South-South Migration and Human Development: Reflections on African Experiences

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Abstract

This paper looks at the relationship between migration between developing countries – or countries of the global ‘South’ – and processes of human development. The paper offers a critical analysis of the concept of South-South migration and draws attention to four fundamental problems. The paper then gives a broad overview of the changing patterns of migration in developing regions, with a particular focus on mobility within the African continent. It outlines some of the economic, social and political drivers of migration within poor regions, noting that these are also drivers of migration in the rest of the world. It also highlights the role of the state in influencing people’s movements and the outcomes of migration. The paper highlights the distinctive contribution that migration within developing regions makes to human development in terms of income, human capital and broader processes of social and political change. The paper concludes that the analysis of migration in poorer regions of the world and its relationship with human development requires much more data than is currently available.

Keywords: Migration, South-South migration, Africa, Human development.
Introduction

In the rising tide of literature on international migration and migration and development, the vast majority of contributions have focused on migration from the poorer to the wealthier parts of the world, from the less developed to more developed regions. This focus of research and policy bears little relationship to the distribution of global migration across the world. As we show below, by any measure the numbers of people moving within the less developed areas of the world are no less, and most likely considerably more, than those moving to the most developed regions. The balance is slowly being redressed by a growing body of research on so-called ‘South-South’ migration to which this paper contributes.

This paper was originally conceived as providing an overview of the current knowledge of ‘South-South’ migration. The scale of the phenomenon both in terms of the numbers of people and geographical scope means that it is only possible to give a very partial view. Hence the geographical focus has become limited, with a particular focus on the African continent and a secondary focus on Asia; our references to South America are much sparser. However, the difficulties of writing about South-South migration run beyond the challenges of the broad scope. There are fundamental questions about the very concept of South-South migration that have emerged as themes that run through the paper. Apart from the basic question of which countries are part of this ‘South’, we also need ask what is the rationale for assuming that these disparate countries have anything more in common with each other – as being in the ‘South’ – than they might have with countries of the ‘North’. Why should we consider migration from Russia to the UK (South-North) as being fundamentally different as migration from Russia to Estonia (South-South)? Similarly, why should we associate migration from Russia to Estonia with that from Rwanda to DR Congo? A question recurring in many parts of the paper is thus, what is distinctive about South-South migration here? In practice, the lack of evidence and the diversity within the South means we can give very few answers. To some extent, the paper’s focus on the unambiguous ‘South’ of Africa and Asia helps us to avoid this issue as we can draw on geographical distinctions. However, the problem keeps reappearing in any discussion about South-South migration as a whole.
As a result the paper has become not only a review of some of the literature on South-South migration but also a critical review of the concept. The next section expands on these points and reviews the available definitions of the South and their application to South-South migration. In Section 3, we review the historical trajectories of South-South migration before turning to the contemporary scale and distribution of migration within the South in Section 4. In the subsequent section we discuss the drivers of migration, focusing as far as possible on those that are distinctive to South-South movement. In Section 5, the focus shifts to the role of the state in shaping migration, starting with the role of borders and then reviewing the different migration policies in the South, highlighting the different priorities placed on immigration, integration and emigration in North and South. The penultimate section looks at the impact of South-South migration on human development, noting that it may have a much larger impact within poorer communities than South-North migration, which has remained the focus of most research. The paper concludes by reflecting on the utility of the notion of South-South migration and suggests that a more nuanced approach may improve our understanding of the relationship between migration and human development in the poorer regions of the world.

**Identifying the South**

Before attempting any overview of South-South migration, it is essential to clarify what we mean by the term. This is not a straightforward task. The term remains deeply problematic for a number of reasons, of which we consider four here: the problems associated with its definition, distinctiveness, political construction and chronology.

First, to speak of South-South migration requires a definition of ‘South’ and ‘North’. In the literature, the South is often taken to be a convenient synonym for the set of developing countries, which bears only limited relationship to their geographical locations. Hence, South-South migration is simply migration between developing countries (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; Ratha and Shaw 2007). Unfortunately, there is no universal definition and there are three competing ways of categorising countries that might be considered as developing and included in the ‘South’.
Within the UN system five ‘developing regions’ are defined as follows:

- Africa
- Americas excluding Northern America
- Caribbean
- Asia excluding Japan
- Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand.¹

The 137 countries falling within these regions are classified as ‘less developed’ or ‘developing’. Among this group, 49 countries are listed as the ‘least developed countries’ based on criteria of low-income, level of human capital and economic vulnerability.²

For the World Bank, low and middle-income countries are designated as ‘developing’. This excludes countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and much of the Persian Gulf, which are counted as developing in the UN classification (Ratha and Shaw 2007). Taking this categorisation as the basis for defining South-South changes the picture significantly, as millions of migrants are living in the high-income Gulf countries. Given that much of the data on South-South migration has been generated by the World Bank, its classification has tended to dominate in much of the literature.

UNDP provides the third way of categorising countries by grouping them by their human development index (HDI). Up to the last Human Development Report in 2008, countries were placed in three groups – low HDI (<0.5), medium HDI (≥0.5 and <0.8) and high HDI (≥0.8). Describing countries with a medium or low HDI as being in the ‘South’ and those with a high HDI as being in the ‘North’, placed countries such as Mexico and major countries in South America (Brazil, Chile, Argentina) in the ‘North’. This ran against widespread usage in discussions of migration, which place them firmly in the ‘South’ (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). Such anomalies have been addressed by introducing a new category of countries with a ‘very high HDI’ (≥0.9). In the 2009 UNDP Human Development Report, the ‘South’ is defined as all those countries whose HDI is below 0.9. This approach brings the UNDP South and World

¹ http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm accessed 10th February 2009
Bank South very close together. All the countries with very high HDI are also high income countries. The only large country which the two approaches categorise differently is Saudi Arabia, which is a high income country (in the World Bank North) but only has a high HDI (UNDP South).

Using the estimates of migration between countries from the Global Migrant Origin Database prepared by Sussex University, it is possible to compare the levels of migration between different categories of countries, by level of development, income and HDI. Hence it is possible to see how the movements between South-South, North-North, South-North and North-South vary with the different definitions of ‘South’ and ‘North’ (see Tables 1-4).

Table 1: Origin and destination of migrants by UN Development status (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (000s)</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,193,975</td>
<td>More developed</td>
<td>45,937</td>
<td>58,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,250,612</td>
<td>Less developed</td>
<td>54,962</td>
<td>91,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>678,997</td>
<td>Least developed</td>
<td>4,291</td>
<td>25,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105,190</td>
<td>175,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants as % of population</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Origin and destination of migrants by Income Level - World Bank (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (000s)</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Emigrants as % pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>955,533</td>
<td>High income</td>
<td>High income</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,961,407</td>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>High income</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,203,494</td>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>High income</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>High income</th>
<th>Middle income</th>
<th>Low income</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Emigrants as % pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27,063</td>
<td>5,892</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>34,256</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51,685</td>
<td>36,440</td>
<td>5,612</td>
<td>93,737</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,817</td>
<td>9,254</td>
<td>20,948</td>
<td>46,019</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94,565</td>
<td>51,585</td>
<td>27,861</td>
<td>174,01</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Immigrants as % of population | 9.9% | 1.7% | 1.3% |

Table 3: Origin and destination of migrants by Human Development Index (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (000s)</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Emigrants as % pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>928,479</td>
<td>Very High HD</td>
<td>Very High HD</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High HD</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>733,933</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium HD</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low HD</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,982,048</td>
<td>Very High HD</td>
<td>Very High HD</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High HD</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>478,988</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium HD</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low HD</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>Very High HD</td>
<td>175,59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High HD</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium HD</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low HD</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Immigrants as % of population | 9.6% | 4.6% | 1.1% | 2.0% |

Table 4: Proportion of global migration across South and North by different definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Direction of migration (% of global migrant stock)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-S</td>
<td>N-S</td>
<td>N-N</td>
<td>S-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development status</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income level</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP HDI</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures suggest that the aggregate levels of South-South migration outweigh South-North migration and represent the largest share of migration under the income level and HDI definitions of South. However, the UNDP HDI definition gives a noticeably wider gap between the scale of South-South and North-South migration than the World Bank income level approach. Using the UN development status gives a very different picture as it portrays South-South migration as much lower and suggests a much higher level of North-North migration. Much of the difference can be explained by the migrants, totally over 30 million, originating in the former communist countries of Europe (including Russia); these countries are counted as more developed by the UN by virtue of their European location, but they have yet to reach high income levels or very high HDI.

A full analysis of such discrepancies between these different definitions of South and North is beyond the scope of this paper. The critical point to note is that aggregating migration statistics around a category like the ‘South’ can be very misleading. There is a growing literature which relates the levels of migration to the levels of development, suggesting that South-North migration is primarily driven by discrepancies in development progress leading to spatial opportunity differentials. However, if this ‘South’ includes some countries with high incomes or high human development index, we have to ask how far this analysis is valid at the aggregate level. Likewise, if the South includes many countries in the physical North, such as the countries of Eastern Europe, we may have to take more account of geographical proximity in the analysis. For instance, it is important to note that the majority of migrants that have settled in Europe, Asia
and Africa – the three regions that generate about 80 percent of global migrants – have moved within their own region (see Figure 1).

For the purposes of this paper, the definition based on the Human Development Index will be adopted. The focus here is on migration within areas that fall into the South in all definitions – the unambiguous South of the African continent and the countries of Asia with lower levels of development measured by both HDI and income. Hence the problems of definition do not need to permeate the whole analysis. However, they must be considered in any discussion of global aggregates of South-South migration.

Having reached a working definition of the South, the second difficulty is marking out South-South migration from any other movements. Migration systems are interlinked and it is impossible to separate sharply South-South, South-North and North-North migration. Patterns of migration span the world. A journey started in rural Ethiopia to find work in Libya may end up with a move to the tomato fields of Italy or domestic service in Berlin. Thus, to discuss any one of these realms of migration in isolation means it is easy to miss much of the picture. People’s motivations for migration, the forces which compel it, and the institutions which shape the process are all likely to have transnational dimensions that cut across the borders between North and South – wherever those borders are placed.
Third, the categorisation of countries by development status has arisen from convention rather than any clear analytical distinction. This begs two related questions: a) why should we assume any connection between countries of the South or any commonalities in social processes such as migration by virtue of their being in the South; and, b) why should we assume there is any difference between the experiences of social processes in the South and North? Of course, these distinctions have become very important in policy, as the countries of the North see evidence of increasing migration from the South to North, such as the significant rise in immigration from non-OECD into the OECD since the late 1970s (OECD 2007b: 29).
It is important to bear in mind the political construction of the categories we are using. By analysing South-South and South-North migration separately, we may be creating a false and essentialist distinction. Where we find differences between migrations arising from countries in each realm, it becomes too easy, and seems natural, to look for explanations on the basis of the categorisation of countries as North and South. This may render invisible other possible causes. For example, if we disaggregate South-North movement by continent, we may be more drawn towards explanations of movement related to geographical proximity rather than levels of development (see Table 6 below).

Fourth, the designation of South and North are products of a particular time. Levels of human development and income are rising in many countries of the South, which calls into question their status as developing countries. The UN list of 137 developing countries has remained static for some years – as a matter of convention rather than analysis of their development status – and the inclusion of countries, such as Singapore and Korea, appears somewhat anachronistic. Using the definitions of the South based on income (World Bank) or levels of human development avoids this problem. However, it creates difficulties if we want to analyse changes over time in migration originating in the South (whether South-South or South-North), as our set of countries in the South will change. Even the relatively stable UN list runs into this problem if the timeframe extends over decades, as new states have been recognised and categorised as developing. In particular, the end of the Soviet Union resulted in the creation of fifteen states, of which eight are categorised as developing. It also transformed an estimated 27 million internal migrants in the Soviet Union into international migrants (UN 2005).

Thus, comparing South-South and South-North migration of thirty years ago may have limited utility when the relationships between countries in each group may have changed very dramatically over time. Instead we need a much more nuanced analysis which will take into account the dynamics not only of migration processes but also of the categories used.

