is frequently mentioned as a principal destination for migrants in the region, United Nations population data suggest that there is an increasing shift of destination toward neighboring countries such as Botswana and Namibia, where the migrant share of the population is highest.

**Conclusion**

There are almost no direct data on migration flows in Sub-Saharan Africa. To analyze the dimensions and patterns of migration in the region, researchers must rely on estimates of migrant stocks derived from incomplete and potentially biased census results (Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). Nonetheless, these sources present a compelling picture of migration in the different regions of the continent. African migration is still primarily intraregional. However, reflecting the increasingly global nature of migration, diversity has been increasing both in the countries from which international migrants originate and in their countries of destination.

During the last few decades, as economic and political instability deepened in many regions, fewer migrants found stable and remunerative work in traditional regional destinations. Consequently, migration in Sub-Saharan Africa has expanded to a wide va-
riety of alternative destinations and sometime to places without any historical, political, or economic links to the countries of origin. Migration also became more varied and spontaneous, with rising levels of both temporary and long-term circulation.

Although useful data exist, there are still key data gaps on migrations and displacements within the regions. Comprehensive data on the scale, structure, and characteristics of migrants in different regions are still lacking and constitute the primary obstacle to investigation of likely patterns of future emigration expansion.

4. Migration and Labor Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa

There have been numerous studies of the impact of immigration on labor markets in host countries. By contrast, studies of the impact of emigration on labor markets in countries of origin are extraordinarily scarce (Lucas 2005). For Sub-Saharan Africa information on the movement of highly skilled workers is very limited, so the literature tends to focus on theoretical analysis of migration.

Migration and labor markets in receiving countries

Analyses of the impact of migration on labor markets have traditionally focused on variables such as unemployment levels and the real wages of native workers in host countries (Solimano 2001). The impacts of immigration on the labor markets of the world’s wealthier nations have been much studied. Some of the patterns of immigration within Sub-Saharan Africa reflect very similar concerns. The literature highlights the fact that regional voluntary migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is driven primarily by the opportunity to work.

The impacts of migrants on destination country labor markets are diverse. Migrants are heterogeneous, differing at least as much from one another as from the general population. The experiences of migrants are usually more polarized than those of the population as a whole, with larger concentrations at the extremes for such factors as wealth and poverty, and high and low skills (Glover and others 2001).

Consequently, migrants have mixed success in the labor market. Some migrants are very successful, but others are unemployed or inactive. In part, labor market success is influenced by such characteristics as education, willingness to do “dirty jobs,” foreign language fluency, and labor demand.

There are motivational and decisionmaking differences between immigrants from developed countries and those from developing countries. Push and pull factors play different roles. Most people from developed countries do not migrate without having good
employment prospects, whereas this is not necessarily the case for migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. Migrants from developed countries typically find employment first and then determine whether their incomes are comparable to those of the rest of the local workforce—pull factors predominant. Push factors—because of the absence of economic opportunities in home countries—are more important for migrants from developing countries than for migrants from developed countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa many migrants tend to gravitate toward areas of relative prosperity and low housing costs (and areas where housing is available) and where others from their home country already live. Thus they tend to concentrate in cities and in particular sectors, such as mines and plantations.

Migrants bring diverse skills, experience, and know-how. In theory, migration is important for addressing skill shortages at all levels and for fostering innovation and new business and job creation. There is considerable support for the view that migrants create new businesses and jobs and fill labor market gaps, improving productivity. However, case study evidence of migrants’ labor market performance in destination countries shows that most immigrants from developing countries, regardless of destination, suffer an earnings penalty (Page and Plaza 2005).

This usually poses the problem of the transferability of immigrant characteristics. A number of empirical studies use the Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985) Immigrant Human Capital Model under different econometric specifications to quantitatively estimate the economic returns to immigrants attributes (Glover and others 2001; Page and Plaza 2005), but no such study has been carried out for Africa. This model takes into account the probability that the stock of an immigrant’s human capital obtained in the origin country may not be fully transferable to the requirements of the destination country’s labor market. The model predicts a negative relationship between the transferability of human capital and the initial, upon arrival, immigrant-native earnings gap. The lower the international transferability of human capital, the higher is the earnings disadvantage at the time of migration. To narrow this wage gap, migrants invest in country-specific human capital in the receiving country and adapt their stock of human capital acquired in the country of origin. This form of investment is what economists call economic assimilation (Page and Plaza 2005).

Large and sudden refugee inflows occur far more commonly in Africa than elsewhere. Moreover, clandestine migration is pervasive throughout the region and considered routine in West Africa, where seasonal migration also figures more prominently than elsewhere on the continent (Byerlee 1979; Adepoju 1988). This situation continues to put heavy pressure on the domestic labor market of some countries, creating a growing feeling in some countries that native workers are harmed by migration. An increasingly hostile reception is already perceptible in some countries, with growing xenophobia, apprehension of foreigners, and anti-immigrant political mobilization. Rising illegal migration
reflects a number of factors, including rising demand in the labor market, particularly at the lower end, and other exogenous pressures (including economic, social, and political instability in the country of origin). However, the economic impacts of these flows on the countries of asylum remain both little studied and poorly understood.

Recent research at the global level (UN 2005) reveals that migration does not have a significant impact on labor markets in receiving countries, particularly over the medium term. The reason is that migrants increase not only the labor supply but also the demand for goods and services in the host country. In addition, some use their entrepreneurial abilities to set up businesses. These activities, and their dynamic and multiplier effects, increase the demand for labor, offsetting the initial increase in the labor supply that migrants represent. Testing these observations in the African context would certainly add value to the existing research.

As a result of the economic recession throughout Sub-Saharan Africa recent arrivals face greater challenges and competition in labor markets. Where integration into labor markets is especially difficult, some immigrants establish businesses as alternatives. Immigrant self-employment and entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa have not been well researched. Scattered studies have reported, for example, that in South Africa the post-apartheid waves of immigrants from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe are mostly street vendors and traders seeking to capitalize on the relatively affluent market of South Africa. These entrepreneurs, who work mostly in the informal sector, import traditional African clothing and handicrafts, employ and train locals, and generally invigorate the informal sector. More research is needed to assess how lack of access to employment opportunities commensurate with immigrants’ human capital characteristics may encourage them to look for business alternatives through self-employment.

**Migration and labor markets in sending countries**

Migration also has implications for the labor markets of countries of origin. The number of skilled and unskilled migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa countries has increased dramatically over the past four decades, although data on the share of populations that work outside their borders are unavailable and data on the share of emigrants who are hosted by other African countries are severely limited.

Theory suggests that migration of predominantly unskilled labor, by reducing the supply of this class of labor in the sending country, raises the salaries of unskilled workers in the sending countries. This narrows the wage-income distribution, improving income equality (Solimano 2001). However, these trends need to be confirmed empirically for Sub-Saharan Africa.
Recent debate on the effect of migration on labor has focused on the emigration of professionals (brain drain) and the loss of skilled labor, which may be occurring faster than the replacement rate. The debate originally claimed that rich countries were becoming richer because of the transfer of high skills from developing countries.

