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Abstract

This paper addresses population movement in Indonesia within the broader contexts of human development. Human movement, voluntary and involuntary, is a reflection of the people initiatives and responses to the changing nature of society and economy. As a large archipelagic state, movement of people across the country, historically, has always an important dimension of social formation in Indonesia. The paper however focuses on movement of people in the last four decades. It aims to examine the connection between migration and its wider social and economic contexts, looking at how politics shape migration policy and in turn, how migration affects policy making. The paper discusses at length recent issues of overseas labor migration, particularly on the apparently embedded inertia within the policy making processes. The continuing incidences of irregular migration, forced migration and human trafficking obviously mirror the incapacity of the state in properly managing the movement of people. The insufficient data and information generally hampered any conclusive linkages of migration and human development. With or without state's proper policies people will continuously on the move enriching human development in Indonesia.

Keywords: Indonesia, migration, transmigration, social formation, economic development, human development.

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Introduction

Human beings are constantly on the move, transgressing social and spatial boundaries to expand their capabilities and entitlements in order to improve their welfare. In some circumstances, however, human movements also reflect the people's response to constraint in fulfilling their choices, as seen in the various form of forced migration. Forced migration constitutes a desperate situation in which a voluntary choice to move is curtailed. This report assesses human movement in Indonesia, both the voluntary and involuntary types of migration, as a reflection of the people initiatives and responses to the changing nature of society and economy. In this report, migration issues in the last four decades will be the focus of the review. It aims to examine the connection between migration and its wider social and economic contexts, looking at how politics shape migration policy and in turn, how migration affects policy making.

The content of this report is divided into five parts. The first part is a historical overview of migration and its contribution to the formation of Indonesian society. In this first part, migration is seen as part of the social changes, emphasizing the important role of "traditional ethnic movement", before, during and after, the colonial period. Indonesia is diverse in term of ethnicity, religion and culture. Human movement is increasingly play important role in influencing the diversity of the country and therefore critical in the nation-state building process. The second part devoted specifically to the state's demographic engineering policies in relocating people from Java and Bali to other islands in the archipelago. The politics of this migration policy, its achievements and the social and political consequences will be highlighted. In the third part, based on the available statistics on migration between regions in Indonesia, human movement will be seen in the context of regional development, particularly during and after the New Order developmental state regime.

The fourth and the fifth parts of this report will look at the increasingly important migration phenomena in Indonesia, namely international migration. In the fourth part, movement of people crossing the state's borders, become the alternative source of income for Indonesian migrant workers since the beginning of the 1980s. In this part, apart from

showing the statistics related to international migration, attention will be given on the political contexts of the making and unmaking of overseas migration policy. Particular attention will also be given to the way the systematic exploitation occurred and the cost of migration, both economic and social, that have to be paid by the migrants. An increasingly important issue related to internal migration is the vulnerability of migrant workers in a time of global financial crisis. The fifth part of this report will explore the impact of financial crisis in 1997-1998 and 2008-2009 on the livelihood of migrant workers and their family. The final part of this paper is a conclusion where lessons learned and policy implications will be drawn.

Part 1:

Movement of People and Formation of Society

Indonesia, an archipelago located between Asia and Australia, is currently the fourth largest country in the world in terms of the size of population (See Map of Indonesia). The population in 2008 is estimated to be more than 230 million, geographically distributed into 34 provinces and more than 450 districts. It is estimated that more than 6 million Indonesians are living abroad, mostly as migrant workers. Indonesia has a diverse human development as indicated in the stark differences between provinces with the highest (Jakarta, North Sulawesi and East Kalimantan) and the lowest (Papua, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara) human development index (Table 1.1). Ethnically and religiously Indonesia is a diverse country, reflecting a long process of social transformation that continuously took place through human movement in this archipelago (Table 1.2, Figure 1.1, Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2). The current demographic configuration of Indonesia constitutes demographic dynamics, resulting from changes in the fertility, mortality and migration, and the social processes in which different collective identities, interacting and creating new cultural identities. Human movement within culture is only through a web of cultural values and social networks enabling humans to roam in search of economic opportunities in geographical space.

