Urbanisation and Migration: An Analysis of Trends, Patterns and Policies in Asia

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Abstract

The present paper overviews urbanisation and migration process in Asian countries at macro level since 1950s, including the projections made till 2030. It questions the thesis of southward movement of urbanisation and that of urban explosion in Asia. Increased unaffordability of urban space and basic amenities, negative policy perspective towards migration and various rural development programmes designed to discourage migration are responsible for this exclusionary urban growth and a distinct decline in urban rural growth differential, with the major exception of China. The changing structure of urban population across different size categories reveals a shift of growth dynamics from large to second order cities and stagnation of small towns. The pace of urbanization has been modest to high in select countries in Asia, not because of their level of economic growth but its composition and labour intensity of rapidly growing informal sectors. Several countries have launched programmes for improving governance and infrastructural facilities in a few large cities, attracting private investors from within as well as outside the country. These have pushed out squatter settlements, informal sector businesses along with a large number of pollutant industries to a few pockets and peripheries of the cities. The income level and quality of basic amenities in these cities, as a result, have gone up but that has been associated with increased intra-city disparity and creation of degenerated periphery. Nonetheless, there is no strong evidence that urbanization is associated with destabilization of agrarian economy, poverty and immiserisation, despite the measures of globalization resulting in regional imbalances. The overview of the trend and pattern suggests that the pace of urbanization would be reasonably high but much below the level projected by UNPD in the coming decades.

Keywords: urbanisation, migration, exclusion, periphery, informalisation, small towns, economic concentration, urban rural growth differential, Asia, China and India.

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1. Introduction

An overview of the contemporary literature on population mobility in Asian countries suggests that despite widely different trends and patterns, alternate policy frameworks and varying ideological dispositions of the policy makers and researchers, the dominant perspective is that the region is currently experiencing rapid urbanisation and migration and that this would continue in future years. The past decade and a half has been considered to be a period of a progressive shift of the epicentre of urbanisation from “the predominantly northern latitudes of developed countries to the southern ones of developing countries” and that “the mean latitude of global urban population has been steadily moving south.”¹ Several countries in Asia are noted to be experiencing acceleration in the growth in the number of migrants and urban population since the late seventies and as a result the continent currently account for about half of the world’s urban population. Projections have been made that the pace of urbanisation would go up in the next few decades which would double Asia’s urban population during 2000-30, its share in global urban population going up from 48 per cent to 54 per cent².

The proponents of ‘market and governance’ oriented perspective believe that the strategy of globalisation and structural reform is responsible for the acceleration of rural urban (RU) migration, giving boost to the pace of urbanisation. The later is attributed to pull factors operating through the cities and towns and much of the investment and consequent increase in employment would take place within or around the existing urban centres. This rapid pace of urbanisation is promoted by the scale of production, particularly in manufacturing, information asymmetries contributing to agglomeration economies, technological developments in transport and building sectors and substitution of capital for land. Even when the industrial units get located in inland rural settlements or virgin coastal areas, in a few years, the latter acquires urban status.

This perspective and the proposed package of solutions have not gone unchallenged. It is argued

¹ Rakesh Mohan and Dasgupta (2005)
² As per this projected figure (United Nations 2005), the implicit annual growth rate of urban population works out to be 2.3 per cent per annum. United Nations (2007) predicts that urban population would double between 2007 and 2050. This apparently impressive urban scenario implies that the growth rate would be only 1.6 per cent per annum, which is not very high as per the historical records.
that the pace of migration and urban development in Asia is associated with accentuation of regional and interpersonal inequality, resulting in increased poverty\(^3\). Furthermore, employment generation in the formal urban economy is not high due to capital intensive nature of industrialisation. A low rate of infrastructural investment in public sector - necessary for keeping budgetary deficits low - is resulting in deceleration of agricultural growth. This, coupled with open trade policy is responsible for “contraction of purchasing power” and destabilisation of agrarian economy, causing high unemployment and exodus from rural areas. All these are leading to rapid growth in urban population in several countries, most of the migrants being absorbed within informal economy. The protagonists as also the critics of globalization, thus, converge on the proposition that urban growth in the post liberalisation phase would be high. An analysis of the trend and process of urbanisation in Asia, however, gives reasons for questioning its validity. It would be important to begin the analysis of demographic trend by examining the empirical validity of the proposition of rapid RU migration and unprecedented urban growth\(^4\). The data on urban and total population used in the statistical analysis are from World Urbanisation Prospects (Revisions 2007) brought out by the Population Division, United Nations (UNPD)\(^5\). The Migration data are from the Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Population Division, UN. The UNPD classification of countries into regions and groups, have been adopted here, unless there are reasons for making a departure from this which then has been mentioned specifically.

The present paper overviews the urbanisation and migration process in Asian countries at macro level since 1950s including the projections made till 2030 in the second section which follows the present introductory section. An attempt is made here to examine the thesis of southward movement of urbanisation and urban explosion in Asia. An analysis of the trends and pattern of urbanisation

\(^3\) “The world’s poor once huddled largely in rural areas. In the modern world they have gravitated to the cities.” (Piel 1997). In a similar vein Anna Tibbajuka, Executive Director UN-HABITAT in her keynote address at the Opening Ceremony of the FIG Working Week 2008 argues that “95 percent of this urban expansion is taking place in those cities least equipped to negotiate the urban transition – the secondary cities of Africa and Asia. As a result we are witnessing the urbanisation of poverty.”

\(^4\) “This phenomenon of such rapid urbanisation is indeed unprecedented and it has changed human geography beyond recognition” Rakesh Mohan and Dasgupta (2005)

\(^5\) It is indeed true that UNPD compiles these figure from the Census or surveys in different countries that use different concepts for defining urban centres which creates problem of temporal and cross sectional comparability. Sometimes consecutive surveys in the same country employ different definitions including India, China and several other countries. Unfortunately, it is not possible to generate temporally and cross sectionally comparable figures by cleaning up the data from these anomalies.
across different regions and countries in the continent has been attempted, with reference to international migration in the third section. The next section overviews the changing structure of urban population across different size categories, shift of growth dynamics from large to second order cities and stagnation of small towns in different regions of Asia. Difficulties in decomposing incremental urban population into natural growth, new towns, expansion of urban boundaries and RU migration has been considered in the context of non availability of data on internal migration from standard international sources in the fifth section. It also speculates on the change in the share of each of these components based on fragmented evidence from different countries and proposed government policies. The sixth section attempts to understand the dynamics of migration and urbanisation in a historical and socio-cultural context and explores if that can justify the urban projection of the UN. The pattern of interdependencies of migration and urbanization with a select set of indicators articulating aspects of economic and social development for all the Asian countries has been carried out in the seventh section. The eighth section overviews the programmes and interventions at national, regional and city levels to determine the major thrusts of urban policy and their implications in the context of slum evictions in high income areas, city segmentation, degenerated peripheralisation as also deceleration in the rates of migration. The major findings of the study and reflections on the future urban scenario of Asia based on these are presented in the last section.

2. A Macro Overview of Urbanisation and International Migration

The demographic weight of Asia, accounting for over 60 per cent of world population, is so overwhelming that researchers, planners and administrators have often build their perspective on Asian urbanisation and migration based on the absolute magnitudes or the changes in these in relation to corresponding global figures. The facts that the share of Asia in global urban population has gone up from 32 per cent in 1950 to 44 per cent in 1970 and then to about 50 per cent in 2005 have often been quoted to support an over optimistic or alarmist view of urbanisation. That Asia claims about half of world’s urban population in 20086 and that it would exceed the global figure by

6 This event “is a consequence of rapid urbanisation in the last decades, especially in less developed regions” United Nations (2008)
16 per cent in 2030 are simple milestones and not significant landmarks. There is a need to look at these in the context of the increases in its share in total population rather than treating these as sensational events or major achievements in history. The large shares of Asia in total number of migrants or incremental urban population reflect the impact of the rural and urban population base that are responsible for sending out and receiving these people. Similarly, the number (or its share in global total) of cities above certain cut off point (say a million or five million) increasing dramatically in recent past simply implies that a large number of cities existed just below that point in Asia and the population growth here, which is largely due to natural and socio-cultural factors, is higher than their counterparts in developed countries. These milestones would have been achieved in a decade or so, even if the urban rural growth differential (URGD, taken here as the in the annual exponential growth rate of population difference between urban and rural areas) was below that of the rest of the world, simply because of Asia’s higher population growth. The components of URGD and implications of its declining trend has been discussed in some detail in Appendix I.

A glance at the Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the speed of urbanisation in Latin America including Caribbean during the second half of the present century was spectacular which led the percentage of urban population going up from 41 per cent to 75 per cent. Africa, too, registered similar urban growth during 1950-70, the rate slowing down after this period. Sub Saharan Africa has recorded even higher URGD (which has continued throughout the half century) as is the case of South America - a region within Latin America. It is argued that Asia now “will replicate the experience of these continents”.

The growth rate in urban population and URGD in Asia are reasonably high but have fluctuated over the past decades (Table 2). The rates were above that of the world average, both when China is included or excluded in the calculations, during the entire second half of the last century. Understandably, these were higher than that of Europe and North America mainly because, in the latter two regions, the rural population base, from where migrants come to cities and towns, is very low due to the high percentage of urban population. The Asian rates have, nonetheless, been consistently below that of South America and Sub Saharan Africa. More importantly, these were

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7 “The world is now half urban. Sometime in 2008, humankind achieved a momentous milestone” UN-Habitat (2008)
less than that of Latin America and whole of Africa until the mid seventies. The rates have decelerated since the late sixties. The real acceleration in urban growth and URGD came during the second half of the seventies, the rates being higher than that of Africa and about the same as Latin America during 1975-90. These have come down once again during nineties. The URGD declined from 2.35 percent during 1970-90 to 2.28 per cent during 1990-00, the latter being less than that of Latin America and has remained so during the entire period 1990-2005, for which data are available.

Analysing the changing pattern of international migration, it is noted that the stock of immigrants in Asia was less than 2 per cent in 1960 which has declined systematically since then (Table 3). The corresponding figure for the world as also all other regions were much higher. A declining trend, however, is noted in other developing regions as well. The growth rate in the stock of foreign migrants in Asia has declined dramatically during nineties as compared to the preceding two decades which corresponds to the deceleration in urban growth. The continent as a whole is experiencing net outmigration (3 per thousand during each quinquennial period since 1990), although the rate is below that of Africa and much below that of Latin America (Table 4). Importantly, the growth in the stock of immigrants was negative during sixties, primarily due to political turmoil/transition in Cambodia, Turkey etc. The corresponding rates for Latin America and Caribbean and all less developed countries were also negative. The Asian growth rate in the stock of migrants picked up during seventies and eighties working out to be 2.1 per cent and 2.4 per cent respectively - the aggregate figure working out to be just below the world average. It came down significantly to 0.1 per cent during nineties and subsequent period - much below the average figure of the world.

There has been a growing concentration of international out-migrants from Asia in a few countries in the developed world. In 1960, 57 per cent of all migrants lived in the less developed regions but

8 See Kundu and Kundu (2009)

9 Inglis (2005) argues that the security concerns of the Asian Governments, like the Malaysian government resorting to mass deportation in 2002, were factors behind decline in the rate.