During the 1970s the debate changed, and even the terminology was replaced by terms such as “reverse technology transfer” and “cooperative exchange of skills between developing countries” (Page and Plaza 2005). One implication is that investment in education in a developing country may not lead to economic growth if highly educated people leave their countries. Developing countries that subsidize higher education may lose doubly through an additional loss in public resources invested in education. They also lose the future contributions that highly educated people would have made to the economic development of the home country, including future tax payments (Lucas 2005; Ozden and Schiff 2006). The significance of the brain drain for development is underscored by the new growth theory, which argues that a person’s knowledge not only provides a direct benefit in terms of available skills but also has positive effects on the productivity of others (UN 2005). Emigration of those with skills eliminates this indirect benefit to the economy at large.

Recent partial studies point to the magnitude of the phenomenon of brain drain in Sub-Saharan Africa. Makinwa-Adebusoye (2006) reports that, on average, African migrants have three times as many years of schooling as the national average at the migrants’ destination. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO 2003), up to 75 percent of people emigrating from Africa to the United States, Canada, or other OECD countries have completed university-level studies or equivalent technical training. Since the mid-1980s, when the economies of many African countries worsened drastically, many highly skilled workers have left Africa, including doctors and nurses who received training at great public expense.

The migration of medical personnel is especially extreme. About 600 first-generation medical specialists from Nigeria work in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and up to 12,000 are in the United States (Adepoju 2006). In South Africa white doctors emigrated to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, attracted by higher incomes and troubled by the South African government’s policy requiring service in rural areas and fearful of the rise in crime. An estimated 60 percent of Zimbabwean doctors recently moved to Botswana and South Africa. Makinwa-Adebusoye (2006) reported on the case of Ghana, which exemplifies how damaging the brain drain can be. From 1995 to 2002 nearly a quarter of various cadres of health workers trained in Ghana emigrated, including more than two-thirds of medical officers (general practitioners). Workloads for remaining personnel rose steeply, contributing to poorer health care in Ghana.
The general issues pertaining to brain drain are well known. First, the withdrawal of any factor of production, such as highly skilled labor, diminishes returns to other factors remaining at home. However, the distribution of those losses among the owners of capital, and unskilled and skilled workers depends on the nature of technology and thus on the degree of substitution that may occur. Moreover, the extent of these losses is affected by how productively the highly skilled workers are employed before their departure. Such broad concerns apply to the emigration of any type of labor. However, a second line of concern is more specific to the departure of highly skilled labor. Emigration of highly skilled labor may impose various externalities. Three potential forms of external benefits from the continued presence of highly skilled labor have been distinguished (Lucas 2005): their effects on the productivity of others, their influence on economic growth, and their contribution as key personnel in the delivery of specific services and social goods. Each of these remains controversial.

A recent feature in the brain drain literature is the “brain gain” hypothesis (Schiff 2005). This new literature posits that the brain drain raises the expected return on education because of the share of skilled individuals who migrate and earn a higher wage abroad, thus inducing additional investment in education (brain gain). This may result in a beneficial brain drain or a net brain gain: that is, a brain gain larger than the brain drain. A net brain gain raises welfare and growth.

This line of reasoning illustrates the complexity of the impact of brain drain and its multidimensionality. Adepoju (1988) reports some evidence to support a pattern of replacement migration, with rural migrants moving to towns to occupy positions vacated by migrants who emigrate abroad. This seems to be occurring in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Mali. The same seems to hold true for Senegal (where urban workers go to France) and Egypt (whose migrants move to Persian Gulf countries). In some cases immigrants from neighboring countries occupy positions vacated by nationals who have emigrated, yielding a step-by-step migration pattern, first from rural areas to cities, from cities to cities in the same country or regions, and then from cities to foreign destinations.

The case of agricultural labor

The links between migration and agriculture are especially important in Sub-Saharan Africa, where close to 80 percent of the population live in rural areas and practice some form of subsistence farming. Migration and agriculture are related in two ways. Changes in the agricultural sector lead to changes in migration flows, while migration affects food production and agricultural development.

Historically, migration has been viewed favorably in the development literature because it was perceived to reduce intraregional and interregional wage differentials and
to assist in transferring new crops and ideas over wide areas (Eicher and Baker 1984). Migrants have been characterized as innovators, risk takers, and entrepreneurs. Hill’s (1963) pioneering research revealed that migrants were the risk takers in settling land and mobilizing capital in Ghana’s cocoa boom in the late nineteenth century. Using a human capital model of migration, Vijverberg (1989) concludes that rural areas lose their productive workers and that urban areas may gain in productivity from the geographic shifts in population from rural to urban zones. Eicher and Baker (1984) argue that the migration of rural people for work in plantations, mines, and factories has been a major catalyst for social change in Africa.

Migration across and within national boundaries affects the distribution of resources—especially human capital. When millions of people are involved, as in West Africa, the economic and social effects of migration are important to the development of both the countries of origin and those of destination (Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980). Essang and Mabawonku (1974) found that in Nigeria emigration is associated with increases in hired labor, increases in farm size, higher rural earning per person, and a net transfer of capital from rural to urban areas.

In West Africa commercial agriculture is the principal employment sector for all countries in the region (Nkamleu 2004). Agricultural migration occurs principally from the savannah hinterland to Côte d’Ivoire cocoa plantations and to the groundnut farms of The Gambia and Senegal. The main migration streams are from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, and from Mali and Guinea to Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia and Senegal (Adepoju 1988).

Agricultural migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is seasonal, mainly on a north-south axis, and largely spontaneous and uncontrolled (Adepoju 1988). Throughout rural Africa family labor is the most important resource in household production, and hired labor is the largest production expense. At the peak season—usually July and August—labor is generally a bottleneck in agricultural production. There is a widespread and competitive labor market to allocate labor within households, villages, regions, and even across international boundaries (Byerlee 1979; Byerlee et al. 1977).

Seasonal migration has been of central importance in providing labor for farming throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Dupire’s (1960) study of Côte d’Ivoire is a classic on the role of seasonal migrants. Swindell (1995) and Stier (1982) report that many of the farmers in the groundnut basin in Senegal are seasonal farmers. Seasonal farmers have been migrating to the basin annually from April to December since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when groundnuts were first exported from the basin. Seasonal migration is also significant in the semi-arid areas of Africa, where migrants move from the savannah zone (such as Burkina Faso) to the forest zones (such as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana).
during the dry season (November to April) to harvest and maintain tree crops (cocoa, oil palm, and rubber). In Ghana some 200,000 people from the savannah area of the north migrate annually to the south to participate in cocoa harvesting and maintenance of cocoa trees (Beals and Menezes 1970).

An increasing number of studies focus on how the characteristics of origin and destination areas and of migrants, their households, and their communities shape particular population flows (Ouensavi and Kielland 2001; Kielland and Sanogo 2002). Yet this type of analysis has not been applied to agriculture. Agricultural migration is dynamic and evolves with the changing nature of today’s commercial agriculture. New facts and new research in this field are certainly warranted.