Putting aside these reservations about the terminology, the rest of this paper will discuss South-South migration, with a particular focus on countries in Africa and Asia which have been included as being in the South for many years under all definitions discussed above.
An historical perspective on South-South migration

This section turns to the historical trajectory of South-South migration within Africa and Asia, drawing particular attention to the role of colonialism in transforming migration dynamics in these continents. This is where the term South-South migration creates the most difficulties as it looks decidedly anachronistic if applied before the middle of the twentieth century. However, it is essential to consider these historical patterns as they continue to have echoes in the migrations of today. Therefore, despite the anachronism, in this very brief overview we continue to use the contemporary understanding of the South.

This section addresses four key themes, which have not only played an important historical role in shaping migration patterns within the South but also continue to play an important part in mobility today. Two of these – the influence of colonialism and migration movements associated with post-colonial conflicts – are issues which are distinctive to the South. While such factors may have had a critical role in shaping migration, it is important to remember that they were played out in the context of societies and economies in which mobility was deeply embedded. It is too easy to focus on colonialism and conflict and to forget that the search for better livelihoods and trading opportunities has been (and continues to be) a basic factor underpinning migration in the South – as it has in the rest of the world. Hence, this is the first theme under discussion.

The final issue addressed is the link between migration and the formation of identities in the South, particularly Africa. Again, such linkages are found across both the North and South. However, assumptions of essentialist links between people and place remain common and the brief discussion here serves to illustrate the heterogeneous nature of people’s shifting identities and their relationship to place.

Livelihoods and trade

Migration has always played an important role in sustaining and expanding people’s livelihoods (de Haan 1999). This may involve gaining access to new natural resources, such as land, minerals, water, wild animals or fish. It may also provide access to new sources of labour and
markets – very clearly illustrated by the European colonial expansion, and its reliance on the ‘unfree labour’, first of slaves and then of indentured workers (Castles and Miller 2009, Chapter 4; Cohen 1987; Cohen 1995). While the European incursions into what we refer to here as the South did involve significant North-South (settler) migration, and did dramatically change patterns of South-South migration, it was prefigured by earlier South-South migrations: the colonial migration was overlaid on existing movements. For example, the southern African labour migration system (Box 2), which provided labour for the mines of the region could only be established because it drew on the widespread pre-colonial practice of migration in the region (Bakewell and de Haas 2007).

The establishment of trading routes encouraged and required permanent settlement along the way. Migrants settled to provide services to traders and to act as intermediaries with local residents. The trading routes also opened up new horizons for people to see new areas, and new opportunities. These long standing routes of trade and migration are still relevant today. For example, the trans-Saharan routes have connected sub-Saharan and North Africa over centuries and resulted in long-established sub-Saharan African populations of sub-Saharan origin in the Maghreb. Throughout known history, there has been intensive population mobility between both sides of the Sahara through the trans-Saharan (caravan) trade, conquest, pilgrimage, and religious education. The Sahara itself is a huge transition zone, and the diverse ethnic composition of Saharan oases testifies to this long history of population mobility (Bakewell and de Haas 2007).

The old Silk Road linking Asia to Europe also continues to move people between the continents, spreading populations and ideas as it has done for centuries (Hoerder 2002). Likewise, the sea routes from China linking up with the nations of South-East Asia have been major conduits for migration. It is particularly important to note such historical patterns today, when it is widely – and often erroneously – assumed that South-South migration (such as that between sub-Saharan and North Africa) is the first step in people’s journeys to the North.
Colonial influences on migration

Various configurations of this autonomous and coerced migration are likely to have emerged across the South in different periods and different places. Where the balance lays between forced and voluntary movements may be contested in each case, but such movements established dynamics of migration and transnational\(^3\) relationships across large distances, which the Europeans colonists found in place. For example, Europeans arriving on the Angolan coast first found out about the interior from African travellers and traders (von Oppen 1995). The Europeans did not introduce slavery to Africa; the Atlantic slave trade brought a new scale and brutality to the practice of domestic slavery, which was found in many regions across the continent (Birmingham 1981; Miller 1988). It is important not to forget that there was also an older ‘South-South’ practice of slavery from Africa to the Middle East and Asia (Jayasuriya and Angenot. 2008). The Atlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades brutally wrenched millions of people from Africa creating a decisive rupture with the continent and breaking all contact with their homelands (Nayyar 2000). Thus, while the African Diaspora in the US may be recreating those links (Cohen 2008; Manning 2003), the African slave trade did not establish ongoing migration systems that continued after the abolition of the slave trade.

In contrast, the establishment of European colonialism across Africa and Asia in the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries established pervasive patterns of migration which can still be seen today. Colonial power exerted great efforts to control the mobility of the colonised peoples in order to direct them towards the places where labour was required for colonial enterprises. In some cases this was achieved by forced labour, little removed from slavery. For example, the use of forced labour by the Portuguese on plantations in Angola until the middle of the 20th century maintained the effective practice of internal slavery for a century after the end of international trading (Henderson 1978). Others adopted more indirect mechanisms. The introduction of hut and poll taxes, the expropriation of the best land for settler agriculture, and the imposition of compulsory labour services for villagers were all policies that served to ensure Africans had to offer their labour to earn cash. This stimulated the large-scale movement of people in different parts of Africa. Most notably, in West Africa, the colonial period stimulated widespread labour

\(^3\) Of course the use of the term ‘transnational’ is anachronistic before the establishment of nation-states, but it is consistent with our use of the term South before it existed.
migration from Benin, Niger, Mali and Togo to the plantations and mines of Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (Schuerkens 2003). In Southern Africa, the mines of South Africa and the Zambian Copperbelt drew in hundreds of thousands of labourers from across the region. The establishment of urban settlements by the colonialists also required workers to serve in the new administration, the armies and police forces across the whole continent.

Across Asia, the introduction of indentured labour systems served a similar purpose. Indenture (or the ‘coolie system’) involved recruitment of large groups of workers, sometimes by force, and their transportation to another area for work. British colonial authorities recruited workers from the Indian sub-continent for the sugar plantations of Trinidad, British Guiana and other Caribbean countries. Others were employed in plantations, mines and railway construction in Malaya, East Africa and Fiji. The British also recruited Chinese ‘coolies’ for Malaya and other colonies. Dutch colonial authorities used Chinese labour on construction projects in the Dutch East Indies. Up to 1 million indentured workers were recruited in Japan, mainly for work in Hawaii, the USA, Brazil and Peru (Shimpo 1995).

According to Potts (1990:63-103) indentured workers were used in 40 countries by all the major colonial powers. The system lasted until 1941, when it was finally abolished in the Dutch colonies. Indentured workers were bound by strict labour contracts for a period of several years. Wages and conditions were generally very poor, workers were subject to rigid discipline and breaches of contract were severely punished. On the other hand, work overseas offered an opportunity to escape poverty and repressive situations, such as the Indian caste system. Many workers remained as free settlers in East Africa, the Caribbean, Fiji and elsewhere, where they could obtain land or set up businesses (Cohen 1995, 46). Indenture epitomized the principle of divide and rule, and a number of post-colonial conflicts (for example, hostility against Indians in Africa and Fiji, and against Chinese in South-East Asia) have their roots in such divisions.

These patterns of South-South migration continued into the post-colonial period. For example, many Mozambicans continue to play a very significant role in the mines of South Africa. Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria have continued to be the significant regional poles for migration in
West Africa drawing in people from the semi-arid north to the larger cities and stronger economies on the coast.

Rural-urban migration, which the colonialists attempted to control – with limited success – continued to expand rapidly. In the 1950s, towards the end of the colonial period, twenty per cent of the population in the South was living in urban areas; by the 1990s this had grown to forty per cent.

**Post-colonial refugee movements**

While the end of colonialism brought to an end many of the coercive systems of (labour) migration control, the wars of liberation and civil wars played out across the South, particularly in Africa and Asia created a new form of forced South-South migration: refugees. From the 1960s, prolonged liberation wars, for example in Algeria, Eritrea/Ethiopia and across southern Africa (Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia), and civil wars, for example in Nigeria, Sudan and Somalia, forced millions of people to flee across borders as refugees to neighbouring countries in Africa (and millions more within their countries as internally displaced persons) over generations. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s helped to bring some of the prolonged conflicts to an end, but during the 1990s new brutal civil conflicts erupted in West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia), Rwanda and DR Congo creating more refugees and IDPs.

Most African states have remained very reluctant to accept refugees as permanent residents and have insisted that refugees should be repatriated once conditions improve in their country of origin. However, the results of repatriation have been very mixed. In many areas the arrival of refugees has eventually led to the permanent settlement of many as migrants despite the government policies. For example, in Nairobi, exiled Somalis have established a significant residential and business district in the city (Lindley 2007). Millions of Afghan refugees first came to North-West Pakistan in the 1980s and have become integrated into the social, economic and political life of the area. Such movements have permanently changed the cross-border patterns of mobility.
Migration and identities

Across the world, it is clear that migration has played a fundamental role in shaping modern human society over centuries. In every continent, many different groups look back to ancestors who came from another place at some stage in time. The way in which such groups relate to the place of their ancestors may vary considerably.

For some, these links to other places form a central part of their identity and continue to shape their transnational relations. Such people may identify themselves as members of diasporas, which look back to a putative homeland over generations (Cohen 2008; Safran 1999). For example, the first Lebanese arrived in West Africa in the mid 19th century, and their descendants continue to sustain links with Lebanon and Lebanese populations in other parts of the world (Akyeampong 2006; Leichtman 2005). Chinese migration to South-East Asia goes back centuries. In the colonial period, millions of indentured workers were recruited in China and India. Chinese settlers in South-East Asian countries (Sinn 1998) and South Asians in Africa became trading minorities with an important intermediary role for colonialism. These migrations created a dense network of transnational relationships, which persist to this day. Such groups maintain these links and retain some cultural distinctiveness (notably language, religion, food) that continues to mark them out from other groups.

For others, this history of migration is part of their myth of origin, but their contemporary identity is bound up in the place where they now live. Africa is often portrayed in both historical and contemporary accounts as a continent of people on the move (de Bruijn, et al. 2001; IOM 2005) and great migrations – such as the ‘Bantu expansion’ from central Africa, the ‘Arab conquest’ of North Africa, the ‘Hamitic myth’ of migration from north to south, and even the Voortrekkers ‘Great Trek’ in South Africa - figure in the origins of many of its people (Bilger and Kraler 2005). The historical basis or the nature of these migrations may sometimes be in doubt but they play an important role in the construction of contemporary identities. However, in contrast to those who maintain a diasporic identity, such groups, while acknowledging their history elsewhere, have no affective bond with that historical place or myth of return and establish new identities in new places (see Box 1).
Box 1: Migration and the formation of new identities in NW Zambia

The Lunda and Luvale people of North-Western Zambia and eastern Angola look to their origins in the upper Kasai area of DR Congo. They still honour the paramount chief from whose court their ancestors departed generations ago. However, the process of movement resulted in the emergence of new group consciousness, and new languages and cultural variations. The Lunda and Luvale of Zambia are closely related but distinct from both each other and from the Luunda people of their ancestors in DR Congo (Bakewell 1999; Papstein 1989; Sangambo and M.K. 1984).

Contemporary South-South migration

As already noted in Section 2 above, the available data suggests that the volume of migration within the South is larger than migration to the North. Given both the scale of migration and its geographical spread, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive overview of the patterns of South-South migration here. In the light of the somewhat arbitrary construction of the South (see Section 2), which brings together countries as disparate as Latvia and South Africa, or Mexico and Viet Nam, it is also reasonable to question the value of attempting to bring together their migration experiences under the rubric of South-South migration. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, we attempt only to give a brief overview of very broad South-South migration trends and then give more details on contemporary migration patterns within Africa.
The scale of international South-South migration

Table 5: Origin and destination of migrants by South and North (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Emigrants as % pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Emigrants</td>
<td>24,486</td>
<td>7,563</td>
<td>32,049</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as % pop</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Emigrants</td>
<td>64,538</td>
<td>79,007</td>
<td>143,545</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as % pop</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Emigrants</td>
<td>89,024</td>
<td>86,571</td>
<td>175,594</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as % pop</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>as % of pop</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data presented in Table 5 above, suggest that there is a stock of nearly 80 million migrants who have moved between countries of the South, or about 45 per cent of the total number of migrants across the world. While such global figures are beguiling, they are aggregates of estimates derived from a vast range of data which varies dramatically in quality (Parsons, et al. 2005). The Global Migrant Origin Database prepared by Sussex University remains the best available for estimating the movement of migrants within and between regions (Ratha and Shaw 2007), but it is important to bear some caveats in mind.