10 The United States is the largest recipient of international migrants, with 38 million migrants followed by the Russian Federation having 12 million.
by 2005, just 37 per cent did so, Asia accounting for 53 million or 28 per cent, basically due to its high demographic weight. Of the top twenty countries in terms of the share in total international migrants, exactly half are from Asia both in 1990 as well as 2005. It would, however, be erroneous to take this as an evidence of Asia being a major receiver of international migrants as the share in total population is just one per cent. This figure as also the growth rate in the number of immigrants in Asia have declined dramatically in recent years.\(^1\)

It may nonetheless be noted that the refugees, who face far serious problems of rehabilitation, as a percentage of total immigrants has increased in Asia from 2.3 per cent in 1960 to 14.6 per cent in 2005 (Table 5). In contrast, the corresponding figure for the world has gone up only marginally from 3 per cent to 7 per cent. Further, Asian migration tends to be more male selective than in the rest of the world. The female share in total migrants in Asia is 45 per cent in 2005 compared to the global figure of 50 per cent (Table 6). Interestingly, the ratio was only 46.5 per cent both in the World as well as Asia in 1960. While in case of the former, it increased to achieve male female parity, in Asia it has worsened marginally.

3. **Regional and Cross Country Variation in Urban Growth with specific Reference to International Migration**

Migration and urbanization in Asia are characterised by wide diversity across countries which can only be explained in the context of their history, social fabric and political environment. Notwithstanding these, levels of economic development and disparity in growth emerge as important determinants of the spatial pattern of urbanization over the past five and a half decades (Table 3 & 4). Variations are noted in the percentage and rates of international migrants across regions that roughly correspond to their levels and pace of urban growth.

\(^1\) In a sharp contrast to that, the growth in migrant stock in developed countries was fairly impressive - about 2 per cent per annum - during sixties and seventies. The growth rate accelerated to 5.5 per cent during eighties which was more than two times the figure of the developing countries. This can partially be attributed to the formation of smaller states through fragmentation of larger units (a number of countries emerging from Soviet Union in 1991, Yugoslavia in 1992 and Czechoslovakia in 1993 ‘converted’ many citizens moving within a country into international migrants). The migration rate for the developed countries during 1980-90 works out to be much higher than that of the developing countries, even if one makes adjustment for the emergence of new countries. That is the case in the subsequent decade as well.
In a sharp contrast to the high incidence of foreign migrants in West Asia which has a high level of urbanisation, the other regions of Asia report less than one per cent foreign migrants, if the values are recalculated by excluding the erstwhile communist countries (Table 3). The total number of migrants in the former is less than the combined migrant population of other three regions by only two million in 2005. The high migration in West Asia during 1950-90 has been linked to the boom in urban economy due to their oil linked earnings and phenomenal growth in construction industry, creating commercial and business space for the global economy.

The cities in the region understandably collapsed with the withdrawal of commercial and financial capital as their growth was not rooted in strong industrial base. All the West Asian countries, except Iraq, Turkey and Yemen have very high percentage of immigrants, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Palestine reporting about or more than fifty per cent figure. The significant deceleration in the growth rate of foreign migrants compared to preceding three decades and a net outmigration during nineties can be attributed to the economic meltdown in the countries which affected their cities adversely, bringing down their growth in urban population. It is indeed true that many of the South Asian workers continue to trail the earlier generation migrants to the oil-rich countries in the Middle-East (the region taken here as West Asia excluding erstwhile Soviet countries) for jobs even after the oil boom, in retail service and maintenance, house construction, store-keeping, security etc.\(^\text{12}\), more workers have moved to better-paying jobs in South-East Asia during 1990-05\(^\text{13}\). Besides Japan, the more attractive destinations are Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. Sri Lankan women, for example, have gone to Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong as domestic help, Bangladeshis have gone to Malaysia as plantation workers while Nepalese have sought construction jobs in the Republic of Korea. India, however, being at a higher distance from SE Asian countries, has continued to send workers largely to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states. Indeed, migration in the twentieth-century Asia had a bottom-heavy structure dominated by the movement of blue-collar workers. The pattern has continued through the seventies

\(^{12}\) The marginal decline in the growth rate of migrants in West Asia (excluding erstwhile Communist countries) could be due to saturation in labour market as also policies of restricting further migration largely from Asian countries.

\(^{13}\) Docquier and Rapoport (2007) highlight that international migration has become \textit{increasingly} selective in recent years.
and eighties when South Asians were absorbed in construction, small factories, domestic services, and agriculture within and outside Asia. It was only in the 1990s, that the computer personnel, software managers and IT engineers started going to not only East and SE Asia but also Western countries\textsuperscript{14}.

It may be noted that a few of the countries belonging to South Central Asia like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and those falling in West Asia like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (that together with Russian Federation constitute “North and Central Asia”) have data problems for the period 1960-90 due to their being part of erstwhile USSR\textsuperscript{15}. During 1990-05, these countries report high stock of migrants, mostly above 5 per cent of their population (Table 3). This can be explained in terms of policies of shifting population from one region to another within USSR for political as also developmental reasons before and after the Revolution. The process of industrialization and subsequent coming up of many townships with modern structures and facilities provided a whole new basis of urbanization as well as migration. Workers were shifted with their families for construction related projects, considered necessary for nation building.

These movements have become rare after the collapse of the Soviet system. The disruption of an otherwise integrated system has led to destabilisation of the economies in the region. The system with its emphasis on development of urban infrastructure was no longer in existence to attract the rural population which at least had food supply to sustain them in their agrarian setting. On the other hand, the disarray in the economy affected the process of urban industrial growth adversely. Thus, the withdrawal or weakening of federal support that had sustained their growth in the fifties and sixties dwindled the economic base of their cities. All of these were responsible for these countries experiencing a rapid decline in immigration from other countries and sending out a large number of migrants to Russian Federation and a small number to Western Europe (Table 4). All

\textsuperscript{14} Asian students in the British and American universities respectively to stay on and work, rather than return to their countries of origin on completion of their degrees. With the launch of the Science and Engineering Graduate Scheme (SEGS) in 2004, it has become easier to remain in the UK and pursue a career.

\textsuperscript{15} The creation of a large number of countries out of USSR would imply that those who moved within the country and were considered as internal migrants would now be identified as international migrants in the nineties.
these factors have been responsible for the deceleration in the rate of internal migration from rural to urban areas as well, manifest in deceleration in their urban growth/URGD during 1990-05.

South Central Asia records a significant decline in URGD which is basically due to a similar trend in India, which accounts for about 70 per cent of the population of the region and 17 per cent of the world population. This in turn has been partly responsible for the slowing down of this rate in the whole of Asia. The rate of outmigration in India was low during eighties but has become high in the nineties and later years (Table 4). One, however, must not delink this from similar deceleration in other countries in the region. The second and the third largest countries, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and two other neighboring countries like Sri Lanka and Afghanistan exhibit a similar trend. Furthermore, Pakistan and Sri Lanka record significant fall in the number of foreign nationals. Bangladesh, too, is following this pattern since late nineties. In case of Afghanistan, complete disarray of institutions has led to an absence of stable governance conducive to growth. Significantly, the decade long political violence in the northern part of Nepal has not led to any deceleration in urban growth which in fact shows an increase along with that in Bhutan. However due to their small population weight they make no dent on the regional scenario.

The South Eastern Asia, interestingly records reasonably high URGD during the entire period, the average figure going up from 2.5 per cent during 1950-90 to 3.5 per cent during 1990-00. All the countries in the region, except Myanmar and Timor-Lest, record high rates of urbanisation and no deceleration in that during nineties, despite being trapped in Asian Economic crisis (Table 2). The percentage of international migrants for all the countries were low except Malaysia and of course the small city states of Singapore and Brunei Darussalam during sixties, seventies and eighties but jumped up suddenly in the nineties (Table 3). The rates can be seen as going up during nineties except Indonesia which can be attributed to a series of ethnic and political upheaval. The scenario in South East Asia in some sense contrasts with that of West Asia. The former has shown greater stability in its urban growth and the URGD has ranged between 1.8 and 3.3 and going up to 3.7 in the latest decade, almost opposite to what has happened in West Asia.

The other region to record moderate to high urban growth during the entire second half of the last century is East Asia. The consistent rise in URGD in the region during the three successive periods
under consideration is because of a similar trend in China which accounts for over 86 per cent of the population in the region. The country had experienced low urban growth and URGD during 1950-70 partly due to definitional factors – particularly adoption of a more stringent criterion for identifying urban centres in 1964 Census compared to the previous one\textsuperscript{16}. The rates picked up in late seventies and accelerated during eighties, due to opening up of the economy. Researchers have, however, explained a part of the acceleration in terms of the adoption of a more liberal criterion for identifying the urban centres in 1982, which led to the number of towns becoming more than twofold, comprising largely small and medium-sized cities\textsuperscript{17}. In 1984, the guidelines for identifying urban centres were further loosened, allowing for lower population cut off points and nonagricultural percentages. Similarly, the Censuses of 2000 and 2008 have adopted incrementally liberal definitions that seem to have ‘accelerated’ the rate of urbanisation. The opening up policy is reflected also in the sudden increase in the growth of foreign migrants during eighties and nineties. This, nonetheless, have not had much effect on its rate of urbanisation unlike in central Asian and West Asian countries, as the share of foreign migrants in total or urban population is very small.

The proportion of female migrants in Asia has been low and this has declined further in recent years. The situation seems to be alarming in West Asian countries where the figure has gone down from 47 per cent to 39 per cent during 1960-05. This is attributed to the state policies discouraging family immigration. South Central as also South Eastern Asia report unfavorable sex ratio among the migrants but the saving grace is that the figure has improved the figure marginally over the years. In South Central Asia and West Asia, the share of refugees in total migrants has gone up significantly during the four and a half decades. The regions have seen a series of political convulsions and disturbances due to both internal as well as external factors which resulted in massive displacement of people.

\textsuperscript{16} China's statistics regarding urban population sometimes can be misleading because of not too infrequent definitional changes. In the 1953 census, settlements with populations above 2,500 wherein more than 50 percent of the labor force were engaged in nonagricultural pursuits were referred to as “urban”. The 1964 Census, however, raised the cut-off to 3,000 and the requirement for nonagricultural labor to 70 percent that could be responsible for the low growth rate.

\textsuperscript{17} The 1982 census had maintained the 3,000 and 70 percent cut off points of the previous Census but introduced the criteria of 2,500 to 3,000 and 85 percent as well. Also, in calculating urban population, it included the agricultural population residing within the city boundaries, thereby making a departure from the past practice.
The differential urban growth across the countries in Asia as also the rates of international migration and sex ratio can, to an extent, be attributed to their processes macro economic development. Most of these countries show a decline in their rates in international migration and URGD, from the first period, 1950-70, to the second period, 1970-90, and then to the third period, 1990-05 which, with a few exceptions, corresponds roughly to their rates of economic growth. It would be important to see how the trends and patterns of international migration, largely into urban centres, are linked with that of migration from rural to urban areas within the countries, as attempted in the fifth section.

4. Changing Structure of Urbanisation with Differential Growth across Size Class of Urban Centres

The cities and towns in different size categories have been growing at different rates, altering the size composition of urban population. The share of urban centres with population below half a million (BHM) has remained stable at fifty percent in Asia over the past 30 years while the global figure has come down from a much higher to this level during this period (Table 7). The variation in the figure across continents and regions, however, works out to be high. The developed regions like North America, Central America, Australia and New Zealand, for example, record figures much below fifty per cent. Contrastingly, all the regions in Europe report figures between 60 and 70 per cent. One would stipulate that in countries where the process of urban industrial development has a long history, urban structure tends to be more balanced and broad based as compared to the new continents where the process has taken roots in recent times. In case of the latter, development impulses get concentrated in and around a few large cities.