**Conclusion**

Analysis of the interaction of migration and labor markets is hampered by lack of data and empirical research on the subject. However, it is clear that Africa has high migration rates compared with other large developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, and Indonesia. This is particularly so for highly skilled workers. More than 40 percent of the highly skilled population of some small African countries live and work abroad (including doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, scientists, and technologists). But very little is known about their numbers or their destinations on the continent. Information is still lacking on the composition, concentration, and sectoral impact of migrations in Sub-Saharan Africa. These impacts are important for understanding not only the consequences of the withdrawal of highly skilled workers, but also the labor market adjustments to the departure of less skilled workers.

Some basic questions pertaining to the effects of regional migration urgently need to be addressed: Does migration induce higher wages for those who stay behind? Is internal migration stimulated to replace departing workers? Both international and internal movements, and the direction of the flow, affect the development of the labor market of individual countries and might contribute to regional growth. Similarly, little is known about the labor market experiences and assimilation of returning migrants, including foreign students and other highly skilled people, short and longer term workers, and repatriated refugees.

Migrants constitute a considerable share of the labor force in developing countries. The magnitude of migration will continue to be an important determinant of the supply of new job seekers. An understanding of the relationship between migration and labor markets in each country and region is central to any analysis of employment problems in Sub-Saharan Africa.
5. Migration and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Among the gaps in knowledge about the impact of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, an important one is the relationships between migration and development. This is particularly the case with estimates of the scale of remittances and their impact on the livelihood and well-being of households and nations. Another area where information is lacking is on the impact of migrants on the labor markets of host countries and on host countries more broadly.

Migration and remittances

In contrast to the loss of human resources embodied in brain drain is the financial transfer to the home country represented by the remittances sent by migrants to their families. Remittances have been at the center of debates in the literature about the costs and benefits of migration. Reliable data on remittances are hard to come by. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that global transfers of remittances have grown steadily in the last 10 years and exceeded $100 billion worldwide to developing countries in 2004 (IMF 2005). A recent World Bank study estimates that remittance flows have doubled in the last decade, reaching $216 billion in 2004, with $150 billion going to developing countries (Ozden and Schiff 2006).

Data on remittances are incomplete and almost certainly underestimate their true magnitude because they do not accurately reflect funds and goods in kind flowing through nonreporting and informal channels. First, most remittance source countries do not require the reporting of “small” transactions. Also, remittances through post offices, exchange bureaus, and other money transfer companies are often not reflected in official statistics.

Second, official data do not capture remittance flows through informal channels, which are believed to be large. Recent studies attempting to estimate the size of unofficial remittances worldwide yield quite different results. El Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson

<table>
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<th>Box 5. Summary data on remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Some $4 billion in remittances were officially received in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2002. This figure represents 5 percent of total remittances to developing regions—the same as the fraction of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa relative to total migration from the developing world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Official data are believed to severely underestimate the true magnitude of remittances. Some estimates put global remittances at 2.5 times the size reported in the IMF balance of payments data.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• For most countries remittances exceed the volume of foreign aid and investment. For example, the total amount sent back by the 60,000 illegal Malians in France is about 100 million euros; official French aid to Mali is 60 million euros.</td>
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(2003), in a study for the IMF, estimate that unofficial transfers of remittances to the developing world amount to $10 billion a year. Page and Plaza (2005) report that some estimates of global remittances are 2.5 times the size reported in the IMF balance of payments data. Available data do agree, however, that remittances have grown in parallel with the number of international migrants and that for most countries remittances exceed the volume of foreign aid and investment (UN 2005; Adams 2005).

In Sub-Saharan Africa some $4 billion in remittances were received in 2002 (Sander and Maimbo 2003). At 5 percent of total remittances to developing regions, this amount is proportional to the share of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in total migrants from the developing world. The Bank of Ghana estimates that informal flows to Ghana are at least as high as these recorded flows (Lucas 2005), so that total remittances would be at least double this amount.

One reason for the large underestimation of remittances for Sub-Saharan Africa is that most remittances are sent from other countries within the region. In Sub-Saharan Africa, as in East Asia and South Asia, more than two-thirds of emigrants from poor countries migrate to a country in the same region (Page and Plaza 2005). In South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa most emigrants migrate to another developing country. Most of them send their remittances through informal operators or travelers. Household surveys of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Uganda show widespread use of informal channels for remittances (Page and Plaza 2005). In East Africa a range of innovative informal remittance channels have developed to facilitate intracountry flows through bus and courier companies (DFID 2004a).

Another reason for the large underestimation is that unrecorded flows appear to be high in Africa, especially in certain countries (Sander and Maimbo 2003). In Sudan, for example, informal remittances are estimated to account for 85 percent of total remittance receipts. The use of informal routes for money transfer is also encouraged by the illegal status of migrants in some countries. For example, Azam and Gubert (2005) estimate that the 60,000 illegal Malians in France send remittances totaling about 100 million euros.

Despite the scarcity of data, the literature agrees that this is an important but poorly understood type of international financial flow. Given the size of remittances, researchers and development practitioners are now focusing on both the development impact of remittances and on regulatory issues in sender and receiver markets.

**Remittances and development**

Even without firm data the importance of remittances as a source of development financing is becoming clear to policymakers in developing countries, who seek to determine how best to make use of these human and financial resources. That overall, remit-
tances create a stable net positive transfer is becoming widely accepted. Through their effects on foreign exchange reserves, balance of payments, livelihoods, and investments in human capital, remittances are important, particularly for African households and nations. A noteworthy development has been the formation of hometown associations in countries of destination, through which migrants collect funds to send back to the community of origin for financing local development projects.

The case of Burkina Faso, located in the drier Sahel region of West Africa, exemplifies the importance of remittances emanating from migrations within Africa (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006). Burkina Faso is a major source of migrant laborers into coastal areas for the production of primary export crops, notably cocoa and coffee, in Côte d’Ivoire. Until the recent civil war in Côte d’Ivoire remittances from migrants accounted for about a quarter of Burkina Faso’s GDP (Black, King, and Tiemoko 2003) and helped to keep entire families alive.

Still, the macroeconomic effects of remittance inflows remain poorly modeled and poorly understood. One of the most important findings of recent research concerns the role remittances play in linking geographically separated family members (Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). Sub-Saharan Africa has featured prominently in the empirical literature on migration as a family risk-spreading strategy, with remittances offering relief in times of adversity. Studies in the region have looked at the impacts on remittances from rainfall shocks, affecting both cropping and livestock, as well as from shocks arising through ill health or death in the family (Lucas 2005). Studies in East Africa have shown that rural families increase their livelihood security by diversifying the location of family members. Research in western Kenya suggests that the decision to migrate, and remittance behavior, are linked to a form of intergenerational “migration contract” between migrants and their parents, in which the (usually male) migrant moves and sends remittances in expectation of a subsequent inheritance (DFID 2004a). Azam and Gubert (2005) found a similar pattern in Mali.