While there are relatively good data available on migration into many high income countries, especially OECD countries, data on movements from and between countries of the South are much more limited in both quantity and quality (Ratha and Shaw 2007). Even within the OECD, there have been major challenges in ensuring that the migration data collected are comparable across countries (OECD 2007b), but the problem is compounded in many poorer countries where a) data may not be collected, and b) when it is collected it can be of very poor quality. For example, there is a chronic lack of good migration data across Africa. Nineteen of the 56
countries in Africa have either no data or just one census providing any information on migrant stock from the 1950s (Zlotnik 2003). 

Even where reliable data are routinely collected, they are likely to significantly understate the scale of migration in the South. Many of the cross-border movements within the South are undocumented, especially across the many land borders which often may be crossed with minimal, if any, formalities. Again, it is the African continent which provides the biggest challenge with its numerous long borders cutting across kinship and language groups with few formal border crossings. For example, in South Africa, the nation with the highest HDI in sub-Saharan Africa, there are no reliable figures for the population of immigrants and estimates for the number of undocumented migrants vary wildly by at least a factor of four – ranging from four million to less than one million (Black, et al. 2006: 116; Landau 2004: 7-9; SAMP 2008: 17).

Despite such weaknesses in the data, it is possible to make some important observations. First, it is clear that South-South migration is very significant and occurring at levels considerably higher than the total South-North migration. The figures in Table 5 are likely to be very conservative estimates (Ratha and Shaw 2007), hence the actual number of South-South migrants may well be considerably higher than 80 million.

Second, while the size of the overall migrant stocks in South and North may be very similar, it is important to bear in mind the huge difference in populations in these two sets of countries; the population of the South is over five billion compared to less than one billion in the North. Hence, the same scale of migration results in a much higher concentration of migrants living in the North, nearly ten per cent of the population, compared to less than two per cent living in the South. Migrants may be more concentrated in the North, but the North generates more migrants per head (35 per thousand population) than the South (28 per thousand population).

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4 While this makes the collection of accurate data on migration almost impossible, it does not mean that the borders have no impact on migration patterns (see Section 5 below).

5 That is assuming that unreported migration in the South is considerably larger than unreported migration in the North.
Third, it is high HDI countries that appear to be the most mobile with the highest number of migrants per head (65 per thousand) compared to low, very low, and even very high HDI countries. Most South-North migration does not occur between the poorest and wealthiest nations, but from middle-income countries (such as Mexico, Morocco and Turkey) to often rather nearby high income countries. It is therefore no surprise that South-South migration is the most prevalent form of migration occurring from the countries with the lowest HDI. Over 80 per cent of migrants from countries with low HDI move to countries with either low or medium HDI; only two per cent move to countries with very high HDI (see Table 3).

Table 6: Origin and destination of migrants by continent (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>Northern America</th>
<th>Latin America and Caribbean</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% outside region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>31,519</td>
<td>8,534</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>8,234</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>53,380</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>16,058</td>
<td>35,812</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>1,452</td>
<td>10,729</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>65,484</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>7,250</td>
<td>3,123</td>
<td>13,182</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25,075</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1,248</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>3,583</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18,579</td>
<td>3,566</td>
<td>26,621</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58,740</td>
<td>49,483</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>5,063</td>
<td>40,382</td>
<td>6,039</td>
<td>175,708</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sources: Migrant data - Global Migrant Origin Database v4 Updated March 2007
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Versi
on_4.xls

Looking at the data at the level of continents (Table 6), the estimates from the same source suggest that over half of the migrants from Asia have remained in Asia (and even with the same sub-region of Asia) and over eighty per cent of international migrants from Africa have moved
within the continent. The World Bank data suggests that the countries in sub-Saharan Africa contain the highest percentages of South-South migrants, with 64 percent of all international migrants remaining within the region. Only 27 and 22 percent of all international migrants originating from sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, respectively, have migrated to wealthy OECD countries. Proximity is an important factor in shaping the movements of people in the South. Over 80 per cent of South-South migration (recorded in the statistics) is between countries that share a common border, compared to 20 per cent for South-North migration (Ratha and Shaw 2007).

**Changing patterns of South-South migration**

While the broad statistics presented above may give some indication of the overall scale of South-South migration, they do not reveal much of the changing patterns of movement within the South. Given the wide range of countries within the South with their very different historical, political, economic, social and geographical contexts, there are few reasons to expect that they will share too many parallels in their different migration trends by virtue of their being in the South. Given that much of the South-South migration is actually occurring within continents, as shown above, it seems more reasonable to describe changing patterns of migration at the continental level, where at least there are shared geographical boundaries, rather than trying to identify commonalities across the South as a whole. Rather than attempting to cover the whole of the South, the discussion below is largely limited to migration within Africa.

Despite these cautions about generalisations across the South, it is possible to identify some very broad changes in migration patterns, which reflect global shifts in the economics and technologies of transport and the flow of information, and changes in the relative levels of development between countries. These are briefly discussed below, before turning to focus on Africa.

There are some indications that global patterns of migration may be becoming more complex, involving a wider range of people, moving to more destinations over longer distances. It is certainly the case that the real costs of travel have decreased. Air travel remains the most
exclusive form of transport but fares have come down and it is more affordable for more people. This is helping to expand connections between ordinary people across continents: for example, carrying local market traders between Ghana and China (Awumbila, et al. 2009). Most South-South migrants use surface transport, and the perhaps slow but steady extension of road networks in the South greatly reduces the cost of transport and increases its availability. In the Saharan zone, for instance, the recent paving and improvement of road connections have boosted trans-Saharan migration (de Haas 2008a).

The development of information technology has also expanded the horizons of potential migrants. Satellite TV beaming images of urban life can be found in the most remote settlements almost anywhere in the world. People maintain links with their family members and friends who have migrated (Vertovec 2004), thereby developing images of the destination area and information about ways to get there. While the developing regions may lag far behind in basic access to communication technology (see the table below), its coverage is growing rapidly. In the first quarter of 2008, Libya became the first African country where mobile phone penetration reached 100 per cent, followed closely by South Africa by the end of the year. The widespread use of community phone schemes, such as that run by Grameenphone in Bangladesh ensures that access to mobile telephony is reaching far beyond the individual subscribers. The International Telecommunications Union (2008) estimates that mobile phone coverage reached 40 per cent in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa in 2006, and 60 per cent in South Asia. Mobile phones and the internet may play an important role in facilitating the journeys of further migrants and help establish new migration systems. However, the complex interaction between technology and mobility within the South remains poorly understood and there is still a great need for empirical evidence from developing regions.

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Table 7: Mobile phone and internet usage by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Cellular subscribers (per 1,000 people)</th>
<th>Internet users (per 1,000 people)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP HDR 2007/2008

In this process of diversification of migration destinations, more and more middle income countries have experienced increasing immigration from poorer countries. While their own citizens form the most numerous immigrant groups in often nearby wealthy countries, countries such as Mexico, Turkey and Morocco have increasingly evolved into transit and destination countries for migrants from poorer countries located in South America, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Castles 2008). However, even within the less developed countries it is possible to identify migration hierarchies. For instance, most migration within West Africa occurs from the Sahel countries to the relatively prosperous and politically stable coastal countries such as Ghana and Senegal (de Haas 2008a). Within Latin America, important destination countries are Argentina (for migrants from Paraguay and Bolivia), Costa Rica (from Nicaragua) and Mexico (from Honduras and Guatemala). Important destination countries in South and South-East Asia are India (from Bangladesh and Nepal), Malaysia (from Indonesia) and Thailand (from Myanmar) (Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006).

Another very important aspect of the diversification of migration is the general, and in some regions dramatic increase in the proportion of female migrants moving within the South. This has been particularly noted in Asia (Yamanaka and Piper 2005), where women significantly outnumber men among new migrant workers from the Philippines and Indonesia (ILO 2007 cited in Castles and Miller 2009: 133). Across Africa, there is also evidence of the marked feminisation of migration (Adepoju 2006) but at a much slower pace. For example, recent
empirical research by the Southern African Migration Project, found that while the proportion of women among international migrants in the region was increasing, a large majority were still men. The same study found that the proportion of younger single women among migrants was growing while male migrants were increasingly older and married.

**Contemporary patterns of migration in Africa**

The paucity of data and lack of research resources have resulted in there being very limited knowledge about the forms and patterns of international migration occurring within Africa. It is clear that these movements form the vast majority of African migration (Sander and Maimbo 2003). Although there is some evidence that migration from Africa to industrialised states is growing, only a small fraction of international migration originating in Africa results in journeys to Europe, the Gulf, the US and beyond. Only North Africa has high levels of extra-continental migration. Even in West Africa, where migration to the industrialised countries is higher than elsewhere south of the Sahara, regional migration still is at least seven times higher than migration from West Africa to the rest of the world (OECD 2006). West Africa is the only part of Africa where migrant populations relative to the total population have held steady over the past decades, while other parts of Africa have shown a marked relative and sometimes even absolute decline (Zlotnik 2004).

In contrast to popular views of an ‘invasion’ of sub-Saharan migrants trying to enter the European Union, the actual numbers are very limited compared to migration occurring from Eastern Europe and North Africa (de Haas 2008b). This conventional focus of research and policy on migration out of Africa conceals the existence of several migration sub-systems centred on continental migration poles such as Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon and South Africa (Bakewell and de Haas 2007).

In Africa until the 1990s, the post-independence patterns of migration seemed to be strongly influenced by both the colonial experience and pan-Africanist policies of some states. To some extent the language divide between colonies, especially Anglophone and Francophone, shaped movement. Hence, the large exchanges of populations between Ghana and Nigeria and the
circulation of migrants in the Anglophone East Africa Community of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, whereas Francophone migrants were more likely to move within Francophone west and central Africa.

These postcolonial divides appear to be breaking down (Bakewell and de Haas 2007) and there is a diversification of migration destinations in the continent (Zlotnik 2006:30). In South Africa, for example, the southern African labour migration system continued, drawing in migrants from the labour reserve countries of the region, Lesotho and Mozambique, but migrants from further afield in Africa were few and far between. With the end of apartheid, the situation has changed dramatically and South Africa has become a major pole for migrants from all over the continent (see Box 2).

This colonial heritage has interacted with pan-African stances that have been adopted by some states at various times; these have had a direct influence on their migration policies. After independence in the late 1950s and 1960s, the relatively prosperous economies of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire attracted large numbers of internal and international migrants from countries such as Togo and Nigeria (mainly to Ghana), Burkina Faso and Guinea (mainly to Côte d’Ivoire) and Niger and Mali (to both). In a strong anti-colonial spirit of pan-Africanism, the governments of Ghana and particularly Côte d’Ivoire welcomed immigrants to work and stay (cf. Anarfi and Kwankye 2003).

Box 2: The South African mine labour system

Post-apartheid South Africa is the economic powerhouse of sub-Saharan Africa, and draws in migrants from the rest of the continent. The roots of migration go back to the mine labour system developed between 1890 and 1920 to provide workers for the gold and diamond mines. Workers were recruited during the apartheid period from Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. Before 1994, ‘immigration policy was a naked instrument of racial domination’ (Crush 2003). Recruitment was highly organized: virtually only males were hired and most were young; mineworkers had to live in squalid hostels, and were required to return home after one or two years of work. The absence of economic opportunities in their home countries made employ-
ment in South African mines the only possibility for many, despite the high risk of injury or death.

With the end of the apartheid system, the government struggled to develop a new policy. An Immigration Act was passed in 2002, but proved difficult to implement. Emphasis was placed on recruiting people with high skill levels, but it also continued the system of temporary labour recruitment for mines and farms, and introduced heavy penalties for unauthorized immigration. Recruitment of mineworkers from Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland grew: the share of foreign workers in the mine labour force was 60 per cent by the late 1990s. The economic dependence of neighbouring states also continues: a recent survey found that 81 per cent of the citizens of Lesotho (a small mountain state entirely surrounded by South African territory) have worked in South Africa. The figure for the much bigger states of Mozambique and Zimbabwe were 20 and 23 per cent respectively (Crush 2003).

