Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model

Galenianos, Manolis and Kircher, Philipp and Virag, Gabor (2009): Market Power and Efficiency in a Search Model.

Abstract

We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and resulting policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. Our environment has two main characteristics: wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and there is a finite number of agents. We find that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and that the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low-productivity firms. A minimum wage forces the low-productivity firms to increase their wage, leading them to hire even more often thereby exacerbating the inefficiencies. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare because they limit firms’ market power by improving the workers’ outside option.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: directed search, heterogeneity, inefficient allocation, market power
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J0 - General > J08 - Labor Economics Policies; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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