Russian Migration Policy and Its Impact on Human Development

Irina Ivakhnyuk

Department of Population, Lomonosov Moscow State University

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Irina Ivakhnyuk is Senior Researcher and Deputy Director of the Department of Population, Lomonosov Moscow State University. E-mail: irina.ivanhuk@mtu-net.ru.

Comments should be addressed by email to the author(s).
Abstract

For Russia, migration policy – in terms of internal or/and international migration flows management – was an ever-important element of the State activities. Concentrated on State interests, the policy also resulted in human development. The paper presents a historical overview of the Soviet and Russian migration policies with special emphases on the impact on human development and the driving forces behind the changing policies. The Soviet period can be characterized as contradiction between strict limitations on the freedom of movement provided by the propiska system, and large-scale population movements, both voluntary and involuntary, that were inspired by economic and administrative policy measures to meet labor demand of an industrializing economy. In the post-Soviet period, international migration is the major focus of the Russian migration policy. The Russian Federation is the major receiving country in the vast former USSR territory. The evolution of Russian migration policy in the post-Soviet period is a good example for getting a better understanding of how the everlasting conflict between the need for additional human resources and anti-immigrant public moods (typical of all receiving countries), combined with the opportunistic considerations of political elites, that hampers the elaboration of a reasonable long-term migration strategy. Russian migration policy has been drifting from a relatively open immigration regulation based on a laissez faire approach in the early 1990s to restrictive immigration laws in the early 2000s and to an ‘open door’ migration policy in respect to CIS citizens in 2007.

Keywords: Human development, internal migration, international migration, migration policy, Russia.

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1. Introductory notes

The major difficulty in studying migration policy in Russia from the human development perspective results from lack of research into human effects of migration trends and policies. Traditionally, migration policy in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia was shaped in accordance with the State interests and monitored from the State perspective. The outcomes of migration policy for economic development of the country and its regions, redistribution of population to meet the needs of industries, characteristics of migrant flows, the role of immigration for demographic development, challenges of illegal immigration for national security – these issues were earlier and are now well-studied in contrast to elaboration of internal and international migration effects on human capabilities – skills, health, education, political freedoms, etc.

Russian economic mentality is still allied with pseudo-Marxist approach to social development where dominating growth of heavy industry at the expense of ‘live labor’ is considered the most important characteristic of national development (Marx 1885; Cherkovets 1971). It must be admitted that the socialist system failed in Russia and other countries of the socialist block mainly due to its irrational human outcomes. Real socialism turned to be a mono-power and mono-property society with underdeveloped needs of the population and even less possibilities to realize those needs; it was a society of ‘a cheap worker’ with no purpose of high living standards (Kolesov 2008, 15). As a result, data collection and research into migration of population focuses on its effects on the State, not people.

In the contemporary post-Soviet period, with dominating irregular migration patterns, analysis of migration trends and their consequences is limited by the fact that 70 to 80% of migration inflow remains unregistered (Zaionchkovskaya 2007; Krasinets et al. 2000; Ivakhnyuk 2008a; Vitkovskaya 2002), and therefore invisible to statistics.

By explaining these restraints for a systematic analysis of human development outcomes of the Russian migration policy through different periods we shape the possible scale of the discussion. This paper puts evolution of Russian migration policy in the center and analyzes its human dimension at different stages in the context of its effects on migrants, households and concerned societies, where corresponding data is available. Human development understood at macro-level as development of human resources in the country, will also be investigated by drawing from corresponding national statistics on employment, education, health, and social security.
2. Russian transcription definitions and acronyms used

*Chelnok migration* – a type of short-term commercial migration, either international or internal, when migrants move back and forth (like a shuttle=chelnok) to buy and sell essential commodities in order to fill up consumer market of their own countries with consumer goods.

*Novoye/blizhnee zarubezh’e* (new/near foreign countries) – countries of former USSR. To be distinguished from *staroye/dalnee zarubezh’e* (old/far foreign countries) – all other countries.

*Kulaks* – a negative title of rich or well-off farmers in Russia in the 1920s who owned land, cattle, etc. and were considered enemies of the new “people’s power” settled after the 1917 Revolution, in contrast to poor peasants (*bednyaks*) who were seen as natural allies of the new regime.

*Orgnabor* – a state labor recruitment system applied in the USSR in 1930s-1970s to provide industrialization projects with labor resources, especially in remote areas. The movement of people within the *orgnabor* system was stimulated both economically and psychologically. Participation in the economic projects guided by the Communist Party and its Young League – Komsomol was considered a matter of honor for the Soviet people.

*Propiska* = a compulsory territorial registration of the population applied in the USSR in 1932-1991. *Propiska* was certified by a stamp in a person’s passport made by a territorial department of the Ministry of Interior. Every person was registered at a particular address, and in accordance with registered residency he/she got access to employment, primary and secondary education, healthcare, and other social benefits.

*Perestroika* – a period of economic and political reforms in the USSR between 1986 and 1991 initiated by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991). *Perestroika* in the external policy of the Soviet Union resulted in the end of the Cold War period. *Perestroika* in the internal policy was associated with putting an end to the apologetics of socialism, giving up rigid state control over economy, shaping a trend to liberalization, democracy and openness of the society, and freedom of press and discussion. In the context of the paper, *perestroika* was
an important period in the Russian history as it was the first time the ‘human dimension’ of development was acknowledged.

*Raspredelenie* is an administrative mechanism of the migration policy used in the USSR (primarily in 1950s-1970s), and aimed at providing economic projects and remote areas with required number of specialists (engineers, technicians, architects, teachers, doctors, etc.). It was applied to university/professional school graduates (but also to qualified staff) who were forcibly directed to definite employment locations despite their current residency for the compulsory period of 3 to 4 years. (Presently, enforced *raspredelenie* of graduates is applied in Belarus Republic in accordance with the Council of Ministers Decree N: 1702 of 10.12.20071).

CIS – the Commonwealth of Independent States

CPSU – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

EurAsEC – the Eurasian Economic Community

Komsomol – Young Communist League in the Soviet period

RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the official title of Russia (as a part of the USSR) during the Soviet period, between 1922 and 1991.

3. Abstract of migration policies in the Russian Empire in 18th to early 20th centuries

In Russia, throughout the Empire, Soviet and contemporary periods, a highly centralized power system was the basis of the State management. Development of the huge country was ruled from the metropolitan centre, be it Saint Petersburg until 1918, or later Moscow. The need to populate and develop the vast territories made migration policy a permanent focus of the State activities.

1 http://job.bseu.by/help/assignment.htm
3.1. Encouragement of immigration

Historically, the migration policy in Russia started with international migration management. A major concern of Emperor Peter I (1682-1725) and later Empress Catherine II (1762-1796) was how to inhabit and develop the huge fertile lands in the Central European part of the Empire along the Volga river and stimulate agricultural development. As internal migration of population was severely restricted by the existing serfdom system, encouragement of immigration from European states became the source of additional population for Russia. In 1763, a specialized State Migration Management Department – probably the first migration management board in world history – was founded to encourage colonists from Western Europe to move to unsettled areas of rural Russia. In addition, thousands of skilled immigrants, including scientists, professors, military men, engineers, architects and businessmen came to settle in Russian cities. In the middle of the 18th century, among 107 members of the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences only 34 were Russians (Iontsev et al. 2001, 370). Privileges were granted to immigrants, such as tax relief, freedom of conscience, and exemption from military service. Since then, Russia has had numerous diasporas of Germans and Dutch. By the end of the 19th century, 1.8 million Germans lived in the Russian Empire, of whom 77 percent were farmers (source: the 1897 Russian Census, cited from: Iontsev 1999, 186). Between 1764 and 1866, 549 colonies were founded by foreign resettlers in Russia with over 200,000 male migrants alone (Brockhaus & Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1890-1907, vol. XXIV, 672).

3.2. Internal migration

After serfdom in Russia was abolished in 1861, European colonists gradually lost their privileges and internal migration became a major resource of colonization of the Empire’s margins (Kaufman 1905). Freedom of movement for peasants had a great impact on the economic development in Russia. It fuelled urbanization processes, gave rise to industries and crafts, and increased agricultural productivity. It also influenced human development prospects by giving peasants the right to be independent farmers or to be employed in a non-agricultural sector. Since late 19th century the State encouraged migration of peasants from

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2 Serfdom is a feudal state system where peasants are attached to the land owned by a lord; their rights and freedom, including freedom of movement, are severely limited; in fact, they belong to their lords who can buy and sell peasants, exchange them, have them forcibly re-settled and married. This feudal system existed in Russia in 16th – mid-19th centuries as well as in medieval Western and Eastern Europe.
over-populated rural areas in European Russia to the Asian part of the country. They were supported financially and provided with jobs, e.g. in the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. All in all about 10 million people moved from Central European areas of Russia to Siberia, Ciscaucasia, and the Far East between 1871 and 1916 (Narodonaselenie 1994, 234). Besides, from 6 to 7 million peasants migrated for temporary (seasonal) employment every year at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries (ibid).

During the 20th century the management of population movements, though focused on internal movements, in many aspects preserved the strictly centralized management system and all-over State control over population movements.

4. The Soviet period – the ‘propiska’ era

4.1. Introduction of the passport/propiska system

At the beginning of the 20th century Russia faced numerous population movements as a result of the 1917 revolution and the 1917-1923 Civil War. Social transformations, economic regression that resulted in shortage of goods and mass famine, in combination with tough policies of the Government aimed at suppression of resistance and opposition (by collectivization of peasants, dispossession of the kulaks, etc.), forced people to move away in search of better opportunities and security. Population movements were spontaneous, and no migrant registration system existed in the early Soviet period. Neither was any unified identification paper system in use for Soviet citizens. This situation was contradicting the idea of total registration and State control of the population. For this reason, in 1932 a common passport system for the whole territory of the USSR and a compulsory registration of the passport holder at a specific address (propiska) was introduced by a Government Decree (Moiseenko 2004, 88).

The passport became an exclusive identification document for Soviet citizens over 16 years of age and living permanently in cities, towns and industrial communities. Propiska was verified by a stamp of a territorial department of the Ministry of Interior in the person’s passport. A passport without propiska was considered invalid. A person could live, work, study, vote, send children to school or pre-school, and have access to the social welfare system only in accordance with his/her propiska, i.e. at the place of registered residence. For example, it was absolutely impossible for a person with propiska in Novgorod to be employed in
Moscow. In order to get propiska in a city, a statement confirming an employment in this city was necessary. However, to be employed in a city, propiska in this city was compulsory. It was, therefore, a vicious circle (Denisenko et al. 1989, 60).

4.2. Propiska and freedom of movement

In addition to the above measures, there existed a so called ‘sanitary norm’ of the dwelling size that made it impossible to register a person in a house, flat or room where the ratio of square meters per person was less than nine. This norm was applied with no respect to kinship, i.e. a wife could not be registered (and get propiska with all pertaining social rights) in a dwelling of her husband if it resulted in a per capita area less than the legal ‘sanitary norm’. Passport/propiska system seriously limited the freedom of movement of Soviet citizens. Experts called the propiska system the ‘serfdom of the 20th century’ (Popov 1996). Limitations for settlement were most strictly applied to big cities like Moscow, Leningrad (Saint Petersburg), Kiev, Kharkov, Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod), Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg). By the 1960s, of the total of 300 big cities in the territory of the Soviet Union (with population of over 100,000), about 200 cities were ‘closed’ for migrants (Regent 1999, 40).

It is worth noting that only urban citizens were granted the right to hold a passport, while villagers (kolkhozniki) had no passports and therefore had no right to move even within the borders of the administrative unit (province) where they lived (Moiseenko 2004, 89). Only in 1974, in accordance with a Decree issued by the Communist party and the Government, peasants got passports and were equalized in the rights with other Soviet citizens (Popov 1996). This was mainly a result of ratification by the Soviet Union of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1973. Article 12 of the UN Covenant declares that everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his/her residence. The propiska institution was generally in conflict with this statement; but the fact that millions rural citizens in Russia who were fully deprived of their right to move within their own country was an outrage.

4.3. The scale and structure of internal migration in the Soviet period
Despite the strict limitations of freedom of movement, the scale of internal migration in the Soviet Union was large. First, there were voluntary (but strictly State-driven) employment-led migrations: people were moved to large-scale construction and industrial sites within the rigidly organized labor recruitment system (orgnabor). During the 1930s, over 28.7 million people were re-settled across the Soviet Union under this system (Narodonaselenie 1994, 234). These were mainly rural citizens recruited to construction and manufacturing sectors in urban areas, and the urbanization process was accelerated in line with the industrialization policy. In 1926-1939 the urban population of the Soviet Union increased by 18.7 million, in 1939-1958 – by another 24.6 million, in 1959-1969 – by 16.4 million, in 1970-78 – by 13.4 million, in 1979-1988 – by 9.1 million (ibid).

Moved for employment, these people were expected to settle in regions under development permanently. Resettlements to remote regions of Northern and Eastern Russia were encouraged by a set of stimulating economic measures, including a traveling allowance, ‘regional wage increments’, early retirement and a higher pension, accommodation, annual paid vacation with transport fares covered by the state, free vouchers to a health resort and so on. For example, the wage increment rate (‘regional coefficient’) for the extreme north territories was 1.8 to 2.0, for Far East region – 1.3 to 1.8 (Roshin 2008). In the centralized planned economy where wage levels were standardized all across the country, this meant that the same job done in the incremented territories was paid higher in accordance with the ‘regional coefficient’. The size of the coefficient depended on the climatic conditions and the period of uninterrupted residence of the person in the corresponding area. Wage increments were effective migration stimulating tools as they were not merely adjustments to cover differences in living costs but also allowed migrants to make savings. For this reason, up to 60% of migrants to Northern and Eastern territories were moving temporarily, under temporary job contract, with the purpose to earn money for buying a car or a flat in a place of permanent residence (Zaslavskaya and Rybakovskiy 1978, 22). Besides, the benefits typical of a situation blighted by a total deficit of consumer goods like an opportunity to buy a car or other durable goods, were used to prompt migrants to go to remote and difficult-to-live-in territories.

Voluntary by form, migrations under orgnabor were strictly determined by directions. Migration to remote underdeveloped regions with severe climatic conditions was encouraged while movements to developed areas, even for a family reunion, were limited. Regulated by the propiska policy, migration was permissive by nature.
On the other hand, involuntary (also State-driven) migration was an objective reality of the Soviet Union, particularly in the 1930s-1950s. The migration policy was chosen as an instrument of political suppression and struggle against dissent. Initially deportations were aimed at well-off farmers (kulaks) who were dispossessed and – in order to avoid their recovery – forcibly moved to underdeveloped northern areas. Later deportations/displacements of whole ethnic groups (Crimean Tatars, Ingushs, Germans, Chechens, Kalmyks, Koreans, and others) from their native lands to remote areas in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Far East were aimed at destruction of their unity and ethnic identity. Between 1932 and 1940, the number of so called ‘special resettlers’ (spetspereselentsy) as this type of migrants was named in the official statistics, totalled 2.2 million; by 1953 their number increased to 2.8 million (Bruk and Kabuzan 1991). During the Second World War, whole ethnic communities were (often falsely) accused of assisting the German army and were urgently moved to the Asian part of the USSR. Of these, over 1 million Germans, 317,000 Chechens, 165 Crimean Tatars, 84,000 Ingushs, 82,000 Kalmyks, 64,000 Karachaevs, 49,000 Meskhetian Turks were displaced. 78 percent of them were women and children. According to estimates, every fifth of the migrants died on the way (Mukomel 1991). Upon their arrival to respective destinations, the mortality among migrants was also high because of poverty, diseases, bad housing conditions, psychological stress. According to estimates, from 15 to 30% of ethnic deportees died prematurely on the way or soon after arrival to a new place of residence (Ediev 2003, 302). The total demographic losses of deported nationalities in the 1930s-1950s (including the losses caused by reduced fertility) are estimated at 1 million (ibid.).

The ethnicity-based deportations seriously affected human development in the Soviet period, labeled whole ethnic groups as ‘public enemies’³ and reduced their chances to chose a place to live in and get access to higher education; it damaged the physical and intellectual development of those groups, especially children, increased mortality and affected their health.

4.4. Migration management within a state planning system: the outcomes

The migration management in the Soviet period was coordinated with the general economic and political strategy of the State. The need for industrial development and cultivation of

³ http://www.hro1.org/node/505
virgin and long-fallow lands called for mass resettlements that were encouraged by administrative and economic tools, while the trend for a total control over the nation realized through the *propiska* system limited migration to big cities. The authoritarian migration management ensured people would move to where the State interests needed them. The state planning covered not only the economic development of the country, but also shaped migration flows.