In contrast to the lack of macro data on remittances, a number of studies have appeared on the micro determinants of remittances and their impact on development in specific contexts within Sub-Saharan Africa. Many studies have tried to assess the impact of migration and remittances on household strategies and welfare, particularly in the farming system context. Three links interact in this matter: remittances and investment, remittances and production, and remittances, poverty, and income inequality.

Converting remittances into investment determines their impact on development. Although remittances are most often used for consumption to satisfy basic subsistence needs, they also encourage investment, particularly in human capital, through health and education expenditures (Ozden and Schiff 2006). Remittances may be turned into in-
vestment through the purchase of land, tools, or machinery or by helping to start a business. Lucas (2005) shows that both cropping and livestock management improved in several countries in Southern Africa in response to accumulated earnings of migrants who worked in South African mines. Azam and Gubert (2005) find that migration has enhanced the adoption of improved agricultural technology in Kayes village in Mali. Collier and Lal (1984) show that in rural Kenya remittances enable recipient families to hold more productive capital than other families. Studies like these bring out the role of migration and remittances as means of overcoming capital market imperfections and of bringing home capital for funding productive investment. By contrast, Rempel and Lobdell (1978) use household survey data from rural Kenya and conclude that remittances from rural to urban migrants have little impact on the development of the region of origin.

Another theoretical assumption is that a permanent flow of remittances creates an implicit insurance contract between migrants and their families. This can give rise to opportunistic behavior and to technical inefficiency among families in the country of origin. Azam and Gubert (2005) report such a case in the Kayes area in western Mali. Although migration has helped the adoption of improved technology there, migrant households do not exhibit better agricultural performance than nonmigrant households.

The main issue here is whether remittances received are diverted into inefficient expenditures, such as fancy weddings and housing, and other unproductive assets intended only to maintain the family’s prestige.

The inability to finance expensive moves, such as moves overseas or those requiring greater education, may prohibit the poor from relocating. Consequently, many of the micro remittance studies in Sub-Saharan Africa find that the poorest are rarely the major beneficiaries of remittances, at least directly (Lucas 2005). This underscores the fact that remittances are in the self-interest of the migrant (to protect an inheritance, to insure property, or to repay education costs) rather than altruistically motivated. Thus remittances tend to be greater to families with more assets or higher incomes initially.

Nonetheless, remittances may alleviate poverty, either directly through flows to the poor if not the poorest, or indirectly through any stimulant effect of remittances on the local economy. Lachaud (1999) estimates that international remittances to Burkina Faso reduce the poverty headcount by 7 percent in rural areas and by 3 percent in the urban sector. Gustafsson and Mekonnen (1993) examine remittances from Lesotho’s mine workers in South Africa and conclude that the prevalence of poverty in Lesotho would be 15 percent greater in the absence of these remittances. Djajic (1986) argues that remittances improve welfare in the country of migration origin, even of those who do not receive them, because remittances enlarge the set of possible exchanges of tradable and nontradable goods. Rivera-Batiz (1982), using a general equilibrium model, argues that
without remittances, those remaining behind incur a welfare loss. The set of possible
transactions shrinks, because those remaining behind can no longer exchange nontradable
goods with the migrants.

In sum, studies yield ambiguous outcomes in terms of the net impact of migration
and remittances on household welfare in the country of migration origin. The relationship
between international migration and development in the home country has been described
as an “unsettled” or “unresolved” relationship, as Ellerman (2003) notes. More empirical
work is certainly needed.

Migrants in receiving countries: development partners or development parasites?

Voluntary migration—like any profit-motivated international movement of fac-
tors of production—is normally a voluntary market transaction between a willing buyer
(whoever is willing to employ the migrant) and a willing seller (the migrant), and so is
likely to be both economically efficient and beneficial to both parties. Indeed, the basic
economic theory of migration is very similar to that of trade, and like trade, migration is
generally expected to yield welfare gains. As Glover et al. (2001, p.4) notes, “As long as
the marginal productivity of labor differs in various countries, the migration of labor is
welfare improving.” If all markets are functioning well, there are no externalities, and
there are no concerns about distributional implications, then migration is welfare-improving not only for migrants, but (on average) also for natives.

However, the presence of migrants is sometime a source of discomfort and divi-
sion in the host country. This xenophobia is rooted in the negative aspects of international
migration, such as the persistence of unauthorized migration, criminal activities by mi-
grants, and problems of integration. A lack of information may reinforce public percep-
tions that international migration and its social consequences are beyond the control of
state authorities and may give rise to anti-immigrant political parties, as already observed
in some Sub-Saharan African countries.

Internal migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is driven primarily by the opportunity to
work, creating a growing feeling in some host countries that native workers are harmed
by migration. One focal point of the literature has been the impact of immigration on la-
bor markets in host countries. In general, migration increases the supply of labor (and
human capital). In theory, this is likely to reduce wages for workers competing with mi-
grants and increase returns to capital and other factors complementary to migrant labor
(Glover and others 2001). In general, this redistribution will favor natives who own fac-
tors of production that are complementary to migrants and hurt those who own factors of
production that are substitutes. Thus a key question is whether migrants’ skills are substi-
tutes or complements for those of native workers.

24
According to a United Nations (UN 2006) report, migrants do not have a significant impact on the labor market. The dynamic and multiplier effects of immigrants’ activities will boost demand for labor, offsetting the initial increase in the labor supply that migrants induce. Because of such effects, migration inflows have been identified as a factor that increases economic growth to the benefit of the destination country and all its citizens. This is particularly the case if inflows of skilled workers relieve shortages in important sectors of the labor market. They may also increase the supply of labor in low-skilled occupations that domestic residents are unwilling to fill, thus complementing rather than substituting for domestic labor.

However, Glover and others (2001) maintain that this will happen only if markets are functioning well. Otherwise, it is theoretically possible for migration to generate higher unemployment for natives. For example, if native workers are not prepared to accept a wage below a given floor and migration induces the market wage for some native workers to drop below that floor, then migration could lead to an increase in native unemployment. While overall output will not fall, output attributable to native workers may decline. Also, the closest substitutes to new immigrants in the labor markets are migrants who are already living and working in the receiving countries. They have most to lose from additional immigration.

Migration may also have externalities that might affect the native population in a number of ways:

- *Congestion.* Migrants could increase congestion in some areas, imposing costs directly on native workers and businesses.

- *Neighborhood benefits or disbenefits.* Migrants could help regenerate depressed neighborhoods, or the reverse.

- *Intangible social and human capital.* Migrants may have attributes such as entrepreneurship that generate benefits for native workers.

- *Diversity.* Native inhabitants may gain tangible or intangible benefits from interacting with migrants from different backgrounds and cultures.

Migration will also generate costs and benefits for the government, which can be viewed as another form of externality for native inhabitants—a collective rather than an individual one:

- *Consumption of public services.* On the cost side, migrants will consume public services and may be entitled to some social security benefits.

- *Generation of tax revenues.* On the benefit side, migrants will pay taxes, both direct (if they are working) and indirect.
In general, conventional equilibrium analysis would suggest that supply responses would mitigate the effects of migration in the long run. However, it is possible to imagine cases (generally reflecting increasing returns to scale) in which the long-run impact of migration is greater than the short-run. For example, migrants might bring with them the knowledge and entrepreneurial ability to start a new industry or industry cluster, which then expands to employ native workers and to encourage them to start their own businesses in the same sector.