The Dutch historians, Vollenhoven and van Leur, as quoted by Hugo (1980: 97) summarized patterns of migration during pre-colonial Indonesia as being of three main types: (1) colonization by large groups of migrants from one region who settled in another region, (2) migration of individuals, particularly traders, who settled in port cities, (3) establishment of authority in foreign regions. From the sixteenth century up until the latter part of the nineteenth century there was a gradual increase in the number of Europeans, whose activities had much influence on the pattern of migration in Indonesia. According to 1930 population census, 11.5 percent of the total indigenous population of Indonesia was living outside their district to birth. It was interesting that large number of Java-born Indonesians were enumerated in the other islands. Pelzer (1945:189) calculated that 967,000 Javanese, 120,000 Sundanese, 16,000 Madurese and 39,000 other Indonesians of Java ancestries, were found in the other islands, and not all of them were Java-born.

Before independence, two factors contributed to movement of people from Java to the other islands. First, the increase of the Dutch plantations in the other islands where labour was scarce led planters to recruit people from Java. The first group recruited were Chinese coolies, but later Javanese and Sundanese workers were also recruited. Secondly, in 1905, the Dutch government considered Java to be overpopulated and introduced its colonization program to resettle people from Java in the "Outer Islands". However, the concentration of colonial activity in Java also led to a number of growing urban centers, such as Batavia, Surabaya and Semarang. According to Pelzer (1945: 175) these cities attracted people from the crowded interior because of the employment opportunities they offered. Hugo (1980: 114) argued that migration played a key role in the growth of urban centers during the colonial period. Although a significant proportion of urban dwellers were immigrants from overseas, in-migrants from rural areas and the other islands made up a majority among the indigenous urban population. During the colonial period, besides movement due to the impact of colonization, there was also large scale migration by people from the highly mobile ethnic groups, such as the Minangkabau, Bugis, Banjarese and Makasarese.

During World War II (1942-1945) Indonesia was occupied by the Japanese. Little is known about population movement because no data was available during this time. The

only evidence was that the Japanese initiated a forced labour (*romusha*) recruitment system, which resulted in many Javanese being sent to the other islands or other countries in Southeast Asia; many of them never returned. After independence, Indonesian government reinstated the colonization program under the name of *transmigration* and the first transmigrants were settled in Lampung (South Sumatera) in 1950. From the early 1950s anthropologists and sociologists paid more attention to the migration of selected ethnic groups. The principal theme which emerged from these studies of the mobility of ethnic groups was that the pattern of mobility exhibited were apparently due to a tradition of migration or to traditional pressures within these ethnic groups. These studies tend to consider that forces behind migration of these ethnic groups are more or less constant. Forbes (1981: 61) however argued that forces producing this ethnic migration were constantly changing. Some forces (e.g. political unrest) were only significant at particular periods, others (ecological, demographic, economic, educational, urban attractions) increased steadily in significance, while others (geographical and social-systemic) remained constant throughout the period or declined in significance.

McNicol (1968: 37) based on the 1961 census birth place data and the 1964-1965 National Sample Survey; found that South Sulawesi showed the greatest internal mobility, followed by North Sumatera and South Sumatera. The last two regions were also prime recipients of migrants. Regions of particular stability were West Nusa Tenggara and Bali, while Central Sumatera was important as a region of out migration only. The proportions of out migrants from West and Central Java were comparatively large, due to urban migration to Jakarta. In 1961, rural Sumatera, Kalimantan and Maluku contained the largest 'external' population. In Sumatera and Kalimantan the in-migrants were transmigrants mainly from Java, while in Maluku the majority were from Sulawesi. At the other extreme, the rural areas showing the fewest in-migrants relative to their population and the least internal mobility were in East and Central Java, Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi. The reason for rural to urban population movement besides seeking a better life in urban areas is also caused by the feelings of insecurity due to political instability in some rural areas, most notably Darul Islam rebellion in West Java.

According to the 1971 census, nearly five percent of the total population had

migrated from their province of birth and another 1.2 per cent had changed their province of residence more than once. The most important stream of migration (nearly 40 percent of the total net life-time migration) was that flowing into Jakarta from all other provinces. About-four-fifths of this migration was from other provinces in Java. Although the population of Jakarta was one-third of the urban population of Java, about two-thirds of all migrants to urban areas ended up in Jakarta (Sundrum, 1976 : 90). According to Speare (1975: 79) the second largest stream of migration was that flowing into Lampung, Jambi and Riau. The percentage born outside those provinces was 36,16 and 13 respectively. The rest of the inter-provincial migration was to provinces experiencing high rates of economic development in recent times, such as East Kalimantan where there were timber and oil industries. Speare indicated that interprovincial migrants are more likely to settle in urban areas than in rural areas. Fifty-five per cent of all migrants between 1966 and 1971 were living in urban areas in 1971.