The impact of the migration policy on human development during the Soviet period was contradictory. On the one hand, participation in *orgnabor* gave opportunities to young people, particularly those from rural areas, to improve their living, be active in social life, get professional skills up to higher education, and as a result expand their horizons. On the other hand, *propiska* severely limited direction and scale of migration and left the people little chance to decide their own destiny. Limitations of movement inhibited people’s development, both in terms of professional and career growth and income earning. The search for better employment opportunities was limited by area of residence fixed by *propiska*. For example, for researchers in the provinces, work in the advanced research institutions in Moscow or Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) was an unrealistic dream. In many cases it resulted in underdevelopment of human capabilities (Khorev 1974). At the same time, the fact that in order to earn money to buy a car or a flat a person had to take up an employment in faraway regions of Siberia, the Far East or the Far North, can be hardly evaluated as ‘normal’ (Mukomel 2005).

Nowadays Russian researchers (Aleshkovski 2006; Moiseenko 2004; Roshin 2008) tend to evaluate the Soviet experience of internal labor migration policy as positive because (1) the *orgnabor* policy achieved its goals to supply the growing manufacturing and transport industries with labor resources; (2) it succeeded in redistribution of the population across the country and development of its Asian territories; (3) it attracted thousands of young people to industrialization projects and helped distinguish the most initiative and active individuals who later became administrative or political leaders. These arguments can be accepted, but the ‘philosophy’ and inhumane methods of the Soviet migration policy can hardly be approved. The state migration policy was fully governed by the demands of the State, not people. The interest of the state was the highest priority while the interests of its people were largely ignored. If skilled workers were needed in Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Almaty, or elsewhere in newly developing remote territories, university graduates from Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev were forced to take up jobs and stay there for several years. This was a typical way of
supplying underdeveloped areas of the country with teachers, doctors, engineers and other specialists. It was called ‘distribution of graduates’ (*raspredelenie*). It was only after compulsory work for 3-4 years there that residents of Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev could return home. The migration management was a natural result of the rigid system of planning and administrative decisions mandatory for implementation (Aleshkovski 2006, 74).

This situation has deeply influenced the mentality of the Russians. It has damaged the understanding of the role of individuals in their country’s development. The farfetched economic ‘law’ put a heavy focus on the development of production means, including machines, equipment and tools, while virtually ignoring production of consumer goods to meet the basic human needs. The State policy was aimed mainly at economic growth and output rather than on satisfaction of human needs. The mass repressions in the 1930s and the 1950s minimized the value of human life: from 6 to 7 million Soviet citizens were executed by shooting or died in prison-camps (Volkogonov 1990, 339). All in all, about 25 million were subjected to repression during the Stalin rule (Vishnevsky 2007). While the Soviet Constitution declared ‘universal’ human rights and freedoms, in reality people were often deprived of their rights. Such type of double standard was considered normal by the majority of the people. Forced and politically driven migrations swept millions of people and ruined a lot of human lives, impressing a dramatic image on the nation’s character (Roshin 2008). This explains *inter alia* why ‘human rights & freedoms’ is a difficult-to-understand value in Russia even now, two decades after *perestroika* has revised priorities in favor of the ‘socialism with a human face’ ideology (Vinogradov 2001).

Besides, the *propiska* system that limited the people’s mobility in the Soviet period has had its long-term effect on the post-Soviet Russia. The low level of internal migration in the contemporary Russia that impedes development of the national labor market and its progress towards a market economy is psychologically deeply rooted in the artificial restrictions on mobility imposed by *propiska* (Aleshkovski 2006).

4.5. International migration in the Soviet period

In addition to the above limitations of internal migration, it should be said that international migration was an exception rather than a rule in the Soviet Union. For decades of the Soviet regime the USSR was a ‘closed’ country where international migration was strictly limited by the State. The entry and departure rules, granting and revoking citizenship and deportations
were regulated by decrees and ministerial instructions issued in 1918, 1925 and 1959 that reflected the restrictive stance of the State (Tiurkin 2005, 21-22).

Immigration and emigration were meager in number and mainly of a political / ideological nature. Trips of Soviet citizens to other countries were regulated by severe security checks: permission to go abroad was closely related to the ideological loyalty and political allegiance of a candidate, even for tourists. To depart from the USSR, temporarily or permanently, Soviet citizens had to get an exit visa. Membership in the Communist Party and personal testimonial from the SPSU unit was a compulsory requirement for any person to be sent on a temporary job to another country. Temporary labor migrants were sent as specialists to participate in development and construction projects in the ‘satellite’ developing countries like Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, China, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Vietnam, etc., that were encouraged to follow the socialism model and given the economic and financial support.

Arrivals and stay of foreign citizens in Russia, for diplomats and tourists alike, were also strictly controlled. International labor migrants from satellite countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, and China) came to Russia in teams to work in politically significant projects (like oil & gas pipelines and power lines that were parts of the European socialist energy supply system) or in manufacturing industries. Another channel of temporary migration to the USSR was student migration. The low-cost and high-quality education in the Soviet universities and professional schools increased human capital of the Soviet Block states, and supplied them with qualified doctors, teachers, engineers, geologists, etc. At the same time, it was an effective way of strengthening the ties between the countries. The outer borders of the USSR were effectively guarded. Illegal migration, if any, was negligible and concerned criminal cross-border activities; it was effectively counteracted by security services.

5. Shift in migration trends and policies after the collapse of the USSR

In the Soviet period, the migration policy was focused exclusively on internal migration. For the 15 former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine), inter-republican migrations were external by form, although internal by nature. This means that migration from Russia to Kazakhstan or from one Russian oblast (province) to another were regulated by the same rules. Crossing administrative borders between the republics has no special regulation. It was not until after 1991 when they became international
borders, and crossing them in the 1990s was regulated specifically, with consideration of close
connections between people living in the former Soviet republics, and wishes of those who
preferred to change their country of residence after the USSR collapsed (no visa required, a
variety of documents were valid for crossing the border legally, including ‘internal’ (common)
passports, ‘travel’ passports, outdated Soviet passports, military identity cards, seafarer’s
identity documents, birth certificates, and so on).

Both on level of mentality and formal regulation, foreign countries (including other post-
Soviet states) were divided for the Russians into two groups labeled in the Russian language
novoye/blizhnee zarubezh’e (new/near foreign countries, i.e. countries of the former USSR)
and staroye/dalnee zarubezh’e (old/far foreign countries, i.e. all other countries). Different
entry regimes were a major dividing line between the citizens of these two groups of countries.

5.1. Migration-related legislation in the early 1990s – a liberalization trend...

Inspired by the *perestroika* reforms and a general liberalization trend, a new Russian Federal
law was produced in accordance with the democratic norms. The ‘young reformers’ team’ of
the early period of President Yeltsin’s rule embraced the democratic values and was filled with
enthusiasm to improve the Russian political system. The Constitution of the Russian
Federation of 1993 was drafted in line with the UN International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and included its statements on freedom of movement in full. Correspondingly,
the 1993 Federal Law ‘On the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to freedom of
movement and choice of domicile on the Territory of the Russian Federation’ abolished the
*propiska* system in favor of a *registration* system. Formally, the requirements of registration
did not change much\(^4\) but the enforcement of the rules was weakened.

Besides, Russia was becoming a more ‘open’ country and Russian citizens gained the
right to move abroad. Two decades after ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights its statement on ‘freedom of everyone to leave any country, including his/her
own’ was realized in the 1993 Federal Law ‘On regulation of departure from the Russian
Federation and entry into the Russian Federation’ that, among other things, voided exit visa
requirements for Russian citizens (Tiurkin 2005). In accordance with the 1991 Law ‘On

\(^4\) The requirement to get permission for registration is now formally removed, and is substituted by declared
registration at a place of residence. However, since the registration limitations are still preserved this has not
eased the restrictions very much.
employment of the population of the Russian Federation’, Russian citizens were given the right for employment in other countries. Article 10 of the Law entitled ‘The right of Russian citizens to work abroad’ declared that “the citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to seek job and get employed outside the Russian Federation at their own will”. In 1995 the Government Decree ‘On licensing activities assisting Russian citizens to get employed abroad’ was signed and approved by the Duma (Russian Parliament). The need for a legal framework for overseas employment of Russian citizens was a result of the socio-economic crisis faced by Russia that pushed people to look for alternative sources of income, including international labor migration. An attempt to channel labor outflow was aimed at shaping Russia’s participation in the international labor market and protecting the social rights of labor migrants.

Liberalization of internal and international movements of Russian citizens in the 1990s is hard to overestimate. Freedom of movement as one of the basic human values; freedom to chose place of residence; privatization and establishment of private property; the State withdrawing its control over private life; access to international education; betterment of opportunities and income earnings by means of overseas employment, and widening choice of life strategies have gave Russian citizens a feeling of freedom unknown before, increased their mobility and made them part of the global community. However, impoverishment resulting from the economic recession made those benefits inaccessible for a significant part of population.

5.2. ... combined with unreasonable tangles

Liberalization of the migration management happened when the economic and political situation served mainly as a strong push factor. This was true for Russia – and it caused a large-scale emigration to the USA, Germany, and Israel, i.e. the countries that took into consideration ethnic and political factors as reasons for admission of the ex-USSR émigrés. This was true also for other former Soviet states – and it caused immigration flows to the Russian Federation. In addition, an unreasonably indifferent migration policy affected former Soviet citizens who were staying in other post-Soviet states and wished to move to Russia to escape ethnic conflicts, wars and poor state governance, but were not welcomed by Russia, and flooded the country in millions. The status of those immigrants was undefined, and their social
rights were infringed. People came to Russia benefiting from an easy visa-free entrance but were not able to get legalized due to intricate bureaucratic procedures.

Russia is a country where bureaucracy is traditionally very strong. 1.5 million people are employed in the state service and federal and regional administrations of different levels (Vishnevsky 2006). Giving permissions is the State prerogative associated with endorsements, delays, checks, re-confirmations, etc. (Obolonsky 2002). In the sphere of migration management, the over-bureaucratic registration process became a major impediment of legal immigration and a main source of corruption in the immigration process. Labor in-flow from the CIS states, though badly required by Russian industries but clashing against an irrational work permits procedure, has made migrants employment a largely illegal sphere.

5.3. Visa-free regime in the post-Soviet territory

Highly valued by people in the post-Soviet territory, the visa-free cross border regime is a truly humane principle of the migration policy. It is the most ‘natural’ (however, questionable if one were to consider the previous inhumane Soviet experience) border crossing regime in the situation where new interstate borders have artificially separated families, relatives, and countrymen; the result of decades and generations when people were living in a common country called the USSR.

In 1992, an Agreement on visa-free entry of the CIS citizens to the territories of the member countries (the so-called Bishkek Agreement) was signed by the CIS governments. However, in 1999 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and in 2000 Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, withdrew from the Bishkek Agreement. Russia explained it by the fact that of the joint CIS agencies cannot effectively counteract cross-border terrorism threats, arms, drugs and human trafficking, and immediately signed bilateral agreements on visa-free population movements with all the CIS members except Turkmenistan that insisted on a proper visa regime for all the post-Soviet states. In 2001, visa requirements were introduced by Russia for Georgian citizens as a result of a political tension between the two countries. In addition, an Agreement on visa-free movements was signed in November 2000 between the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) members (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan). In 2006, Uzbekistan joined the EurAsEC and correspondingly the multilateral visa-free Agreement. Thus, as of the end of 2008, Russia has visa-free migration agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

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5 In the Russian language the term bureaucracy has a vividly negative side to its meaning because of abusive practices, red-tape, corruption, bribery, and humiliation of ordinary people notoriously practiced by bureaucrats. It is deeply rooted in the Russian history with long-standing mutual alienation between the bureaucracy and the society based on non-transparency and mistrust.
Table 1. Visa regimes in former USSR Republics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Country of entry</th>
<th>RU</th>
<th>BY</th>
<th>MD</th>
<th>UA</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

All information for regular passports
— no visa required; V – visa required

5.4. A ‘repatriation’ trend

The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by a serious political shock in all former Soviet republics. The dissolution of economic ties between them provoked a deep economic crisis, job cuts, open and latent unemployment, and deterioration of living standards. Citizens of a once indivisible country were suddenly divided into “those of our kind” and “outsiders”—natives and immigrants. The latter were not guaranteed citizenship, inheritance, pensions,
seniority, or other basic rights, and were subjected to laws requiring the use of the national language. Replacement of ethnic Russians working as administrative officers, managers and specialists with natives, and a policy to form ethnically homogenous states declared (openly or implicitly) by new political elites\(^6\) caused massive migration to countries of origin where at least ethnic security seemed to be guarantied. These movements were called ‘repatriation’\(^7\): ethnic Tajiks were moving to Tajikistan, ethnic Armenians – to Armenia, etc. Russians were moving back to Russia, and they were the most numerous ethnic group involved in those forced, stress-driven migrations. Between 1991 and 1998, over 3 million ethnic Russians resettled to Russia. It appears that under the post-disintegration shock those who were in their own ethnic republics stayed home, while the mobility of non-natives increased, most of them returning to their homelands either voluntarily or as ‘forced migrants’.

Moreover, the political, economic and social stress resulting from the collapse of the USSR had serious negative effects on human development regardless of ethnicity: poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, lack of medicaments, and growing inequality contrasted to the Soviet low but equal and guaranteed wellbeing. The crisis especially affected the long-term opportunities for human development. People were forced to survive rather than live and develop. Most advanced representatives of the titular nations of the new sovereign states and those who could rely on the former ethnic networks started moving to Russia with its huge labor market and business opportunities. Totally, Russia received more than 12 million immigrants from ex-USSR states between 1992 and 2007 (Rosstat 2008b), while the aggregated number of registered labor migrants employed in Russia during the same period was over 4 million (FMS 2008). Besides, there are millions of irregular migrants in Russia: estimates vary from 4 to 10 million, of which 90% are unregistered labor migrants from various post-Soviet states (please refer to section 9.5.). Thus, the Russian Federation has become the major receiving country in the post-Soviet territory.

During the early post-Soviet years, development of the Russian migration policy was influenced by two major factors: (1) lack of practice and knowledge in the field of

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\(^{6}\) Laws on status of the state language in newly sovereign states reduced the official use of the Russian language; laws on citizenship introduced compulsory knowledge of the titular language as a requirement for the citizenship; employment opportunities of non-titular nationals was artificially narrowed (for details please refer to: Yatsenko et al., 2008).

\(^{7}\) Strictly speaking, the term ‘repatriation’ is not correct in the particular context of population movements in the post-Soviet area. Repatriation means return to the native country/fatherland (patria) from a country of residence, i.e. this phenomenon is related to international migration. Meanwhile, the native country of former Soviet citizens was the Soviet Union as a whole, so when moving across the territory of the USSR they were internal migrants. However, this term became popular in the Russian migration literature of the 1990s.
international migration management; (2) huge inflow of former Soviet citizens from different parts of the post-Soviet territory who had to be provided with social protection, including access to public medical care and education systems, habitation, social benefits, provision of pensions, etc. The situation was complicated by the fact that migrants to Russia were mostly refugees or people in a similar position: they arrived from the areas of armed ethnic conflicts; they lost all their possessions and needed urgent help. This explains the reactive and emergency-oriented character of the Russian migration laws in the 1990s.

5.5. Economic (chelnok) migration as an alternative to reduced employment opportunities

It is important to understand that education, healthcare, and accommodation were free in the Soviet Union, and after migration to Russia from other former Soviet republics people expected to have these benefits in their new place. Savings were minimal due to generally low wages, and even those savings disappeared because of galloping inflation. The sudden and rapid transition to paid services and accommodation no longer affordable marginalized millions of Russian citizens and immigrants. Besides, immigrants to Russia in the early 1990s were mainly well educated people: 20% of immigrants were people with university degrees and another 35% were skilled specialists with professional school diplomas (Vishnevsky 2006, 313). However, they could not get jobs corresponding to their qualifications in the depressed Russian economy, especially in the state sector that traditionally called for specialists. Immigrants, alongside with Russian citizens, could not realize their human capital. Many of them ‘migrated’ to the emerging private sector including commercial trips to other countries (primarily Poland, Turkey, and China) with the purpose to buy and import small batches of consumer goods to sell in Russia. They were called shuttle traders (chelnoks). This was the most widespread type of circular cross border movements in the 1990s and a sort of ‘business school’ for former Soviet people who had had no experience in free enterprise due to understandable political reasons (Zaionchkovskaya 2003).