Not enough is known about migrants’ social outcomes, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Migration brings negative aspects, but also enriches destination communities socially and culturally by bringing different ideas, customs, languages, cultural values, religions, academic contributions, and increased consumer choice. A key empirical question is in which context and conditions do negative or positive aspects predominate.

Conclusion

As a whole, remittances are estimated to be larger than all aid transfers in many countries of the region. Thus the potential developmental role of remittances should be an important topic for future policy research and experimentation.

The effect of migration and remittances may be more pronounced for specific sectors of the economy and population in sending and receiving countries. This could depend on the economic and social environment; the speed, scale, and concentration of migration; the particular characteristics of the migrant and native populations; the extent to which migrants complement or are in competition with native workers; and the status of the migrants in their country of origin before their departure. All these aspects will need further investigation in order to capture the real overall outcome of migration and remittances in the region.

For individual countries of origin and destination it will be urgent first to identify a number of tangible positive and negative economic and social effects of migration. The attention being given to remittances by policymakers provides an opportunity to look at ways to increase the benefits that these flows provide. An immediate goal should be to disaggregate the impact of remittances by sector, method of transmission, and all other characteristics pertaining to migrants and their home family. As discussed in the following section, policymakers also have an important regulatory role.
6. Institutions, Policies, and Regional Migrations

International migration is increasingly viewed as a development issue. However, national and international migration policies do not yet fully reflect this development perspective and are sometimes inconsistent with other dimensions of development policy, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. In both countries of origin and countries of destination migration is not usually dealt with by the same ministry as development (UN 2005). Migration policy needs to be integrated into development policy, ensuring consistency and coherence between the two.

National regulatory frameworks

Before independence most countries in the region were sparsely populated, and demographic growth and population movements were not considered a problem by most countries. Following independence many governments enacted legislation to regulate movements across their borders and, in some case, to limit the number of resident foreigners (Miro and Potter 1980).

Policies to regulate inflows have become increasingly refined in recent decades (Adepoju 1988), in part because governments have developed the legislative and administrative capacity to formulate and implement such measures and in part as a response to domestic political pressures—generated by chronic unemployment, sluggish economic growth, uneven income distribution, inflation, and political instability. Policy measures include quotas, border controls, visa and passport requirements, and indigenization policies. Doubts are now surfacing about whether such policies have produced the beneficial effects for the national population that were claimed for them (Miro and Potter 1980). Still, most international migration in Africa has occurred and still occurs outside any regulatory framework, because few countries have a well articulated policy on international migration and even fewer seem to rigidly enforce their laws.

Insights into attitudes and policies toward immigration are provided by periodic United Nations inquiries on government policies, conducted in conjunction with the UN Monitoring Report. Only 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa reported that they consider current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and all 12 report having policies to lower levels of immigration (table 1). The remainder reported that current levels of immigration are insignificant and satisfactory and that their policy is to maintain these flows. Equatorial Guinea, which reported that immigration was too low and that its policy was to raise it, recently revised this assessment following the discovery and exploitation of oil.
Table 1. Comparative views of levels of immigration by governments in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current levels of immigration are significant and too high</th>
<th>Current levels of immigration are insignificant and satisfactory</th>
<th>Current levels of immigration are too low</th>
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</table>

*Source: Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990.*

Most African governments have liberal policies toward the emigration of their own citizens. Freedom to emigrate is recognized and even explicitly provided for in some constitutions (Adepoju 1988). An important trend has been the development of policies in countries of origin to enhance the benefits that they derive from international migration and to reduce the costs they incur (UN 2005). Such policies include measures to facilitate migrants’ remittances, support to networks that link migrants to their country of origin, facilitation of return migration, strengthening of consular services, and in a few countries dual citizenship and the right of emigrants to vote abroad in national elections.

In recent decades a main component of internal migration in Africa has been the involuntary movement of populations. Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed significant flows of forced migrants, including internally displaced people and victims of trafficking. Peace processes in several African countries suggest that attention needs to be turned toward facilitating sustainable return. Despite increased awareness, a recent survey by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA 2005) indicates that fewer than half of the governments in the region—21 of 43 responding countries—have taken any measures or adopted strategies to encourage repatriation, including changes in legislation to facilitate the reintegration of returning nationals to their communities.

Around the world almost all countries have adopted national policies on international migration to address an array of concerns. These include the effects of low fertility and population aging, unemployment, protection of human rights, social integration, xenophobia, national security, brain drain and brain gain, remittances, granting of asylum, undocumented movements, and trafficking in people. However, enforcement of such legislation is still weak.
Regional integration, economic grouping, and migration

While many bilateral and regional agreements on migration have been established in the region since the 1960s, most voluntary international population movements in Sub-Saharan Africa do not occur within the framework of these agreements. For example, accords between Nigeria and the Spanish authorities sought to organize the migration of Nigerians to what is now Equatorial Guinea. In 1960 an agreement was concluded between Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Côte d’Ivoire to replace the former system of direct recruitment by Ivorian employers. A 1973 agreement between Burkina Faso and Gabon similarly sought to organize the flow of workers to Gabon (Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990).

Bilateral approaches, although effective for advancing the interests of two governments, have a narrow geographic focus and thus generally make only a limited contribution to the regional or continental management of international population movements.

Managing international migration has also become a high priority of regional and subregional groups. A number of regional consultative processes on international migration were initiated in the 1990s (UN 2005), as exemplified by the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA). It is generally thought that the formation of regional economic groupings has reinforced these interregional migrations.

In West Africa the regional organization that has most influenced migration is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Established in 1975 by a treaty among Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of people and rights of residence and establishment. Some 97 percent of Côte d’Ivoire immigrants are citizens of ECOWAS signatory nations.

The West African Economic Community (CEAO) is an international member of ECOWAS. CEAO was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Economic Union of West African States. The original members—Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal—were joined by Benin in 1984, and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO’s fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on October 28, 1978 (the Bamako Protocol on Free Movement of People), which permits free circulation (entry, travel, residence, and exit) upon presentation of a valid passport.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1980 as a loose alliance of nine majority-rulled states in Southern Africa. The alliance, known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), had as its main aim
coordinating development projects to lessen economic dependence on South Africa, which was then under apartheid. The founding member states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The transformation of the organization from a coordinating conference into a development community took place on August 17, 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia. The member states include the original alliance members plus the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa. The process of ratification of the protocol to facilitate the free movement of people within SADC countries is well advanced, and the protocol will soon enter into force.

The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organization of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Formalized in 1948, this interterritorial cooperation, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, provided a customs union and a common external tariff, currency, and postage and dealt with common services in transport and communications, research, and education. Following independence, these integrated activities were reconstituted. It has been called the East African Community since November 1999. EAC has recently introduced new East African passports and temporary passes to speed up population movement between countries in the region and a range of other initiatives to promote greater regional integration. This process supports and reinforces interregional migration.