The degree of population concentration in large cities in Asia emerges clearly from the fact that the percentage of people living in cities with five million plus population is 18 as compared to the figure of 15 at the global level. This is a manifestation of top heavy urbanisation. The ten-million plus Asian cities, however, have recorded no increase in their number and barely 1.7 per cent population growth per annum which is much below that of cities between 5 and 10 million people during 2000-07. And yet, the growth rates of the latter - both in number as also population during 1990-05 are much below that of the previous decades. The growth dynamics seems to have shifted
to cities between 1 and 5 million. These second level cities are projected to grow faster than the ten million and five million plus cities during 2005-25 as may be seen in Table 8. These cities are likely to attract much of financial as also industrial capital in future years, resulting in their rapid population growth. Interestingly, the number of million plus cities has increased from 143 in 1990 to 192 in 2000 and further to 246 in 2005. The number of these cities in China has gone up from 63 in 1990 to 87 in 2000 and 94 in 2005. The other country to record increase in the number of these cities is India, the figure going up from 23 to 32 and then to 40.

The importance of the BHM cities and towns in the urban system and their population shares vary significantly across regions within Asia as in no other continent, despite their percentage share remaining stable at 50 per cent (Table 5). East Asia, for example, has less than 40 per cent urbanites living here while the corresponding figure for South Eastern Asia is over 70 per cent. The shares of South Central Asia and Western Asia lie in between the two limits - at 53 per cent and 49 per cent respectively.

The directions of change in the size composition of urban population, too, differ considerably across the regions. South Central and Western Asia report a decline in the share of BHM urban centres, the percentage figure going down from 65 and 62 in 1975 to 53 and 49 in 2005 respectively. This declining trend is projected to continue in the next couple of decades. One would argue that the thrust of migration would shift from mega cities to the middle and lower order cities. Unfortunately, the towns below a hundred thousand population do not seem to be receiving many migrants. Also, emergence of new towns through rural urban transformation is not adding to the demographic weight of this category.

As opposed to this, East Asia and South East Asia have registered an increase in their shares of BHM urban centres from 34 per cent to 40 per cent and from 60 per cent to 70 per cent respectively during this period (Table 5). It is projected that five-million plus cities would not claim larger

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18 UN-Habitat (2008) reports that the “L(l)arge cities in the developing world, with populations of more than 5 million people ….. did not experience such high growth rates in the 1990s; the average annual growth rate of large cities was 1.8 per cent, with the exception of those in China”

19 This can be explained in terms of the rapid growth in the number and population in large cities in China occurring as a result of the government's emphasis on urban development at higher end after 1949 and the reform measures adopted since mid seventies. Understandably, the 22 most populous cities had a total of 47.5 million people or about 12 percent of the country’s total urban population in 1985.
shares in total/urban population over the next couple of decades in the former. This could be because of the change in the strategy of urban industrial development and a policy shift in favour of middle level cities, particularly in China. South East Asia shows a rise in the share of the BHM towns in the eighties and nineties but stabilizes subsequently, possibly because of economic crisis of the nineties that had slowed down migration towards large metropolises. One may argue that the urban structure here has become less top heavy over time which may have a healthy impact on urban system in the long run.

The maximum top heaviness in the urban structure is noted in South Central Asia which has over 22 per cent of urban population in five million plus cities, followed by East Asia for which the figure is 18 per cent (Table 7). The latter has 42 per cent of urban population in cities between half million to 5 million, compared to 25 per cent in SC Asia, which is responsible for a somewhat broader urban base in the former. Furthermore, the increase in the population share of half million plus cities has been dramatic in the SC Asia, from 35 per cent to 47 per cent during 1975-2005. A similar increase has been recorded in West Asia as well. The only difference is that in the latter, one to five million cities predominate as opposed to ten million plus cities in the former. The SC Asia may, therefore, be considered to be a bit more unbalanced compared to even West Asia.

It is a matter of anxiety that the cities at the third level, with population between half to a million, that had witnessed acceleration in growth during 1990-05, would report low growth in future years. More importantly, the towns at the lowest end of urban hierarchy, that have in general recorded low population growth all throughout the period under consideration²⁰, would experience growth much below the million plus cities in the next couple of decades. One would argue that not only the population growth in these towns has been low, there has not been any reasonable increase in their number through RU transformation²¹. This emerges as a major area of concern for the continent in the context of balanced regional development.

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²⁰ A recent study (Webster 2004) focussing on SE Asian countries, particularly China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Philippines, Vietnam and Mongolia reports the annual population growth rate in many of the small towns as very low and even negative. In case of Mongolia, the rate has been noted to be negative, “with virtually all dynamism focusing on Ulaan Baatar”. In Philippines, only natural growth and migration have been considered as factors behind urban growth with exclusion of the contribution of new towns.

²¹ In India, these towns are finding it difficult to finance any of their development projects through internal
4. **Decomposition of Urban Growth and Estimation of Internal Migration**

**Problems of Comparability of Data on Internal Migration and Generalisations**

Studies on internal migration are seriously constrained by the fact that no international organisation systematically collects or tabulates even the basic demographic information on this in a cross sectionally and temporally comparable manner. Whether this is because of the low priority attached to this theme or difficulties in gathering the information due to inherent reporting bias, the outcome has tragically been that this subject has received little importance in research agenda and policy making. Despite the number of persons moving within the countries being much larger than any other type of movement in Asia, it has not figured in ‘mainstream’ reports on development, such as Human Development or World Development Report. There has been an upsurge of interest in international migration and of late, an enormous amount of literature has come up on it and yet migration within countries, particularly that linked to search for livelihood, has failed to motivate the researchers and policy makers. This is responsible for the lack of integration of the theories on spatial mobility of labour with mainstream development economics.

The data constraints on internal mobility are extremely important but this can not be a justification for the continued lack of attention on this phenomenon\(^{22}\). Information available from national statistical agencies in most Asian countries are indeed inadequate in capturing temporary movements. Consequently, the scholars working on internal mobility have chosen to work with primary data. Micro level studies focused on a region, a sector or an issue, understandably, have limitations in putting forward a macro perspective. Researchers nonetheless have attempted to combine the national statistics with information and impressions gathered through field studies, for developing a macro perspective on migration and its correlates. Governmental interest in internal migration surfacing sporadically has to a great extent been politically driven – more often being guided by an alarmist framework, linked to the programmes to control inflow of people for security resources or borrowings from capital market in the era of globalization. The fiscal discipline imposed by the government, credit rating agencies and other financial intermediaries, make it impossible for these even to maintain the level of services. As a consequence, the absolute number of these (Census) towns have gone down in 2001, the first time in the century.

\(^{22}\) Haan (2005)
concerns or reducing pressure on limited resources/amenities in receiving regions/cities. In the absence of rigorous data on the subject, this negative perspective has often guided not only the research framework but also data generation process and empirical findings.

It is no surprise that researchers, sincerely regretting the inadequacies in official statistical system\textsuperscript{23} and non-comparability of information collected through micro studies, have come around to the conclusion that internal migration within Asian countries is high and increasing over time. Probing the aspects of data availability in some detail and overviewing the research studies in four Asian countries - India, China, Indonesia and Vietnam - Deshingkar (2006) argues that “there is persuasive evidence from locations across Asia that population mobility has increased at an unprecedented rate in the last two decades”, the proposition getting endorsement of Overseas Development Institute (2006) as well. The studies on Vietnam, (Guest 1998, Djamba et al. 1999) underline the problem of the seasonal and temporary migrants into urban areas and rapidly industrialising zones not being captured in Census as the major hurdle in policy research. The scholars, nonetheless, have no reservation in stipulating that “given the current development patterns and future projections on urbanisation, the growth of manufacturing and agricultural development, it is very likely that internal migration, both temporary and permanent, will persist and grow”. A similar perspective dominates urban development scene in Pakistan despite research studies revealing that that there are “blind spots in the data” and that rural populations are less able to fill demand in urban labour markets” resulting in “a reduction in out-migration from rural areas”\textsuperscript{24}

The alarmist perspective regarding internal migration could be attributed to the projection of urban population made by UNPD and other national and international agencies. These are distinctly on a higher side. The policy perspective of controlling RU migration and slowing down the growth of large cities has motivated administrators and policy makers to readily accept such propositions. The opposition to the anti migration initiatives, too, have been guided by humanistic appeal, anecdotal evidences, and mobilization by media or NGO groups around specific issues, rather than strong

\textsuperscript{23} Rogaly et al. (hold that while in Vietnam and China, the formal registration system is likely to miss out migrants employed in the grey economy, in India where such registration system does not exist, short duration rural-rural migration is likely to be under-recorded.

\textsuperscript{24} Rolfe (2008)
empirical evidence.

Department of Economics and Social Affairs of the United Nations (UN 2000) has made a serious attempt to decompose the increase in urban population into a few components for 55 countries falling in different continents. Of these, in case of 21 countries the figures for urban growth due to internal migration/reclassification for the eighties are available in comparison with that of the seventies or sixties. Importantly, only four countries record a decline in the figure while 17 report the opposite trend. This in a way confirms the apprehension that the contribution of internal migration is becoming weak over the decades.\(^{25}\)

*Decomposition of Urban Growth and the Change in the Components over time*

Given the data related problems, a few researchers\(^{26}\) have attempted to estimate the number of rural to urban (RU) migrants through indirect methods, using the population figures from Population Census. Based on a simple identity, the incremental urban population during a decade has been decomposed into four segments: (a) natural increase, (b) new towns less declassified towns, (c) merging of towns and jurisdictional changes in agglomerations and (d) RU migration. The mathematical derivation of the components is given in Appendix I. It has been argued that there is serious underreporting of the migrants due to hostile environment in the places of destination and consequently, the number can be estimated also as a residual component. In the Indian case, the contribution of RU migration in total incremental urban population through this residual approach has been estimated to be 21 per cent during the nineties. It should be possible to use this framework for working out the figures for all countries for which the migration data are suspects. Importantly, in Indian case, this figure works out to be almost identical to that of the increase in lifetime migrants, reported in the Population Census of 2001. One can argue that the negative attitude towards the

\(^{25}\) The study by DESA (UN 2000) additionally puts up a Table showing that the percentage share of internal migration and reclassification in the total increase in urban population has gone up from 40 per cent in sixties to 44 percent in seventies and further to 54 per cent in eighties for the developing world (Table IV5 in the Report). The corresponding percentage figures for Asia work out to be 40, 47 and 64 respectively. One may note that the growth in urban population for Asia during seventies computed through the figures in the Table is much higher than actually reported by UNPD while that for the eighties is the other way around. This understandably is because the countries included in the analysis in the three decades have not been kept the same. Consequently, the percentage figures are not temporally comparable, lending little support to the proposition of increasing role of migration in urbanisation.

\(^{26}\) East West Centre, Kundu (2003)
migrants, making them report longer period of residence in urban centres, as discussed below, has not prompted or allowed them to misreport their place of birth.

It would be important to examine the proposition if RU migration within the countries has gone down in relative terms over recent decades in the Asian countries, as noted in case of international migrants. The decline in the rate of growth in urban population in most of these countries understandably is due to decline in natural growth. One can, however, isolate the impact of population growth by focusing on URGD, assuming that the decline in rural and urban areas are similar in magnitude. Now, it may be seen in Table 2 that URGD has gone down for Asia as also in 36 out of 50 countries during nineties compared to the preceding two decades. The deceleration in urban growth must, therefore, be explained in terms of factors other than natural increase in population.

Can the deceleration in the pace of urbanisation be attributed to the second factor - growth dynamics becoming week at lower category of settlements slowing down the process of RU transformation. It is possible to hypothesise that since globalization tends to promote growth in large cities, not many new towns would come up on the scene and several existing towns would get declassified. It is difficult to answer this question with definite evidence as information on small towns in all countries of Asia are not available. Also, the definition of urban centres varies across countries that would affect the data base for smaller towns, clouding the understanding of classification/declassification and RU transformation. In the absence of the firm and comparable data at country level, it would be worthwhile to tie up fragmented evidence from different regions and countries, link these up with existing and proposed policies of government and speculate on the change due to this factor.