The Chelnok migrations played a great role in the development of small and medium businesses in Russia. Commercial trips provided new entrepreneurs with initial capital and nourished the development of related industries: international transportation, charter air companies, small-batch and retail networks and markets that created millions of jobs. According to estimates, about 30 million people were employed in the cross-border and internal chelnok migrations and related activities in the mid-1990s (Vorobyeva 2001b, 42).
Participation in the *chelnok* migration was a desperate attempt of ex-USSR citizens to adapt themselves to the new post-Soviet realities when the state sector was in decline while the private sector was just emerging. Small-scale business aimed at meeting shortages of consumer goods in the Russian internal market by means of imported goods was a form of ‘self-organization’ of people in their attempt at beating unemployment, arrears of wages and salaries, and reduced value of education. Many of today’s owners of small and medium scale trade and transportation companies earned their start-up capital in *chelnok* trips (Iontsev, Ivakhnyuk 2002, 67). In this particular case the *laissez faire* approach of the Russian Government that dominated its migration policy in that period had a positive effect on opportunities for human development under the circumstances of the deep economic, political, and social crisis.

5.6. Policies on emigration to non-former-Soviet states

The emigration from Russia in the 1990s was steadily high in comparison with that in the Soviet period – 100,000 people per year on average (table 1). After a long moratorium on travelling outside the Soviet Union, the Iron Curtain was lifted under Gorbachev’s rule.

*Table 2. Emigration from Russia to non-former-Soviet states by ethnic groups, 1993-2000*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russians</th>
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<th>Jews</th>
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<tr>
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<td>51.3</td>
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<td>46.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
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<td>38.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<td>%</td>
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<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>Women</td>
<td>Children</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>18.1</td>
<td>50.8</td>
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The abolition of exit visa requirements in 1991 facilitated emigration from Russia: between 1987 and 1992, the annual emigration from Russia to non-former-Soviet states increased tenfold, from 10,000 to 104,000 (Goskomstat 1999). At first, only selective ethnic emigration was permitted – that of Jews, Germans, and Greeks. However, the emigration boom from the CIS, as many experts had feared, did not actually happen (estimates of possible outflow from the former USSR territory varied from 1.5 to 50 million). The reason was a restricted migration policy in major receiving countries. Few countries welcomed migrants from former Soviet states, primarily on ethnical basis, namely Germany, Israel, and the USA. Germany received about 550,000 emigrants from Russia between 1992 and 2000, i.e. 60% of the total amount (approximately 900,000 émigrés). Israel received around 180,000 emigrants.
The USA, with its large Jewish community that welcomed Russian Jews, came third in the top list of destination countries. In total, these three countries received 92% of Russia’s emigration outflow as of 2000 (Iontsev et al. 2001, 317).

Table 2 proves that the emigration from Russia in the 1990s was definitely ethnic-based with prevalence of Germans and Jews. However, the share of Russians was steadily growing. In 2000, 41.5% of emigrants were Russians, while in 1993 they were made only 18.7%. This structural shift was mainly related to a decrease in the migration potential of preferred ethnic groups (Germans, Jews, Greeks, etc.) as those who had intended to emigrate had already emigrated, and a growing number of well-to-do Russians who wished to change the country of their permanent residence and immigrate as business migrants – investors, entrepreneurs, or property owners.

A permanent and temporary outbound migration of Russian citizens for employment, business, or education has become an ordinary business. In the 2000s, emigration for permanent residence was gradually replaced by contracted employment, ‘incomplete’ emigration, dual citizenship and other flexible types of migration typical of the globalizing community. In 2006, emigration from Russia to non-former-Soviet states for permanent residence was 18,799, and in 2007 – 15,684 (Rosstat 2008a). However, since many Russian migrants receive education and live abroad for extended periods without registering their formal departure from Russia, official data fails to give the full picture.

To President Yeltsin’s credit, his administration did not follow the way of bans and limitations, in contrast with the Soviet regime. Started by Gorbachev, liberalization of people’s movements was formalised in the freedom of movement principle, and this principle has not been revised, although it has caused some damage to the country, facilitating the “brain drain”.

“Brain drain” is the most painful migration trend for Russia. Emigration of scientists, professors, engineers, researchers is often an irretrievable loss for the Russian intellectual potential that has threatened existence of some branches of fundamental science and advanced industries. For ‘intellectual workers’, movement to more developed countries was often an uneasy but the only way to save their professional skills. The underfinanced Russian science and R&D industry was in fact pushing people with academic degrees to self-survival in, for

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8 Despite very few reliable data, we can assume – from interviews with immigration agencies – that at least half of ethnic Russians in the big outbound flow have chosen this immigration channel (Iontsev and Ivakhnyuk 2002, 60).
example, petty trade\(^9\) or emigration. The estimates of the “brain drain” impact on Russia are impressive, but fragmentary and varying. It is often difficult to distinguish between temporary intellectual contract migrants and students, and those who leave with an intention not to ever return. The most reliable figure says that about 30,000 Russian intellectuals (people with academic degrees) left Russia (and declared that) in the 1990s (Mozgi utekayushie 1998).

In general, the ‘qualitative’ characteristics of outbound migration from Russia were very high. Of all emigrants to Israel, people with university degrees made a share 20 times higher than that in average for Russia (Ushkalov 1998, 36). However, when in the destination country their skills were often not required due to imbalance between supply and demand in definite professions, language barrier, or non-recognition of their degrees. By the mid-1990s, The emigrants to Israel from ex-USSR countries included 60,000 engineers (twice as much as in the whole of Israel), 15,000 doctors, over 10,000 research and cultural workers, and over 25,000 teachers. However, three years after their arrival to Israel, only 27.4% of immigrants were employed in accordance with their qualifications (Eckstein and Weiss 1997).

Temporary labor emigration of Russian citizens also became a widespread practice. The official statistics provide data only about labor migrants employed in other countries in accordance with inter-governmental agreements on construction & equipment projects or with the assistance of licensed private recruiting agencies. In 2004, there were 55,903 Russian citizens employed in other countries through these two channels; in 2005 – 60,926 people; in 2006 – 65,747. About 60% of them are marine crew members contracted for work in foreign marine companies (Federal Migration Service 2007).

This data does not reflect the majority of labor migrants who have contracted their jobs independently, by means of personal contacts, foreign labor agencies, internet, etc. or work illegally. According to some experts, the total number of Russian citizens working abroad is close to 1 million (Kamensky 2002; Vorobyeva 2001a; Iontsev and Ivakhnyuk 2002).

The State does not impede, neither facilitates labor emigration of Russian citizens. Even when inter-governmental agreements on employment of Russian workers in other countries are signed (with China, Germany, Finland, Slovakia, Switzerland, Poland, etc.) quotas for Russian workers and trainees often remain unfilled. For example, the annual quota for Russian trainees in Germany in accordance with the 1993 bilateral agreement is 2,000. However, it is regularly

\(^9\) This process was called ‘internal brain drain’: about 2.2 million persons with academic degrees dropped out from science in the 1990s, mainly to commercial sector (Ivakhnyuk 2006, 97).
unfilled because of low skills in the German language among the candidates, while the Russian side does nothing to arrange for necessary language courses (Ivakhnyuk 2005, 250).

5.7. Policies on immigration from outside the former Soviet Union

Since the collapse of the USSR, the geopolitical situation for Russia has radically changed, and this has greatly affected immigration. Immigrants are coming to Russia mainly from countries of Asia and Africa. Three major influxes of immigrants can be identified, different by their goals in coming to Russia.

• Economic immigrants, looking for income opportunities and employment. These are mainly Chinese and Vietnamese. Labor migrants from Turkey come to work for Turkish construction companies contracted for projects in Russia.

• Refugees and asylum seekers from regions blighted by war or other stressful situations, mainly Afghans and residents of some African countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, etc. (including university students and graduates who came to study and are unwilling to return home). After Russia signed the UN 1951 Convention on Refugees in 1993, the refugee channel was actively used by migrants from Asian and African countries, most often having an intention to move further into EU countries.

• Transit migrants who are trying to use Russia as a conduit to western countries. According to the Russian Ministry of Interior, there are at least half a million of transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ethiopia and other countries ‘stuck’ in Russia (Nelegalnaya tranzitnaya... 2002). The Border Guards argue that there are around 1.5 million illegal transit migrants from Southern and Central Asia and Africa in the country (ICMPD, 2006).

In 2006, about 600,000 people entered Russia with ‘transit’ declared as the purpose of entry (of whom 220,000 persons entered from the territory of Kazakhstan). That is 2.5% of the total number of arrivals of over 24 million. However, over 60% of arrivals were classified as ‘private visits’ (Rosstat 2007). Migration officers believe that this often signals an intention to stay in Russia and get prepared for further movement to Europe\textsuperscript{10}.

The major concern of the Russian law-enforcement bodies is countering human smugglers and traffickers who have created a well-organized network of illegal transit

\textsuperscript{10} From an interview by the author with Deputy Director of the Federal Migration Service Vyacheslav Postavnin on 18.12.2007.
migration support. Between 1999 and 2003, over 500 organized groups of human smugglers were detained. Numbers of tourist agencies penalized for human smuggling were 16,200 in 1998, 6,300 in 1999, 7,100 in 2000, and 8,900 in 2001\textsuperscript{11}. In 2000, Russia signed the UN 2000 Convention against transnational organized crime and two supplementing Protocols against smuggling and trafficking of migrants. Correspondingly, new articles were introduced in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in 2003.

5.8. Internal migrations – a ‘westward drift’

Internal migration in Russia is relatively low. In 2007, about 2 million people (1.4% of the total population) changed their residence inside the country, of which less than a half moved across provincial borders (Table 3). For comparison, in 1990 3.3% of the population participated in internal movements.

\textit{Table 3. Internal migration in Russia, 1992-2002, thousands}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Registered arrivals</th>
<th>including</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>intra-provincial movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4263.1</td>
<td>2415.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3690.8</td>
<td>2071.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3266.8</td>
<td>1760.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2902.8</td>
<td>1511.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3017.7</td>
<td>1544.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3130.3</td>
<td>1653.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2886.7</td>
<td>1577.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2724.9</td>
<td>1484.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2582.0</td>
<td>1416.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2477.0</td>
<td>1366.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2303.0</td>
<td>1284.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2140.6</td>
<td>1204.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{11} Data of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male (18-50)</th>
<th>Female (18-50)</th>
<th>Both (18-50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2017.3</td>
<td>1131.4</td>
<td>885.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2039.0</td>
<td>1141.4</td>
<td>897.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1998.3</td>
<td>1146.4</td>
<td>851.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1911.4</td>
<td>1095.7</td>
<td>815.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1935.7</td>
<td>1095.7</td>
<td>840.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1998.0</td>
<td>1137.8</td>
<td>860.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 2005 survey of population mobility conducted in 10 big urban centers of the Russian Federation showed that 2/3 of urban citizens of working age (18-50 years old) had never changed their residence and half of those born in other places had moved only once in their life (Vishnevsky 2008, 246-247). This implies that urban citizens in Russia do not see migration as a way to improve their lifestyles. The low population mobility not only contradicts the economic and demographic interests of the country, but also means less employment opportunities for its people. Unemployment among people who have never moved is higher than among those who have moved at least twice (ibid.).

The low population mobility largely results from a ‘poverty trap’ where people find it impossible to cover migration-related expenses while the expected income growth after migration is questionable, and housing opportunities are scarce (Aleshkovski 2006). With the State taking an indifferent stance, in contrast to what was typical of the active migration policy in the Soviet period (*orgnabor*, regional wage increments, free accommodation opportunities, etc.), people are reluctant to move.

The well-shaped geographical vector of internal migration is westward, i.e. there is an out-flow of population from eastern and north-eastern provinces of Russia to its western areas that was called a ‘westward drift’ by some experts (Zaionchkovskaya 2007; Vishnevsky 2006). Between 1990 and 2005 the Russian Far East lost 14% of its population (Vishnevsky 2006). In the deep economic crisis in the early 1990s and the related hyper-inflation the regional wage increments lost their importance to keep people in areas with rough climats.
Table 4. Internal migration in Russia by Federal Districts, 1989-2001, thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal districts</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Departed</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>2357.0</td>
<td>1569.8</td>
<td>787.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>1104.2</td>
<td>1248.5</td>
<td>-144.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>1562.0</td>
<td>1378.7</td>
<td>183.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privolzhsky</td>
<td>2035.8</td>
<td>1774.7</td>
<td>261.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>1231.8</td>
<td>1312.7</td>
<td>-80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia</td>
<td>1169.7</td>
<td>1440.8</td>
<td>-271.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>737.6</td>
<td>1472.9</td>
<td>-735.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia in total</td>
<td>10,198.1</td>
<td>10,198.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4 shows that the territory of the Russian Federation is divided into two zones, with the Central, Southern and Privolzhsky (along the Volga river) districts facing an inflow migration, and North-West, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East facing an outflow migration. Surprisingly, declines in production and rises in unemployment appear to have no visible connection with migration patterns. Thus, the correlation coefficient between positive net migration and unemployment is only 0.22 percent. Moreover, in many cases there is a reverse link (Vishnevsky 2006, 334). At the same time, a connection between migration and the level of development of the private economic sector is obvious. The southwestern part of Russia, particularly along the border, differs sharply from the rest of the country in that it has a more developed private sector. Apparently, it offers better opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship (ibid).

In contrast to low mobility for permanent residence or employment, internal private short-term commercial trips became a survival strategy for many Russian households in the 1990s. They were a spin-off of international chelnok migration (refer to section 5.5) and provided local markets with imported consumer goods when the economy was unable to meet even the basic needs of the population in essential goods like clothes, underwear, tableware, etc. (Vorobyeva 2001a, 28-37). Internal chelnok migrations are difficult to evaluate but during
1990s, until ‘civilized’ commercial networks were established in Russia, they provided the biggest source of internal economic migration. It is estimated that every tenth household in Russia was involved in chelnok migrations, either international or internal (Zaionchkovskaya 2003).

Commercial migrations are closely related to upward social mobility of population: increased income, business-like manner of thinking, and commercial experience inspired chelnoks to develop entrepreneurial skills and start small- and medium-sized businesses in the country (Vorobyeva 2001a, 33). However, experts indicate that there were some negative effects of participating in chelnok migrations, namely little social security, deterioration of health and family relationships (Vorobyeva 2001a, 77).

6. Periodization of Russian migration policy in the post-Soviet period

The Russian Federation is one of the major receiving countries in the world. According to the United Nations data, Russia ranks second (after the USA) in the top list of immigrant receiving countries, with the total number of immigrants amounting to 13.3 million foreign-born persons residing within its boundaries in 2005 (United Nations 2006). Like in other receiving countries, the Russian migration policy is mainly focused on the management of permanent and temporary migrant inflows.

Over the recent two decades, the Russian migration policy has been drifting from a relatively open immigration regulation based on a laissez-faire approach in the early 1990s to restrictive immigration laws in the early 2000s and to an ‘open doors’ migration policy for CIS citizens in 2007. Following this pendulum-like trend we can distinguish four periods in the post-Soviet Russian migration policies: (1) 1991-1995, when the government had to develop an urgent migration legislation in response to the international migration boom, primarily for the sake of refugees and forced migrants; (2) 1996-2001, when the focus in migration policies shifted to dominating economic migrations; however, these regulations became increasingly complicated; (3) 2002-2005, when the national security reasons came to the forefront as a result of huge inflows of irregular migration, and brought about a tough migration policy that, in turn, provoked a further growth of irregular migration; (4) ever since 2006, when the migration policy in respect of CIS citizens radically shifted towards liberalization. Here, we shall examine the differences between the four periods in terms of drawing up and implementing of the migration policy in Russia, the reasons and drivers behind these policy
shifts, and their effects on human development in Russia and in the CIS countries being major source countries for Russia.

7. 1991-1995: Response to the international migration boom

7.1. Migration as a reaction to the disintegration shock

The crumbling of the USSR resulted in a number of forced migrations\textsuperscript{12} across the post-Soviet territory. The push factors were mainly the ethnic-based nation-building processes in new sovereign states: the rise of nationalism, infringements of civil rights of non-titular nations and ethnic discrimination, fear to miss out on the privatization opportunities and to be deprived the right to claim citizenship in the country of (ethnic) origin. Migrations in the first period were mainly forced, occurred in a state of panic and were ethnically determined. The armed conflicts in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Russia provoked numerous refugee flows. In the first half of the 1990s as much as 5 million people were forced to leave their places of residence in the areas threatened by armed conflicts: about 2.4 million left for other CIS states (of these over 1 million received a refugee or a forced migrant status), and 2.2 million became internally displaced persons. Later on, 1.6 million persons returned to their home regions (Mukomel 1999, 69).

Families divided by the new state borders faced serious challenges. Increased transportation costs and enforcement of the new visa regulations in some states (particularly the Baltic States), and dangerous situations in others (the countries of the Trans-Caucasus, Tajikistan, and Moldova) undermined their communication capacities. The breakup of the previously uniform currency system limited peoples’ ability to provide a financial support to family members living in other states.

