Yamamura, Eiji (2009): The Effect of Learning Varies According to Locality: Micro Data Analysis of the Lawyer Market in Japan.
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By using individual level data, this paper attempts to examine how and to what extent behavior and perception of those bringing lawsuit’s differ between large district courts (competitive lawyer market) and medium or small district ones (less competitive lawyer market). The major findings are; (1) in medium or small but not in large districts, trial experience discourages persons from employing a lawyer. (2) A natural person is less likely to employ a lawyer than a legal person in medium or small districts, but not in large ones. (3) The self-rated cost of searching for a lawyer is lower in large districts than small ones. It follows from these results that the lower competitive pressure in the lawyer markets in medium and small districts results in higher costs of employing a lawyer than is found in large districts.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The Effect of Learning Varies According to Locality: Micro Data Analysis of the Lawyer Market in Japan|
|Keywords:||Learning, Lawyer market|
|Subjects:||K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K49 - Other
L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L88 - Government Policy
|Depositing User:||eiji yamamura|
|Date Deposited:||20. Jul 2009 05:22|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 07:49|
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