The regional strategies followed in several Asian countries to contain metropolitan expansion include development of satellite towns. Without trying to be exhaustive, certain country/city specific cases may be cited in this context. India has avowedly tried to promote the growth of small and medium towns through infrastructural provisions and incentives to private entrepreneurs. Besides, there have been regional plans, lunched for major metropolises with the objective of diverting migrants to peripheral townships. Similar programmes have been adopted in and around other metro cities in Asia as well. In case of Seoul, specific planning guidelines were designed for the capital

27 Incase the SE Asian region (with 11 countries) is excluded, the number goes down to 5 only.
region for establishment of ten satellite towns within a radius of thirty kilometers from the city. The
growth in these cities, each with population between 200,000 and 1,000,000, has been rapid,
attracting especially low-skilled, poorly educated youths, creating thereby a degenerated periphery
(Yeung 1986). A similar programme has been pursued around Shanghai since late fifties, each
satellite towns, located twenty to seventy kilometers from the city, absorbing between 50,000 to
200,000 inhabitants. In the current Eleventh Five-Year Plan for China, the policy of accelerated
urbanization remains in force (Fan 2008) but the emphasis has shifted to small and medium towns
(urban areas with 50,000 – 250,000 population) that have been the “workhorses” of Chinese
urbanization. In case of India, a study based on field data confirm that population growth in the
periphery of cities has been rapid but that has led to miserable micro environment and poor health,
education and environmental outcomes.

The city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore, too, have used satellite towns to decentralize
population and economic activities from congested core areas since the early 1960s, although on a
much smaller scale. The program in Hong Kong has been pursued vigorously since 1972 with
considerable success. As a result, the percentage of population living in the towns in the hinterland
rose from 9.8 percent to 18.8 percent during 1971-81. Attempts to redistribute population away
from primate cities such as Bangkok and Jakarta have also met with reasonable success (Yeung
1986). In Mongolia and Cambodia that are economically less developed, the national strategies
have focussed on developing secondary cities to act as “growth poles”. In fact, “growth centre
approach” happens to be a part of urbanization strategies in the entire SE Region. Programmes have
been launched also in West Asia too for controlling excessive concentration in large cities and
diverting investments and prospective migrants into “neighboring small towns and intermediate
cities, supplemented by creation of new towns” (Sheikh, 2007). In view of such endeavours
reported in most of the countries in Asia, one would expect emergence and growth of a few new
towns. Given the policy of globalisation and thrust on global cities, these towns are likely to emerge
around the metropolitan cities\(^\text{28}\). It is therefore possible to hold that the contribution of new towns in
incremental urban population may not go down in future years.

\(^{28}\) “The slowing down of growth in large cities and high growth in the peripheries or satellitic cites and towns
has been described as the “doughnut effect”.\)” UN-Habitat (2008)
The impetus of growth in Asia has shifted from five million plus cities to those with one million, as discussed in the preceding section. While the very small towns, particularly those in remote areas at a distance of major metropolises, have not attracted national and global investors, the latter have sought locations in close proximity of the first and second order cities. This has led to expansion in the boundaries of agglomerations and merging of old and new towns with the central city. This phenomenon has become conspicuous around the global cities in China, India and many other countries in this continent.

Overviewing of the process of urbanisation in the SE Asian countries, Webster (2004) underlines the importance of peripheral development around metro cities. He argues that in case of fast-growing urban centres, peri-urban areas have experienced rapid economic growth as that is the easiest environment in which new communities and manufacturing structures can be built, absorbing large numbers of migrants. In addition, “large segments of the existing poor living in urban cores are being pushed to the periphery by land market forces or drawn there by employment opportunities”. Importantly, the informal activities of the poor along with other pollutant industries are being shifted out to the ‘degenerated periphery’. The population growth rate outside the formal boundaries in several mega cities of Asia, therefore, works out to be much higher than that within the city.

Much of urbanization (about 30-35%) in Indonesia, for example, is occurring through transformation of rural settlements into urban places as also outward spread of large cities enveloping rural communities because of the extremely high rural densities. This has been noted to be an important factor in rice growing areas of Vietnam, China, and Thailand as well29. There is thus no reason why the expansion of city boundaries, the third component in the decomposition model, should become less important over time. In case of Seoul, most of the environmentally hazardous industries are getting relocated in its periphery. Istanbul, too, has serious problems of degenerated periphery largely because of in migration of people from the southeast of Turkey, particularly Anatolia, searching for employment. Mostly they are settled in the outskirts of the city that had a number of factories. This results in the emergence of new ‘gecekondu’ with illegal and sub standard dwelling units accounting for as high as 65 per cent of all the buildings at the outskirts.

29 Webster (2004)
of the city, which are later integrated into the metropolis\textsuperscript{30}.

Based on the overview, it would be difficult to attribute the fall in URGD during nineties to decline in natural increase, contribution of new towns or expansion in urban boundaries.

\textit{Policies and Programmes Concerning Internal Migration and their Impact}

The explanation for declining URGD can possibly be sought in terms of decline in RU migration. The data available on migration from a few of the countries may be examined for this purpose. One must analyse internal migration in China in some detail as this is the most discussed subject among quantitative demographers as also this is one of the very few Asian countries which reports acceleration in urbanisation and migration. The Fourth Population Census of China which considers persons who have stayed in the enumeration areas for more than 1 year during the period of July 1st, 1985 - July 1st, 1990 as migrants, reports their number to be 34 million in 1990. Of these 16 million are rural migrants in urban areas, constituting 59 percent of the total urban migrants (PCOSC, 1993). The National Population Sample Survey covering the period 1990-1995, which excluded the persons who moved within the city from the category of migrants, however, reports the figure to be 36 million in 1995, giving a very low annual growth of 1.1 per cent per annum. This may be considered unrealistic in view of the urban dynamics in the country during this period. The sample survey conducted by the State Family Planning Commission in 1992 covering 30 provinces, suggested the migration rate to be much higher. As per the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 2006), the number of migrants has increased dramatically from about 26 million in 1988 to 126 million in 2004 implying an annual growth rate of 14 per cent. The information from these sources, thus, vary significantly, reflecting unresolved conceptual and methodological issues and non comparability of data. There “is no consistent criterion for collecting data” on mobile population who continue to remain “statistically invisible” (Fang 2000). Given the widely different estimates and projections, one has no basis to hold that migration would accelerate in future years.

\textsuperscript{30} The problem of the periphery of Istanbul has become a matter of global concern since the Izmit earthquake of 1999 which brought forth massive destruction for people residing in these substandard houses.
The government programmes to launch policies to strengthen the rural economy are likely to slow down RU migration, as has been observed in recent years. The State Council has issued a policy document in the year 2008 vowing to set up a permanent mechanism for closing urban-rural gaps. The government has boosted investment in the countryside, slashed fees and taxes for farmers, rolled out favourable medical care schemes and strengthened protection of farmers’ land rights. As per Chen Xiwen, the Director of the Office of the Central Leading Group on Rural Work, the central government is raising its rural budget by about a third compared to last year. Importantly, the latter, too, represented a record-high increase of 17 per cent over the previous year. Correspondingly, the local governments in cities have adopted policies that aim at reducing competition from rural migrant workers through a series of discriminatory policies.

Urban population in China has been noted to be 530 million in 2005 by the Population Division of the UN. As per the NBS, the number of workers in urban areas was 480 million at the end of 2006. China’s rate of urbanization was between 3 and 6 per cent during early 1990s before coming down to the 3-4 per cent during the late 1990s. However, in the early years of the present decade, the rate appears to have accelerated again. The Bureau Release in February 2008 reveals that number of rural people engaged in agriculture shrank by more than 80 million between 1996 and 2006. Further, 70.8 percent of rural workers were engaged in some type of agriculture at the end of 2006 which is five percentage points less than that of 1996. Furthermore, a nation wide survey (see Chan and Hu 2003), had reported the floating population to have gone up from 70 million in 1993 to 140 million in 2003. Westendoff (2008) estimates the size of the floating population in the range of 150-200 million. The majority of these migrants are circular migrants who retain strong links with their rural family. Faced with all these statistics, one may hold that while sectoral diversification will shift workers from agriculture to industries and business, the state may not allow large scale absorption for avoiding pressure on urban infrastructures and social security system. It would nonetheless allow them to shuttle between rural and urban areas and consequently, the share of migrants in incremental urban population may not go up significantly.

31 Times of India the 31st December, 2008
32 see Chan and Hu (2003)
33 Besides these, researchers have projected as early as 1994, that China had a surplus of approximately 200 million agricultural workers, and the number was expected to increase to 300 million in the early twenty-first century. Current projections suggest that between 12 and 13 million migrants will move to urban areas each year over the next two decades. This will be on top of the existing 103 million urban migrants, as officially reported (Fang 2000).
Indonesia has policies restricting internal migration like China, though the system is less rigid. The government here has taken several measures to discourage the prospective migrants from entering the large cities and re-directing them to rural areas or provinces that have labour shortages (Munir 2002). Interestingly, a field study by Hugo has noted widespread prevalence of circular migration and commutation from rural to urban areas, as in case of China, as early as in the seventies which slowed down permanent migration. A resurvey conducted in 1992-93 further confirms this kind of mobility since only 20 percent of households reported dependence on agriculture for their livelihood. (Hugo 2003). A comprehensive longitudinal study (Collier et al. 1993) of 37 villages in Java carried out over the period 1967-91 further corroborates this finding.

Many city level initiatives have also made it difficult for the migrants to become legal residents of the city. For example, in Jakarta\textsuperscript{34}, under the "closed city" policy, migrants are required to show evidence of employment and housing before being issued a residence permit. Furthermore, they must deposit with the city government for six months the equivalent of the return fare to the point of origin. In September 2007, a new law has been passed forbidding giving money to beggars and roadside workers and banning squatter settlements on river banks and highways. Reducing Jakarta's population growth has now been taken up as a national goal and the government is desperately trying to promote reverse migration.

Vietnam had an elaborate and complex system of controlling migration flows, especially to large cities through migration policies and household registration system (\textit{ho khau}), similar to that of the Chinese which made spontaneous migration a costly affair (Anh, 2003). Although the economic renovations (\textit{Doi Moi}) officially launched in 1986 have abolished much of that, giving increased economic opportunities and avenues for mobility to rural labour (Dang, 1999), the apprehension of rural poor flooding the cities has resulted in several policy initiatives to control migration. In view of the limited success of these measures on the ground (Anh, 2003), an incentive system has been

\textsuperscript{34} Indonesian government had declared Jakarta a special metropolitan district in 1966, which had attracted huge inflow of population, resulting in Jakarta urban agglomeration growing into the adjacent province of West Java, known as Jabotabek. The population of Jabotabek region was about 25 million in 2000 despite the government adopted strong measures to control growth of population launched in early seventies by prohibiting the entry of unemployed migrants.
introduced under which a person registered in the district of birth is entitled to all government facilities. Those registered in a district other than that of origin and those with temporary registration (a) for a period of six months and more and (b) for less than six months, are placed in different categories and receive lower levels of facilities.

The data on migration from rural to urban areas in India seems to have serious problems as is the case of China. The major criticism of the official sources that provide the basic demographic data on migration in India - Population Census and National Sample Survey (NSS) - has been that these do not capture large segments of migrants due to deficiencies in data gathering – designing and canvassing of the questionnaires. Furthermore, the scope and coverage of data compilation have varied significantly from one Census to the other and over different rounds of NSS, as noted above. Temporal comparability of this data has been rendered difficult due to not-too-infrequent reorganization of state and district boundaries.

The problems of comparability of migrants with different durations of stay at the place of enumeration are equally serious (Kundu 2005). Many of the recent migrants have falsely claimed their arrival date to be before ten or more years. The reason for the deliberate misreporting is to claim legitimacy against eviction, access civic amenities and escape social hostility. The motivation for claiming longer duration of stay is high in large cities as entitlement to land, basic amenities etc. is often linked to the date of arrival. The conclusion, thus, emerges inescapably that not only the data on inter and intrastate migration but even that on migrants by durations of stay have serious problems of temporal comparability.