In the early post-Soviet period a number of migrations between the newly independent states happened, while the legislation in the sphere of international migration was equally underdeveloped in all post-Soviet countries. The lack of experience in international migration and its management was a major reason for the inadequacy of the law in that it failed to take

\textsuperscript{12} The definition of a \textit{forced migrant} in the Russian legislation, in terms of reasons for leaving, is not limited to an imminent life threat as it is applied to refugees in international law. An ‘unbearable situation’ as a result of persecution on political, ethical, etc. grounds as well as an extreme economic, political, ecological situation are considered reasons to grant a \textit{forced migrant status} for a certain period of time.
into consideration the specific stressful situation in which the former Soviet citizens found themselves after the collapse of the USSR. The most inexcusable omission of the early post-Soviet period was ignoring the need for a continuous social security for former Soviet citizens who moved to live and work in other parts of the previously united country. The system of employment records was interrupted, pension funds were separated, and the USSR education certificates lost their validity in a few newly established states. Hastily signed bilateral agreements on social guarantees for migrants did not work because they were too generalized and not contain relevant mechanisms of implementation.

7.2. Gaps in the migration-related legislation

The disintegration shock and vulnerability of forced migrants could have been mitigated by a proper migration policy had it been developed in time. The need for proper migration laws and rules was urgent in order to react to the large-scale migration in the early 1990s that was difficult to coordinate due to an utter confusion of norms and overly complicated administrative procedures for obtaining residence permits, work permits and citizenship, even by former Soviet citizens.

The hastily developed migration legislation had a lot of gaps and inadequacies that affected people coming to Russia. The borders were remained semi-transparent. A poor border control and a visa-free entry regime between most of the post-Soviet countries could not stop people who were pushed by economic crisis, military conflicts, and ethnic-based pressure. Between 1992 and 1996 about 5 million of the former Soviet citizens came to Russia from other ex-USSR republics for permanent residence. Most were granted a proper legal status and/or Russian citizenship. However, the gaps in the Russian legislation on migration and a tough law of citizenship resulted in over 3 million permanent migrants staying in Russia without any status as of 2002 (Iontsev, Ivakhnyuk 2002, 52). They were not irregular migrants in the ‘classical’ understanding of this term: they were not hiding from Russian authorities, they were staying in Russia with their families for years, owned property and worked; their children attended schools and universities, they were dealing with any trouble by bribing the

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13 For example, since 2002 regulation of the legal status of foreign citizens (including ex-USSR citizens) in Russia has been realized in accordance with an utterly obsolete “Regulations of stay of foreign citizens in the USSR” issued 26.04.1981. Co-existence of a number of laws and regulations hastily designed in the 1990s, spawned discrepancies and contradictions in their application.

officials; however, they could not get a lawful residence permit and Russian citizenship due to the discrepancy between the ‘old’ (Soviet) and the ‘new’ (Russian) regulations\textsuperscript{15}. The rights of these migrants were limited and their legal status was uncertain. In fact, they were treated as irregular migrants. Their situation was a negative example for millions of other ex-Soviet citizens\textsuperscript{16} who wished to move to Russia.

On the one hand, the regulation of this period had an liberal approach towards former Soviet citizens in that it made no difference between the Soviet citizenship and the Russian citizenship (the Soviet passports remained valid in the post-Soviet territory until early 2000s). Later on this resulted in political infringements of immigrant rights in Russia and difficulties in applying for the Russian passport after 2000. On the other hand, the fact that no distinction was made between refugees from former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Tajikistan), who had been citizens of the united country only a couple of years before, and asylum seekers from countries like Afghanistan, Somalia, or Ethiopia, seemed unfair. The Federal Russian laws ‘On Refugees’ and ‘On Forced Migrants’ (1992) drew a line between internal forced migrants and international refugees, but equaled in rights asylum seekers from elsewhere including former USSR republics.

By the mid-1990s it had become clear that Russia was in fact unable to carry out its obligations towards refugees which it had assumed following its participation in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Between 1992 and 1995, 1.4 million people were granted a refugee or forced migrant status\textsuperscript{17} in Russia; however, their status was limited in time and their access to financial support and social benefits did not correspond to the requirements of the Convention as Russia and its population were suffering a deep economic crisis (Vorobyeva 2001b). Initially, applicants, especially those from the CIS states, were granted the refugee status semi-automatically, without proper personal consideration (Regent 1999, 226). The revision of the laws ‘On Refugees’ and ‘On Forced Migrants’ in 1995 made them more detailed and formalized the application procedure. For

\textsuperscript{15}For example, migrants couldn’t prove the date of their entry to Russia as border crossing was not verified by a stamp in their Soviet passports.

\textsuperscript{16}The total size of Russian community that outside Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union is estimated at 24 million. Surely, not all of them were definitely intending to move to Russia but the migration potential among them was high. By mid 2000s, the potential of permanent migration to Russia from post-Soviet states is estimated by some experts at no more than 4 million. (Vishnevsky, 2006, 320). This decline can be explained by an improved economic situation in the countries of stay, mitigated ethnic tension, successful adaptation, etc.; however, it is largely the extra-strict migration laws in Russia that have had its dramatic effect.

\textsuperscript{17}According to the Russian legislation, the \textit{refugee} status (for international migrants) is granted for 5 years and \textit{forced migrant} status (for internal migrants) – for 3 years. After this period, irrespective of personal situation of an individual or situation in his/her country of origin, the status is terminated.
example, to get a ‘forced migrant’ (vynuzhdenniy pereselenets) status, a former Soviet citizen had to leave a place of his/her residence, prove his/her permanent (not temporary) stay in the territory of a former Soviet republic, prove his/her emergency situation, and apply for the Russian citizenship (Mukomel 2005, 117). For those who could not meet these requirements, the institute of a ‘temporary asylum’ was introduced; social guaranties for this humanitarian category were minimized (ibid.).

Thus, the design of migration-related laws in the early post-Soviet period was complicated by a lack of experience in migration management, the need for migration laws and rules was very urgent, often to the detriment of their quality, as well as a lack of specialists able to develop detailed legal documents and foresee their effect.

7.3. Founding of the Federal Migration Service

As a response to the growing numbers of migrants, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) was founded in 1992 as an independent state institution responsible for migration-related issues. In the early period of its operation it fully concentrated on the issues of forced migrants which by then had become extremely problematic. Territorial units of the FMS were set up in all the Russian provinces, while in the most affected provinces centers of temporary accommodation for forced migrants (refugee camps) were organized.

FMS was involved equally in international and internal migration issues. Accommodation, support and compensations for internal forced migrants fleeing from areas of armed conflicts was a major focus of its activities. Forced migrants from the Chechen Republic to neighbouring North Caucasian republics was one of the most pressing issues. In 1996, of the 15,900 forced migrants placed in temporary accommodation centers, 87% were staying in the centers located in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya (Mukomel 2005, 132). Failure to pay proper compensations for the lost property to migrants from the Chechen Republic was a reason for repeated complaints of migrants and human rights NGOs. Later, in 1998, these complaints culminated in a special commission being set up to review the agency’s activities which found its operation unsatisfactory and forced FMS head T. Regent to resign.
8. 1996-2001: Focus on economic migration

8.1. Shifts in structure and scale of migration flows

The second period is characterized by a relative stabilization of political and social situation in the CIS countries and termination or freezing of armed conflicts. As a result, the volume of forced migrations went down. In Russia, the peak of migrant inflow was passed in 1994 when it received over 1 million of immigrants. By 1996, the immigrant inflow had reduced twice (Goskomstat 1999). This happened mainly because less Russian-speaking population in source countries wanted to move top Russia having gradually adapted to the new political and socio-economic conditions, and because the political situation in the CIS countries had improved, and less nationalist rhetoric and discriminating slogans were used (IOM 2002).

At the same time the structure of migration flows was shifting in two aspects. Firstly, among migrants for permanent residence, the share of Russians was declining while that of the titular nations of former Soviet republics was growing. Between 1993 and 2000, the latter was about 850,000 people, i.e. 22% of the total 3.8 million inflow of permanent immigrants. Of these, Ukrainians totalled 312,000 people, Armenians – 261,000, Azeri – 92,000, Georgians – 51,000, Tajiks – 32,000, Uzbeks – 22,000 (Vishnevsky 2006).

Secondly, the structure of the migrant inflow was shifting in favor of temporary labor migrants. Temporary employment-driven migrations were booming, though they were not properly reflected in statistics as employment of migrant workers was often unregistered. The economic recovery of Russia had started earlier and was more robust than in most of other ex-USSR states. This created incentives for labor migrants pushed from their countries of origin by the poor economic situation, unemployment, and low standards of living and drove them to Russia which was doing better in its transition to a market economy.

Visa-free border regulations, historical understanding of the post-Soviet territory as a common country, the knowledge of the Russian language provided ‘psychological easiness’ of going to Russia rather than to any other country outside the former USSR. In the 1990s Russia signed bilateral agreements on labor migration with the majority of CIS countries. However, these agreements were not followed by subordinate arrangements and programmes and they were not incorporated in the scope of relevant ministries, so their effectiveness was low. Between 1994 and 2001, the total number of foreign workers officially employed in Russia was more than 1.5 million. In 2001 alone, there were 283,700 labor migrants hired officially,
in accordance with the legal procedure; among them 50% were from the CIS states (see Annex, Table 1).

8.2. Growth in irregular migration

Meanwhile, the unregistered employment-driven migration a way times bigger. Since the opportunities for legal employment were rather narrow (not because of a lack of jobs but due to an inadequate system of foreign workers recruitment) and the migration out-flow potential in Central Asian states, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus republics was growing, first of all, due to a protracted economic recession and, in case of Central Asian states, due to a demographic pressure18. With meager employment opportunities in their home countries migrants from smaller post-Soviet states were arriving for irregular employment. They found jobs as seasonal workers in construction, agriculture and service sectors.

The overly bureaucratized and artificially complicated procedures of migrant registration and work permit application pushed both migrants and employers out of the legal field. For Russian employers, the administrative procedure of getting a license to hire foreign labor force and – as the next step – getting work permits for individual foreign workers was time-consuming and involved bribing. Meanwhile, thousands of job seekers from the CIS were already in the Russian territory and ready to start working at any moment and on any terms. This was the stimulus for wide-spread illegal employment practices, especially when the control was low and penalties were nominal.

Table 5 is based on the official data of the Russian National Committee on Statistics (Rosstat) on the numbers of issued work permits and national origin estimates of regular and irregular labor out-migrants. It proves that the actual number of labor migrants from CIS states in Russia is from 10 to 20 times higher than the officially registered labor migrants. Some Russian experts estimate the number of irregular labor migrants at 3 to 4 million (Zaionchkovskaya 2003; Krasinets et al. 2000; Vitkovskaya 2002), while the FMS officers come up with bigger estimates – 6 to 10 million (estimates of the FMS directors and senior officers in early 2000s, cited in: Ivakhnyuk 2004).

18 In the Central Asian states, the labor market narrowed by economic recession and dissolution of economic ties with other post-Soviet states, seems unable to absorb a growing numbers of young people entering the working age. By 2025, the share of population of the working age will increase in all Central Asian countries: in Tajikistan from 59% in 2000 up to 65% in 2025; in Uzbekistan from 58% up to 68%; in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan from 60 up to 68%. Totally, population of the Central Asian states between 2000 and 2025 will increase for 16.5 million while population of Russia will decrease for 17.3 million (World Bank 2007).
Table 5. Numbers of regular and irregular migrant workers from CIS states in the Russian Federation, early 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIS country</th>
<th>Regular migrant workers (thousands)*</th>
<th>Irregular migrant workers (thousands)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>550-650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>350-400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>600-700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1.000-1.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>550-600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the data from the Russian National Committee on Statistics (Rosstat)
** Based on national estimates of source countries.


The prevailing irregular migration and illegal employment of migrants is also a result of the specific economic system in Russia with its sizeable shadow economy and informal labor market. It is estimated that the Russian shadow sector produces more than a quarter of the country’s GDP and employs 15 to 30% of the total labor force (Radaev 1999, 10).

During the 1990s, the general principle of the Russian migration policy was mainly laissez-faire, i.e. the government professed noninterference with the scope and structure of migration inflows and out-flows. No limitations, quotas or selective mechanisms were set by the Russian migration legislation or applied in practice. The major purpose of the Russian migration policy was to cope with refugees and forced migrants; however, even this ‘narrow’ purpose was not implemented properly as many people found themselves in a dire situation once their refugee or forced migrant status ended (Zaionchkovskaya 2002).
The migration pressure from Central Asian and Caucasus republics as well as from Ukraine and Moldova, both economies less successful in their post-Soviet transition, faced a deficit in proper regulation of emigration to Russia for purposes of short-term or permanent residence and employment. As a result, migrants from CIS states who easily crossed the transparent interstate borders could not legalize their status when in Russia and would turn into illegal immigrants. Irregular migration from outside the former Soviet Union also increased during this period. From 1996 to 2000, the number of illegal migrants arrested on the border increased tenfold (Vorobyeva 2001b). Russia was selected as a relatively convenient and cheap destination for transit migration to the European Union by international networks of human smugglers and traffickers (IOM 1995; 2002; ICMPD 2006). The 09/11 factor also had an alarming contribution. Uncontrolled migration flows were considered an additional destabilizing factor and rated as a national security threat.

8.3. Economic migrations: effects on migrants and source countries

The above mentioned shifts in migration situation in the late 1990s, especially the growth of economic-driven migrations, had important economic and social effects on source countries. Already in this period labor migration to Russia was seen by many households as an important survival strategy in the conditions of a deep economic decline. Surveys showed that by the end of the 1990s every third household in Moldova and Armenia had at least one family member working abroad, primarily in Russia. In Ukraine, 25% of citizens participated in temporary, seasonal or circular cross-border migrations (Zaionchkovskaya 2003). The role of money transfers by labor migrant in sustaining and improving the wellbeing of their families was shaped already in late 1990s. For example, in Armenia the share of earnings by labor migrants in the total income of migrant households was estimated 15 to 20% (Arutiunian 1999). In Tajikistan, where the average monthly wage was equal to 9 USD in 1999, the income of a seasonal out-migrant of 500-700 USD per season could cover the household expenses for the whole year (Maksakova 2002, 8).

Migrants became more pragmatic and reasonable in their choice of the form of migration. Forced migrations driven by a purpose to survive in any way and anywhere, were replaced by a well-reasoned choice of the destination and the mode of migration (permanent emigration, temporary labor migration, seasonal migration, or circular migration). Migration has become a free choice of people, and migrants were able to make their plans, coordinate them with other
aspiring migrants, and develop contacts with those who had already settled in abroad. Migrant networks were rapidly developing in Russia (Diatlov 2003). Later they would encourage and promote further migrant inflow from their origin countries to Russia.

An opportunity to work and earn in neighboring Russia increased the social stability in the post-Soviet region. It reduced the risks of social outbursts in smaller ex-USSR states (and correspondingly, the challenges of new refugee flows) by providing migrant households with additional income, reducing poverty, creating an alternative system of social security.

Involvement of population of former Soviet republics, in particular of Central Asian and Caucasus nations, in migration flows, both permanent and temporary, was in a striking contrast to the Soviet period when the mobility of these nations was very low. According to the 1989 USSR Population Census, 88% of Kyrgyz people lived in the Kyrgyz Republic (and 98% - in the Central Asian area). For Uzbek people the same figures would be 85% and 97%, for Turkmen people – 93% and 98%, for Tajik people – 75% and 99% (The 1989 USSR Population Census). A rise in the people’s mobility, though caused by an extremely unfavorable economic situation in a short run, can have had a positive long-term effect as it has been an important element of transition towards the market economy that implies a flexible labor market.

8.4. Early attempts to conceptualize the State migration policy

In this period there were first attempts to conceptualize the State migration policy. The Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation had been under consideration since 1996. The Concept was to define what the State attitude towards immigration and emigration was. Development of the Concept was followed by discussions among the interested state authorities and experts. Academics insisted that given the demographic crisis in Russia and forthcoming labor shortages, the Concept should clearly explain to the society and migration managing bodies that Russia is in need for migrants and it welcomes those who come legally to work and live here. The initial drafts of the Concept wrapped up the goal of the Russian migration policy as “reasonable management of migration flows for the sake of realization of intellectual and labor capacities of migrants and achievement of sustainable socio-economic development of the Russian Federation” (Konseptsia 1999).

However, the rising security concerns after 11.09.2001 and strengthening of the hardliner stance in politics resulted in serious revisions of the Concept in 2001-2002. As a result, the
final version of the Concept was named the Concept of Migration Processes Management in the Russian Federation and was given an absolutely different core idea of fighting irregular migration (Konseptsiya 2002). It was adopted in 2002 as the official guideline for purposes of the Russian migration policy. An illogical and confusing document, the 2002 Concept was an unsuccessful attempt to combine the Russia’s need for migrants with an inapt management of migration flows. A lack of strategic vision of the role of international migration in the economic and demographic development of Russia compromised the capacity of the 2002 Concept to harmonize the migration-related laws, which by that moment had become contradictory and difficult-to-follow (Mukomel 2005, 33).

