Narain, Aditya and Ghosh, Saibal (2001): Bank supervisory arrangements: International evidence and Indian perspective. Published in: Economic and Political Weekly , Vol. 36, No. 37 (2001): pp. 3543-3553.
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Historically, central banks have had the dual objective of safeguarding monetary and financial stability. Increasingly, over the last two decades or so, concerns about financial stability have gained prominence, reflecting the growing number, breadth and severity of bouts of financial distress. At the same time, the role of central banks in safeguarding financial stability has been evolving. In part, this has resulted from developments in the financial system in the wake of liberalisation and innovation. More recently, some central banks have been divested of their supervisory responsibilities through changes in legislation. Structurally, as the blurring of distinction between different types of institutions (banks, securities firms and insurance companies) continues, there remains the issue of whether single or multiple supervisory authorities should be the norm and whether the central bank should be assigned any supervisory role. In this context, the present chapter seeks to understand the cross-country evidence with regard to regulation and supervision. The purpose of the Chapter is to delineate the extant arrangements of regulation and supervision and whether supervisory authority in respective countries is conducted monopolistically by the central bank or shared with other supervisory authorities. Such an analysis seeks to achieve two broad objectives: (a) whether and to what extent do different countries exhibit different supervisory arrangements and (b) on the basis of available evidence, what broad inferences can be gleaned regarding the synergies between supervision and monetary policy?
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Bank supervisory arrangements: International evidence and Indian perspective|
|Keywords:||supervision; central banking; mega supervisor;|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
|Depositing User:||Saibal Ghosh|
|Date Deposited:||22. Sep 2009 11:08|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 12:47|
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