Increasing repression in Ghana following the 1966 coup, a declining economy and rising unemployment marked the country’s transition to an immigration country. The immigrant community in Ghana became a scapegoat for the deteriorating situation and, in 1969, the Ghanaian government enacted the Aliens Compliance Order, leading to a mass expulsion of an estimated 155,000 to 213,000 migrants working informally in the cocoa industry, predominantly from Nigeria. Also Ghanaians started emigrating in large numbers. An estimated two million Ghanaian workers left Ghana between 1974 and 1981, their primary destinations being Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire. Also skilled Ghanaians such as teachers, doctors and administrators migrated to Nigeria, Uganda, Botswana, and Zambia. From the mid 1980s, Ghanaians have increasingly migrated to a range of destinations in Europe and North America (Anarfi and Kwankye 2003; Bump 2006; Van Hear 1998)

While migration to Côte d'Ivoire continued, Nigeria took over Ghana’s place as West Africa’s second migration pole after the 1973 Oil Crisis. Similar to Libya and the Gulf countries, the surge in oil prices made oil-rich Nigeria into a major African migration destination. However, misguided economic policies and a major decline in oil production and prices heralded a long period of economic downturn alongside with sustained political repression. In 1983 and 1985,
Nigeria followed the Ghanaian example, and expelled an estimated two million low-skilled west African migrants, including over one million Ghanaians (Arthur 1991; Bump 2006). As Ghana had done earlier, Nigeria transformed itself from a net immigration to a net emigration country (Black, et al. 2004: 11), although many immigrants (in particular Beninois and Ghanaians) have remained.

Libya’s policies of the 1990s caused a major increase in trans-Saharan migration as it encouraged sub-Saharan Africans to work in Libya in the spirit of pan-African solidarity (Hamood 2008). In the early 1990s, most migrants came from Libya’s neighbours Sudan, Chad and Niger, which subsequently developed into transit countries for migrants from a much wider array of sub-Saharan countries (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005:6). In the same period, violence, civil wars and economic decline affecting several parts of West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria), Central Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo), East Africa (Sudan) and the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Eritrea) also contributed to increasing trans-Saharan migration (de Haas 2008a).

Since 1995, such mixed groups of asylum seekers and labour migrants have gradually joined Maghrebis who illegally cross the Strait of Gibraltar to Spain or from Tunisia to Italy (Barros, et al. 2002; Boubakri 2004). This has been further incited by increasing xenophobia and expulsions in Libya after violent anti-immigrant riots occurred in 2000 (Hamood 2008). A substantial proportion of migrants consider North Africa (in particular Libya) as their primary destination, whereas others failing or not venturing to enter Europe prefer to stay in north-Africa as a ‘second best option’ rather than return to their more unstable and substantially poorer origin countries (Barros, et al. 2002; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Escoffier 2006)- see Box 3.

Box 3: Sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco

Although massive media attention has recently focused on sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, research on this subject is only just beginning. Studies show that the status of many of these migrants is currently changing from that of ‘transit migrants’ en route to Europe, to that of immigrants who are settling in Morocco. Since pre-colonial times, Morocco has been a historical
crossroads between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, with migratory flows moving in both directions. However, the current forms of sub-Saharan migration in Morocco tend to be analysed quite separately from Moroccan migrations (Berriane and Aderghal 2009).

The main motive of most of these sub-Saharan migrants is to transit Morocco in order to enter Europe. Yet, the majority of them end up settling in Morocco, awaiting their hypothetical passage to the North. On the basis of qualitative research in Rabat, Tangier and Casablanca, Collyer (2006) concludes that the spiralling costs of migration mean that a growing number of sub-Saharan migrants whose financial resources are exhausted have become stranded at different stages along the way, with little prospect of continuing, but also no hope of returning. These individuals are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by other migrants or by unscrupulous officials and have no option but to live in unsanitary conditions with inadequate food supplies and no health facilities.

The current figures on sub-Saharan migrants are mere approximations; but the first surveys have documented the presence of populations in Morocco who have arrived from various countries in Central and West Africa. This includes countries marked by war and conflict such as the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Sudan and Angola; or unstable countries like Nigeria. Migrants also come from countries with a more stable political situation but with increasing impoverishment, like Senegal, Niger, Mali, Benin or Guinea; and finally, from countries without conflict, like Cameroon (Escoffier 2006).

The Moroccan city of Fes is an interesting case, as it has become the receiver of a significant flow of sub-Saharan Africans (Berriane and Aderghal 2009). The city is a cross-road for these migrants, who move on from Fes in two opposing directions: either towards the north (Tangier) and north-west (Nador and Oujda) of Morocco, or towards the cities on the Atlantic coast (Casablanca and Rabat). In Fes, the sub-Saharan migrants tend to stop and reconsider, or momentarily suspend, their migratory project. At the same time, Fes also plays a religious role for sub-Saharan populations adhering to the Tijani brotherhood. The Tijani come from Senegal, where they constitute one of the most prominent Muslim brotherhoods. One of their principal saints is buried in Fes, and the city is therefore an important destination for Tijani pilgrims.
Finally, Fes has historically been involved in migrations that were linked to commercial exchanges with sub-Saharan Africa; it is likely that this history of exchange has established Fes as a place of familiarity and anchoring for the sub-Saharan migrants who come to the city.

According to anecdotal evidence, another important group of sub-Saharan immigrants in Morocco are merchants, many of whom are taking advantage of the activities of pilgrims and other travellers. In Fes, many Senegalese merchants have established shops in the vicinity of the tomb of the Tijani saint, where they sell both religious and non-religious merchandise. Casablanca is another hotspot for sub-Saharan merchants, and this phenomenon is closely linked to the presence of the airport, which covers a large number of international destinations.

Although most of the sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco are represented in popular discourse as ‘clandestine’, many of them are moving in entirely legal manners. Studies tend to only emphasise the more spectacular aspects of these dynamics, while in fact student migration is an important part of these sub-Saharan migrant flows. A study conducted in Rabat by Johara Berriane (2007) showed that the students from sub-Saharan Africa usually have grown up in an environment that was favourable to migration, and that the students in Rabat maintain social ties with sub-Saharan migrants around the world, including Europe and other African countries. These transnational ties can play an important role in decision making and the pursuit of their life projects. Ideally, the students’ stay in Morocco is considered a stage in their migratory project, which they envision to be followed by subsequent moves for study or work. Moreover, they experience their stay in Morocco as a confrontation with, on the one hand, a host society which is culturally different and, on the other hand, sub-Saharan immigrants of various origins. From this “double encounter”, new identities develop as the sub-Saharan student forms an identity as a “citizen of the world” who is, at the same time, anchored in an African community of origin.

Another important aspect of migration within Africa is the displacement of large numbers of refugees. Violent conflicts in eastern and central Africa have generated substantial refugee movements from Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to countries such as Egypt, Chad, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Bakewell and de Haas 2007). In West Africa, civil wars in Sierra Leone (1991-2001), Liberia (1989–1996 and 1999–2003), and Guinea
(1999-2000) caused at least 1.1 million refugees and internally displaced persons to leave their homes (Drumtra 2006). Towards the end of the 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire, which used to be West Africa’s most important migration destination, entered into a civil war and a deep economic crisis, creating a new population of refugees.

Box 4: DR Congo regional migration (Ngoie and Vwakyanakazi 2009)

The current migratory dynamics in the DRC are characterised by an intensification of flows and a diversification of destinations – including most of the neighbouring countries, South Africa, Nigeria, the US and Canada, and Western Europe. These flows are often ignored as the focus tends to be on refugees and internal displacements. Statistics, particularly on regional migrations involving the DRC, are very hard to obtain and unreliable but there are some estimates available showing the proportion of migrants from DRC in neighbouring countries. In Cameroon, 0.2% of the immigrant population originates from the DRC while in Gabon, they constitute 5.1% of the total population. In the Central African Republic, 39% of the foreign African population comes from the DRC. In Congo Brazzaville, migrants from the DRC constitute the majority of the immigrant population.

Yet another overlooked feature of migratory flows in the DRC is that since the end of the war in 2001, the country has become highly attractive to foreigners, particularly due to the boom in its mining sector. Investors from China, India, Korea and Pakistan are becoming increasingly visible. In the Katanga province, about 280 Chinese owned mining societies have been created since the elections in 2006. Finally, the DRC has for a long time received immigrants from Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. The first two groups have been present for generations. Nigerians are mainly visible in the capital where they dominate certain niches of commercial activities. In Lubumbashi, Malians and Senegalese, known as ‘Ouestaf’ (colloquial for West Africans) occupy certain neighbourhoods where they carry out activities that distinguish them from other residents, such as jewellery production and purchase of precious objects (matières précieuses).

The plight of refugees in different regions of Africa has quite rightly been the subject of great concern and policy interest and stimulated major aid interventions over many years. While it has
been essential to highlight the situation of refugees in order to attract such attention, in some parts of Africa – in particular the Horn, East and Central Africa (Oucho 2006) – it has cast other forms of migration into the shadows (see Box 4).

**Conclusion**

This brief overview gives some sense of the changing migration patterns within one continent of the South, with the rise and fall of migration poles and the mixing of different forms of migration. Some of those who moved to one country as labour migrants have been forcibly repatriated placing them in situations akin to that of refugees. Some of those who fled their countries as refugees have merged into the rural areas or cities rather than making any formal claim for asylum. There is evidence of increasing inter-linkages between these different forms of migration and the different migration sub-systems: both those centred on continental migration poles as well as migration systems that link Africa to Europe, the Gulf and North America. Looking at Africa in isolation can only ever yield a partial picture; equally so does looking at migration out of Africa to the exclusion of intra-continental mobility. For example, as noted above, the migration of sub-Saharan Africans to Morocco may be undertaken with the motivation to move on to Europe, but in many cases results in settlement in Morocco. Looking further afield, there is evidence that African migration systems are extending to China. The complexities and dynamics of these emerging, interconnected migration systems are little understood and seem likely to remain that way in the absence of so much data and with the limited research capacity within the continent.

**Drivers of South-South migration**

As the previous sections suggest, there is no reason to expect that the determinants of South-South and other forms of migration differ in any fundamental ways. Migration in the South is shaped by a similar set of economic, social and political factors as migration in the North, such as geography, livelihoods, and social networks. There is a large body of literature that analyses these factors, but very little that particularly focuses on South-South migration. Hence, when it comes to discussing South-South migration, there is very limited material that points towards the
distinctive drivers of this particular sub-set of global migration, as compared to South-North, North-South or North-North migration.

For example, Ratha and Shaw (2007) suggest that the major determinants of South-South migration are likely to be income differentials, proximity and networks. They also put forward a list of further motivations for South-South migration including seasonal migration, petty trade, conflict and disaster and transit. With the exception of transit, these are also factors that feature in other migrations. The distinctiveness of South-South migration is claimed to be one of degree but the evidence is limited and only lends itself to rather broad generalisations. For example, they argue that income differentials are likely to play a lesser role in the South than they do in North-South migration as income differentials between countries of the South are relatively modest. Similarly, they suggest that ‘[s]easonal migration may be more prevalent in South-South migration, because borders are more porous and agriculture weighs more heavily in the economy’ (Ratha and Shaw 2007: 19).

Rather than attempting to summarise the wider literature on the causes and consequences of migration (Castles and Miller 2009; Massey, et al. 1998), this section simply highlights some of the factors that the literature suggests play a particularly important role in shaping South-South migration. These are considered under four broad headings, livelihoods, the political context, social and cultural factors and the environment.

**Livelihoods**

Migration plays a fundamental role in the livelihoods of many people across the globe. It is widely used as a strategy to actively improve their livelihoods within the constraining conditions in which they live. Apart from the immediate prospect of gaining new access to resources or job opportunities, migration also serves to spread risks, disseminate ideas and practices. In particular, the rural livelihoods of the poorest are often linked to traditional forms of seasonal and circular migration, such as nomadism, pilgrimage, migration related to shifting cultivation and marriage practices.
Scholars have therefore argued for a ‘livelihoods approach’ to migration, which considers migration on a par with other livelihood strategies (de Haan 1999; McDowell and de Haan 1997; Olwig and Sørensen 2002). While there appears to be a growing acceptance of these arguments, in practice the analyses of livelihoods within development organisations struggle to cope with mobility (Bakewell 2007: 29-30). Complex patterns of mobility still challenge the norms of a sedentary lifestyle and are rarely captured in any national statistical records. Hence they remain largely invisible within the datasets currently available.