8.5. Institutional reshuffle

Institutional reshuffle of migration responsibilities also contributed to the fact that benchmarks of the Russian migration policy at the dawn of the 2000s were in confusion. In 2000, the Federal Migration Service was abolished because it had failed to protect the rights of refugees and forced migrants, not to mention its inability to cover the whole range of migration-related issues in its scope of work. The responsibility to manage migration processes were handed over to the Ministry of Federation and National Policy. However, in 2001 the Ministry was closed down and after a six-month delay the Federal Migration Service was re-established, this time as part of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation.

The leapfrog with responsibilities of migration regulation resulted from an imperfect migration legislation rather than activities of the Federal Migration Service which is an executive body. Delays in drafting and adoption of the federal laws on citizenship and legal status of foreign citizens created a lot of legislative traps and deadlocks that stirred up a lot of complaints on the side of migrants who could not get legally established, and migrant human rights protecting NGOs. In accordance with the 1993 Law ‘On citizenship of the Russian Federation’, a facilitated procedure of obtaining the Russian citizenship by ex-USSR citizens came into effect within three years only. Appended with a confusing list of compulsory supporting documents required to prove the eligibility for the facilitated procedure, this law in fact prevented many immigrants from getting the Russian citizenship. Legalization of foreign citizens in Russia regulated by the law inherited from the Soviet period also provoked a growth

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19 The Russian Federation – a multinational country with millions of immigrants of non-Russian origin – has not had a specialized government board on national policies ever since!
in the number of migrants who could not legalize their status (refer to section 9.3). The society severely criticised the Federal Migration Service as the major migration managing body.

9. 2002-2005: A tough migration policy

9.1. Security priorities

Under President Putin, the institutional structure and ‘ideology’ of Russian Government was revisited. Strengthening of the political structure and recent security concerns, the defense and law enforcement agencies demanded a wider field of activities under the guidance of the army and police. Aiming at neutralization of the security challenges, the government chose to rely on force and, as a result, to throw the police into the battle against illegal migration.

In this period the official attitude to migration was strongly negative. Big numbers of illegal migrants staying in Russia and a lack of effectives measures to counteract the illegal migration made the Russian Government rate it as a national security issue. A rise in crime among migrant communities stressed by the law enforcement bodies along with the worldwide trend to link irregular migration with international terrorism, aggravated by the media, created a generally negative image of a migrant in Russia and fuelled intolerance in the society. In this context, further development of the Russian migration laws changed towards restrictions.

9.2. Migration management under militia

In 2002, the Federal Migration Service was reassigned to the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation. The major problem of this institutional shift was that the Ministry of Interior had no experience in managing migration. In the Soviet period territorial departments of the Ministry of Interior executed passport control and registration of people’s domiciles including migrant registration in accordance with the propiska system. Management of internal migration was conceptually and practically realized by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). In the post-Soviet period migrants (both internal and international) registration functions were performed by the Federal Migration Service. Besides, the Ministry of Interior had no experience and skills to work with migrants or human rights organizations (by that time NGOs specializing on protection of migrants rights were numerous in Russia as a response to
ineffective work of the FMS that resulted in violation of migrant rights) (Mukomel 2005, 133). The Ministry of Interior was a typical law-enforcement body aimed at maintaining order by any means with the emphasis on coercive methods. Any individuals, especially migrants, are seen as potential criminals by militia officers.

Since 2004 the Federal Migration Service has operated under supervision of the Ministry of Interior but also under direct guidance from the President of the Russian Federation who determines the FMS functions and nominates the FMS director and vice-directors20. Thus, the Russian migration policy became a major priority of the presidential policy, and all further revisions and amendments of the State migration policy would be initiated directly on the President’s instructions.

In addition to immigration control and registration of migrants, the functions of the Federal Migration Service were expanded when passport services were included in its scope of competence in 2004. The headcount in FMS grew from 3,000 to 18,000 officers between 2001 and 2005 (Mukomel 2005).

Negative results of reassignment of migration issues to militia became obvious very soon. First of all, the operation of the reformed Migration Service became non-transparent. Secondly, the level of qualifications of the FMS staff lowered as many experienced workers had resigned or retired. Also, the relationship between the FMS and NGOs deteriorated. Finally, cooperation with academic experts was neglected.

Importantly, the systematic bribery made illegal migrants a huge source of income for Russian militia officers. In big cities with a high migrant concentration the city blocks were divided between groups of ‘inspectors’ who regularly harvested bribes from migrants in exchange for letting them carry on with their work.

Later on, some high-rank Russian officials admitted that placing the migration policy under control by the Ministry of Interior had been a mistake. The Head of the Council of Federation S. Mironov announced that poor governance of migration issues by the Ministry of Interior did not help solve a single related problem; worse, it multiplied corruption21.

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9.3. Shift in focus of the migration-related legislation

In 2002, the long-awaited Federal Law ‘On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation’ was approved (No. 115-FZ of July 25, 2002). In fact, it is the principal law in the Russian Federation governing the relations between foreign citizens and state authorities in the sphere of residence, employment, etc. This Law was to replace the dramatically outdated ‘Regulations of stay of foreign citizens in the USSR’ issued 26.04.1981. During 1997-1999, the draft law would be repeatedly discussed and approved by the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian parliament) but rejected by the Council of Federation (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament) or the President. The final draft was prepared by a working group headed by Viktor Ivanov, an officer from the Putin’s team who was then Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. The 2002-2005 period of a tough migration policy in Russia is closely related to the activities of this working group. Its security-driven strategy dramatically influenced the laws on citizenship, on legal status of foreign citizens and the concept of the state migration policy. There were even attempts – though unsuccessful – to revise the law on freedom of movement of Russian citizens towards its restriction (Mukomel 2005, 119,156)

The new Law of the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens was expected by the society to regulate the legal situation of millions of non-status migrants in Russia and set transparent procedures for obtaining temporary and permanent residential status for new migrants. However, due to the domination of security reasons it became increasingly prohibitive for the citizens of former Soviet republics.

Based on the wording of the Law, the entire system of immigration management became oriented towards maintaining tight control over the number and structure of migrants coming for a long-term or permanent residence and temporary employment. Control is to be maintained via a number of administrative procedures and barriers, often duplicating each other:

- any foreign citizen arriving to Russia has to register within 3 days (place of residence);
- accommodation (residence) has to be found before registration, i.e. within 3 days;
- temporary stay (upon authorized registration stamp) is limited to three months;
- temporary residence (upon temporary residence permit) is possible within the administrative area where the permit was issued;
- the number of permits for temporary residence in Russia for foreign citizen is limited by a quota;
- temporary residence permit holders and permanent residence permit holders must re-register every year in a territorial unit of the Ministry of Interior;
- employment for foreign citizens, temporary or permanently staying in Russia, is possible only with a valid work permit;
- recruitment of foreign employees is possible for licensed employees;
- on entering the Russian Federation, at the border passport control, a foreign citizen has to fill out a migrant card; the card is to be returned to a border guard officer.

The law made no difference between ex-USSR citizens (except those who were born in what is now the Russian Federation) and migrants coming to Russia from outside the post-Soviet territory. Indignation in the society and especially among NGOs specializing in human rights protection made the government introduce amendments to the Law in 2003 granting some privileges to ex-USSR citizens for purposes of obtaining a temporary or permanent legal status in Russia.

The 2002 Law introduced quotas for foreign workers from non-CIS states in Russia. For 2003, a quota of 530,000 invitations for foreign citizens to enter the Russian Federation was approved. The quota was broken down by provinces of Russia depending on the demand in each such local labour market. However, the licensing procedure for employers recruiting foreign workers was so time-consuming and complicated that the approved quota of 530,000 foreign workers was not fulfilled. Consequently, the quota for 2004 was reduced to 213,000 foreign workers. The mechanism of establishment of annual quotas was not transparent. In fact, it was artificially narrowed the legal channels of labor migration because the actual number of migrant workers employed in the Russian economy was at least twenty times higher (Riazantsev 2007). It was a clumsy attempt to demonstrate protection of national labor market while the actual reason for setting quotas was domination of the Russian politics by a conservative wing.

9.4. Illegal migration as a reaction to tough legislation

The system proved inefficient. The red tape turned out to be unconquerable for most migrants (registration delays, long lines, multiple visits to authorities, intentional delays, lack of reliable information, problems with finding an eligible address for registration). Although unintentionally, the registration procedure actually became a powerful tool against the legal immigration. Narrowing channels for legal migration provoked a growth of corruption in the immigration industry (services issuing permits or certificates of registration unofficially, authorities who take bribes from migrants without valid documents, etc.) (Tishkov et al. 2005). Militia got the right to stop migrants in the streets and check their documents without any reasons. Kickbacks from migrants have become an additional source of income for lower militia staff (Grafova 2006b).

Surveys conducted by Russian researchers in the mid-2000s prove there are close links between employment, illegality and registration. Half of employed migrants are registered but only one in every five migrants is employed officially. A legal employment is typical of registered migrants while unregistered migrants work without any written agreement with the employer. One migrant in two is unable to legalize their employment because the registration could not be obtained first. Two in three unregistered migrants are paid unofficially, while of the registered migrants, 55% are paid officially (Tiuriukanova 2004a; Zaionchkovskaya 2007; Soboleva and Chudaeva 2007; Zotova 2006).

Other results of the new approach include exploitation and forced labour distribution, the most widespread practices being confiscation of documents and other types of bonding; physical, psychological and other types of persuasion; abuse of power by officials; unpaid labour (Tiuriukanova 2004b).

Thus, labor migration, suffering from red tape and corruption, ‘went underground’. Instead of the expected decrease, the illegal migration was on the rise. No effective regulation was at hand.

9.5. Illegal migration: assessment of the scale

It is commonly recognized that the volumes of irregular migration in Russia amount to millions. However, the range of available estimates casts doubts on their reliability. When
during the same week B. Gryzlov, the then Head of the Ministry of Interior responsible for migration regulation, mentioned that there were 1.5 million of irregular migrants in the country\textsuperscript{24} while A. Chernenko, who was then Head of the Federal Migration Service acting within the same Ministry declared that the number was over 6 million\textsuperscript{25} it became evident that even senior officials have little idea of the scale of to the problem with which they were trying to cope (Ivakhnyuk 2004).

Resenting such blatant irresponsibility of estimations, journalists felt free to give their own estimates of up to 15 million\textsuperscript{26} irregular migrants, with over 3 million residing in the Moscow region alone.\textsuperscript{27}

Even expert estimates differ greatly. For example, G. Vitkovskaya, coordinator of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Moscow Migration Research Program, gives an estimate of 3 million (Vitkovskaya 2002). Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, head of the Migration Research Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ (RAS) Institute of National-Economic Forecasting—3–4 million (IOM 2001). Y. Krasinets, expert on irregular migration at the RAS Institute for Socio-Economic Studies of Population—4–4.5 million (Krasinets et al. 2000, 82). V. Mukomel, the Senior Researcher of migration in the RAS Institute of Sociology, estimates total number of irregular migrants in Russia as 4.9 million (Mukomel 2005, 196). V. Ivanov, head of the Presidential Committee on Migration Policy, said in 1999 that if no urgent measures to counter irregular migration were taken, it would increase threefold by 2010, i.e. to 19 million. This forecast was repeatedly quoted by the media.\textsuperscript{28}

It seems reasonable to put aside extreme estimations provoked either by inaccuracy or political machinations. In any case, assessment of the actual number of irregular migrants in Russia is complicated by inadequate border & immigration control, the absence of an integrated migration database, poor coordination between the border guards and the migration services. Most often the methodology of estimates is not transparent.

Our assessment is based on categorization of the irregular migrant stock, numbers of apprehensions and deportations of migrants, the shadow economy estimates, the flows of money transfers by migrants, local surveys of migrant workers in different Russian provinces,

\textsuperscript{24} ITAR-TASS News Agency, 12 December 2002
\textsuperscript{25} Paper presented by Alexander Chernenko at the State Duma hearings on the Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation on 9 December 2002
\textsuperscript{26} Gazeta, 12 March 2003
\textsuperscript{27} Vremya MN, 12 December 2002
\textsuperscript{28} See, for example, Chuykin M. ‘Russia Is Becoming a Heaven for Illegal Migrants’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 February 1999 (in Russian).
and information from source countries (IOM 2004; ADB 2007; Maksakova 2002; Nelegalnaya... 2002; Tiuriukanova 2004a; Riazantsev 2007; Sadovskaya 2007; Vitkovskaya 2002).

The biggest group of illegal migrants in Russia is citizens of the ex-USSR countries who have come to the country looking for jobs and/or residence. Visa-free entrance rules based on the bilateral agreements between the most of CIS countries allow them to cross the boundaries legally. However, due to the bureaucratic obstacles on the way to Russian citizenship and legal employment the overwhelming majority of migrants find themselves in an illegal status. They are primarily employed in the informal sector of the economy. Many of them come for seasonal work in construction, services and agriculture and stay in Russia for 7-9 months on average (Tiuriukanova 2004a; Soboleva and Chudaeva 2007). During the high season (spring – summer) their number reaches 3–4 million.

Besides, there are 2-3 million irregular migrants from CIS states who stay in Russia for a few years. They work and live in Russia with their families, they do not visit their home countries and they would probably like to get naturalize in Russia but the lack of required documentation prevents them from going legal. They are usually closely tied to their ethnic communities where they get unofficial protection and support.

Irregular migrants from non-CIS countries are mainly represented by transit migrants from Asian and African countries on their way to the Western Europe where they intend to apply for a refugee status or reunite with their relatives, but they sometimes stay in Russia for months and years before progressing to the intended destination (the account for about 500,000 illegal migrants) (Nelegalnaya... 2002), and foreign citizens (mainly from Vietnam and Korea) whose employment contract in Russia has terminated, or who have graduated from Russian universities and professional schools (students from Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, Congo, Guinea, and Ethiopia) and who would rather not return to their countries but stay in Russia (they are about 100,000) (Krasinets et al. 2000; Vitkovskaya 2002).

Thus, the total number of irregular migrants in Russia can be estimated at 3–4 million; this number rises to 5–7 million in spring and summer with the arrival of seasonal workers. Concentration of irregular migrants by regions and industries generally corresponds to the distribution of regular migrants. About one third of them stay in the Moscow region; other regions of concentration are big cities like Saint-Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar region, and rapidly developing oil & gas producing regions – Khanty-Mansiiskiy AO and Yamalo-Nenetskiy AO (IOM 2004). Like regular migrants, illegal migrants are
employed primarily in construction, trade and services; one can see them in open markets and on construction sites, sometimes employed for small-scale private housing projects (e.g. building a cottage) (Riazantsev 2007).

9.6. The advantages and disadvantages of irregular migration

Once irregular migrants are in the country, their illegality creates a number of problems that have human and economic costs for the individuals and the society. Their status allows their employers to exploit them rather than employ them, and many businesses employing illegal migrants operate in the grey economy, their activities being either illegal or not officially registered, often linked to criminal activities. Immigrants often become victims themselves and face many threats and problems, the safeguarding of their human rights and safety being a challenge to the authorities (Tishkov et al. 2005). Their illegal situation in the country leads most of them to accept the poor conditions of employment, way below the accepted standards of labour in Russia. Employers can evade social taxes and violate the environment, sanitary and labour safety norms.

Table 6 clearly shows that irregular migrants are more vulnerable in their relations with employers than migrants of the regular status. However, even among regular migrants only every third worker has an officially signed employment contract. Confiscation of the passport by the employer is the most widespread practice to keep irregular migrants in a slavery-like situation when the worker cannot leave the employer and look for a better working opportunity. Coercion to low-paid or unpaid work, physical and psychological pressure and isolation are faced even by regular migrants; however, among irregular migrants this occurs 5-6 timed more frequently. Every sixth irregular female migrant faces coercion to sex services. Industries where exploitation of irregular migrants is most typical include entertainment and housekeeping (ILO 2004, 66).
Table 6. Situation of regular and irregular migrants in Russia
(based on the results of sociological surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular migrants</th>
<th>Irregular migrants</th>
<th>Totality of migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average working week, hours</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of written job</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages, USD per month</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport is taken by employer</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt-bondage for employer</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-paid labor (partially)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-paid labor (completely)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation of freedom</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavery situation</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faced physical violence</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faced psychological violence</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced for sex services (for</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>females)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The table is from the article by M. Deliagin, the Head of the Institute for Global Studies: http://www.deliagin.ru/articles/2232.html. The data on irregular migrants is based on the survey by Y. Tiuriukanova (ILO 2004, 66)

However, poor economic conditions in their own countries outweigh the harsh employment terms in Russia for migrants from CIS states. Employment and earning in Russia is an element of the survival strategy for a growing number of households in their countries of origin. By mid-2000s, for 20 to 40% of households in smaller CIS countries – Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – cash transfers by migrants have become an important source of income (Zaionchkovskaya 2003; Moshnyaga 2007; Sadovskaya 2007; Riazantsev 2007, Kireyev 2006).
The illegal migrant-oriented services in Russia have developed over the recent decade into a prosperous industry, often supported by militia officers (fake recruitment agencies, businesses specialising in issuing false registration certificates, medical certificates, work permits, migration cards) and expanding even further (Perepelkin and Stelmakh 2005).