It is important to point out that the percentage of rural migrants arriving in urban areas during 1991-01 is marginally less than that noted in the previous decade. This would be in line with the proposition of increasing immobility of Indian population35. One may add that even the percentage of lifetime migrants, which in 2001 is slightly above that of 1991, is significantly below those of 1961 and 1971. The data from NSS, too, confirm the declining trend of migration when one considers the period from 1983 to 1999-00. The general conclusion, thus, emerges unmistakably is that internal mobility in India, particularly of men, which is often linked to the strategy of seeking livelihood (as

35 Kundu (2006)
opposed to family linked migration for women), has gone down systematically over the past few decades. Besides the indirect measures of urban development making the cities unaffordable to the poor, there are regular slum clearance programmes whereby development authorities or municipal corporations in most of the Indian metropolises, are bulldozing unauthorised structures, often at the initiative of resident welfare associations. Thus, it is not so much the reactionary policies of the state that are restricting migration in India. The functioning of the market for land and basic services, combined with a sense of ‘otherness’, has become the major barrier.

Bangladesh is an interesting case in the South Central Asia which is pushing out slums and informal activities from its cities through administrative and fiscal measures, despite grass-root mobilisation by powerful civil society actors like Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh Legal Aid Society Trust (BLAST) and Coalition for Urban Poor (CUP). In Dhaka, for example, police and city authorities came down heavily on the slum areas (BBC News, August 8, 1999) in late nineties with the avowed objective of ‘reducing crime rate and illegal activities’. The evictions in Agargoan and other settlements in the city led to major outbursts of violence, raised human rights issues and created job displacements, particularly for women. The High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in a landmark judgement in 1999 equated the right to housing with right to livelihood and ruled that there shall be no eviction without serving proper notice and a follow-up rehabilitation plan. The National Housing Policy adopted in the same year also placed emphasis on programmes for housing the poor. Despite all these, the eviction drive has continued unabated. A note released by Sultana Kamal (2007), Executive Director of ASK reveals that the number of persons evicted annually during 2003 and 2006 has varied between 4,000 and 8000 in the city of Dhaka. The presentation on behalf of CUP entitled “NGO Perspective on Evictions and Resettlement in Dhaka” reports eviction of 29 slum settlements during January-March 2007, affecting over 60,000 people. Several petitions have been filed by these NGOs against eviction in several cities forcing the Courts to order stay the government’s plans. The latter, however, has not been able to make it obligatory for the government to provide permanent accommodation for slum dwellers.

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36 In case of women, the percentage of migrants has gone up marginally as this is determined by socio-cultural factors that respond slowly with time.
37 See Hossain et. al. (2003) and Afsar (2003).
All these lead to the argument that the decline in URGD is possible in Asian countries only when RU migration is declining. The former is certainly not a proxy of RU migration but the two are likely to move in the same direction and cross sectionally, there will be strong positive correlation between the two. In cases of countries for which reliable RU migration data are available, one can check if the rate of migration has indeed declined. In India, RU migration has gone down significantly over the past couple of decades, particularly for the male population. Such data are not available for a large number of countries within a comparable format.

Based on the evidence available from the existing literature, as attempted above, there is no reason to believe that RU migration has been accelerated or that it makes a larger contribution to urban growth in Asian countries. There have been specific years, regions and cities wherein high immigration is recorded but that does not provide a basis for macro level generalization. The perspective of rapid and unprecedented RU migration is linked more to the apprehension of urban collapse due to infrastructure deficiencies and legitimisation of the harsh initiatives for evicting slums or deterring future migrants.

6. **Understanding Historical Context of Urbanisation and Migration and Perspectives for Future Growth**

The last few decades of the Twentieth century emerges as exhilarating for the urbanization process in modern history in more than one sense. This period is marked by culmination of prolonged cold war into the disintegration of the ‘Second World’ and leaving many smaller countries in the block completely disoriented and disillusioned. The collapse of the Soviet system has also been associated with the undermining the importance of institutions at international levels and curtailment of state’s welfare oriented interventions. It would therefore be important to look at declining trend of migration and urbanisation not merely as an outcome of individual decision making based on economic rationality, characterising the Harris-Todaro model, but in the context of wider social, political and economic change.
Migration needs to be viewed not as a dependent but largely an independent variable by stipulating that many of the countries, regions and their citizens have developed a negative attitude towards in-migrants, despite benefiting from the supply of low cost labour through them. This attitude has got reinforced through growing regionalism, voicing concerns about ‘foreigners’ interfering in local political process, threatening internal socio-economic stability, impacting adversely on culture, norms and values etc. Economic opportunities at micro level, therefore, may not be the key determinants of international and internal migration since it is state policies and social environment that currently determine whether people would be allowed to leave their country of origin and be welcome in receiving countries. While the role of individual’s decision cannot be dismissed, the later is not guided purely by economic benefits accruing to the person. This perspective would get theoretical underpinning from the security/stability framework (SSF), as expounded by Myron Weiner.

It is important to look at the changing migration streams in Asian countries with reference to the historical legacy of both the colonial and the pre-colonial era. Globalization, which is signified by the movement of capital across national borders, is not a new phenomenon in Asia. Since the sixteenth century, the Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, English, French and more recently Japanese have been important players on the regional arena. The logic of surplus generation within the Colonial framework had made deployment of workforce from one part of the empire to another relatively easy in early decades of the last century. It is in the colonies where plantation and mining activities came up in a big way, requiring labour being recruited, often from outside their erstwhile political boundaries. Transmigration was also carried out in an effort to remove the potential for political instability. While colonisation made trans-border or even transoceanic migration of population possible, it also paradoxically led to creation of national or colonial borders which influenced the later day independent nation states to tighten their policy regimes to control

38 This argument finds support in the works Weiner (1990)
39 During the Japanese occupation (1942-1944), Indonesian workers were forcefully sent to Singapore and Thailand to be used in the construction of railroads and airports (see Kurosawa, 1993).
40 Tirtosudarmo (1997) holds that the geographical stretch for labour migration was very extensive before the advent of colonialism, particularly in South East Asia, “as there were no rigid national state boarders as is the case today”.
41 The Dutch, for example recruited people from the island of Java during the colonial period to work as plantation workers in the coastal areas of East Sumatra, in New Caledonia in the south Pacific, and also in Vietnam (See Breman (1997), Suparlan (1995), Adam (1994).
migration of population across territorial borders. For example the pre colonial migration of population in the South Central Asia or East Asia had a completely different dynamics than what it came to be in the period during and after the colonial process began.

Importantly, the East and West Asian countries witnessed an induced process of urbanization in the post-war phase during the Cold War period, initiated largely by the developed countries in the west, particularly the USA. The trend and pattern of urbanisation here were very different from the model of urban development, backed up by indigenous industrialisation and modernization, as propagated by the neo-classical economists. It is argued that this process of urbanization could not have continued for long which explains the deceleration in urban growth in the nineties. The birth of the Association of South East Asian Nations is often attributed to the Western apprehension about the political orientation of East Asian countries\footnote{Tirtosudarmo (1997) believes that the fall of Soekarno and the collapse of Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 provided the momentum for the West to influence the political re-orientation of Indonesia which occupies a unique geo-political position in Asia.}. Further, the collapse of the overarching Soviet system brought racial and regional prejudices into the forefront resulting in conflicts, making the environment for the migrant population in several nation states inhospitable. It is, thus, not a coincidence that the end of the Cold War is associated with deceleration in the rate of urbanisation and that of immigration in Asian countries.

The economic disparities existing and accentuated in the process of restructuring of global capitalism and the sense of regional deprivation have forced skilled labour to move not only to the West and America but also to a few of the urbanised countries within the continent in recent decades, as discussed above\footnote{Tirtosudarmo (1997) argues that the domestic political system in several East Asian countries excluded the working class from political circles and “migration of people, a justifiable reaction to the economic and political situation”. The economic crisis since mid 1997 which followed the period of rapid economic growth influenced the economic and political balance in the region, responsible for net outflow of foreign migrants and the percentage of the stock of migrants in Indonesia. Even now, there is a genuine fear of an exodus from Indonesia to countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Australia.}. Many of the governments encouraged and supported international migration of workers with a view to reduce unemployment within the country as also to increase national foreign exchange earnings. Many of the relatively developed countries of Asia, however, have resented immigration of people and adopted restrictive measures, including repatriation of
workers\textsuperscript{44}. Their perceptions of the problem are often based on political and security considerations than economic prosperity. Furthermore, ethnic and racial factors within and across the countries in Asia have created labour market tensions slowing down movement of people, despite growing disparities in the levels of economic development.

For assessing the future pattern of urbanisation in Asia, it would be important to separate out the impact of population size from the absolute demographic magnitudes, as noted above. There has been a decline in the pace of urban growth across the countries but that is not suggestive of ‘slowing down of urbanisation’ since population growth too has come down globally. Instead of focusing on the share of Asia in the global totals or urban growth rates per say, one must, therefore, focus on the trends and regional variation in urban rural growth differential (URGD), as has been attempted in the preceding sections, which in certain sense captures the dynamics of internal migration in a country.

The thesis of over urbanisation and alarming rate of rural urban migration dictating policy perspective in many countries is a carry over from the colonial period. Unfortunately, this has weighed heavily on demographers and urban planners in making projections of urban population in Asia. It received empirical backing of sorts from the acceleration in urban growth during late seventies and eighties. Notwithstanding the fact that the rate declined subsequently, most of the official projections of urban population for Asia have been made under the shadow of this thesis and consequently errored on the higher side.

The method for projecting the urban population by the Population Division of United Nations (UNPD) for less developed countries is based on a simple logistic model. Its basic assumption is that the countries with less than half the population living in urban centres, would experience an increase in their URGD till that limit of urbanisation is reached\textsuperscript{45}. It would be important to analytically examine the empirical validity of this assumption, its developmental implications and

\textsuperscript{44} Indonesian workers have been sent back from Saudi Arabia and Malaysia in recent years. There are strong negative attitudes in India at political as well as citizen’s level towards migrants from Bangladesh and Nepal on the grounds of threat to law and order and unwieldy growth of slums in large cities.

\textsuperscript{45} In case of Asia, for example, the URGD has been taken to be increasing consistently from 2.26 during 2005-15 to 2.46 during 2025-30 (Table 1) and in fact even beyond that.
several modifications that have been proposed in the model to deal with its lacunae. Unfortunately, the model which is a historical in its approach but incorporates the apprehension of hyper urbanisation in its projections, has been adopted by most other international agencies as also national governments, without any such rigorous examination during seventies and eighties. Given the discrepancies between the projected and actual values, the UNPD subsequently has come up with a procedure for estimating the URGD based on a regression equation (from 113 countries), which allowed it to decline even before attaining the 50 per cent level. However, the gaps between the projected and actual figures, obtained through this alternate model, still worked out to be high. This made the UNPD propose yet another modification, allowing the actual URGD for the latest period to be the starting point which incrementally is stipulated to move towards the normative value within a time frame.

The variations in URGD and growth rates of urban population across regions and countries in Asia can not be explained in terms of the level of urbanisation. Contrary to the stipulations of the model and its variants, these depend on a host of region and country specific factors. In several less developed countries, the rates are noted to be declining sharply much more than stipulated in the models. Unfortunately, the latter have no provision for bringing in the country specific socio economic factors as explanatory variables within the predictive framework.

Are there then enough grounds for projecting Asia to record the highest URGD during 2000-30 (Table 2), the rate going up systematically after 2015, as has been done by the UNPD? The question becomes critical because Asian current URGD works out to be less than that of several continents, the figure computed by excluding China being less than that of the World. More particularly, there has been a significant decline in this during the last decade and a half, It would be extremely important to question the empirical basis of this ‘over ambitious’ or optimistic urban scenario and the view that Asia would experience unprecedented migration and urban growth 46, much higher than other continents in future years.