Thus, while it may be true that the income differentials that are captured in national statistics appear less significant in shaping South-South than South-North migration (as asserted by Ratha and Shaw 2007), it is important not to downplay the importance of differential livelihood opportunities in determining peoples’ mobility. Micro-level studies have shown that relative deprivation is a very significant factor in migration decisions, which are taken not just by individuals but as part of a household strategy, not only to increase income but also to diversify livelihoods and spread risks (Halvor 2002; Rosenzweig and Stark 1989; Stark 1984; Stark and Lucas 1988). Where such studies draw on data from Asia and Africa, their focus tends to be on rural-urban migration rather than international migration, but their findings are consistent with those produced by the much larger dataset on migration between Mexico and the US. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect the results to hold for South-South migration.

Drawing attention to the importance of the livelihood strategies of individual households in shaping migration processes in the South does not mean that the impact of the formal and informal labour markets at the macro-level should be forgotten. Millions of people move to follow job opportunities within the South, as in the North. Many developing regions continue to be reliant on labour intensive resource extraction, which has proved a major stimulus to migration. Oil production in the Gulf has spurred the creation of a massive migrant labour system, which has drawn in workers from across South Asia and North Africa. Libya encouraged the immigration of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans in the 1990s. Despite an anti-immigrant backlash occurring after 2000, the Libyan economy remains heavily dependent on African immigrant labour (de Haas 2008b). It is anticipated that the development of new oil fields in Ghana may stimulate immigration from other West African countries (and the North – see...
Awumbila, et al. 2009). As noted already, the mining industry also continues to play a major role in stimulating regional migration across Africa, especially in southern Africa.

Industrial development and manufacturing has played a much larger role in economic development across Asia than Africa. In particular, the growth of China’s industrial base has stimulated the largest contemporary migration of population from the interior to very rapidly growing eastern cities. India is also experiencing high levels of internal migration from poor regions such as Bihar to industrial areas and coastal areas such as Gujarat (Deshingkar and Natali 2008). Newly industrialised nations, such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Malaysia, have also become major destinations for migrants within the region.

**Political conditions**

Migration decisions are always taken in a political context and it may be true that in general this has a greater impact on South-South migration than South-North. There is no doubt that many large scale movements between countries of the South have been directly shaped by political changes and crises, in particular those associated with the beginning or end of conflict. Political unrest, conflict and other crises that cause the flight of refugees are perhaps determinants that are distinctive to South-South migration, although they inevitably play a role in also stimulating migration to the North. It is possible that they are over-represented in the migration statistics as refugees are one category of migrants for which detailed data on numbers of people, origins and settlement locations are readily available (see the data tables produced by UNHCR 2008a).

The majority of the world’s refugees move within the South; at the end of 2007, UNHCR reported that nearly 80 per cent of the global refugee population were living in Asia and Africa (UNHCR 2008a). As already noted in Section 4, conflicts across Africa have created refugees in each region of the continent over the last five decades, large numbers of whom have been in exile for many years (Crisp 2003). Numerically the largest refugee populations are found in the Middle East (UNHCR records two million refugees from Iraq) and Asia (nearly two million from Afghanistan). Such refugee populations not only represent a significant proportion of South-
South migration (approximately ten per cent), but they also help to create new migration paths which are likely to remain long after the refugee population has either returned to the country of origin or received full citizenship elsewhere. Far from living passively in camps, refugees have played an important role in the development of transnational networks and remittance flows in the South (see discussion on protracted displacement in Section 7). Their movements are often linked in with economic motivations as political violence is frequently accompanied by economic decline. For example, in Cote d’Ivoire the economic collapse at the end of the 1990s and the start of the civil war in 2002, which effectively split the country in two, forced thousands of foreign migrants to leave the country and led to its decline as a migration pole in West Africa (Adepoju 2005).

It is important not to forget the political determinants of migration that are common to South and North – changes of government bringing new policies, shifts in international relations and so forth. For example, in Europe the expansion of the European Union has dramatically changed migration patterns, both within the EU and beyond. Likewise, the opening up of South Africa with the end of apartheid in 1994 has transformed migration across southern Africa and the whole continent. South Africa was at the centre of the regional labour migration system (see above). This supplied migrant labour for the mines under strict controls, which limited where mineworkers could live and prohibited family migration. To a large extent, South Africa remained closed to other migrants from elsewhere in Africa. With the end of apartheid, South Africa opened up to the rest of the continent. Given its relatively vibrant economy, well-developed infrastructure and good educational system, it rapidly became a major new pole for migration within Africa. Libya’s provides another example, as its pan-African turn in the 1990s also stimulated significant new migration flows (see Section 4).

**Social factors – education and marriage**

While much of the literature emphasises the importance of economic factors (jobs and income) in causing South-South migration, other factors also play an important role in shaping migration patterns (as they do in North-North and South-North migration). For example, while the lure of the cities can be cast in narrow monetary terms, they also provide important opportunities for
people to build up their human and social capital. In particular, the importance of educational opportunities in determining people’s migration decisions should not be underestimated. In East Africa, a region where there is a dearth of research into migration beyond refugee movements, there is some evidence of widespread migration over large distances for education, including both internal migration and movement to neighbouring countries (Black, et al. 2004).

Educational migration is better documented in Asia. Economic growth has led both to flows of highly-skilled personnel to emerging industrial economies like China and Malaysia, and to strategies for improving education and vocational training in the countries concerned. Japan, Korea, China, Thailand and other countries now seek to attract students from other Asian countries, and intra-regional student mobility is often closely linked to later professional migration (Hugo 2005).

Marriage has always been associated with migration to some extent as one partner moves to the home of the other. Traditionally this involved internal migration over relatively short distances – in India for example, movement of brides to their husbands’ villages is a substantial factor in internal migration. Today, however, migrants often sustain transnational links, and international marriage migration is growing as migrants look to their place of origin to find partners, who subsequently migrate to join the spouse. In parts of Asia, the emigration of potential marriage partners (particularly women) in some rural areas has resulted in men seeking wives in other less developed countries through marriage brokers, creating new patterns of South-South migration (see Box 5).

Box 5: Asian marriage migration

Asian women moved as brides of US servicemen from the 1940s – first from Japan, then Korea and then Vietnam. From the 1980s, a new phenomenon emerged: so-called ‘mail order’ brides to Europe and Australia (Cahill, 1990). Since the 1990s, foreign brides have been sought by farmers in rural areas of Japan and Taiwan, due to the exodus of local women to more attractive urban settings. This is one of the few forms of permanent immigration permitted in Asia. The young women involved, (from the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand), can experience severe social isolation.
By the early 21st century, marriage migration to Korea was increasing, and brides were being recruited for Indians in Bangladesh. Chinese farmers called for wives from Vietnam, Laos and Burma – China’s one-child policy has led to severe gender imbalances, with 118 male versus 100 female births (IOM 2005:112). International marriages accounted for almost 14 per cent of all marriages in Korea in 2005, with even higher percentages in rural areas. Marriages are often arranged by agencies (OECD 2007b). By 2003, 32 per cent of brides in Taiwan were from the Chinese mainland or other countries, and births to immigrant mothers made up 13 per cent of all births (Skeldon 2006b:281). This has important cultural implications: the countryside is frequently seen as the cradle of traditional values, and the high proportion of foreign mothers is seen by some as a threat to national identity.

Migration also plays an important role in preparation for marriage. Migration by young men has long been associated with gaining sufficient wealth to secure a bride at home. In some cultures, the experience of migration has become a rite of passage, particularly for men, which enhances social status. In southern Africa, the ritual of going to the mines became an intrinsic part of male education proving one’s manhood, and this was a factor in making men go (Mandela 1994: 31; Ashton 1952 cited in Wright 1995). Recent research by the Southern Africa Migration Project showed that the tradition of migration across the region (mainly to South Africa) continues to be passed down the generations – about half of the migrants surveyed reported that their parents worked outside their country of origin (Pendleton, et al. 2006: 16). In Senegal and Mali there is evidence to show that international migration boosts men’s status and marriage options. Those who remain at home are regarded less favourably by women (see Box 6).

Box 6: A culture of migration - migration as marker of the transition to adulthood in West Africa

Recently, scholars have drawn attention to what they call ‘the culture of migration’, to argue that international population movements are influenced not only by economic considerations but also by cultural values, including the inclination to emigrate (c.f. kesson 2004; Heering and al 2004; Jonsson 2007; Kandel and Massey 2002). For many young people all over the world, spending time abroad is considered a normal part of the life course and migration represents a marker of the transition to adulthood. In West Africa in particular, migration is often not merely a vehicle for economic mobility but is also considered a process through which a young boy attains the social status of a mature man.
Local meanings of migration play a significant part in shaping migration aspirations. Amongst the West African Soninke people in the Senegal River Valley, from where migration to France has been widespread, migration is associated with manhood and considered an almost natural part of the life cycle, particularly for males. In the Soninke village of Kounda in Mali, mobility and migration is one of the distinguishing features between the two genders (Jonsson 2007). Masculinity in Kounda entails the freedom of mobility. Soninke women in the village are to a large extent fixed inside the household, while men are outside moving between the field and other tasks, both within and beyond the village, and partaking in public life. Men who do not migrate and remain economically dependent on their kin are considered as immature youngsters. Particularly the women express great contempt of non-migrants, and refer to them with a derogatory term, tenes. This is a Soninke adjective that means ‘being stuck like glue’, ‘unable to move’. There is even a song about the tenes, which has been composed and broadcast on local radio by a couple of women, taunting and denouncing non-migrants as parasites with nothing to offer their families and undesirable to women.

For the Soninke, migration is a common strategy, whereby a young man can detach himself from his family and become an independent, mature individual. Migration can therefore, in this sense, be considered a ‘rite of passage’. In Mali, the colloquial French term that is used to describe migration is aller en aventure literally, to go on adventure, which has a different connotation than simply ‘migration’. For the Soninke, ‘being on aventure’ implies, ‘being on the path to adulthood’. Meanwhile, amongst the Soninke, regional migration does not always qualify as an aventure. The Soninke word for the space to which people migrate is tunga which can be translated as: ‘where one is not at home’. Hence, moving to neighbouring and familiar areas does not constitute an aventure, because of the socio-cultural proximity of the places of origin and destination (Jonsson 2007). Meanwhile, regional migration can provide a temporary escape for young men who feel constrained and burdened by the obligations towards their families in the village, with whom they are expected to share all their resources. Young men may strategically slip off from the village and go to the big Malian cities to spend money on themselves; or to Senegal or the Gambia, where they can work to save up a small sum.
Once young Soninke men have liberated themselves from the constraints of parents and elders and ventured abroad, they ideally re-establish the intimate ties with their families in the village of origin. Apart from paying occasional visits to the family, such intimacy can be maintained through various transnational ties, including marriage, communication and transfers of social and financial remittances. In this way, migrants still make their presence felt in the village, even if they do not return physically to settle. While more and more Soninke migrants end up spending their entire lives abroad, the natal village may still be their final destination: returning the corpses of migrants in France is a common practice and members of the Soninke migrant community in France are obliged to contribute to a funeral fond, which pays for the transport and burial of dead migrants back in the natal village.

Environmental factors

Migration scholars are divided over the question as to how significant the natural environment is in motivating migration decisions, particularly in the poorer parts of the world. The nexus between migration and the environment has become particularly pertinent in relation to discussions about the possible consequences of future climate changes resulting from global warming. Extreme predictions have been made by alarmists, warning about millions of people, especially in the global South, being forced to migrate as a result of climate change (e.g. Myers and Kent 1995). This has led to the calls for the recognition of ‘environmental migrants’ as a distinct category of people who have been displaced primarily by deterioration in environmental conditions.9

The livelihoods of many people in the global south are closely linked to the natural environment, as are the conditions and standards of living for those people. Hence, it seems obvious to suggest that worsening environmental conditions could prompt people to move in search of ‘greener pastures’. There were many empirical studies of migration related to severe droughts in the Sahel in the 1970s and ‘80s (e.g. Caldwell 1975; Findley 1994; Pedersen 1995), but this offers little evidence to support dramatic predictions of a massive exodus of migrants from environmentally fragile regions. Many people live with and adapt to environmental change while remaining

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9 The term ‘environmental refugees’ has also been used by many but this creates even greater potential for confusion (see Boano, et al. 2008).
sedentary. The limited data available suggests that where environmental change does result in migration, it tends to be internal rather than international (EACH-FOR 2008; Findley 1994; Renaud, et al. 2007: 17). Since the people who are most vulnerable to environmental change and degradation are also likely to be the poorest, one might presume that, if they move at all, it will not be very far, as they most likely do not have the resources to migrate over long distances.