Numerous migrant networks in Russia also support migration inflow and act as informal promoters of their compatriots in the illegal labor market. Creation of ‘ethnic niches’ (Vorobyeva 2001a; Kamenski 2002, Ivakhnyuk 2008a) in the Russian labor market, where Armenian migrants engage in road construction, Azeri migrants concentrate in the market trade, Moldavian migrant teams specialize in apartments renovation, Kyrgyz migrants monopolize cleaning & product arrangement in supermarkets, etc., facilitate migrant employment. Ethnic networks create a competition among illegal migrants from different countries by reserving certain types of jobs for definite ethnic groups. In the periods of economic crisis and a tightening labour market, this ethnic-based labor market monopolization could spark social tension because the local workers are concerned about with dumping of wages.29

For these reasons the migrant inflow to Russia has been growing despite the lack of legal opportunities and the desperate working conditions, and fuelling the illegal sector of economy. About _ of migrant workers in Russia were employed in shadow economy in the early 2000s (ILO 2003).

9.7. Public debate on migrants

The general policy of strengthening of power and establishment of order declared by Putin administration resulted, among other things, in a real ‘war’ against irregular migrants (Grafova 2006a). Mass apprehensions, penalization and deportations of migrants were followed by xenophobic publications in media. Only in 2003, about 45,000 labor migrants working in Russia without authorization were deported and over 1.5 million were fined (ILO 2003).

Xenophobia in the society was aggravated by the populist media comments and reports. Calls for ‘stopping the hordes of uninvited settlers’ (D. Rogozin, the Rodina [Motherland] Party leader)30 and ‘not letting the immigrants feel masters (?) in the Russian land’ (V.Ilukhin,

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29 http://www.kp.ru/daily/24118/340972
30 http://www.rogozin.ru/library/386/#_Toc49922066
the KPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] Secretary)\textsuperscript{31} were absolutely typical of the Russian nationalism-driven politics in the early 2000s.

Meanwhile, the voice of the liberal opposition was not heard. ‘We have no choice of whether immigration to Russia will be taking place or not. The choice is whether it will be regular, duly managed, with priorities given to Russians and Russian speaking migrants willing to work, or it will be irregular, spontaneous, criminal, giving rise to corruption and hatred of aliens’ (A. Chubais, co-leader of the SPS Party (Chubais 2003). ‘The type of the future Russian society depends on how the Russian authorities and the Russian society will design an effective immigration policy. The success of this policy is closely related to the cultural openness of the society that would enable immigrants and their descendants to identify themselves with the country of residence and become its integral part in the course of time... The nowadays Russian migration policy has no future’ (Y. Gaidar, ex-Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, co-leader of the SPS Party (Gaidar 2005, 466).

The public debate on migrants was over-loaded with pseudo-scientific arguments often borrowed from western sources like additional pressure on social infrastructure of Russia. Calculations of experts prove that this argument, which is true for European countries, especially those where the social support of immigrants is a priority issue (e.g. Sweden), is hardly applicable to Russia. Access to the social security system is regulated by a compulsory medical insurance, a social pension insurance certificate, and so on. Even a pressure on transportation system in cities and towns increases to a minor extent as irregular migrants do not usually travel a lot (Perepelkin and Stelmakh 2005).

In analyzing the public debate on migrants and migration policy in Russia it is important to understand that its influence of actual migration policy is very limited. The Russian political system and decision making process is very different from western patterns. The Russian migration policy is directly guided by the President (refer to section 9.2). Even if the key political parties express their attitudes towards migration trends (brain drain from Russia, out-migration of Russian females who marry foreign males, excessive in-migration, especially labor migration, etc.) these are usually no more than populist acts that have minimal influence (or no influence at all) on decision making process.

A hundred years ago the Russian historian Vladimir Klyuchevsky argued that ‘in Russia there has never been struggle of parties but rather struggle of bureaucracies‘. This phrase

\textsuperscript{31} ‘7 dney’ [7 days Gazette] 11.01.2001.
gives the essential idea of the Russian political process. For this reason, reforms in Russia are contradictory and chaotic; they reflect interests of various lobbying groups, but even those are not clearly shaped, and the final decision is always made by the head of state.

9.8. Degradation of labour relationships

However, professional debate on foreign labor in Russia emphasized the increasing degradation of the culture of labour relationships. This issue is related not only to the well-known fact that migrants lower wages in the sectors where they concentrate (IOM 2001, 7-8). In fact, relatively low prices for shadow migrant services, for example in construction and apartment repair works, allow low-income Russian households to hire the migrants’ services rather than contract official construction & repair companies. The worst thing is that labor migrants from less prosperous ex-USSR states bring with them ‘non-civilized’ abominable labor conditions to whole industries be it construction or transportation. In Russia these industries have become marginal sphere of employment due to hard labor conditions (non-heated worker’s locker rooms, lack of showers and hygienic rooms, hot meals, etc.) (ILO 2004). Russian laws on migration are no more than framework regulations that do not guarantee wages, social and labor rights for migrant workers equal to national workers. They are not detailed in guest-worker programs and schemes. Army of illegal migrant workers discourages Russian employers to improve labor conditions and make their sites attractive for national Russian workers (Riazantsev 2007).

In this context, illegal labor migration is resulting in worsened social standards in the field of employment, damages fair competition and equal-rights principle but on the contrary, develops unfair labor practices that are forbidden in developed countries and condemned by the International Labor Organization.

10. The radical turn of 2006: a liberalization trend

10.1 Political call for reasonable migration policies

As already said above, the evolution of the Russian migration policy is closely related to the personal stance of the President. The second Presidential term of Vladimir Putin was generally more constructive, with a trend to liberalism. Political pragmatism called for elimination of
most outrageous phenomena of dissociation between declared values and real policies. Apathy of population during the 2003 (Duma) and 2004 (President) elections could not be unnoticed by the higher political leadership. Radical changes in the State policy were needed to ‘shake up’ the country. The corruption and despair in the field of migration were the areas where ineffectiveness of the authorities was most blatant.

The wisest decision was to turn the situation pro domo sua, i.e. radically change the vector of migration policy in order to benefit from it economically, demographically, and politically. Such a decision needed political will and courage. Staff changes in the Presidential Administration allowed the alarming forecasts of academics reach the closest Presidential advisers.

In fact, there is a long list of reasons that stand behind the 2006 radical shift in the Russian migration policy. It was initiated earlier, in March 2005. The President Putin speech at the ad hoc meeting of the RF National Security Council on March 17, 2005 outlined new Russian strategy towards immigrants and labor migrants that come to Russia in search for employment. ‘There is a need to revise our migration strategy to make inflow of migrants our benefit... For this purpose Russian migration policy is to be closely correlated with economic and demographic development purposes of the country... Today, out most important task is to encourage migration inflow... The major reasons of irregular migration are much-talked-about administrative barriers, which stand up against people who would like to stay and work in Russia legally… Migrants are excluded from social security system… By lack of humane attitude to millions of migrants we ourselves push them to the criminal sphere. Mess in procedures of legalization of migrants harms interests of the State, the society and economics.’

That was a sort of a signal of readiness of the State to perceive a new, more liberal, approach to migration management, which was already outlined and insisted by academic community, liberal politicians and NGOs.

10.2. Objective reasons for a revision of the migration policy

The new strategy was rooted in the following objective and subjective considerations:

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(1) *Demographic forecast.* Immigration has never been as important for the development ofRussia as it is expected to be in the coming decades. Demographers are unanimous in forecasting a sharp population decline. Since 2006, Russia is losing its working population at an increasing rate, expected to reach around 2010 over 1 million per year, amounting to a total of about 18 million between 2006 and 2026. (The total labor force in Russia is 69 million in 2007.) The gravity of the situation is obvious. The decline of the working age population is forecasted towards the middle of the century. Russia will need more than 25 million of immigrants to compensate the labor force decline within the next 20 years. Thus, immigration has become a strategic element of the Russian State policy (Ivakhnyuk 2008b).

(2) *Economic considerations.* An increased rate of Russia's economic growth, recovery of industries, implementation of nation-wide economic projects, particularly in housing construction, call for additional labour resources. In 2003, 40% of Russian enterprises faced a labour deficit (Vishnevski 2006). Besides, an idea to curb the shadow sector by widening the legal channels for employment was important. Given an opportunity for legal employment, former irregular migrants and their employers ‘go out of shadow’; the shadow sector becomes less attractive to labour migrants from other CIS countries as it was before, when they had no alternative to undocumented employment.

(3) *New understanding of national security.* While irregular migration remains a major national security concern in Russia, the understanding of national security has shifted from being focused exclusively on the State to a wider approach incorporating economic, social, demographic, cultural, ethnic, and human security of the nation. Correspondingly, the general purpose of tackling irregular migration is pretended to be realized by combination of police instruments (proper border management, exposure of human traffickers, immigration control, secure identification documents, etc.) together with humane measures (regularization of irregular migrants, development of legal channels for permanent and temporary migration as an alternative for irregular migration and human trafficking).

(4) *Social considerations.* Xenophobia and intolerance towards migrants in the society have brought about a risk of social outbursts. Sporadic ethnic-based conflicts in Russian cities were inspired by nationalist organizations and populist slogans of political leaders\(^3\). In has became apparent that the social climate, the regional development, the integrity of the country

\(^3\) During the 2003 Moscow Duma election campaign the Rodina [Motherland] Party headed by D/ Rogozin was excluded from election list because of inadmissibly nationalist slogans against labor migrants.
depends on how the State will cope with the issue of legalisation and attracting the sufficient number of immigrants.

(5) **Inefficiency of police suppression to reduce irregular migration.** Police raids against irregular migrants, inspections in enterprises aimed at finding illegally employed foreign workers, and deportations that were widely practiced since 2002 proved their low effectiveness. Estimates of irregular migrants continued growing. Besides, more liberal migration policy could be a blow on human traffickers who specialize on supplying Russian employers with cheap labor. In 2004, Russia ratified the UN Convention against transnational crime and its Protocols on trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants. Correspondingly, in December 2004 the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was supplemented with the Article 322 determining sentence to penalties up to prison punishment for persons guilty in organizing human trafficking and smuggling. That was a shift in focus of counter-irregular-migration policy from irregular migrants (who are often victims, in fact) to organizers of irregular migration and human traffickers. Easier legalization procedures enable migrant workers to seek for jobs via official migration infrastructure institutions not shadow middlemen.

(6) **Counteracting corruption.** Over-bureaucratized procedures of getting residence and work permissions gave rise to criminal migration infrastructure, often headed by migration service officials, and developed shadow market of relevant services for migrants. Bribes-taking from migrants and employers was an everyday practice and source of non-official income for millions of militiamen.

(7) **International organizations, academic experts and NGOs** made a lot to prove ineffectiveness of the existing labor migration management model and inform Russian authorities of the possible alternative models. Since 2005, experts from academia and NGOs are permanent participants of different level meetings to discuss migration trends and policies.

(8) **Re-orientation of migrant flows.** Since 2001 Kazakhstan has been a preferred destination for Central Asian labor migrants. Competition for labor resources has already become a reality of the globalizing world posing a risk for Russia to loose its appeal and the migration potential.

(9) **Geopolitical concerns.** At the above ad hoc meeting of the RF National Security Council on March 17, 2005 President Putin stressed that ‘the migration policy is also a strong instrument to reinforce integration between the CIS countries... Legal employment and social wellbeing of migrants coming from former Soviet states is one of factors to strengthen
cooperation with our closest partners... For us, it is the most ‘natural’ way to replenish our labor resources because these people are Russian speaking and they can be easily integrated in Russian life. These statements were a response to call of the governments of the source countries to provide better employment conditions and security for their migrant-workers, on the one hand, and desire of Russia to strengthen its leadership in the CIS, on the other hand.

Consequently, requested personally by the President Putin, the turn in Russian migration policy was grounded on objective political, economic, and demographic reasons.

10.3. A pilot legalisation campaign

Revision of the Russian migration policy was realised in several directions simultaneously. Initially, the pilot regularization of irregular labor migrants from the CIS states, which have visa-free entry regime with the Russian Federation, was realized in 10 Russian provinces in late 2005. The Concept was elaborated by the working group attached to the Expert Council of the RF Human Rights Commissioner. As Russia has no experience in legalisation campaigns, the experience of European countries and the United States in migrants’ amnesties was carefully studied. The papers on different approaches to regularization of migrants written by experts from these countries were published in detailed comparative studies. So, the Concept issued from the experience of other countries in migrants’ amnesties as well as the experts’ estimates and results of sociological surveys of irregular migrants and employers that showed that migrants and employers would prefer regular stay and legal work in case the appropriate regulations are provided by the Russian legislation. The draft Concept was discussed at round tables with participation of representatives of interested government bodies, NGOs, international organizations, experts from European countries that have experience in migration amnesties. In mid-2005 the Concept was approved by the Tripartite Commission on Regulation of Labor Relations (the Government, employers’ national associations, and trade unions’ national associations) and the pilot regularization program was implemented in 10 regions of Russia in November-December 2005.

The regularization procedure of the pilot project was utterly simplified: the ‘urgent legalisation team’ comprising representatives of the Federal Migration Service, Federal

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34 http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/03/85300.shtml
35 The city of Moscow, the Moscow Province, the city of Saint Petersburg and Leningradskaya Province, the city of Yekaterinburg and Sverdlavskaya Province, Omskaya Province, Irkurskaya Province, Sakhaninskaya Province, Primorsky Krai, Krasnodarski Krai.
Taxation Service, Federal Employment Service, and Ministry of Health arrived directly to the enterprises, which voluntarily manifested their will to legalise the hired migrant workers and within several days provided every migrant with a valid migrant card, a temporary residence permit (for the term of labour contract), and a work permit. Totally, about 460 employers participated in the pilot project; 7,400 irregular migrants were regularized (Zaionchkovskaya 2007). However, the results of the project were estimated as unsatisfactory due to the lack of mechanisms to prevent re-illegalization of migrants; insufficient legal base, contradictions with major migration laws, etc.

10.4. Policies regarding compatriots

Meanwhile, the purpose of dealing with an imminent demographic crisis in Russia and consolidating the Russian community by encouraging its partial re-settlement to the territory of the Russian Federation was reflected in the 2006-2012 State Programme on providing support for voluntary re-settlement of compatriots to the Russian Federation (adopted by President Decree of 22.06.2006).

The Programme is guided by the pragmatic purpose of the Russian Government to alleviate the demographic crisis Russia is facing presently. At the same time, it has an important humane potential as it provides compatriots36 and their family members who would like to move to Russia for permanent residence with State guaranties and social support including:

- a refund of travel expenses and transportation of their possessions;
- guarantees of the State duty for the paper work to regularize their status at the territory of the Russian Federation;
- a one-off grant (travelling allowance);
- a monthly allowance for the period until the Russian citizenship is obtained but not more than for 6 months, in the absence of income from labour or business activities;
- a ‘compensation packet’, including services of pre-school institutions, secondary education, vocational training, social welfare, health care, and assistance in job seeking.

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36 In the Russian legislation the term compatriots is applied to people who were born in Russia or have Russian ancestors, but who have left the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or the post-Soviet Russia to live in other countries. All former Soviet citizens are compatriots (or former compatriots) irrespective of their ethnicity or current citizenship.
The Programme is aimed not only to encourage compatriots to come and settle in Russia but to distribute them over the territory of the Russian Federation giving preferences to those migrants who move to the areas where economic and demographic situation requires an urgent human inflow or where large-scale investment projects requiring labour resources are underway.

The Program will be realized in 3 stages:

*The first stage* (2006): working out of legislation assigned to provide legal basement of realization of the Program; assessment of demand for human resources by the administrative units (republics, provinces, and territories) of the Russian Federation; information campaign.

*The second stage* (2007-2008): resettlement of the Program participants; integration of compatriots; evaluation of the results; if necessary, modification of further regional projects of immigration encouragement.

*The third stage* (2009-2012): further realization of resettlement regional projects; evaluation of the results of the Program; if necessary, shaping of a new Program.

Roll-out of the Programme is managed by a special Inter-Departmental Commission attached to the Government of the Russian Federation. Coordinator of the Program is the Federal Migration Service. The Programme is under the direct patronage of the President of the Russian Federation.