The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) also includes programs to foster labor mobility within Africa and sustained development of the region. This type of integration is likely to accelerate, paving the way for closer economic cooperation and labor migration in the region.

Since international migration is not likely to decrease in volume or importance in the foreseeable future, governments have an interest in continuing to seek new forms of international cooperation in migration management. While bilateral, regional, and multilateral approaches have their own strengths and limitations, the achievement of orderly migration calls for efforts at all levels, preferably in the context of an overarching, universally agreed and applied international framework. Less than one-third of the governments in Africa (12 of 43 countries) had ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families at the time of an ECA survey (2005). Even fewer countries had started implementing the convention—Algeria, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa, and Sudan (ECA 2005).

**Migration, democratization, and rebellion**

African societies and people are noted for their traditional hospitality to strangers. For many decades it was relatively easy for migrants to acquire foreign “citizenship.”
However, many migrants did not find it necessary, as they were well integrated into the host countries, coexistence was peaceful, and they paid little attention to arbitrary national borders. Ethnic groups, split into adjacent countries when the European powers partitioned Africa into “spheres of influence” at the Berlin conference in 1884, regarded movement across these “artificial” boundaries simply as an extension of internal migrations, in line with long-standing ethnic solidarity.

During the last decade many Sub-Saharan African countries have undergone democratic changes that have led to the emergence of multiple political parties. Suddenly, the right of migrants to vote became relevant. Political parties well-rooted in migrant communities (mainly opposition parties) have been supportive of the integration of migrants in the political process, while “nationalist” parties (mainly the ruling party) have feared that migrants could swing the vote in favor of an opposition party with ethnic or religious alliances. In many countries this atmosphere has created turmoil, as political parties have behaved opportunistically, courting migrants to win an election or disenfranchising them when they are considered to back the opposition.

Citizenship and nationality are becoming problems for many migrants. Some migrants were brought to the host country by traffickers, to work as child laborers in slavery-like conditions. After they were freed, they established themselves in the host country. Others were born in the receiving country and are the children or grandchildren of migrants. Most of them have lost family ties to their ancestors’ country of origin and lack citizenship in that country. At the same time they are prohibited from becoming citizens in the host country.

In some countries this has led to an increase in the number of undocumented migrants caught in a trap of poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunities. A recent UN Report (UN 2005) noted that many of these immigrants, lacking legal status in the receiving country, become victims of traffickers of all kind, who exploit the vulnerabilities such social conditions create.

Another weapon used by politicians is manipulation of nationality and property rights. Increasingly, political leaders have used migrant status to reclassify longstanding residents as non-nationals and thus as ineligible to own land during the transformation of property rights that occurred in recent years in many countries. Communal land tenure systems prevail in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, with public ownership and private use rights of land (Razzaaz 1993). Communities control access to land and individuals appropriate the use of land and the products and have descent rights to the land. The combination of communal control and private use rights over access to land allows families to have continuing use of the same land over time. However, there is still an absence of judicial legitimacy and legal security in these systems. Many countries including Burundi,
Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe began to consider legalizing land tenure and providing titles to informal settlements (Place and Migot-Adholla 1998).

In many countries of the region, migrants appear to be the losers from such transformation. According to Razzaz (1993), responding to risks of loss or opportunities for gain, actors might be tempted to create new facts on the ground and invest in alternative institutional arrangements. These new facts can explain the political disorder and rebellion observed in some countries, including conflict and war in countries with a primary commodity dependence, such as diamonds, cocoa, or oil (Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2003). As argued by Collier (2003), primary commodity dependence often exposes countries to merchant-capital war, involving unregulated international trading networks using desperate migrant soldiers, sometimes with dramatic spillover effects, as illustrated by the arc of instability in West Africa from Liberia to Sierra Leone to Guinea to Côte d’Ivoire.

Research in this area is remarkably scant. Migrants’ involvement in political affairs in the host country is a sensitive issue that can affect the overall outcome of migration. Further investigations will certainly help to broaden the understanding of the ongoing political instability in some receiving countries and predict the likely trend in other countries that have the same characteristics.

**Conclusion**

Although national and regional policies may have had an impact on interregional migration, the extent of their impact is unknown. There may also be a two-way relationship between migration and policy change, as migration can also influence policy. Clarifying this relationship will help yield insight into the migration and policy nexus. Further research should thus examine the influence of policy change on in- and out-migration at both the national and the regional levels and the influence of migration on policy. Trends in regional economic integration should be used to predict the future picture of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Public attitudes in a number of countries remain hostile to migrants. In some cases this hostility is exacerbated by unclear policies and programs on migrants. Governments and regional organization should work to reverse this trend by ensuring that all stakeholders—countries of destination, countries of origin, transit countries, individuals who migrate, and those left behind—recognize that well-managed international migration can be mutually advantageous. The consequences for migration of political events such as democratization and elections, and the involvement of migrants in internal rebellion in some Africa countries, also deserve attention. Such analysis will illuminate the endogenous relationship between migration and political change.
7. Migration and Social and Gender Issues

International migration involves many social issues in sending and receiving countries as well as economic issues.

Migration, health, and HIV/AIDS

Malaria and AIDS are major threats to human health and to the social and economic progress of individuals, communities, and countries in Africa.

Each year malaria causes at least 1 million deaths, and there are an additional 300–500 million clinical cases, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates. Ninety percent of malaria deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa. High-risk groups include children, pregnant women, travelers, refugees, displaced persons, and laborers entering endemic areas. Malaria is prevalent in 45 countries in Africa. The total direct and indirect costs of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa exceeded $2 billion, according to 1997 estimates. In countries with a heavy burden of malaria the disease may account for as much as 40 percent of public health expenditure, 30–50 percent of in-patient admissions, and up to 50 percent of out-patient visits.

Sub-Saharan Africa is also the world’s most infected region for HIV/AIDS, with a profound impact at the individual, family, and community levels. An estimated 3.8 million adults and children in Sub-Saharan Africa became infected with HIV during 2000, according to a Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) update of December 2000, bringing the number of people living there with HIV/AIDS at year’s end to 25.3 million (Fluitman 2001; UNAIDS 2000). Regionally, Southern and Eastern Africa have the highest HIV prevalence (map 1). African economic development depends critically on the development and the effective deployment of its human resources, and both are seriously compromised by the pandemic, which has dramatic consequences in virtually all spheres of life.

33
The high rates of HIV/AIDS infection in Africa create a nightmare scenario of acute labor shortages in key sectors of education and health, according to Adepoju (2004). This is keenly felt in the major labor-sending countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia,) and labor-receiving countries (Botswana and South Africa) of Southern Africa. However, it is also increasingly the case elsewhere in the region (Adepoju 2004). These acute labor shortages are now translating into more migration from skills-surplus countries, especially in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, and outside Africa.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic adds new urgency to the problem of the emigration of health personnel from Sub-Saharan Africa. Many South African doctors and nurses emigrated to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, attracted by higher incomes. In turn, an estimated 60 percent of Zimbabwean doctors recently moved to Botswana and South Africa. In Ghana nearly a quarter of health workers emigrated between 1995 and 2002 (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006). This migration of a significant number of trained personnel increases the work load for the remaining few, thus contributing to the poorer health care in Ghana.