Moreover, the idea of ‘environmental migration’ implies that migration is a problem that is caused by a pathology in the environment, rather than considering it as a normal human process which is often integral to people’s livelihoods. The decision to migrate is always motivated by a complex set of determinants, such as the economic, political and social drivers discussed above. There is broad agreement among researchers that the environment by itself is never the sole cause of migration (Castles 2002; Suhrke 1994). Rather, migration has always been one of the possible responses to changes and disasters in the natural environment, including drought, flooding, hurricanes, or environmental degradation. While it is important to build up our understanding of the relationship between migration and environmental change, it is important to understand that this relationship is not a new a phenomenon nor can we ever expect it to be deterministic.

**The role of the state in shaping South-South migration**

The previous section has discussed some of the broad drivers of migration in the South, which may explain the micro-level motivations and macro-level structural conditions which shape people’s migration decisions. These included the general political conditions. This section focuses on the policies developed by states, often in response to people’s migration. Of course, migration policies can affect people’s decisions, so they could be considered as drivers of migration. However, they generally lag behind migration and are often limited in their scope and effectiveness, especially in the poor regions of the South, where the reach of states is somewhat limited. While they may not be drivers of migration (probably much to states’ disappointment), they do have a major impact on the experience of migrants: especially with respect to their access to rights and prospects for long-term settlement.
The record of direct attempts by states, whether in the South or North, to influence migration behaviour has been extremely poor. For example, there have been many attempts by African states to reduce rural-urban migration by investing in rural infrastructure and services. These have been largely futile (Bakewell 2008b). While policies to control movement may fail, states have implemented aggressive policies of expulsions to push settled migrants back to their place of origin, whether in the rural areas through slum clearance in cities (Macharia 1992) or by mass deportation of foreign nationals, as seen at various times in the three major migration hubs of West Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (Adepoju 2005; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Van Hear 2004). While such policies are clearly aimed at migrants and do have an impact on migration patterns, they can hardly be described as migration policy. They are more usually associated with responses to economic or political pressures and crises in which migrants can serve as convenient scapegoats against whom action is politically feasible.

In general, migration policy in the global South is remarkably underdeveloped. There is a sharp divide in the literature between the South as ‘sending’ countries and the North as ‘receiving’ countries. In the North, there is great interest in policies for the control (‘migration management’) of entry and issues of settlement – social, economic, political and cultural integration, multiculturalism, racism, community cohesion and xenophobia – and ways to facilitate circular migration. In contrast, debates about policies in the South are more concerned with issues of emigration (especially to the North), the emigration of skilled workers (the ‘brain drain’), the impacts of migration on development, remittances, and the role of migrants and their descendants in the development of the country of origin.

Before moving on to consider different areas of policy, this section starts with a brief discussion about the nature of borders, which define the geographical limits of states and separate international from internal migration. It then turns to consider polices concerning immigration, the integration of migrants and relations with emigrants and diasporas. The section concludes by looking at regional agreements on the free movement of people.
The significance of borders

As noted in Section 4, one of the major challenges for analysing South-South migration is lack of reliable data on cross-border movements in many parts of the South. This has been a particular problem in Africa, which has a large number of countries that have long land borders with many countries. Formal crossing points are relatively rare and much of the border is unmarked and can be crossed with no government control. Most of the international borders in Africa were imposed by the colonial powers in the late 19th century and some were only demarcated in the early 20th century. These colonial lines on the map paid little respect to language and cultural boundaries and cut across many groups, dividing traditional chieftainships and separating kinsfolk.

Hence, the legitimacy of the borders remains open to question and this, along with the lack of border formalities, means that it is often assumed that they mean little in the day-to-day life of people. In the literature, international migration across land borders in Africa is sometimes treated as an informal extension of internal migration across little recognised borders (Adepoju 2008). Deshingkar and Natali distinguish such ‘cross-border’ migration from other international migration, referring to migration within Africa and also movements from Burma and Laos into Thailand. They argue that cross-border migration should be viewed together with internal migration, especially for countries that are separated by porous borders and populated by people who are historically very similar in language and culture (Deshingkar and Natali 2008: 180).

However, while there is certainly a case for breaking down the sharp distinctions between internal and international migration, there is a danger that the significance of borders, particularly African borders, may be downplayed too often. Discussions on international migration with respect to Africa usually refer to people leaving the continent, while intra-continental mobility is portrayed as moving across porous borders with little relevance. A different logic seems to apply elsewhere in the North. Intra-European borders are becoming ever more porous, especially in the expanding Schengen zone, but there is no suggestion that migration between European states is somehow ‘not really international’. While people may cross borders without any formalities, doing so will change one’s rights and one’s relationship with the state, and even one’s self-identity (Skeldon 2006a:19 – although Skeldon also makes an
exception for African borders). It may be easy to cross borders (and impossible to count those who do cross) but it does not mean it is easy to live outside one’s country of citizenship.

Despite their often ‘artificial’ nature, the international borders of Africa do matter. The creation of the colonial borders marked out the territories for different institutional regimes, such as tax rates, social policies, military service, language of education and so forth. This immediately created incentives for crossing to the more favourable side. In pre-colonial central Africa, in order to escape from the influence of a chief or some other powerful person it was necessary to move until one was out of their reach. Power radiated out from centres and distance was the key to escaping from it. For the Europeans their power was defined by the territory they controlled and the borders defined the extent of their authority. They claimed tribute, in the form of taxes, from all who resided inside their borders, but would not make any such claims for those outside. Thus rather than fleeing long distances to escape their influence, it was merely necessary for the Africans to cross a line. On the Zambia/Angola border, the introduction of taxes by the British stimulated movement into Angola. The Portuguese practice of forced labour encouraged people to move east into Zambia (Pritchett 1990; von Oppen 1995). Crossing borders is also associated with finding protection from war, as many thousands of refugees have done. The establishment of an international border introduces a new set of constraints and opportunities which become an important part of peoples’ lives as they cross to avoid taxation and violence, to gain protection or to find jobs, markets, education and health care (Miles 2005; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996).

**Immigration policies**

Immigration policies, which are prioritized in Northern states as they provide a legal tool to restrict entry and settlement, remain very weak in some parts of the South. For example, in Africa, the UN Population Division’s review of World Population Policies (2005) found that just over half of the states had immigration policies of ‘no intervention’. In contrast, the vast majority of Asian countries were reported to have put in place some immigration policy (UN 2006). Many of these Asian policies appear to be converging towards immigration policies based on the model used in the North, whereby highly-skilled migrants obtain more rights, including family
reunification, and low and semi-skilled labour migrants are subjected to levies and time restrictions (Wickramasekara 2008).

Recently, some African countries have adopted more restrictive immigration policies in an apparent effort to reduce immigration levels. For example, Morocco and Tunisia have introduced new legislation to combat illegal immigration and other countries in North Africa are also taking a tougher stance on immigration (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). In general, stronger immigration controls tend to be supported by public opinion, which tends to see migrants as competing for scarce jobs and public services, such as schools and clinics and scapegoats for crime (see Crush 2007). However, this trend towards more restrictive immigration policies in some parts of the South seems to be responding as much to pressure from Northern countries as reflecting domestic policy priorities. For example, it is clear that the European Union is having a strong influence on the development of immigration policies in parts of Africa. In particular, there has been a concern that strategic ‘transit’ countries in the South such as Morocco and Libya should restrict immigration more tightly as a pre-emptive measure to prevent subsequent onward migration to Europe (Betts and Milner 2006; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; de Haas 2008b; Hamood 2008). The influence of the EU also reaches deeper into the South. For example, notwithstanding the occurrence of expulsions in the 1980s, Nigeria used to have a rather laissez-faire immigration policy until recently. However, pressure from Northern countries to re-admit undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers persuaded the Nigerian state to implement stricter migration controls. As a result, most non-ECOWAS foreigners must obtain a visa to enter Nigeria. In exchange for this collaboration with Northern countries on migration control, the Nigerian state has negotiated immigration quotas in the North (de Haas 2006a).

Several African states’ interests to implement restrictive immigration policies is countered by their need to promote economic growth and improve a socio-political environment that would attract skilled workers and, at the same time, offer solutions to long-term high unemployment rates. Regional agreements, such as ECOWAS and NEPAD, which include the promotion of labour mobility with the objective of promoting regional economic development, officially prevent many African countries from implementing stricter immigration policies. However, in practice, migrants face many obstacles that do not allow them to move freely among countries,
even within the same regions. For example, transport routes are dotted with checkpoints guarded by opportunistic civil servants who halt the journeys of migrants who are unwilling or unable to pay unofficial taxes and in doing so they control the circulation of individual migrants outside of the context of any national immigration policy (cf. Brachet 2005).

Integration policies

While debates about integration, multiculturalism and assimilation of migrants are swirling around the European Union stimulating a massive body of research and new policy initiatives, such discussions are much more muted in the South. In Europe, questions about the integration of migrants are inextricably linked with issues of race, citizenship and class. Put crudely, with the arrival of large numbers of migrants who were seen as culturally, economically, linguistically and physically ‘different’ came questions of how they could become part of the society in the states receiving them. Such issues are hardly raised across large parts of Africa (for some exceptions, see Box 7 below) but they are starting to emerge in some parts of Asia.

In Africa, while questions of social cohesion and inter-group relations have been very prominent in many countries, they have tended to be focused on issues of relationships between the different socio-cultural groups that make up the state. This is hardly surprising given that: a) many African states have tens of language groups within their borders; and b) with the end of colonialism, newly independent states across Africa engaged in processes of nation-building. These concerns about the diversity of peoples with nations have been exacerbated in various countries by prolonged political instability and violent conflict associated with struggles for power. African politics and conflict is routinely described in terms of ‘ethnic’ relations and sectarianism.

Therefore, in many African countries, debates about ethnicity, multiculturalism and even integration, seem to be concerned with the relations between citizens, rather than with the arrival of immigrants. Immigration brings another layer to an already complex picture. This is in stark contrast to Europe, where for the most part, it is non-citizens who bring ethnicity (at least within

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10 For example Angola has 41, Kenya 61, Nigeria 510 (Gordon 2005).
English discourse – e.g. ‘minority ethnic groups’) and there is much less interest in indigenous ethnic relations.

Box 7: Research into the position of immigrants in Ghana (Awumbila, et al. 2009)

Due to recent events in Ghana, interest in immigration issues could potentially assume higher stakes. The country enjoys political stability, relative peace and security. More importantly, the country has recently discovered oil in commercial quantity in the south-western corner. All these factors point to the possibility of an increase in migrant labour, immigration and general foreign presence, especially in the petro-chemical industry in Ghana (Awumbila, et al. 2009).

However, very little of the current research on Ghanaian migration addresses the situation of people moving either into or within the country. More attention has been focused on the so-called brain-drain and on Ghanaians living abroad. Immigration into Ghana has mainly been studied in relation to the visits/return of diasporas from the US, Caribbean and South America, or Liberian refugees in Ghanaian camps. The few exceptions that look at migration into the country include research on Lebanese migrants (Akyeampong 2006) and Nigerians (Antwi Bosiakoh 2008; Eades 1993). Meanwhile, other African migrants from Niger, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Ivory Coast have not been sufficiently studied. Many of these migrants are traders, in products such as grains, cola and yams; they are also found selling herbal medicine, working as porters carrying loads and in urban vegetable production. The different dynamics, including motivating factors and socio-demographic characteristics underlying this intra-regional migration, need to be better understood.