46 UN Habitat Report for 2008-09 informs of the phenomenon of shrinkage of cities resulting in a loss of 13 million people in 143 global cities during 1990-00, about seventy per cent of which is confined to Asian cities. The Chinese cities, that have been projected by the UNPD to maintain their population growth rates, are worst affected, accounting for about seventy five per cent of this population loss in Asia, as per this Report. Furthermore, UNPD have had to revise downwards the projections of urban population for Asia and
7. Urbanisation and Migration: Impact on Economic and Social Wellbeing

Given the serious data limitations, alternate perspectives and conflicting empirical claims on the causes and consequences of urbanization and migration, as discussed above, an analysis of interdependencies of migration and urbanization with a select set of developmental variables, taken as ‘context indicators’ pertaining to all Asian countries, has been carried out in the present section. The objective of looking at these interrelations is to bring in larger macro considerations within the explanatory framework. This implicitly implies making a departure from the Harris-Todaro model, as argued in a preceding section\(^{47}\), the latter stipulating that RU migration decisions are governed by individual rationality and is a matter of weighing the difference between the expected earnings in urban areas against that in present rural employment. The departure here is in a more fundamental sense than proposed by scholars like Stark and Bloom (1985) and Haan (2005) who had made a case for considering households as units of decision making rather than individuals. It may be argued here that while micro level rationality holds the key to mobility, a much better understanding of the process is possible if socio-political factors at regional or country levels are also brought in as the determinants in the model. In the absence of data on internal migration for the countries, URGD may be considered as its proxy variable, as discussed above.

A set of 54 indicators pertaining to level of urbanization, urban growth, URGD, immigration etc. have been taken up along with those of economic and social development including those of poverty, health, education, access to civic amenities etc., as given in Table 7. For undertaking the analysis within a comparative static framework, the key indicators have been built at different points of time, depending on data availability. The first 24 indictors pertain to demographic dimension, reflecting the level and pace of urbanization, migration, growth rates of population, density and female male ratio among migrants. The next set of 18 indicators pertains to levels and pattern of economic growth, investment, exports, employment etc. Social dimension covers poverty, access to water and sanitation, education and health, accounting for the remaining 12 indicators. The pattern of interdependency among the different sets of indicators is presented in the correlation

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\(^{47}\) Importantly, Lucas, Hatton and Williamson and Larson and Mundlak have re-affirmed the validity of the model in contemporary context.
matrices (Table 8a, 8b and 8c).

The growth rates of urban population during the period 1950-70 are strongly correlated with the corresponding URGD which reveals that population growth was a major driving factor in urbanization. This has however changed since seventies; the correlations between the two above mentioned indicators have weakened considerably. Furthermore, the URGD of the nineties has no correlation with the corresponding figures for the period 1970-90 and weak correlation with that of 1970-90, implying some kind of structural shift during nineties with regard to dynamics of urban development in Asia (Table 8a). The correlations of urban growth and URGD for 1990-00 with that of 1990-05 is almost unity, implying that for many of the countries, the past Census estimates have been taken as valid for the year 2005 as well, since they did not have any recent information. The correlations further reveal that the future urban growth pattern will not be determined by what was observed during 1950-70 or 1970-90. However, the countries reporting high urban growth during 1990-05 are predicted to carry this dynamics forward in the coming couple of decades. Interestingly, the countries that have a high percentage of people living in urban areas - generally at a relatively high level of economic and industrial development - would not record high rates of urban growth or URGD during the next few decades. In fact, the correlations suggest that the former would experience lower URGD compared to less urbanized countries. Particularly, the correlation between urban percentage and projected URGD is negative, high and statistically significant (Table 8b).

The percentage of international migrants emerges as a strong developmental indicator and this could be a manifestation of both cause and effect of urbanization and development. The indicator is strongly related to the percentage of urban population across the countries at all the time points considered in the study (Table 8a). Both the indicators in turn exhibit high and positive correlations with per capita income suggesting that more urbanized and economically developed countries tend to have larger percentage of immigrants (Table 8b). The correlations have been maintained over the years as a high stock of migrants is the outcome of a historical process of development which is unlikely to change dramatically over a couple of decades. Also, there are only a few countries that record high level of immigration while others have very low figures, the coefficient of variation working out to be very high. The urbanized countries, however, record low female male ratio
among the migrants until the seventies, the negative relationship being statistically significant. Many of the west Asian countries like UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain had female migrants numbering a third of the male migrants. This reveals that the migrants are being absorbed in construction sector and low level services. Subsequently, with the fall in the rate of migration in the region, the sex ratio has declined or at best is maintained, reflecting restrictions on family migration.

Focusing on the decade of the nineties and later, one observes positive and significant correlations of the percentage of urban population and of international migrants with most of the indicators of economic development (Table 8b). The positive correlation with percentage of value added in industries, FDI and exports of goods and services as percentages of GDP, besides per capita income, merit special mention. This is not a startling result as most of the presently developed countries in Asia have grown during the past half century with foreign investment or that by a federal government of which these are no longer a part (countries emerging from erstwhile Soviet Union) which explains their high percentage of foreign population. The values of the positive indicators of social development such as life expectancy at birth, both for men and women, are also high in countries having high international migration while those of the negative indicators like Infant mortality rate are low (Table 8c). This can be explained in terms of the capability of these countries and their institutions to take care of the social problems much better than in less developed countries. The correlations of the levels of basic amenities are high with the levels of urbanisation but not with current urban growth, URGD, percentage of immigrants, per capita income and its growth. The developed economies nonetheless record high level of per capita carbon emissions due to high level of urbanisation and concentration of industries in and around a few cities.

The increase in the number of immigrants in the countries in relation to their population during 1990-05 correlates strongly with the level of urbanization, percentage of immigrants, levels of economic development, investments and exports in relation to GDP, life expectancy and pollution. One notes that the city states like Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore and Brunei Darrudsalem that reported high figures of immigrants in early nineties have reported significant inflow even after that. They have reported high rates of growth in total and urban population as well. These are not
the only countries responsible for the positive association between inflow of population from outside the country and economic development. Many of the relatively developed countries in West Asia like Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates that recorded high rates of population and urban growth also attracted a large number of immigrants, making their stocks high in 1990. The same is true for South Eastern Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.

The nineties and the subsequent years that records significant deceleration in urban growth has also brought forth a transformation in the migration scene, the percentage of immigrants reporting a decline. Many of the above mentioned countries with high to medium share of foreign population are reporting significant out-migration and low net immigration. Even those that had low shares - between one and seven percent - like Republic of Korea, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Turkey are experiencing out migration to other countries or significant decline in immigration. The countries falling in a third category, with less than one percent foreign migrants in 1990 and reporting small out migration, particularly China and India, have maintained this characteristics during the last one and a half decade. There are of course exceptions – one, the four city states noted above, two, countries like Timor Lest, Afghanistan and Bhutan that have seen significant fluctuations in migration due to socio-political factors and three, countries like Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand that have continued to receive net migrants from outside the country. The stocks of foreign migrants have come down steadily in all other countries. International migration, however, has been a small factor in urbanization in Asian countries except in a few countries, its contribution becoming even less in future years.

The incremental immigration which exhibits positive correlations with developmental indicators, as mentioned above, however, relates negatively with urban growth and future URGD. This would explain the change in the pattern of urbanization over time and internal migration (URGD being used as its proxy) being delinked from international migration. To the extent URGD captures internal migration, one would argue that mobility within the country shows no positive association with the indicators of international migration, growth therein as also levels of economic and social

48 The migrant stocks in 1990 are not comparable with those of earlier years at regional and continental level as the data for erstwhile Soviet countries are not included.
development. In fact, the less developed countries that are at a low level of urbanization and have low shares of immigrants are projected to experience high URGD in future years. The correlations of URGD with the indicators of economic development are mostly negative but not strong enough to ring the alarm bell that internal migration is due to exodus linked with rural destabilization. Furthermore, the internal mobility indicators are negatively related with most of the social development indicators but these too are not significant.

It is evident that the relatively developed countries that also happen to be more urbanized would not be in the forefront of urbanization in future years. The critical question would, therefore, be whether the high URGD in less developed countries would be backed up by growth in income and industrial value added. The correlation between URGD and GDP growth during 1990-95 is noted to be positive but this turns out to be negative when the more recent period 2000-05. The GDP growth rates during the three quinquennial periods during 1990-05 show no stable spatial pattern, correlations turning from negative to positive.\(^{49}\) Given this volatility of income growth in Asian countries, no definite conclusion can be advanced regarding the relationship between the pace of urbanisation and GDP growth. Interestingly, the correlations of urban growth rates and URGD with unemployment rate or poverty are negative but not significant. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that current and future urban growth would make a distinct and positive impact of the economic scene, including unemployment and poverty and access to basic amenities. On the other hand, there is no definite evidence that future urbanisation would be driven by poverty or be a manifestation of destabilization of agrarian economy. Many of the smaller countries with low level of urbanization would endeavor to get linked to global capital market by opening up their economies. In a cross sectional analysis of the pattern of migration and urbanization, The Department of Social and Economic Affairs of the United Nations has posited that “the least developed countries within the less developed regions (that) are characterized by a low proportion of population residing in urban areas” would experience “faster urban growth”. Location of a few global projects here would push up the figures of economic development and urban growth as the economies are very small. The high income growth in countries like Macao (China), Myanmar, Cambodia, Afghanistan Bhutan, Armenia, Azerbaijan Tajikistan, Maldives during 2000-05 and 2005-06 may be cited as examples.

\(^{49}\) The correlations of GDP growth during 1990-95 with that during 2000-05 and 2005-06 are negative while that between the rate of the last two periods is positive.
One would therefore hold that future urbanization in Asia is likely to be more rapid in small and less developed countries and be backed up by industrialization and economic growth.

8. Perspectives, Policies and Programmes for Intervention in Migration and Urbanisation

The task of overviewing the policies and programmes in this section has been lessened as the strategies to push out slums and squatters along with their informal activities into peripheries, promote growth of satellite towns and discourage migration into large cities launched by different countries have already been discussed towards the end of section 5. It would, nonetheless, be important here to categorise the major programmatic interventions, based on their underlying perspectives on urbanization and migration and analyse how these impact RU migration and wellbeing of the affected population. The three categories would be (a) promotion of globally linked urban centres and benefiting from scale economies, (b) stabilisation of agrarian economy and discouraging migration and (c) welfare programmes for poor migrant workers and their families in urban areas. Importantly, many of the countries have pursued all the three types of programmes concurrently, the outcome being determined by the relative emphasis and resource allocation.

Promoting Globally Linked Cities and their Scale Economies

Policy makers, planners and administrators in Asian countries have mostly viewed urbanisation and RU migration as positive phenomena, interpreting these in terms of growth in manufacturing, benefits of scale and agglomeration economies etc. Asian Development Bank (1996) which has played a crucial role in guiding policy thrust in the region argues that the countries experiencing rapid urbanisation “in the last 10 to 20 years are generally those with most rapid economic growth”. It observes that “macro economic changes within Asia and the region’s transactions with OECD countries - in particular emergence of global economy…. will further increase the role played by urban areas in these countries” as there exists “well established correlation between development and level of urbanisation”. In a study undertaken for Australian Agency for International Development, Forbes and Lindfield (1997) observe that in Asia “urbanisation has been an essential part of most nation’s development towards a stronger and more stable economy over the last few decades.” A recent Report of UNFPA 2007 is even more categorical on this as it postulates that “no
country in the industrial age has ever achieved significant economic growth without urbanisation” (UNFPA 2007).