The most comprehensive study about voluntary migration of highly mobile ethnic groups, is probably, the work of Naim (1979). He made an intensive study about why, where the Minangkabau migrate (*merantau*), and the consequences upon the place of origin and the place destination. According to Naim, *Merantau* as a type of migration behaviour is unique. It is a voluntary movement, usually leaving one's cultural territory whether for a short or long time, with the aim of earning a living or seeking further knowledge or experience. In the migration literature *merantau* is considered as temporary migration or circulation because the migrants have the intention of returning home. Naim (1979: 51-56) compared the migration volume of some of the most highly mobile ethnic groups since 1930. In 1930, the percentage of migrants among the Bawean was the largest (35.9 percent), followed by the Bataks (15.3 percent), the Banjarese (14.2 percent) and the Minangkabau (11 percent). The projected migrant population in 1961 showed that the Bawean is still the most mobile (31.6 percent), followed by the Minangkabau (31.6 percent), the Bataks (19.5 percent) and the Banjarese (12.22 percent). In 1971, the projected Minangkabau migrants was 44 percent, probably the highest among the ethnic groups in Indonesia.

The island of Sulawesi is also the homeland of several of Indonesia's most

peripatetic ethnic groups. The Bugis, The Makasarese and the Torajan are the three largest ethnic groups in the province of South Sulawesi. Lineton (1975) showed that out-migration has a long history among these ethnic groups. The fact that the Bugis have been migrating for centuries, in itself, is a factor predisposing other Bugis to leave their native land since the Bugis colonies abroad are a source of information about more favourable economic opportunities elsewhere and often provide both financial and moral assistance to the would-be migrant. The success of many former migrants arouses a spirit of emulation in those who have remained behind. Migration is seen to be a means, for many people the only means, to achieve wealth and a higher social status (Lineton, 1975: 190-191). There is also substantial Bugis movement within South Sulawesi, including seasonal circular migration between village and the provincial capital city of Ujung Pandang. Much of this rural-urban movement also has a seasonal rhythm and involve the Makasarese and the Torajans as well.

The population of Indonesia (Table 3.1) for three decades, from 1971 to 2000 have rapidly grown from 119.3 million to 203.9 million. For three decades, the population of Indonesia mainly concentrated in Java, now comprises around 60 percent of the total population of Indonesia, decrease from 73.8 percent in 1971 to 60.8 percent in 2000. Apart from Jakarta and West Java, other provinces in Java have relatively low population growth, presumably indicating high rate of out-migration, especially from Central and East Java provinces (Table 3.2). The movement of people from Java to the other islands most notably through emigration policy under the Dutch, and continue by the Indonesian government under transmigration policy. Apart from the result of emigration and transmigration policies, the Javanese being the largest ethnic group in Indonesia significantly the most mobile ethnic group. In 2000 the Javanese not only demographically dominant group in Java but also in provinces outside Java, such as Lampung, North Sumatra, East Kalimantan, Jambi and South Sumatra (Table 1.4 and Figure 1.4). Indonesia's national motto, unity in diversity, reflects the process of social transformation in the making of Indonesian nation.

Part 2:

Transmigration and Developmental State

Emigration as an attempt by the colonial government to move people from Java to the other islands is considered to be the least successful measure of the Ethical policy. The first organized attempt in this direction was made in 1905 when, as an experiment, an agricultural colony called Gedong Tataan, was set up in Lampung (South Sumatra). By 1930, the colonists numbered thirty thousand. Efforts to settle Javanese farmers in the south-east of Kalimantan and Sulawesi met with failure. The situation improved somewhat during the 1930s when, as a result of more skilful propaganda, better selection methods, and more extensive preparatory work in the areas of settlement, more farmers could be induced to leave.

Heeren (1979:10-15) divided Dutch resettlement policy (1905-1941) into three broad phases. First, there was the Experimental Phase (1905-1911). The assumption adopted during this phase was that new settlements should, as far as possible, resemble villages in Java. Up to 1911, only about 4,818 Javanese had been moved to Lampung. Second, came the period of the Credit Bank of Lampung (1911-1928). The government established a Credit Bank of Lampung in March 1911 to provide 22.5 gulden as a migration premium to every migrant family, in addition to a maximum of 300 gulden, given as credit. This amount had to be repaid by the migrants after three years with 9 per cent per annum interest. Migrants could borrow additional money for the purchase of, for example, livestock, agricultural equipment or building materials. Since the majority of the migrants did not have any experience of banks, problems of repayment were inevitable. Many used the money for unproductive purposes, such as for clothing or festivities (*slametan*), or even for alcohol or drugs (*candu*).