Meier has produced an insightful study, which sheds some light on the social lives of immigrants in Ghana’s urban areas. The study explores whether rural migrants in the cities of Accra and Tema make use of the concept of friendship as a means of social integration and for attaining social peace. Meier argues that, instead of committing themselves to intimate personal relationships, many of these migrants are hesitant to initiate and encourage friendship relations. Indeed the concept ‘ambivalence’ best describes their attitudes towards forging friendship relations. The migrants fear that making friends with fellow migrants from the same ethnic
background could lead to information misuse. In cases where friendship is forged, many of these
migrants therefore choose their friends ‘from amongst completely unrelated groups, preferably
those from different ethnic backgrounds’ (Meier 2005: 68).

The literature on integration in Africa is largely limited to two aspects of migration. First, there
has been a longstanding debate about the integration of refugees across the continent. ‘Local
integration’ of refugees is one of the durable solutions recognised by UNHCR for the problem of
refugees and one of the most problematic (Crisp 2004; Jacobsen 2001).

Second, there is considerable interest in questions about the reintegration of migrants who return
to their country of origin. This has become the focus of many policy interventions as the return
of migrants to their countries of origins is often seen as the preferred end to the (forced and
voluntary) migration cycle (Bakewell 2008b; Black and Koser 1999). Again much of the
research work has focused on the return of refugee migrants (e.g. Bascom 2005; Kibreab 2002)
but there is a growing literature looking at how returning ‘voluntary’ migrants reinsert
themselves into their countries of origin (Diatta and Mbow 1999; Thomas 2008).

Policies for the integration of migrants are less common in African countries. Yet evidence
seems to indicate that certain migrant groups face substantial integration problems even decades
after their arrival, and that they often face xenophobia in countries as diverse as Côte d’Ivoire,
Libya and South Africa. Public attitudes are often similar to those in many Western countries:
migrants are commonly perceived as a threat competing for access to already limited resources
(Nyamnjoh 2006; SAMP 2008). The limited literature on reintegration of those who were labour
migrants (in contrast to the refugee literature) tends to be focused on the economic aspects of
people’s return – how they re-establish livelihoods – rather than the focus on social and cultural
relations found in the literature on the integration of migrants in Europe. There is an urgent need
for more research and analysis of migrant integration in Africa (see Box 7).

This limited research into integration is accompanied by a policy vacuum. The UN Population
Division found that only eleven countries in Africa had developed a policy on the integration of
non-citizens in 2005. In contrast, with the exception of Malta, which only joined in 2004, all EU
states have integration policies. African states are more likely to have policies with respect to the return migration of citizens, compared to European states where the majority of states do not have any policy (UN 2006).

Box 8: Assessing the process of migrant integration in Africa

There is very limited data available on the migration policies of African states and even less on how these policies work out in practice. This is an area where there is scope for much research. One possible approach would be to build on the approaches and initiatives undertaken in Europe. For example, in 2008 the British Council and the Migration Policy Group published the Migrant Integration Policy Index (see www.integrationindex.eu/). This attempts systematically to summarise the integration policies of 27 European states (and Canada), and score them against a benchmark of best practice derived from Council of Europe Conventions and European Community Directives, along six ‘strands’:

- Labour market access
- Family reunion
- Long-term residence
- Political participation
- Access to nationality
- Anti-discrimination

For each country an overview chart has been prepared which illustrates how the country compares to the benchmark, and the best and worst practice in the sample (see below for the example of France). A similar approach could be adopted to analyse global migration and integration policies based on international human rights standards, labour conventions and so forth.
In a similar way, Asian policy makers continue to focus on temporary labour migration, which is not expected to lead to settlement. This understanding matches the wishes of the main actors. Employers want low-skilled workers to meet immediate labour needs. Many migrant workers wish to work abroad for a limited period to improve the situation of their families at home. Sending country governments do not want to lose nationals permanently. Ideas from Europe, North America or Oceania on the benefits of multiculturalism are unpopular in most Asian countries, while turning immigrants into citizens is unthinkable. The dominant policy in Asia countries can be summed up in the principles: immigration is not good for the nation-state and should only be a temporary expedient; migration policies should be concerned mainly with restriction not migration management; immigrants should not be allowed to settle; foreign residents should not normally be offered citizenship; national culture and identity should not be modified in response to external influences (see Castles 2004; Skeldon 2006a). However, a key question for the future is whether this exclusionary model can be sustained in the face of demographic and economic trends which encourage more labour migration, longer stay and family reunion. The South Korean Government has begun to explore the possible consequences of settlement and increased ethnic diversity for a country hitherto considered culturally
homogenous. In Japan, by contrast, there is little willingness to address such issues at the national level, yet local authorities in areas of high migrant density are beginning to explore strategies to improve the civil and welfare rights of immigrants.

**Emigration and diaspora policies**

The interest of national governments in emigration and diaspora policies is often grounded on the perceived strain on national resources as in the case of the ‘brain drain’ or on the state’s belief that their citizens working abroad have development potential, which triggers concern for their well-being and their protection. Most interest is focused on migrants who moved to the North and there is very limited academic research and policy concern about the potential contribution of South-South migrants (Bakewell 2008a).

The departure of large numbers of individuals who are highly trained and fill key roles in health or education is widely thought to have negative effects on the countries of origin. According to an UNDESA review in 2000, all but one African countries perceived that too many of their nationals emigrated and felt the need to introduce policies to reduce emigration. The exception was Cape Verde, where the government considered its migration rate too low, but no emigration policy was introduced to encourage the emigration of greater numbers of its citizens (Black, et al. 2006:8). A more recent detailed analysis of South-North medical migration is provided by the OECD (OECD 2007a).

The increasing importance of migration for national development has encouraged governments to adopt policies that attempt to address the welfare of nationals abroad. In 2002, a ‘presidential dialogue with Nigerians abroad’ marked an effort by the Nigerian state to incorporate Nigerian emigrants and the organisations that they have established abroad in national development policies (de Haas 2006a). Such ‘migration and development’ policies often focus on the identification of highly-skilled diaspora members who could contribute to development. Increasingly migrants are granted voting rights as a reward for their commitment to the country of origin (e.g. Nigeria, India, Turkey, Morocco, Mexico, Philippines see Castles and Delgado

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11 The association between the ‘brain drain’ and negative development outcomes is a theme of ongoing debate (Clemens 2007; McDonald and Crush 2002).
Wise 2008; de Haas 2006b; Gamlen 2008). Across Africa, such policies are focused on nationals in Europe and North America rather than elsewhere in Africa.

Since the early 1980s, some Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India and the Philippines have adopted emigration policies with regards to the employment of nationals abroad, including those who have remained in the South – particularly migration within the region and to the Gulf (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; Wickramasekara 2008). These policies, which aim to protect national workers abroad, have been prioritised by policy-makers in light of the public and media concern about the welfare of workers abroad. They include measures to prepare workers before departure, assistance with documentation and visas, liaison officials in destination countries, and the development of welfare funds (see Khadria 2008). Paradoxically, this attitude is not met with similar concerns about immigrant workers who immigrate to these Asian countries, whose well-being is often not served by immigration or integration policies (Wickramasekara 2008).

**Regional free movement agreements**

Several regional cooperation agreements exist amongst developing countries, which in some cases also include regulations on migration. However, such agreements are often not transformed into legislation at the national levels. In 1979, just four years after its foundation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its member states\(^\text{12}\) adopted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment. In 1980 the implementation of the Protocol’s provisions began with the aim of reducing the obstacles created by the more than 15,000 km of borders between the 15 member countries (ECOWAS 2006). However, in practice, the movement of people within this region is often still marked by complications partly due to corruption of police and border officials and the levels of bureaucracy. ECOWAS is promoting activities to control corruption, which is hindering the effective implementation of the free movement protocol throughout the ECOWAS zone. However, the viability of this ECOWAS’ efforts is weakened by the recurrent bilateral approach taken by EU countries, which try to negotiate country-to-country agreements on migration.

\(^{12}\) Current ECOWAS members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
control, thereby partially undermining negotiating power of ECOWAS as a block vis-à-vis the requests from Northern countries (de Haas 2006a).

Regulations for the free movement of nationals within regional borders have also been introduced by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). Similarly to ECOWAS, the implementation of such rules have not been obstacle-free as national priorities and conflicting policies and practices take precedence over rules of regional bodies (Castles and Miller 2009, 158-9).

In Asia, states typically sign bilateral agreements with sources countries to regulate the movement of migrations. However, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has taken a firm stand on the protection of migrants by adopting the 1997 Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.

**Impacts of South-South migration on human development**

In this section, we turn to the question of the relationship between South-South migration and human development. Once again, we are faced with the dilemma that this relationship is very complex and heterogeneous, varying enormously with the context; we cannot expect to find a shared, coherent account for South-South migration as a whole. The impacts on human development of migration from Ukraine to the Czech Republic are likely to be very different to those arising from movement between Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire.

Moreover, it is important to recall there is no simple causal relationship between mobility and human development. As already noted in Section 5, the level of human development (income, levels of education) is a critical aspect of the context within which migration takes place, simultaneously constraining, enabling and stimulating the process. A potential migrant not only needs to have the capability (in particular, the financial resources) to move but also the aspiration to do so, with a view to enhancing their capabilities further. Likewise, in general, mobility is a reflection of people’s capabilities, in as far as it is an expression of their freedom to move; it can
therefore be considered as a constitutive element of human development. Hence, migration is both a cause and consequence of human development (see de Haas 2009 for a more detailed elaboration of this argument).

There is a vast and rapidly growing literature on the relationship between migration and development (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; Chamie and Dall’Oglio 2008; Naik, et al. 2008; Sørensen, et al. 2002); much of the empirical research is based on cases of South-North migration, especially Mexico-US migration. Research into the role of migration within different regions of the South (and internal migration) in development and poverty reduction has only recently come to the fore (Black, et al. 2006; Hujo and Piper 2007; Ratha and Shaw 2007).

While most of this literature has been framed around economic development, de Haas has completed an analysis focused on the role of migration as a driver of human development. He elaborates the impacts of migration in six broad areas: income, poverty and inequality; remittances; human capital formation; social and cultural change; migrants’ participation in civic and political life; and, the contribution of migrants to the national economy (de Haas 2009). Recalling that there is no a priori reason why the impacts of South-South migration should be fundamentally different to those of South-North migration, this section aims only to point towards the limited areas of difference rather than the whole range of impacts.

**Income and inequality**

Some studies indicate that there are fundamental differences between South-North and generally less remunerative South-South migration with regards to the extent to which they enable migrants and their families to improve their livelihoods. For instance, recent studies conducted in Burkina Faso (Hampshire 2002; Wouterse 2006) and Morocco (de Haas 2006b) suggest that internal and international migration within the African continent should primarily be seen as a means to enhance livelihood security through income diversification and that welfare gains are relatively small. From both countries, it was mainly migration to Europe that allowed households to accumulate substantially more wealth besides stabilising incomes. However, in other contexts there can be income gains for South-South (and internal migration). A study conducted in rural
China found that internal migration increased per capita household income for those left behind, by between 16 and 43 percent (Taylor, et al. 2003). Because there are only few studies that systematically study the impact of South-South remittances, it is unclear to what extent this pattern applies to other countries or continents.

It is also important to bear in mind that South-South migration is generally less costly and therefore more accessible for the relatively poor in comparison to migration to wealthy countries. This may not enable them to diversify income and spread risks as widely as longer-distance migration (South-North), but even modest income increases might make a huge difference to their livelihoods and are likely to substantially decrease poverty levels. Hence, it is possible that South-South migration may have a much greater overall impact on poor communities than South-North migration. Where it takes place, South-North migration may provide very significant benefits for the area of origin, but the much lower numbers of people involved and the very sparse coverage may mean that the aggregate contribution to human development is rather limited. Some evidence to support this analysis is provided by Wouterse’s study in Burkina Faso which analysed the difference between long-distance international migration out of Africa and migration within the region. This found that the former tended to exacerbate household inequalities, but the latter was positively related to a reduction in inequality (Wouterse 2008).