The major causes of transmission of HIV in Africa are thought to be through heterosexual intercourse and through the placenta from an infected mother to her unborn baby. Other causes include blood transfusion and drug abuse (Adepoju 1994). Anecdotally, migrants are accused of being a major vector in spreading HIV/AIDS. Further in-
vestigation of these allegations will help to deepen understanding of the potential impact of migrations in spreading HIV/AIDS.

**Women in migration**

In most countries immigration regulations are not gender specific. Yet until recently immigration laws and policies tended to assume that female migrants were secondary migrants, moving to join other migrants rather than initiators of migration themselves. This assumption reflects the widespread traditional views in Sub-Saharan Africa of the status and role of women within the family and in society, which are related to the agricultural and economic system, which in turn is related to population density and technological levels (Boserup 1990). Women face discrimination and segregation, both in the organized labor market and in informal sector employment. They also have inferior legal rights in such matters as inheritance, land, and credit.

A wide range of structural constraints and inequities prevent African women from participating more fully in migration. These include laws and cultural norms limiting their access to education, land, credit, productive inputs, information, and health care. Women’s literacy rates are considerably lower than men’s (Fluitman 2001). This sexual difference in privileges could explain early low involvement of women in international migration.

However, the picture is changing. Where once migration worldwide consisted mainly of men performing physically demanding work in the industrial or agricultural sectors, now women are increasing involved in international migration. Lucas (2005) highlights this growing role of women in migration in Africa (table 2). In 1960 women made up less than 41 percent of the migrant stock in Africa; by 2000 they made up more than 47 percent. Adepoju (2005) also cites anecdotal evidence on the growing autonomous migration of women within Africa. Nonetheless, despite the general increase in women in migration in Africa, Southern Africa still has the lowest portion of female migrants of any major region in the world, together with Western Asia.

There are many reasons for women’s growing role. Migrant women have less access to formal sector employment and must depend on work in the informal and unregulated labor sectors, such as domestic work, small trade, entertainment, and prostitution, Tyldum, Tveit, and Brunovskis (2005) argue. The growing participation of native-born women in the labor force in many societies has led to an increased dependence on foreign workers for childcare, elder care, housekeeping, and other services traditionally performed by housewives, increasing demand for migrants (Tyldum, Tveit, and Brunovskis 2005). In the last decade, however, some professional women have emigrated from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal to other parts of Africa and developed countries (Page and Plaza 2005).
Not much research has been conducted on gender and migration in Africa. Available information is scattered and incomplete. One study (Page and Plaza 2005) notes that for the West Africa region migration within the region is female-dominated, especially for Benin, The Gambia, and Togo. Migration to destinations outside the region is male dominated.

**Table 2. Share of women in the migrant stock, 1960–2000**

( percent )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Africa</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Migration and ethical issues: trafficking and child labor**

The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice distinguishes *trafficking* from migrant *smuggling* by the presence of force or coercion for purposes of exploitation. In a 2002 paper for the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions the Advisory Council of Jurists (ACJ 2002) argued that while human rights figure prominently in the discourse on trafficking, it is the connection between trafficking and migration—particularly illegal labor migration—that is the driving political force behind international antitrafficking efforts.

Trafficking, like other forms of irregular migration, involves movements mainly from poorer countries to relatively wealthier ones. The gap between the number of people who wish to migrate and the legal opportunities for them to do so has created a demand that is being filled by traffickers and migrant smugglers operating in increasingly organized and successful ways. Migration occasioned by trafficking of women and child workers is the second most lucrative business after gun running according to Makinwa-Adebusoye (2006).

Africa’s human trafficking and smuggling map is complicated, involving diverse origins within and outside the region. Today, analysts are looking into trafficking in children (mainly for farm labor and domestic work within and across countries), trafficking in women and young people for sexual exploitation (mainly outside the region), and trafficking in women from outside the region (for the sex industry of South Africa) (Adepoju 2004).

In several African countries newspapers recount stories about individual children sold practically as slaves. Slave-like arrangements have been reported about children
from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, yet no reasonable estimates exist of the size of this problem. Nevertheless, recent empirical work has been conducted to identify the causes and the characteristics of the phenomenon in some parts of the continent (Ouensovi and Kiellend 2001; IITA 2002; Kielland and Sanogo 2002; Nkamleu and Kielland 2006).

A growing number of young people are involved in daredevil ventures to gain entry into Europe. Movements are more clandestine, involving riskier passage and trafficking through diverse transit points, such as through Senegal to Spain by way of the Canary Islands. Individual stowaways engage in life-threatening trips hidden aboard ships destined for southern Europe, and recently they have headed as far as East Asia. Unscrupulous agents exploit these desperate youths with promises of passage to France, Italy, and Spain.

Between 500,000 and 700,000 women and children are trafficked worldwide each year, according to Makinwa-Adebusoye (2006). For Africa as a whole the number of children subject to trafficking and to the worst forms of child labor is estimated at 80 million. The most active source of child labor is West Africa, where children are taken from Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo to work on farms or in domestic service within the same region or in Central Africa and beyond (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006).

In West and Central Africa slave-like child labor is believed to be especially prevalent in rural areas, where the capacity to enforce minimum age requirements for schooling and work is lacking (Bonnet 1993; Grootaert 1998; Andvig 2001; Ranjan 2001). In West Africa the main source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked women and children are Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, according to Adepoju (2004). Trafficked children are recruited through networks of agents to work as domestic servants in the informal sector and on plantations. Parents are often forced by poverty and ignorance to enlist their children, hoping to benefit from their wages to sustain the family’s deteriorating economic situation. Some children are indentured into “slave” labor in Mauritania and Sudan. In East Africa young girls and women abducted from conflict zones are forced to become sex-slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men in Sudan and the Gulf States. South Africa is a destination for regional and extraregional trafficking activities. Women are trafficked through the network of refugees resident in South Africa; children are trafficked from Lesotho’s border towns, as are girls and women from Mozambique. Women are also trafficked from China, Thailand, and Eastern Europe to South Africa.

Until very recently, almost no information was available on trafficking routes through and from Africa. Even today, the depth and quality of information available is relatively poor, although the situation is improving. The most likely explanation is that trafficking, particularly within Africa, is not given as high priority as elsewhere. As ar-
gued by ACJ (2002), African governments appear to be less concerned with irregular, nonpolitical border movements than their counterparts in Europe, Asia, or the Americas. Partly as a result of this disinterest and partly because of competing resource priorities, official data on trafficking within Africa is almost nonexistent, and administrative structures to protect, detect, and control these flows are often weak or underresourced.

**Conclusion**

Migration in Africa is dynamic and is becoming extremely complex and increasingly feminized. International migration not only involves economic considerations but also touches some basic issues of freedom and individual rights. In thinking about policy on migration in Saharan Africa, it is important to investigate human trafficking, which seems to becoming a lucrative activity. Another area needing further scrutiny is the potential impact of migration on the spread of HIV/AIDS, in both the country of origin and the country of destination.