Linking migration with poverty reduction, Adams and Page (2003) conclude that an increase of 10 per cent in a country’s share of international migrants leads to 2 per cent decline in $1 a day poverty. The study by Oberai and Singh (1983) on internal migration in India shows that the remittances improved distribution of income in receiving regions. Similarly, Durand et al. (1996) hold that income from migration stimulates economic activity, both directly and indirectly, and that it leads to significantly higher levels of employment and investment. It is, therefore, no surprise that Jones and Douglass (2008) find the state policies in Asian countries mostly treating RU migration as an instrument of poverty alleviation and the cities an ‘engines of economic growth’ rather than as a habitat.

The perspective that cities must enable countries to realise the highest economies of scale and production efficiency has understandably characterised the policies of most of the governments. The new system of urban governance emerging since eighties has allowed the Asian metropolises attract national and multinational companies. Many of them have attempted to create "select global centres of the future" by providing land to the companies at preferred sites and opening up the land market. This is being done by simplifying the legal and administrative procedures for changing landuse and by pushing out "low valued" activities including slum colonies from the city core to the peripheries. The ‘sanitisation drives’ are often carried out or facilitated by state agencies. In the absence of formal registration in urban areas, in China, for example, migrants are excluded from land and housing provisions, leading to emergence and fast growth of ‘urbanizing villages’ (Song et. al., 2007). Their settlements are often allowed to stay within the cities for simple economic reasons. However, when their utility is over, these are systematically demolished50. Michael Cernia (1989) suggests that “the frequency and magnitude of compulsory displacement are likely to increase in the developing world as the trend towards urbanization grows stronger.”51

50 The village of Zhejiang with 100,000 migrants and thousands of enterprises, demolished in December 1995 at the insistence of local authorities. Similarly, 171 informal settlements around the Olympic stadium, lying within the fourth ring road were demolished as per the plan for Olympic construction projects (Westendoff, 2008).
51 Cernia
recent examples of massive evictions worldwide were related to mega-events. The Global Report on Human Settlements suggests that “beautification” projects immediately prior to such events are one of the most common justifications for slum clearance programs. The government schemes in India and many of the SE Asian countries have a provision for giving the evicted squatters, pavement dwellers and hawkers plots or flats, in the building being constructed at the original site. In most cases, however, the allottees have not been able to hold on to them, given their acute need for finance, growing land values and relaxation in legal and administrative environment.

The agencies like World Bank, USAID etc. have recommended an increase in Floor Space Index (FSI) in the central areas of most of the Asian cities so that multi-storied structures can come up, providing space for upcoming business houses, recreational and shopping complexes and high income residential units. Local governments have welcomed this as it has helped in generating resources for infrastructural development by selling the extra FSI or land obtained through eviction. Sanctioning of loans by the international agencies has often been contingent on the acceptance of higher FSI in the central city by the local authorities (Kundu et. al. 1999). These measures could push the poor out to the fringes or outside the municipal boundaries of the cities. The system of allowing extra FSI (mostly to be utilised outside the central city) to be traded in the land market has helped the process of reorganisation of population and segmentation and is unlikely to increase the density of population or give a boost to immigration.

The fiscal discipline imposed by the government and credit rating agencies on urban local bodies have encouraged large cities with strong economic base to mobilise resources from institutional sources including the capital market, using innovative financial instruments. This is because of their ability to secure high credit rating from financial intermediaries and raise resources through bonds and other instruments of credit. This has allowed them to undertake investment in infrastructure and basic amenities on their own as also to attract private investment from within or outside the country. The small and medium towns located at a large distance from the "emerging global centres of growth",

53 The major concern in the scheme for Rehabilitation of Slum and Hutment Dwellers, currently being implemented in Brihan Mumbai, for example, is not to ensure that poor hold on to their land but to prevent future encroachment in central areas. The Study Group (1995) set up for this purpose observes that "(e)ncroachment of any land need to be firmly and quickly removed. For this purpose action needs to be taken as the first signs of unauthorised construction surface. Machinery needs to be established and strengthened wardwise with police force which should be well equipped."
particularly those in backward regions, have not got their due share. Unfortunately, these are not in a position to finance capital expenditure through internal resources or borrowings from the capital market. This has increased disparity across urban centres and with public investment becoming less and less over the years, this is likely to increase.

A strong lobby is emerging, particularly in large cities, pleading for disbanding all zoning restrictions, building laws and bye-laws and making the cities relatively independent of state and central level controls. It is stipulated that decisions regarding location of industries, change in landuse etc. should be taken expeditiously at the local level. The decentralisation of planning responsibilities, sought to be ushered in different countries, as discussed above, is also expected to help this lobby, particularly in large cities that have relatively high tax and non-tax revenue base. Privatisation of land and civic services and withdrawal of public subsidies have pushed up their prices in large cities. That too has slowed down immigration of the poor.

*Stabilising Agrarian Economy and Discouraging Migration*

The perspective to promote urban centre to attract global capital and maximise macro economic growth is fraught with problems. This builds up a case for greater openness of the economies in Asia, which unfortunately has been associated with higher spatial inequality and massive inflow RU migrants, without their physical and economic absorption in formal urban system. At a conference organised by DFID entitled “Asia 2015: Promoting Growth, Ending Poverty”, inadequacy in infrastructure and basic amenities and illegal (informal) settlements facing perpetually a risk of eviction, have been identified as the key concerns in the Asian cities (see Satterthwaite 2007). A report from the United Nations for Asia and the Pacific Commission notes that the pace of urbanization has resulted in economic growth but has increased the level of poverty within cities. Pietro Gennari (2008), chief of ESCAP’s Statistics Division holds that current growth of cities is having a “knock-on effect” through erosion of “people’s ability to access clean water and sanitation

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54 Balisacan and Ducanes (2005), Kanbur and Venables (2005) and Friedman (2005) argue this to be the case in severl Asian countries, including China. Even in transitional economies like Vietnam and Tajikistan, Jensen and Tarp’s (2005) and Anderson and Pomfret (2005) show that spatial inequalities have gone up significantly due to globalization measures.

55 UNESCAP 2008
in urban areas”, pushing “more and more people into slums. Homeless International (2006) stipulates that poor, being encouraged to live in the city and provide cheap labour, on which city economies are built, without benefiting from the city’s development process, is one of the major paradoxes in Asian cities. Also, the policies of national and city governments focused on issues of economic efficiency and global competitiveness have resulted in massive proliferation of slums⁵⁶. It argues further that the process of urbanisation in Asia has led to marginalization of a large majority of local population and also caused serious environmental problems due to industrial concentration and production of energy intensive consumer durables.

The claims of the positive effect of migration have been questioned by several researchers. Black and Skinner. (2005) highlight that migration – international migration in particular – does not always reduce the inequalities while Islam (1991) shows that the negative effects of migration to the Gulf from villages in Chittagong in Bangladesh far outweighed the positive ones. Papademetriou and Martin (1991) and Richard Adams et. Al. argue that rural-urban migration does not equalise incomes as it helps economically better-off and better-educated and only a fraction of the remittances are channelled into productive investment. The major thrust in policy, as per this alternate perspective, has been to promote development and access to basic facilities in rural areas so that RU migration is curbed. Many of the governments in Asia have launched measures to control the growth of city population through restriction of the inflow of migration, eviction of slums and informal activities and diversion of prospective migrants into the towns and rural settlements in the hinterland. The most significant initiative in mitigating urban-ward migration has been through launching of rural development and other related programmes. It would be useful here to take a stock of the policy directions and programmes launched by governments at national regional and city levels in recent years.

China, which has a serious problem of rural urban inequality and of exodus from backward regions to select towns and cities, is at the forefront in adopting measures of employment generation in rural areas and of industrial dispersal. With the opening up of the economy and relaxation of the controls since mid seventies, migration rate was high. To control this, government has launched measures within the framework of a “socialist market economy” since mid nineties, including reforms in the

⁵⁶ Ooi and Phua, (2007)
taxation system that was earlier favouring the cities (Riskin 2007). The new pro-rural policies envisage “cities supporting the rural areas and agriculture supporting industry” and thereby building a “new socialist countryside”. The mechanism for city government to expropriate land from farmers in China has been tightened while relieving the grassroots governments of their excessive tax burden. (Cheng 2007). Further, the anti poverty programs that had little impact on the farm labourers have been radically modified. The institutions like rural credit cooperatives, introduced in 2003-04, as also the recent changes in land reforms are helping to slow down migration from villages. Making a departure from this line of reasoning, Reuters (2005), Kahn (2005), Chan and Buckingham (2008) argue that there is a good deal of rhetoric in the reforms aimed at abolishing the _hukou_ institution and that it continues to be a major wall in preventing China’s rural population from settling down in cities and maintaining the rural-urban “apartheid”. They in a way confirm the postulate of Wang (2005) who had held that the system stands “adapted and adjusted” but very much “alive and well” as a part of ground reality in China.

India, while not implementing direct controls on population movement, has a range of policies for rural development which is expected to slow down RU migration. For example, people who are classified as ‘below the poverty line (BPL)’ are entitled to subsidised food, and a range of other benefits. The proof of BPL status is a ‘ration’ card which is issued based at the place of residence and cannot be used to claim benefits in another village, town or city. This, thus, excludes most of the short duration migrants from any public distribution system. Besides, India has recently introduced the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme, which promises 100 days of wage labour to one adult in every rural household in unskilled work, which again is expected to check out-migration. The numerous watershed and rural development projects too have this as one of the goals. Despite their being no ‘nativist policy’ in the formal sense, every state government gives preference to persons born in the state or those living there for a specified length of time for lower category jobs which discourages interstate migration (Waddington 2003).

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57 A review of the functioning of the new localized _hukou_ management system by Chan (2008) reveals the contradictions between the policy and its implementation. The recent initiatives aim at devolution of the decision-making power of granting _hukou_ from the central government to local governments. The latter have, unfortunately, used this power mostly to attract only the “best and the brightest” and wealthy investors (Wang, 2005b) and not to respond to the central government’s stipulation of alleviating rural-urban inequality.
Similar policies and institutional actions have been proposed by the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh in 2003 in its ‘National Strategy for Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and Social Development’ which delineated programmes to reach out to poor and remote rural areas, which are vulnerable to adverse ecological processes, including coastal regions, chars and river erosion affected areas and those with high concentrations of socially disadvantaged and marginal ethnic groups. Special attention is given to the development problems of the hill and tribal population as well. An increase in employment opportunities both within and outside of agriculture in rural areas with rising share of peri-urban employment has been noted in recent years which is likely to slow down urban growth. Self-employment as also rural housing, promoted through micro-credit programmes by Grameen Bank, has been a factor in decelerating RU migration. Further, the government has introduced two housing schemes to encourage the urban poor to return to villages in 1999. Bangladesh Krishi Bank offers loans for income generation and resettlement in Ghore Phera Programme. Asrayan Project provides basic housing in barrack like tin structures with cooking arrangements, a community room and a common pond for fishing and other needs.

Thailand, where the national government is cautious concerning urbanization, has adopted a two track strategy of local self-sufficiency and selective global engagement. Indonesia too has announced a similar big bang decentralization policy in 1999. It has launched a number of micro finance schemes and programmes for rural development in backward regions. Malaysia reports decentralisation of industrial areas and opening of new development corridors including a 270 square kilometer multimedia super corridor, besides setting up a new capital. Mongolia launched an effective programme of decentralised governance in 2001, targeted at the city (kota) and district, devolving virtually all government functions to them, with the objective of promoting growth centers alternative to Ulaan Baatar. Philippines has the longest history of decentralization in East Asia with the introduction of Local Government Code in 1991 and have subsequently launched Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 2001-2004. It is encouraging location of industries and large educational facilities 50 kms. away from metro Manila. Many of the governments in South East Asia (as also Bangladesh) are apprehensive that climate change may lead to increased incidence of flooding and drought that have led to formulation of programmes for livelihood

58 Younus (2002)
59 National Economic and Social Development Board (2002)
60 Webster
stabilisation, particularly in coastal areas.

