Deb, Rahul and Fenske, James (2009): A Nonparametric Test of Strategic Behavior in the Cournot Model.

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Abstract
We devise a nonparametric test of strategic behavior in a multiproduct Cournot oligopoly. It is assumed that firms have cost functions that do not change over the period of observation but that market demand can change in each period. Market prices and firmspecific production quantities are observed and it is assumed that neither the inverse demand functions nor the cost functions are known. The driving assumptions of the test are that market inverse demand functions are decreasing and differentiable at each period and that cost functions are increasing and convex for each firm. Under these very general conditions, we show that this test imposes strong restrictions on observed data. We apply the test to the crude oil market and find that strategic behavior is strongly rejected.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A Nonparametric Test of Strategic Behavior in the Cournot Model 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Competitive behavior, Multiproduct Cournot oligopoly, Nonparametric test, Crude oil market, OPEC. 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D2  Production and Organizations > D21  Firm Behavior: Theory C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1  Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C14  Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General D  Microeconomics > D4  Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43  Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  16560 
Depositing User:  Rahul Deb 
Date Deposited:  07. Aug 2009 00:21 
Last Modified:  15. Feb 2013 19:53 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/16560 