The Program is guided by the emerging idea of attracting people with some link to Russia who for various reasons are living outside the country. It is thereby assumed that the Program will be attracting people whose integration is likely to be the least problematic. The participants of the Programme are exempted from the strict regulations of obtaining Russian citizenship as set by the 2002 Russian Federal Law on Citizenship (e.g. the required five-year uninterrupted residence in Russia, a legal source of income and the knowledge of Russian language\(^\text{37}\)).

10.5. Policies regarding migrants from CIS states

The focus of the 2006 migration policy reform was on generating more favorable conditions of residence and employment in Russia for citizens of the CIS countries. Most importantly, two principal laws on migration were adopted in 2006 and came into force on January 15, 2007:

- the Federal Law No. 110-FZ of July 18, 2006 on Amendments to the 2002 Federal Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation, and

The main objectives of the new laws were to simplify the procedure for recruiting a foreign citizen, issuing permits for temporary residence/stay and for registration. The amendments apply primarily to migrants from the CIS countries who come to Russia under a visa-free regime. The new features include:

- the term of permanent stay for foreign citizen was increased to 180 days (twice as much as earlier),
- the quota of permits for temporary residence to visa-free foreign citizen was cancelled;
- a new procedure was introduced providing issuance of the Russian work permit personally to the foreign citizen rather than to the employer while the employer can hire any foreign citizen with a work permit.
- a 10-day approval term for work permit applications by foreign citizens.
- a simplified registration procedure at the current address (rather than earlier requirement to register at the place of permanent residence) was introduced; but the registration procedure at the place of residence is maintained with somewhat simpler rules (the notion of a “host of the foreign citizen” was introduced, making a more flexible link between the residence in Russia and actual accommodations).

Entry without a visa, a notification-based registration and a simplified work permit procedures, as well as the right to choose an employer ‘opened’ the Russian labour market for citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.38

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38 Belarus is not included in this list because under the Belarus-Russia Agreement on a Union, citizens of the two countries are fully equalled in rights including the right of employment in the territory of both countries of the Union. Belarus workers who come for a job in Russia do not need a work permit and can be employed in Russia just as easily as Russian citizens.
For 2007, Russia set a quota of 6 million work permits to foreign citizens from countries that enjoy a visa-free regime with Russia. The geographical distribution of work permits had to be approved jointly by the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Interior and local representatives of the federal authorities. The government also imposed a quota of max. 40% of foreign workers for jobs available, and starting from May 1, 2007 no migrants from the countries with a visa-free regime with Russia are allowed to work in retail sale of alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals, or in the markets within the Russian Federation. This was a natural result of a hidden political struggle around the liberalization of migration-related regulations. A compromise in line with the principle ‘to win the bigger, sacrifice the smaller’ was reached.

According to the new laws the process of hiring CIS citizen became simpler for both employee and employer. The new procedure offered significant liberalization of the rules of temporary employment for people the CIS countries enjoying visa-free agreements with Russia. People from these countries could finally receive a work permit without a prior recommendation or job offer from a Russian employer. The procedure can legally take ten days only. The number of requested documents has been reduced: an identity document, an immigration card, a receipt of the state fee (30 EUR) and HIV test results. A one-year work permit allows its holder to change employers during his/her stay in Russia within the boundaries of an administrative unit (province) where it was issued. The stay can also be prolonged for another year.

Most importantly, the new migration policy in Russia is more humane than anything before. Driven by a growing understanding of the futility and irrationality of the existing situation where millions of people staying in Russia have no legal status and are deprived of social security and legal protection, while corruption and crime are flourishing, the new migration policy is increasingly in the interests of migrants from ex-Soviet countries and encourages them to come to Russia regularly, making the process of migration to Russia easier, more transparent, with a choice of legal opportunities for living and working in Russia. Respect for the migrants’ rights is a significant feature of the new approach, as it confirms the legally guarantied freedom of movement across the territory of Russia and grants the migrant access to (and protection of) his/her personal data in the Migration Databank.39

The Federal Migration Service with its new migration policy acknowledges its responsibility for migrants coming to Russia. The then Deputy Director of the Federal Migration Service Vyacheslav Postavnin said in his interview: “Introducing the new laws we are saying to migrants from the CIS states: ‘Come openly, work legally, pay taxes and comply with the Russian laws and enjoy equal rights with the Russian citizens’. We expect economic benefits from their presence in Russia. On our part, we guarantee them respect and protection”\textsuperscript{40}. The Deputy Minister of Interior Alexander Chekalin highlights the anti-corruption potential of the new legislation: “Migration bureaucrats were repeatedly blamed for despotism and corruption. The new regulations are aimed at improving the situation. Now we relieve migrants of the onerous need to personally contact the officers responsible for making decisions. By introducing the State Migration Registration System based on a generalized Migration Database, we take migrant inflows under our control to be processed in a new and more effective way”\textsuperscript{41}.

Vladimir Lukin, the Human Rights Commissioner of the Russian Federation, argues that “The turn in the migration policy of the Russian Federation towards liberalization and humanization looks very promising. Though with a delay, the State is trying to introduce order and rationality in the migration management. It is very important to promote this trend, to ensure people’s awareness of the new initiatives, to explain to them the strategic goals of the State, to win their support. The ethnic structure of the Russian society is transforming. This requires a particular attention from the State: programmes of migrant integration, teaching tolerance to the society must be part of the migration policy... Besides, the result of the new policy strongly depends on how it will be implemented.”\textsuperscript{42}

10.6. The new legislation: implementation results

During 2007, over 1.2 million work permits were issued to migrant workers from the CIS countries which was twice as much as in 2006 and three times as much as in 2005. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of foreign labor inflow to Russia (in accordance with the annual numbers of issued work permits) while Table 7 shows information about migrant workers by countries of origin for the 2000s.

\textsuperscript{40} From an interview by the author with Vyacheslav Postavnin on 18.07.2006.
\textsuperscript{42} From an interview by the author with Vladimir Lukin on 22.07.2006.
Figure 2. Foreign Labor Force in Russia, 1994-2008, thousands
(as to numbers of issued work permits)

**Table 7. Foreign Labor Force in Russia, 2000-2008**
*(numbers of issued work permits)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>213.3</td>
<td>283.7</td>
<td>359.5</td>
<td>377.9</td>
<td>460.4</td>
<td>702.5</td>
<td>1,014.0</td>
<td>1,717.1</td>
<td>2,157.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>from CIS states:</strong></td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>148.6</td>
<td>204.6</td>
<td>186.5</td>
<td>221.2</td>
<td>343.7</td>
<td>537.7</td>
<td>1,152.8</td>
<td>1,596.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>109.6</td>
<td>160.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>117.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>250.2</td>
<td>347.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>344.6</td>
<td>563.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td>108.6</td>
<td>141.8</td>
<td>171.3</td>
<td>209.3</td>
<td>227.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>from non-CIS states:</strong></td>
<td>106.9</td>
<td>135.1</td>
<td>154.9</td>
<td>197.4</td>
<td>238.5</td>
<td>358.8</td>
<td>476.3</td>
<td>563.8</td>
<td>560.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>160.6</td>
<td>210.8</td>
<td>228.8</td>
<td>241.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>121.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data for January-September 2008

However, in reality the new regulations turned to be less liberal than they seemed. By the mid-2008 it became clear that the new rules so much welcomed by migrants clashed against the unreasonably small foreign workers quotas (1.3 million for 2008 against 6 million for 2007) and a legalization procedure that started in 2007 had an unexpected turn. With no reliable methods for calculating the demand of foreign labor, the quotas became a stumbling block for the new liberal model of labor migration management. Quotas for 2008 were established on the basis of the total amount of requests from employers. However, the first requests were collected as early as mid-2007 when many employers had not known about the quotas for CIS migrant workers. Besides, there are no effective interaction schemes for different state authorities, no programmes of collection and submission of data required to fix and harmonise the quotas.

An income tax rate of 30% for foreign workers compared to the 13% tax rate for local workers\footnote{According to the Russian Tax Code, a 30\% income tax is applied to all foreign citizens employed in the Russian Federation during the first 6 months of their work in Russia.} forces labor migrants to agree on the unofficial labor relations with their employers and conceal their true incomes from taxation. A poor labor migration infrastructure (a lack of information resources about vacancies, legal advice, eligible recruitment agencies, etc.) also contributes to the low effectiveness of the ‘free migrant labor market’ model (Ivakhnyuk 2008c).

10.7. Assessment of the new migration legislation by migrants and employers

The new regulations assessed by migrants and employers are shown in Figure 3. The monitoring of implementation practices of the new migration legislation in Russia, which is the basis of this data, was conducted in September 2007 in several provinces of the Russian Federation, i.e. only half a year after the new laws were put into force. It is clear that at this early stage shortcomings could seem more obvious than benefits because the new procedures hardly had any trial period, and there was the lack of experience, queues in migration service offices, etc. However, this data already allows for certain conclusions.

The fact that 2/3 of employers agree that the situation in the labor migration management has improved is optimistic. However, one should not forget that the employers who were
interviewed do hire foreign workers legally. For them, the fact that they don’t have to get permissions to hire migrant workers from the CIS and apply for work permissions on their behalf is a definite advantage of the reform. It corresponds with the argument of M. Moskvina, Director of the Labor Relations and Labor Market Department of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (RUEE): “There should be no procedural difference for Russian employers for hiring local or foreign labour force. Most importantly, they are to be supplied with labor resources needed for a systematic production process”.\footnote{Speech of M. Moskvina at the theoretical and practical conference “Practice of foreign labor force attraction and use in Russia: trends, mechanisms, and instruments’, Moscow, Russian Academy of Sciences, 16-17 October 2006.} It is unlikely that employers who hire migrant workers illegally were covered by the poll, so the monitoring results cannot apply to all Russian employers.

As for migrants, the results of monitoring seemingly demonstrate their low knowledge about the reform. The fact that one third of both migrants and employers do not know whether the new regulations have made the situation better or worse proves that either the information about the new rules is inadequate, that there are obstacles on the path of the easy-to-follow idea of new rules. The fact that every fifth migrant argues that the situation has not changed is even more surprising. Nevertheless, interviews with migrants show that when legally employed, they have an easier access to the healthcare system and vocational training, and this fact only makes them embrace wholeheartedly the new facilitated regulation (Vitkovskaya and Platonova 2008).

We may, therefore, conclude that the reform was not very well prepared, or properly promoted, and it should have been followed by an educating campaign. The benefits of a simplified legalization and employment procedure in Russia were overshadowed by the flaws in realization of the new regulations, at least at the initial stage.

10.8. Public debate on migration reform

The idea to liberalize the laws on residence and work in Russia has provoked a sharp discussion in the society, among political parties, and in the media. It has become an apple of discord, an uncompromising delimitation between conservative and liberal politicians. Even within the Federal Migration Service and other governmental institutions involved in migration management there is no unanimous opinion on the reasons and timeliness of liberalization of migration legislation. Traditions of a closed country are persistent while the regulation models of market economy have not settled down yet. A turn in the official migration strategy towards human-oriented regulations and transparent procedures is not an easy process. A survey among migration service officers in summer of 2006 when the new laws had already been approved

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45 Thus, anti-migrants position has already cost representation in the Moscow City Duma (the City Parliament) to the ‘Rodina’ (‘Motherland’) political party.
but not yet put in force showed that almost 40% of the staff responsible for implementation of the migration policy did not support the new rules and insisted on the former permissive employer-driven procedure of foreign workers legalization (Zaionchkovskaya 2007).

The public opinion has mixed views of the new policy, and regulators treat it as a source of crime and capital export. The media often worsen the situation, and fail to show any positive aspects of labor immigration, when in fact many Russian enterprises have managed to escape bankruptcy, and a significant part of the Russian population managed to escape poverty, because of labor immigration, and small businesses could hardly survive without labor migrants, let alone the fact that these are ready to take up jobs that the locals would not even consider taking.

Generally, the public opinion reacted with a ‘passive negativism’. This shows that, on the one hand, there was no information and explaining campaign before the reform and, on the other hand, there were no appropriate public debate before the reform that could ensure better understanding of the role of migration in the contemporary development of Russia, if not the public consent of the subject.

The continuous political debate in the society on migration issues is fuelled by the global economic crisis, which has already hit the migrant-loaded construction industry. A recent study in Moscow commissioned by the Public Chamber46 showed that ‘the majority of Muscovites are ready to take jobs currently held by gastarbeiters … providing they are well paid’. Other experts argue that migrants, if laid off, will not turn to criminal activities as populists and journalists fear but will move to other employment niches being more flexible than locals; for example, they may switch from construction to commerce and services47 (also refer to section 11).

10.9. Position of source countries

The ‘open door’ policy is appreciated by migrants and governments of CIS countries. For them, bigger opportunities to work in Russia mean a larger volume of migrants’ remittances (table 8). The legal channels for money transfers have notably increased since 2005 when estimates of money transferred from Russia to source countries were made public and attracted

47 Interview of V. Mukomel, Head of Department of Xenophobia in the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Available at: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/poehali/557038-echo/
attention of business that reacted by starting of a variety of banking and non-banking 
institutions specially designed to offer services to migrants. Legal and illegal migrants have 
equal access to these services; however, as it is proved for other countries, when duly 
legalized, migrants are more likely to use the official channels of remittances (Ratha 2003).

Table 8. Remittances inflow and outflow in the post-Soviet states, 2000-2007, million USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflow to:</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>1273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>1403</td>
<td>1359</td>
<td>1453</td>
<td>2495</td>
<td>2918</td>
<td>3091</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>1250</td>
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<tr>
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<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
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<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>1400**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflow from:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1409</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>2226</td>
<td>3233</td>
<td>5188</td>
<td>6989</td>
<td>11438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>1354</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimate of the World Bank.

** Estimate of experts of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) (Ehe EurAsEC Economic Review, 2007, N:3, p. 50)

Sources: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, August 2007; World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, April 2008.

The role of migrant remittances for origin countries in the CIS region at macro level is 
illustrated in table 9. In many cases the migrants’ money transfers exceed in volume foreign
direct investments (FDI) and official development aid (ODA), and play a major role in the balance of payment statistics.

**Table 9. The role of migrant remittances in selected CIS countries, 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrant remittances *</th>
<th>Foreign direct investments (FDI)**</th>
<th>Official development aid (ODA)**</th>
<th>Exports of goods and services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in million USD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>-584</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>13,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>2,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>6,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>in per cent of GDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* IMF data

** World Bank data

10.10. Labor migration effect on opportunities for migrants’ human development

Even more importantly, migrants’ money transfers help reduce poverty, improve incomes of population, consumption and health standards and provide an alternative source of social security when the State resources for social support of the population are extremely limited. A survey of CIS migrants employed in Russia was conducted by Yelena Tiuriukanova in 2004 and it gives her reasons to conclude that ‘without exaggeration we can argue that migrants’ remittances definitely re-shape the social structure in source countries by prompting the growth of the middle class and reducing the poor and extremely poor layers’ (Tiuriukanova 2005).

As for interviews with migrants, the majority of them indicate ‘very bad’ (every fourth respondent) and ‘bad’ (every second respondent) economic conditions in their homeland prior to migration. The analysis of subjective estimates by migrants of their own welfare before and after the migration proves that migration has helped a majority of migrants to improve their living standards and shift them from a low-income group to a higher-income group. As a result, a number of people in a ‘very bad’ and ‘bad’ economic situation has reduced more than twice while the group with a situation described as ‘average’ has increased significantly (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Economic Situation of Migrants Before and After Migration
Amounts of money transfers sent monthly by CIS migrants from Russia to their homelands generally correspond to the average global IMF estimate of USD 100 per month. For example, migrants from Moldova who work in Moscow, send home USD 114 per month, or USD 1,368 per year on average (Tiuriukanova 2005). For migrants from Azerbaijan the respective figures are USD 107 and USD 1,284 (ibid.). Migrants from Kyrgyzstan who have a permanent job in Russia, send USD 2,065 per year while seasonal workers scrape up USD 1,419. Tajik migrants send home USD 1,187 on average, including males – USD 1,203, females – USD 950 (ADB 2007, 38). Households in Armenia receive from their family members who work in Russia USD 1,890 per year; from those who work in other countries USD 2,117 (Roberts, Banaian 2004).

All sociological surveys of migrant households without exception conclude that the overwhelming part of migrants’ money transferred home is expended by households on essential goods: food, clothes, medicine, etc. Even this role of migrant remittances is important for the context of human development as increased quality and quantity of food, access to paid healthcare facilities and opportunity to put children into school improve the living standards of migrant families. An increase in everyday consumption stimulates production of consumer goods and pushes an economy ahead. Moreover, a growing volume of money transfers creates new ways to use them, including buying land and real property, investments in human capital, founding one’s own business and development of the local infrastructure (Ratha 2003).