In addition to analysing the impact of migration on inequality in the country of origin, it is also important to consider conditions in the destination. This is especially true for South-South migrants, many of whom are likely to be living in less favourable circumstances than most South-North migrants, in terms of income, housing and legal protection. They tend to be less protected by governments of origin and destination countries and may be subject to both gross exploitation in labour markets and large-scale expulsions (for examples see Section 4). This is often tacitly accepted by states, in particular in the Gulf, which continue to view the labourers as engaged in temporary, or circular migration and grant them very few rights, despite the growing evidence of permanent (or at least very long term) settlement (Fargues 2006; Hujo and Piper 2007: 22).
The precarious nature of South-South migrants’ position in their country of destination and their engagement in low-wage low-skilled jobs leaves them particularly exposed to the vagaries of the global economic system (Ratha and Shaw 2007: 30-31). An economic slowdown bringing a reduction in factory orders or global commodity prices is likely to rapidly feed through to the labour market, pushing migrant workers out of jobs. They face the prospect of living with no rights to social support or returning to their place or origin or migrating elsewhere. This presents a strong contrast with the situation of South-North migrants whose rights, while widely abused, are much more deeply embedded in legal and policy frameworks. The relatively weak social, economic and legal position of many South-South migrants makes them more vulnerable and seems to limit the extent to which their position can be seen as enhancing their capabilities and thereby contributing to human development.

**Remittances**

According to recent estimates, South-South remittances may account for 10 to 29 per cent of the total amount of remittances sent worldwide (Ratha and Shaw 2007). South-South migrants not only tend to earn less than South-North migrants, so have less to remit, but also the costs of South-South remittances also tend to be higher (Ratha and Shaw 2007).

A study of remittances sent by migrants from five countries of southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) moving within the region showed that the vast majority of migrant-sending households received remittances, mostly in the form of cash, from both male and female migrants (Dodson, et al. 2008; Pendleton, et al. 2006). A large portion of these remittances are spent on food and there was very little evidence of their being invested in income generating activities. The study concluded:

> Clearly migration and poverty are closely related in this region. The migrant-sending households of Southern Africa are generally poor although the degree of poverty does vary. Migration is a livelihood strategy of the poor. Remittances in cash and kind keep poverty at bay but they do not do much else. There is very little evidence, as yet, that remittances in Southern Africa have developmental
value, as conventionally defined. Equally, they are critical for poverty alleviation in many households. (Pendleton, et al. 2006: 40 emphasis added).

However, if we are concerned with human development, the reduction in poverty brought by remittances does represent a very real improvement in people’s wellbeing. Hence, while these remittances may not have developmental value ‘as conventionally defined’, they do increase levels of human development.

The real volume of South-South remittances may be much higher due to the under-registration of South-South migration and because many South-South remittances may be sent informally. The formal channels for sending remittances within the South are more expensive and harder to access than moving money from North to South. Where migrants are moving between neighbouring countries, informal channels and personal delivery of cash and goods is likely to be much easier. In southern Africa, most remittances were transferred by these means (Pendleton, et al. 2006). If this is widespread, it would suggest that efforts to reduce the cost of money transfer may have little impact on South-South remittances.

**Human capital formation**

South-South migration is often dominated by the movement of people with much lower levels of education than South-North migration that often involves some of the most highly educated people from the poorest regions of the world (Bakewell 2008c: 274). While debates about the ‘brain drain’ from South to North rage, the movement of highly educated and skilled people within the South has received much less attention. A noticeable exception is the case of South Africa which has emerged as a major pole for migration within Africa and attracted large numbers of graduates and entrepreneurs from across the Southern African and the rest of the continent (McDonald and Crush 2002).

In general, discussions about the relationship between migration in the South and human capital have been largely concerned with impact on rural labour supplies and reductions in agricultural production (Wouterse and Taylor 2008). Much of this literature has focused on internal migration (Lipton 1980). As noted above, the desire for education is a significant driver of
South-South migration, and there seems little doubt that it does open up new possibilities to the poor. However, there has been little exploration into the particular contribution of South-South migration to education levels.

**Social and cultural change**

Moving beyond remittances, identifying the social impacts of migration is a complex task, because social change might also be attributed to other internal and external influences such as globalisation and various endogenous factors. After all, social transformations in developing countries occur even in the absence of migration.

The notion of ‘social remittances’ refers to ‘migration-driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion’, which include ‘ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow from sending to receiving countries’ (Levitt 1998). Like any other form of migration, South-South migration can deeply affect norms, practices and preferences in origin areas, for example by influencing gender roles, political forms of organization, religious practice and by transferring knowledge and techniques, for instance with regard to agricultural production and health.

In rural Mali, for example, it has been observed how rural-urban migration has contributed to creating new consumer patterns and desires, ranging from clothes, to music and food, as well as introducing modern notions of romance, democracy and youth culture (Jonsson 2007). These influences, in turn, shape migration aspirations, as young people are increasingly enmeshed in transnational networks and global flows. Hence, the transfer of ideas, practices, identities and social capital from one place to another can shape migration aspirations, as people begin to imagine their own lives elsewhere. This may contribute to the development of a ‘culture of migration’, where spending time abroad becomes a normal ‘rite of passage’ for young people (see Box 6 above).

**Transnational engagement**

There is a huge interest in the transnational engagement of migrants and their descendants in the development of their countries of origin and it has become a major focus for policy (see Section 6). Much of the literature is focused on North-South transnationalism. For example, there is a growing body of research and policy initiatives about the role of diasporas in the development of
Africa, but this is almost exclusively concerned with Africans living beyond the continent. There is virtually no interest in the potential contribution of Ghanaians (say) living in Nigeria. The African diasporas within Africa are absent from the picture (Bakewell 2008a).

Given the volume of migration and the proximity of many of the migrants to the country of origin, one might ask whether there is any reason to expect that South-South transnationalism should be any less significant than North-South. There are several South-South migrant groups with very strong transnational connections, including Indians in Eastern and Southern Africa, Chinese in South-East Asia and the Lebanese in Africa and the Caribbean (Leichtman 2005).

In Asia, transnational networks of migrant workers have developed that provide a platform for advocacy on migrants’ human rights and take action to give voice to migrants’ grievances. According to Hujo and Piper, there have been encouraging signs that some trade unions in the region are looking beyond national-oriented policies to form new transnational alliances to promote workers’ rights and uphold human rights standards (Hujo and Piper 2007: 23).

For many communities in the global South, their transnational linkages are crucial to sustaining local social and economic life. For example, the rural economy in West Africa’s Senegal River Valley has been described as ‘assisted self sufficiency’, as farming is complemented by migrants’ remittances (Quiminal 1991). Money from migrants is indispensable to the survival of many households in this area and moreover, local community projects funded by migrants have developed the local infrastructure.

**Protracted displacement**

As noted in Section 5, the majority of the world’s refugees move within the South. Many of these have been in exile for long periods and there is increasing concern about the impact of such protracted displacement on the identities and livelihoods of the displaced, as well as the security and stability of source and host countries. Protracted refugee populations constitute over 70 percent of the world's refugees (Crisp 2003; UNHCR 2008b). The long-term presence of refugee populations in much of the developing world has come to be seen by many host states in these
regions as a source of insecurity. In response, host governments have enacted policies of containing refugees in isolated and insecure camps, have prevented the arrival of additional refugees and, in extreme cases, have engaged in forcible repatriation (Loescher and Milner 2005).

The human consequences of protracted displacement in Africa include material deprivation, psycho-social and gender issues, social tension and violence. To cope with their situation, displaced persons resort to various survival strategies, often with adverse consequences for themselves and their hosts – examples include sexual exploitation; exploitative employment; illegal and unsustainable farming; manipulating and maximizing assistance; negative coping mechanisms (theft, substance abuse); reliance upon remittances; and mobility and migration (Crisp 2003). It is clear, therefore, that human development is undermined in such circumstances as people’s capabilities and freedoms are eroded.

While the circumstances for the refugees may be inimical to human development, it is important to consider a wider context beyond the aid operations. Refugees are often enmeshed in transnational livelihoods, which span the country of origin, possibly multiple countries of first asylum and resettlement countries in the North. For example, Somalis in the camps of Northern Kenya are in close contact with the large and economically very active Somali community in Nairobi, with relatives and friends in Europe, the US and the Gulf and in Somalia itself (Horst 2006; Kleist 2007; Kleist 2008; Lindley 2007). This dense network can serve to provide crucial and to some extent autonomous support for Somalis, which lies largely beyond the power and control of aid agencies and even states. How far this exercise of freedoms (or at least subversion of unfreedoms) and the development of capabilities in the face of incredible constraints can be considered as human development might be open to question. However, without it the situation for many Somalis would likely be considerably worse.

**Conclusion**

This paper has highlighted some of the distinctive features of migration between the poorer countries of the world, which might set it apart from migration to or between highly developed
countries. To some extent it has struggled to find these features. Perhaps the most striking differences are those found in history, especially the experience of colonialism shared by many of the countries of Africa and Asia, which lies at the foundation of the political and social construction of the South and the North. To some extent, this exercise to mark out South-South migration as a different, perhaps exotic, form of migration can be seen as contributing to the contemporary reproduction of the North/South separation and its asymmetrical power relations.

There is no doubt that colonialism has left an indelible mark on the patterns of migration in many parts of the South, especially Africa and Asia. The longevity of its impact should not be surprising, as even pre-colonial migration paths continue to be echoed in contemporary movements. Migration within the South, as in the rest of the world, has always been an essential element of the historical processes of social, political and economic change. The growth of a global labour market and the new technologies of travel and communication have brought fundamental shifts in migration patterns. However, the extent of these changes and their causes can only be understood in the light of history, which can reveal both the continuities and discontinuities in the directions and scale of migrations.

This is particularly important in the consideration of migration within the South. As this paper has shown, in many of the poorer regions of the world current data is lamentably poor and time-series data almost non-existent. A renewed focus on South-South migration, which appears to be emerging in both the policy and academic realms, is to be welcomed, in as far as it highlights a very important process that profoundly effects the human development of millions of poor people. It will generate new data and increase our knowledge of mobility and its impacts. However, it is important that this rediscovery of South-South migration does not instinctively cast it as a problem, or even a symptom of problem, without carefully considering its roots in longstanding economic, social and cultural practices. For example, while the crossing of the Sahara by sub-Saharan Africans may be increasing and may be related to people’s aspirations to reach Europe, it is also part of much older patterns of migration and settlement in North Africa.

Perhaps a more disturbing aspect of the growing interest in South-South migration is the invidious contrast made with South-North migration. The agglomeration of countries which
makes up the South is so heterogeneous that it is difficult to see any rationale, other than rather outdated convention, to consider them together. They offer a convenient short-hand, which appears only to mark out the wealthy countries from the rest. Aggregated figures for South-North migration show increasing movements across the boundary, but fail to reveal that those crossing the boundary are primarily the relatively wealthier members of the South. For example, in Europe, increases in immigration are often discussed in terms of massive flows of Africans across the Mediterranean, despite the evidence that shows that the numbers are relatively small. Framing global analyses of migration patterns around movement within and between crude categories of North and South adds little light to the picture.

There is very little evidence to suggest that there is any essential difference between South-South and other directions of migrations. While this paper has attempted to work with this notion of the South, much of the data it has presented has been concerned with particular regions, especially Africa and Asia. Latin America and Eastern Europe have hardly featured. Even using this subset of the South, the separation between different categories of migration is often based on assumptions rather than evidence. Hence, the assertion that income differentials play a lesser role in South-South migration than South-North (discussed in Section 5), must be held up to question.

It is clear that there is a need for much more data if we are to understand both the patterns of migration in poorer regions of the world, its drivers and its relationship with human development. However, rather than calling for more research into South-South migration, the conclusion of this paper is that more needs to be done about understanding the role of migration (and mobility) in the lives of the poor. Rather than thinking in terms of South-South, at least we can move to consider movement within and between areas of low, medium, high and very high human development. This is most likely to start at national level, but there may be greater analytical value in considering other geographical units of analysis. Disaggregating the South in this way will break down the consensus between the analysis drawing on World Bank income data and that based on the Human Development Index. As the tables in Section 3 show, while the UNDP and World Bank definitions of North and South may be close, the categories of low income and low HDI are very different.
At the same time as disaggregating the South, which might be seen as a way of bringing a more nuanced understanding of differences in migration patterns across the world, it is also important to consider the commonalities of migration experiences, rather than assuming essential differences. In particular, this paper has highlighted the clear discrepancy in migration policy debates related to levels of development. Most strikingly in Africa, policies are concerned with using migration for development and managing the ‘brain drain’. The questions about integration of migrants that are so prominent in Europe are hardly raised though not necessarily less relevant.
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