Separazione funzionale o strutturale nelle industrie regolate? I vincitori non puniscono; possibilmente cooperano (e innovano)

Congedo, Pierluigi (2008): Separazione funzionale o strutturale nelle industrie regolate? I vincitori non puniscono; possibilmente cooperano (e innovano). Published in: Concorrenza e Mercato , Vol. 16, No. 2009 (June 2009)

Abstract

Structural v. functional separation in regulated industries, in electronic communications in particular, is still a debated issue. The article, based on the Ph.D. studies carried out by the Author at King's College London, tackles the reasons that may suggest "cooperative" solutions, such as the negotiation of undertakings with the national competition authorities or sector regulators, aimed at enhancing innovation while granting consumer welfare imperatives. From Shumpeter to Arrow, from Coase to recent developments at European Commission level, the Author combines (Competition) Law and basic principles of economics, having in mind the recent British experience of Openreach fucntional separation of British Telecom.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Structural or functional separation in regulated industries? Winners do not punish; possibily cooperate.
• Language: Italian
• Keywords: structural functional separation electronic communications Coase Whish commitments undertakings competition commission innovation technology consumer welfare broadband digital divide
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K0 - General; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law

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