A survey of migrant households in Moldova in 2006 showed that up to 80% of the households which had reported a family member working abroad had also reported an increase in their income; almost half of the migrant households had got better access to education and health services (Figure 5).
However, the same survey in Moldova showed that despite a significant improvement in the households’ financial situation, labor migration has its negative psychological costs, e.g. in terms of bad effects it has on children because their parents are away. For example, the absence of parents has had a detrimental impact on the children’s morale and academic success particularly if the person who migrated was the mother, as mothers tend to help children more with their homework. Children with migrant parents have exhibited higher risk such as exposure to drug abuse or dropping out of school or precocious sexual relationships.

Children who migrate with their parents also face difficulties, e.g. in terms of access to education and adaptation among peers. Poor knowledge of the Russian language and differences in school curricula in the countries of destination and origin prompt psychological and educational tensions. The poor performance at school reduces further access to university education (Tiuriukanova and Ledeneva 2005).

Changes in the social status of migrants before and after movement to the country of destination seriously affect their development opportunities and especially the prospects of their children. A 2004 survey of immigrants to Russia showed that for 33% of respondents...
their social status had not changed in comparison with the pre-migration situation; 28% stated that their social status had increased, i.e. the migration had resulted in upwards social mobility for them; 39% indicated a lowered social status resulting from the migration to Russia (ibid). The lowered social status directly influenced expectations of their children. In the first two groups, 70.5% and 66.6% of the children respectively are planning to enter universities while in the third group only half of secondary school graduates tend to enter university.

Importantly, the realization of education-related ambitions is one of the strongest stimuli for migration. For 38% of immigrants in Moscow, the intention to educate children in Russian was one of reasons to move to Russia ((Tiuriukanova nad Ledeneva 2005).

10.11. Investment potential of money transfers

There is evidence from origin countries in the post-Soviet territory that a certain part of migrant households tend to use the income from labor migration as a start-up capital for small-scale businesses while the experience and the ‘market skills’ of migrants got from overseas employment reinforces their business activity. In Ukraine, 60% of migrant households, in which family members are engaged in business activity in Ukraine, have got their initial capital from cross border circular trips or temporary labor migration. If a family business has existed before labor migration of a family member, the wages transferred are used for business expansion (Pirojkov et al. 2003, 125). Experts in Georgia also point out ‘a growth trend in expenditure of migrants’ money transfers for purposes of small-scale business’ (Tukhashvili 2007, 124).

Non-migrant households also (indirectly) benefit from the inflow of migrants’ money transfers to their country via the multiplier effect of growing incomes and employment. The housing construction started by migrant families creates jobs for local workers and encourages demand for locally produced construction materials. Surveys in Uzbekistan prove that every fifth or sixth local entrepreneur has got their start-up capital as a result of international migration, and each of them creates from 20 to 30 jobs for local workers in average. A survey of 111 companies owned by former labor migrants that was conducted in Uzbekistan in 2001 showed that in total, these companies had provided 3,700 job places, i.e. 33 per one company (Maksakova 2002, 21).
The above considerations explain why a liberal model of labor migration management in Russia is especially appreciated by source countries. Planned in accordance with the Russian economic and demographic interests, the new Russian migration legislation also plays a positive role for migrants who come to Russia in search of employment or long-term residence.

11. The global economic crisis input in the migration policy debate

The global economic crisis that started in 2008 influences the public debate on migration in many countries, including Russia. A slowdown in economic growth, a decline in demand, including the demand for labor, challenges the expediency of migrant labor when wage expectations of local workers go down. In Russia, labor migrants were the first target of populist politicians in the early autumn of 2008 when the effect of the global crisis started to show in Russia and resulted in growing numbers of unemployed Russian citizens. The papers published alarmist articles on possibilities of criminalization of millions of gastarbeiters who are likely to lose their work on construction sites in the wake of the economic crisis.\(^{48}\) The Movement Against Illegal Immigration headed by Alexander Belov enhanced its protest actions against migrants encouraging ethnic-based conflicts between Russians and migrants from Central Asia\(^ {49}\).

However, the Ministry of Interior statistics does not register an upsurge in crime among migrants. In 2008, less than 3\% of all crimes in Russia were committed by migrants from the CIS states\(^ {50}\) and there is a very slow growth in comparison with 2007.

The outflow of regular and irregular migrants in September-December 2008 was close to 1 million; however, it is a ‘normal’ seasonal decrease in numbers of foreign workers in Russia.\(^ {51}\) Meanwhile, the Director of the FMS K. Romadanovsky is concerned that the negative attitudes of Russian citizens towards migrants inspired by the media can provoke conflicts and destabilize the situation in the streets. To avoid this, the FMS is planning to re-

\(^ {49}\) http://www.dpni.org/
\(^ {50}\) Kommersant-Den’gi, 15.12.2009
\(^ {51}\) Ibid.
distribute labor migrants over the territory of the Russian Federation to find jobs for them in labor-deficit provinces and not to push migrants into illegality or deport home.  

Besides, on December 8, 2008 the Prime-Minister V. Putin declared that it would be reasonable to reduce the quota by half to 3.9 million foreign workers that had been earlier projected for 2009. From then on, the Ministry for Healthcare and Social Development is empowered to revise the annual quota for foreign workers in accordance with changes in the economic situation and labor market demands.

Russian academic experts are unanimous in understanding that the segmented Russian labor market will require migrant workers even under a growing ‘internal’ unemployment. Sooner or later, the crisis will end but the need of the Russian economy for migrant labor will stay on due to the objective shifts in the structure of the Russian population, first of all, ageing and an absolute decrease in the working age population. The idea of a cooperation between Russia and the CIS countries for development of a common labor migration infrastructure and a pre-departure vocational training of migrants in their countries of origin is gaining additional stimuli. Source countries are ready to cooperate in order to avoid a mass return of labor migrants to their countries where labor market cannot absorb them. In Ukraine, parliamentarians are concerned about possible social outburst on the side of returned labor migrants while the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine estimates the possible number of returning migrants is 3 million and warns about potential aggravation of crime. In Kyrgyzstan, the State Committee on Migration and Employment is launching a vocational training of potential migrants in professional schools and expresses hopes that the economic crisis will not significantly decrease the demand for skilled workers in Russia where there is a stable deficit of skilled factory workers.

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53 http://www.kreml.org/news/199356734
54 Interview of V. Mukomel, Head of Department of Xenophobia in the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Available at: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/pochali/557038-echo/; Speech of Zh. Zaionchkovskaya at the meeting of the Public Council of the Federal Migration Service on ‘International Labor Migration Management under the Circumstances of Economic Crisis’ on 28.11.2008
55 Interview of Ekaterina Egorova, Deputy-Director of the Federal Migration Service to Rossiiskaya Gazeta on 30.10.2008.
56 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8.12.2008
57 Ibid.
The intolerance of migrants and xenophobia are a permanent background for the migration policy in the post-Soviet Russia. It is significant that before the USSR collapsed people who were facing an inflow of migrants, including ethnically different persons from other Soviet republics, to their cities/towns/villages/communities did not link their positive or negative attitudes towards newcomers with their ethnicity. According to a 1990 survey of the VCIOM – All-Union Center for Public Opinion Studies, for 52% of respondents the ethnic background of migrants who arrived to their area did not matter at all; 30% said that they are ‘against migrants of any nationality’; 18% said that they would ‘prefer immigrants of their own ethnic group to come’ (cited from: Mukomel 2005, 67-68).

In the late 1990s when the inflow of permanent and temporary migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia became well-shaped, with the social and economic situation in Russia remaining unstable, the attitudes towards migrants became distinctly ethnically biased. The slogans of nationalistic parties and political movements like ‘Russia for Russians!’ were embraced mainly by youth and degrading elderly citizens (Leonova 2004, 86). According to the Levada Sociological Monitoring Center in 2004, 60% of respondents would negatively assess the arrival of labor migrants from the Caucasus, Central Asia or China to their communities while 30% would take this fact indifferently. As for migrants from Ukraine and Moldova, the share of positive and indifferent responses was over 70%.

Nowadays, the authorities, politicians, and the media highlight mainly negative aspects of migration to Russia making special stress on the formation of ‘new diasporas’ (this trend is analyzed in detail in: Diatlov 2003; Grafova 2006a; Petrov 2004; Mukomel 2005). Exaggeration of how important the migrants’ ethnicity is results in xenophobia and attitudes to migrants as aliens. The antipathy towards migrants is typical for 68% of Russian citizens (Pain 2004, 233).

The anti-immigrant public mood does have grounds: among migrants there are criminals, drug pushers, and socially dangerous persons. Some migrant communities are closed; they follow their own cultural norms and values that are different from the local traditions. Self-exclusion of migrants is often a response to the hostility of local communities (Drobizheva 2003, 76). However, the arguments of xenophobes are mainly focused on economic reasons:

58 [http://www.levada.ru/press/2005011203.html]
35% of Russian citizens questioned by the Levada Sociological Monitoring Center in 2005 argue that ‘migrants take jobs that could be taken by local workers’; 31% insist that migrants contribute to an upsurge in criminal activity; 23% say that migrants do not pay taxes and facilitate the outflow of capital; 22% are concerned that migrants dump wages of local workers (cited from: Mukomel 2005,70-71). Surprisingly, respondents do not even mention threat of terrorism in the context of their negative attitudes to migrants.

These concerns, even unconfirmed by research and analysis, offer fertile ground to exaggeration of the negative aspects of immigration in the society and political games that promise election success and other political dividends. Besides, they explain the disposition of the Russian population towards a tough immigration policy.

The radical shift in the Russian migration policy towards an ‘open door’ policy in 2006, well-grounded in terms of the demographic and economic rationales, was – to a certain extent – contradicting the dominating public opinion on the much desired limitation of the immigrant inflow. Instead, the registration and employment-regulating procedures for CIS citizens were facilitated. As already said above, the decision of President Putin on the necessity of a cardinal revision of the Russian migration policy was announced at the meeting of the RF National Security Council in March 2005, a year after he was elected for the second presidential term. With a consolidated power, President Putin embarked on a necessary but unpopular step.

The ‘Kondopoga incident’ in September 2006 when a brawl between ethnic Russians and Caucasian 'newcomers' threatened a continued mass unrest and made the local Russian authorities deploy the regional OMON (Special-Purpose Police Units) to prevent large-scale pogroms,59 revealed the ethnicity-related tension in the society. The local event in the tiny town of Kondopoga, near Petrozadvodsk, in the Republic of Karelia in the Russia’s North-Western Federal District, echoed with serious interethnic clashes over Russia, involving extremist organizations. Viktor Masliakov, the mayor of Petrozavodsk declared that ‘some people try to make Petrozavodsk an example for the whole of Russia.’60 This event demonstrated that the authorities are likely to underestimate the actual and potential challenges posed by the adoption of a large scale immigration policy. Indeed, it was not so much the deaths the conflict caused, but the fact that it was a social unrest that, in combination with a rise of extremist organizations, creates a very dangerous example for cities throughout Russia that have similar interethnic complications but larger populations (Herd and Sargsyan, 2007).

Since then the activities of the Government aimed at preventing xenophobia and extremism and teaching tolerance towards immigrants have gained an extra stimulus. The Federal Tolerance Development Programme designed by the Government and implemented from 2001 is currently detailed in the regional tolerance development programmes in all provinces of the Russian Federation. Special attention to preventing xenophobia is paid in Moscow where immigrants and labor migrants concentrate. The tolerance development programme ‘Capital of the Multiethnic State’ for 2008-2010 is launched. Realization of these programmes is correlated with the activities of human rights NGOs and diasporas. The programmes are incorporated in secondary and professional schools’ programmes. The very first lesson in secondary schools all over Russia on September 1, 2008 was the Lesson of Tolerance. More widely, the tolerance programmes are addressed to the society and relate to the integration of migrants’ programmes that have been traditionally an underestimated element of the Russian migration policy.

13. Final remarks

Evaluation of effectiveness of migration policy in Russia and other post-Soviet states, on the one hand, and ‘old democracies’ on the other hand, is fundamentally different. Inherited from the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods, the idea of a strong State able to manage sensibly any process (economic, demographic, social, or political) is producing attitudes to migration policy as an instrument to secure the State interests. Correspondingly, a migration policy is effective when the interests of the State are provided for. It worked during the Soviet regime when the State was manipulating people in their spatial movements. It was likely to work in the post-Soviet era too, especially under President Putin who made a particular emphasis on strengthening the ‘line of command’. In terms of internal migration, an effective migration policy should reverse migration flows back to depopulated areas in the Far East and the North, and provide higher mobility of population much required in a market economy. In terms of international migration, an effective migration policy should bar illegal immigration, provide the country with a stable immigrant inflow and legally working migrants of required qualifications. However, this ideal pattern does not work.

61 http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/41432
62 See, for example: http://www.gov.spb.ru/gov/admin/otrasl/c_foreign/toler
In democratic societies, the effectiveness of the State policy, particularly in social dimensions, is assessed according to altogether different criteria. Integration policy is an essential part of immigration policy. Selectivity provides for the interests of the labor market / employers, and at the same time it ensures that a migrant, if selected, enjoys social benefits and appropriate treatment. An ‘effective migration policy’ results in a continuing comfort of life and growing opportunities for human development, both for migrants and the local population. This pattern may also seem idealistic but, when evaluated in the light of its effect on human development, a migration policy like this results in a well-balanced union of humanism and respect for human rights.

Design of a migration policy is a matter of political and public debate. The debate is to be based on knowledge of the subject, its advantages and disadvantages, its past, present and future. In this context, the Russian society and policy-makers are in dramatic contrast with, for example, those in the USA, where the nation is created by immigration, and the social, economic, cultural, and political aspects of immigration are thoroughly studied. The lack of knowledge of the phenomenon of migration in Russia, a dominating alarmist approach, and a stereotypes-driven decision making process make the Russian migration policy slack, reactive and contradictory. The fact that there is no migration strategy and clearly defined purposes of migration policy can be explained by a lack of development strategy detailed in economic strategy, demographic strategy, social strategy, etc. In fact, the call for fertility growth and resettlement of compatriots to cope with the current demographic crisis can hardly be taken seriously.

The specific nature of the Russian political space originates in the fact that in the current political structure there are no political parties or movements who could put to words and lobby interests of any particular population groups. The most powerful and numerous party, *Yedinaya Rossia* [United Russia] heralds itself as a ‘party of the nation’ and represents the interests of bureaucrats, large and medium-size businesses, law-enforcement bodies, trade unions, and even NGOs. Small-scale business is only just developing and is poorly organized. The social institutions are inadequately developed. In this situation, a social multiparty dialogue that would protect the migration policy from populist political claims and shape an appropriate migration management mode supported by every side, is simply impossible.

Since the early 2000s, the migration policy in Russia has been developing under the tough ‘line of command’ constructed by President Putin. His own understanding of what is good and what is bad for Russia in terms of migration, was translated into various revisions of
the migration legislation. One of the earliest decrees of President Medvedev validated the existing practice: the Ministry of Interior and the affiliated Federal Migration Service are the bodies ‘directly guided by the President of the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{64}

The poor coordination between ministries involved in the migration issues has resulted in a lack of the complex approach and the low transparency of the migration policy. The president’s personal initiatives to restrict the migration policy in accordance with growing security concerns in the early 2000s and an about-turn in 2006 suffered difficulties in implementation, and were not supported with an information and interpretation campaign. The following steps (ousting foreigners from the Russian market trade and a twofold reduction of quotas for temporary residence permits for 2007 against 2006\textsuperscript{65}) were blatantly populist. A deficit of a clear long-term migration strategy resulted in the work permits quota being axed from 6 million in 2007 to 1.8 million in 2008, which caused a renewal of illegal employment practices among Russian employers.

The Federal Migration Service that has already experienced an undeserved reassignment at the turn of the decade is attempting to distance itself from the unpopular regulations and obscure law revisions. A recent illustration is a statement by the Deputy Director of the FMS A. Kuznetsov explaining that the law on a facilitated procedure of migrant registration was adopted by the Duma while the Federal Migration Service is just monitoring its implementation.\textsuperscript{66}

The recent shift towards an ‘open door’ migration policy is definitely positive in its outcomes for migrants and their households. A wider access to legalization provides them with the social support and labor rights. A compatriots-oriented programme supports people who would like to come to Russia. The freedom of movement principle has not been revised despite sharp debates on the national security and challenges related to uncontrolled inflows and outflows of population. However, the realization of the post-totalitarian rights and freedoms by ex-USSR citizens is often limited by the inconsistent migration policy, unspecified social priorities, and continuing poverty. Besides, the preference of administrative instruments over economic incentives in the migration policy inherited from the Soviet period; the non-transparency and the priority of the State interests suggest the \textit{path dependence} effect despite all the radical changes in the Russian political life (Pierson 2000).

\textsuperscript{64} Decree of the President of the Russian Federation N: 724 of 12.05.2008 ‘Structure of Federal Bodies of the Executive Power’.


\textsuperscript{66} \url{http://www.oprf.ru/structure/comissions2008/108/news/3052}
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