**8. General Conclusions and Implications**

Over the last decades of the twentieth century international migration increased markedly worldwide. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where migration has always been an integral part of the social process, migration flows are largely temporary spurts associated with economic booms in destination countries or political events in countries of origin. An important feature in the region is that some former countries of emigration have become destination countries, while economic and political events in other countries have led to large fluctuations in migration trends. Movements of refugees have been a major—and in some cases, the main—component of international migration flows among countries. However, migration for economic reasons remains the most important component.

Large internal migration flows and their likely positive trend in the region clearly deserve more analysis. Needed are empirical documentation of such features as the magnitude, composition, and place of destination of these flows and examination of their economic and social effects and the policy responses to them. This review of research and knowledge on international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa points to areas requiring research into policy actions needed for better management of migration in the region.

Several features emerge from this review, as summarized below.

**Complexity of labor movements**

Migration has served as an integral part of labor markets and livelihoods across much of Africa for at least the last century. Over time, and in different places, it has taken a num-
ber of different forms. It has included internal, regional, and international movements and has cut across class and skill boundaries. Although African internal migration is still primarily intraregional, it has recently expanded to a wide variety of alternative destinations and sometime to places without any historical, political, or economic links to the source countries of migration. This movement has also become more complex, varied, and spontaneous, with the feminization of migration and rising levels of both temporary and long-term circulation. Moreover, much of the migration in Africa has occurred and is still occurring outside of a regulatory framework.

Recent estimates indicate that in 2005 migrants constituted 3 percent of the population in West Africa, 1.6 percent in East and Central Africa, and 2.5 percent in Southern Africa. Refugees make up a particularly high percentage of migrants in Central and East Africa.

Data gaps
Although useful data exist and give a compelling picture of migration in the different regions of the continent, there are still a number of key data gaps concerning migration and displacement within the regions. A deep understanding of migration flows remains a challenge. Data on the scale, structure, and characteristics of migrants in different regions are lacking, and this lack impedes investigation of the likely patterns of future expansion of migration. Estimates and numbers that the authors themselves claim they do not believe are still being used in the literature. While census data could reveal more about migration scale, dedicated migration surveys will also be needed to understand the migration process.

Underlying forces
Migration can be viewed as a response to economic incentives arising largely from disequilibria between and within sectors of the economy and between countries and regions. The growing body of literature on migration seems to be reaching a consensus that economic considerations are of primary importance in the decision to migrate and that people migrate ultimately to improve their well-being. However, while there is consensus on the benefits of an open trade regime and relatively liberal capital movement, that consensus rarely extends to the free movement of people across countries.

Recent debates of the effect of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa still focus on the emigration of qualified professionals (the brain drain) and the subsequent brain gain in receiving countries. There is still doubt whether brain drain is a serious problem for many African countries. The likely impact of such brain drain, or brain gain, or both, depends of a set of social and economic parameters. Central questions are: How productively were the highly skilled workers employed before their departure? Are higher wages induced
for those left behind? Does the departure of workers induce new internal migration to replace them? What is the nature of technology and hence the extent of substitution that might occur in both receiving and sending countries? What is the extent of external costs and benefits of emigration and immigration of the highly skilled? Also, little is known about the number and the internal destinations of migration on the continent. Information is still lacking on composition by skill level, gender, and legal status and on sectoral concentration. The complex relationships between in-continent migration, training, and labor markets change need more exploration.

Individuals belonging to different families, communities, ethnicities, and countries exhibit remarkably different behavior with respect to the incentives to migrate. Members from some communities respond quickly to economic incentives and seem less worried about losing “social capital” in the sending site. In contrast, members from other communities are reluctant to leave their environment, even in the presence of strong economic incentives. While economists and others have attributed these differences to unobservable institutional, cultural, or individual characteristics, this raises issues of the role of information networks in transmitting impulses about the range of available opportunities, of the ease of migrating despite intervening obstacles and barriers, and of the role of the family as the decisionmaking body for individual migration. Again, more research is needed to inform the academic and policy debates on the matter.

**Remittances**

In contrast with the loss of human resources embodied in brain drain are the financial transfers to the home country sent by migrants to their families. This subject has prompted a lively debate in the literature about the costs and benefits of migration. One central issue is the expenditure of remittances. Some argue that increased income is not increased development. Much remittance spending is sterile for developmental purposes: it is channeled into nonlocal expenditures or conspicuous consumption. Others stress the link between remittances and investment.

Data on remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa remain poor. The best starting point would be to collect consistent cross-sectional and dynamic data before undertaking any serious analysis. Investment in monitoring systems would be helpful because most remittances on the continent flow through informal channels.

The dynamics of social relationships among migrants and their home and host societies are complex and represent an important research challenge. In addition to sending remittances, migration affects the social fabric of both home and host societies. Studies show that migrants tend to be net contributors to fiscal revenue. A central question is whether the sums that migrants pay in taxes are greater than what they cost the state in welfare payments, education, and additional infrastructure. Moreover, migrants create
and maintain other, broader forms of contact with their host country and their country of origin. These may generate flows of knowledge, investment, and trade to and from those countries. Quantification of these flows will be a step forward in the analysis of migration outcomes.

Policies to lower remittance fees through some degree of deregulation of remittance intermediaries could enhance the benefits from migration. Yet responses to existing policy incentives have not been seriously investigated. Financial service deregulation will have some costs, implying that the elasticity of remittances with respect to these costs needs to be known before any recommendation can be made.

**Regional responses**

Countries in the region have started taking international migration seriously in their policies and programs. The complexity of international migration and its growing scale have compelled governments to move from unilateral approaches to regional consultative processes. Examples are the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA). At the international level the United Nations system and other multilateral institutions have undertaken a variety of activities for addressing international migration issues.

Beyond a few conventions and protocols Sub-Saharan Africa lacks a comprehensive framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive, continental response to migration issues. To this end, at least two issues urgently need attention. Adoption of standard definitions and sharing of knowledge on international migration is a necessary first step. Then mechanisms to deal with refugees and undocumented migrants need to be continuously evaluated, as the refugee problem is a dynamic phenomenon.
## Annexes

**Annex 1 Tables on migration in Sub-Saharan Africa**

### Table A.1. Distribution of foreign nationals by country of origin and country of destination, selected West African countries, 1975

(percent, except as indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Togo</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Share of total foreign nationals in region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
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n.a. = not applicable
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*Source: Stier 1982.*
Table A.2. Growth rate of the international migrant stock and international migrants as a share of the population, West Africa (percent)

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*Note:* The growth rate of the immigrant stock estimates the average exponential growth rate of the international migrant stock over each period indicated.

*Source:* UN 2006.
Table A.3. Refugees as a share of international migrants, by region

(Percent)

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Source: UN 2006.
Table A.4. Growth rate of the international migrant stock and international migrants as a share of the population, Central Africa (percent)

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Source: UN 2006.
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*Source:* UN 2006.
Annex 2 Maps on flows and scales of international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

References