In most West Asian countries, the governments have resorted to restrict the growth of cities through immigration policies, controlling entry of foreign labour who generally settle down in large cities. The case of policy changes in Kuwait may be cited as an illustration. The Aliens’ Residence Law of 1959 amended in 1965 tightened entry and exit procedures and stiffened the deportation provisions. In 1982, the Nationality Law was passed whereby naturalisation was restricted only to Muslims. The Amendments Act of 1980 forestalled naturalisation by extending the period of residency requirements from ten to fifteen years for Arabs, and from fifteen to twenty years for non-Arabs (Russell, 2006). In general, the laws of the land are noted to favour entry of able bodied males but discourages that of their dependents (Sheikh, 2007). Similarly, the immigration policy of Oman followed since 1987 has led to reduction of non-national labour force by restricting their employment in certain occupations (Sheikh, 2007). Qatar has passed a law in 1985 limiting absorption of non-citizens in industries and trade, besides stimulating industrial growth in second order urban centres and improving health and educational facilities in rural areas.

In Bahrain, the government instead of directly restricting RU migration, provides housing facilities and civic amenities in rural areas and connects the latter by roads and improved transportation system which facilitates commutation of workers and discourages permanent shifting. Saudi Arabia, too, has designed measures to disperse population to second and third order urban centres and rural areas and settle down the nomadic population through programmes of agricultural development and establishment of industrial zones (Sheikh, 2007). However, the main reason for the decline of migration into cities is policy of the government to replace foreign labour with citizens.

Many of the countries in Asia may be seen as trying to channel “private investments to designated areas or removing subsidies that previously favoured the developed locations” like their national capital. The idea behind this approach is to create “level playing field” whereby a number of areas of a country become equally attractive to potential migrants”. Forty-four per cent of the countries of the world of which 88 per cent are in less developed regions consider their settlement pattern to be a matter of major concern. Importantly, eighty per cent of the countries in Asia hold this view. In most of these countries, population distribution policies have become synonymous with measures to
reduce or reverse RU migration although their interventions have not been very effective\textsuperscript{61}.

\textit{Welfare Programmes for Migrant Families}

Conscious of the poor physical conditions of the migrants and their not having access to basic amenities, many of the Governments in Asia have launched programmes at national and local levels to improve the micro environment in slums and squatter settlements. Unfortunately, however, resource allocation and their spatial coverage have gone down in recent years under the new system of governance and more recently due to global meltdown. Lukewarm response of private sector to get into provisioning of civic amenities, reduction of subsidies in social sectors and local governments becoming increasingly dependent on capital market have resulted in dilution of pro-poor and pro-migrant thrust in the policies. There has been avowed concern for socioeconomic upliftment of the workers in unorganised sector absorbing the migrants in most countries but not much have come up in term of programmatic interventions to facilitate their absorption in urban centres.

Several provinces and cities in China have started setting up social security schemes for rural migrant labour in urban areas since the early years of the present decade. The coverage under these has however been low - far less than similar schemes for other urban workers (Du and Gao, 2005). Consequently, migrant children generally pay fees several times more than the local children in public schools. In fact, very few local governments have actually implemented the policy of accommodating migrant children in public schools (Liang, 2006). Importantly, the National People’s Congress has passed a law, going into effect in 2008, designed to increase workers’ ability to obtain long-term, stable employment. Chan and Buckingham (2008) however argue that the new conditions for formal entry into the cities under the more “entrepreneurial” approach of local (city) governments have actually reduced the chance of poor migrants getting a \textit{hukou} in cities. Similar programmes in most of the East and SE Asian countries have had limited success due to weak administrative and financial support, particularly due to financial crisis of the late nineties and in recent years.

\textsuperscript{61} United Nations (2000)
There have been changes in the nature of the programmes as funds are being sought from private sector and institutional sources to upscale them. The central government support has also become contingent on the regional and local government’s accepting measures for reforming the land and capital market and creating enabling conditions for private investment in city infrastructure. Concerns for affordability, cost recovery and participation of resident associations have been responsible for better off localities cornering larger chunk of resources. Civil society organisations including the resident groups have been active in stopping illegal encroachment of public spaces, including parks, pavements etc., through public interest litigations. Judiciary have also become pro-active and generally upheld the rights of the ‘formal’ citizens. This has been responsible for the poor migrants seeking a foothold either in marginal land within the city in subhuman living conditions or in degenerated peripheries. Consequently, there has been segmentation of cities, increase in disparity in the quality of micro environment and reduced space for poor migrants.

Notwithstanding the governmental claims that the focus of the programmes is the wellbeing of the migrants or prospective migrants, one would note that these are reinforcing the exclusionary character of the cities. The programmes are mostly designed to improve the physical conditions of living for the poor which has a bearing on the health and law and order situation of the entire city population. The process of identification of the migrants, verification of their residence and employment documents etc. are often used selectively for evicting the slum dwellers and “sanitizing the cities”, creating thereby high quality residential areas in select pockets that can attract global investment.

9. Summary of Findings and Reflections on the Urbanisation/Migration Experience in Asia

Based on an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the subject as also the empirical analysis carried out in the study, one would tend to agree with David Ellerman (1991) that the current policy perspective happens to be somewhat optimistic regarding the impact of not only international but also internal migration although the policy debate on the relationship between migration/urbanization and development remains ‘unsettled’. This was the conclusion arrived at
also by Sorensen et. al. (2003) analyzing more recent studies on the subject\textsuperscript{62}. It is nonetheless a bit surprising that despite the positive assessment of urbanization and migration dynamics at the conceptual and policy level, many of the national, regional and city governments in Asia are pursuing programmes that tend to decelerate immigration as also evict and relocate the existing slums, with predominantly migrant population, into city peripheries.

A large majority of the countries belonging to different geographical regions have recorded deceleration in urban growth and migration in recent years that can not be fully explained in terms of decline in natural growth, definitional or boundary adjustment factors. Exclusionary urban growth, increased unaffordability of urban space and basic amenities for the rural poor and a negative policy perspective leading to greater restrictions on migration are the key determinants. The logic of exclusion have had both internal as well as external manifestation as the countries experiencing deceleration in urban growth in recent years report decline in migration towards urban centres both from within and outside the country.

The impetus of urban growth has shifted from large metropolises, from five million plus cities, to those having population between 1 to 5 million or even less. Despite this downward shift of urban dynamics, a large number of small and medium towns with less than one hundred thousand population report economic stagnation and deceleration in population growth in majority of Asian countries. The emergence of new towns has been far and few, resulting in top heavy urbanization, except in South East Asia.

The pattern of interdependencies of the indicators of urbanization/migration with those of economic development suggests that the former have not been determined by the latter to a significant degree and vice versa. The pace of urbanization has been high in several countries in Asia not because of their level of economic growth but its composition and labour intensity of rapidly growing informal sectors. The correlations of urban growth with the level of urbanization, as well as per capita income, value added in manufacturing, foreign direct investment etc. and several other indicators of economic development turn out to be low and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, there is little

\textsuperscript{62} Papademetriou and Martin in 1991, Appleyard (1991) and Sorensen et al. (2003)
evidence that urbanization is leading to rapid reduction in unemployment and poverty or increased access of people to basic amenities.

Several countries have launched programmes for improving governance and infrastructural facilities in a few large cities, attracting private investors from within as well as outside the country. Land for them has been made available through the market as also state supported schemes. These have pushed out squatter settlements, informal sector businesses along with a large number of pollutant industries to the city peripheries that have poor quality of micro environment. The income level and quality of basic amenities in these cities, as a result, have gone up but that has been associated with increased intra-city disparity and creation of degenerated periphery. Nonetheless, there is no strong evidence that urbanization is associated with destabilization of agrarian economy, poverty and immiserisation, despite the measures of globalization resulting in regional imbalances. Several of the governments have taken major initiatives to tackle these problems by promoting rural development, creating satellite towns for slowing down RU migration and reducing pressure on infrastructure, particularly in the globalizing cities. These regional development measures, in a sense, have been complementary to the city level interventions that have encouraged only selective migration into central areas and ‘sanitisation of the cities’. All these questions the proposition that the urban dynamics would shift to Asia in the next few decades, not withstanding the magnitude of absolute figures of increment due to pure demographic weight of the region. The pace of urbanization would be reasonably high but much below the level projected by UNPD.

The pace of urbanization in the next few decades is likely to be rapid in less urbanized and less developed countries, as the relatively developed and larger countries in the continent are likely to limit migration in order to have more orderly urbanisation and well governed cities. Positive association between the pace of urbanisation and a few indicators of economic growth in recent years would make governments push reform measures in land, capital and labour market, giving greater freedom to market based actors. This would also manifest in policies and programmes adopted by the state and city governments to restrict the entry of poor and unskilled migrants from rural areas and outside the country, especially those coming with their dependents, strengthening the process of exclusionary urban growth.
Appendix I

Cross sectional data on URGD – difference between simple growth of urban population less the corresponding growth in rural population for a given period – can be shown as comprising four components as follows:

\[ \text{URGD} = \frac{(U_1 - U_0)}{U_0} - \frac{(R_1 - R_0)}{R_0} \]

\[ = \frac{(g_u U_0 + N_1 - D_1 + A_1 + \text{RUM}_1)}{U_0} - \left( \frac{g_r R_0 - N_1 + D_1 - A_1 - \text{RUM}_1}{R_0} \right) \]

\[ = (g_u - g_r) + \left[ \frac{(N_1 - D_1) + A_1 + \text{RUM}_1}{(R_0 - U_0)/R_0 U_0} \right] \]

where \( g_u \) and \( g_r \) denote the natural growth rates of population in urban and rural areas respectively, \( U \) and \( R \) are the total urban and rural population, \( N \) and \( D \) denote the population of new and declassified towns, \( A \) stands for population in areas merged with urban centres and \( \text{RUM} \) are the net migrants from rural to urban areas during the period under consideration. A distinction has been made between the figures for initial and terminal years by the suffix 0 and 1. It is evident that besides (a) the natural growth difference \( (g_u - g_r) \), there are three other components that constitute the dynamics of urban growth; (b) new towns, less declassified towns \( (N_1 - D_1) \) (c) changes in the boundaries of the existing towns \( A_1 \) and (d) net rural urban migration \( \text{RUM}_1 \). International migration is a small component in urban growth during recent decades in Asia and hence has not been included in the equation.

The decline in URGD can be attributed to one or more of the four components mentioned in the above identity and it is important to determine their relative importance based on available evidence. With many of the countries in the continent having already achieved demographic transition, rural population (natural) growth is likely to go down more rapidly or at the same rate as that in urban areas during nineties and in future decades. It may therefore not be erroneous to hold that \( (g_u - g_r) \) has not gone down during nineties and would not go down (becoming larger with a negative sign) rapidly in the coming decades.

\[ 63 \] The weightage assigned to the last three components \( (R_0 - U_0)/R_0 U_0 \) is likely to go down with increase in urban population till it reaches fifty per cent level, but its impact will be less than that the basic components.
Given the trends of agglomeration and spatial concentration in urbanization, one would expect a large number of new towns to come up around the large cities and considerable areal expansion around these. The component \((N_1 - D_1 + A_1)\) which combines the components \((b)\) and \((c)\) mentioned above, is therefore unlikely to go down. Much of the evidence quoted in the section 5 concerning peripheral development, promotion of satellite towns, creation of small towns through programmes of regional development etc. tend to support this proposition. The focus thus shifts to net rural urban migration the decline in which possibly holds the key to the decline in URGD.
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