The government commenced the third phase of the emigration policy, known as the *Bawon* system. The *Bawon* system was initially devised to meet the needs of migrants in Lampung for labor to harvest their rice. Under the *Bawon* system, the government only provided land for the migrants. They were to pay back their own fares within two or three years of settlement. The government usually moved them into Lampung from Java during harvest time, around February-March, so that they could be hired immediately by earlier migrants. Their wages were paid in kind, in the form of rice. In Java their share of the

harvest typically was one-tenth; in Lampung, they could earn as much as one-seventh or one-fifth of the harvest. From this they paid their debts and started a new life as colonists in Lampung. The *Bawon* system was considered the most successful emigration program of the Dutch period, moving large numbers at relatively low cost.

Among the new national leaders, Hatta (1954:169-170) argued most forcefully that emigration should be continued after Independence. However, the idea of 'transmigration' as proposed by Hatta was somewhat different from the colonization policy implemented by the Dutch. Transmigration was to be implemented in conjunction with the industrialization outside Java. However, the idea of industrialization as the backbone of Hatta's transmigration policy proved unattainable. As Wertheim observed in 1956, the difference between the Dutch and the Indonesian resettlement policy had nothing to do with industrialization. In the period 1956-1960, the government formulated, for the first time, a Five-Year Development Plan, in which transmigration was described as an instrument to: reduce population pressure in Java; provide labor in the sparsely populated provinces; and support military strategy, as well as to accelerate the process of assimilation (Hardjosudarmo, 1965: 128-129).

Partly as the result of regional rebellions in West Sumatra and South and North Sulawesi during the period 1956-58, transmigration gained a new aim as a strategic instrument to strengthen national integration and security. The increasing role of military leaders in the government bureaucracy played an important part in establishing the strategic aims of transmigration. Up to the time of the attempted coup of 1965, although the total number of people who were moved under these schemes was very small, some resettlement areas were designed to bolster the national defense, particularly during the dispute with Malaysia. In the 1950s and 1960s transmigration was always ambitiously planned, but its implementation was consistently poor. Expertise and funds were chronically limited. However, the long-lasting perceptions that have valued transmigration as a multi-purpose instrument may also have mystified transmigration as a 'panacea', a cure for many diseases. In the New Order period, such perceptions have apparently been maintained. This helps to explain many controversies about the implementation of transmigration policy during the New Order (1967-1997). The number of families resettled under transmigration program in

this period, see Table 2.1 and 2.2.

In the First Plan (1969-1973), although the problem of population redistribution was mentioned, it was not elaborated, however, the need to meet labor requirements for development in the regions outside Java, although stated as a secondary goal, was given more detailed attention in the plan. It seems that the economist-technocratic views that considered transmigration primarily an instrument to support the immediate objectives of stabilization and rehabilitation strongly influenced the formulation of the plan. The transmigration program was considered as an important source of labor to serve these broader goals. In addition, the transmigration program was expected to increase food production outside Java. In the First Plan no numerical targets for transmigration were set. This was probably because of difficulties in obtaining reliable aggregate data, a major problem for the planners who prepared that document. In addition, the focus of transmigration seemed to be more on regional development than on solving the problem of uneven population distribution between Java and the other islands.

Prior to the Second Plan (1974-1978), there was some hope, particularly among economic observers, that the plan would be prepared in a more systematic way, based on research and the cooperation of a large number of economic experts. But, as Glassburner (1978: 167) argued, as a result of the rice crisis and the radical impact of changing oil prices meant that Widjojo Nitisastro, the head of *Bappenas*, and his subordinates could not prepare a comprehensive plan. The plan, according to Glassburner, was no more than a statement of qualitative objectives. Although the demographic rationale for transmigration was only implicitly stated in the plan, a numerical target was explicitly mentioned. The target was to move 250,000 families within five years. In 1974, the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, explained that the resettlement of large numbers of people from Java, Bali and Lombok would make a positive contribution to regional development outside Java. In selecting the sending areas, priority was to be given to regions that were considered 'critical', such as areas prone to flooding, and to rural places with population densities of more than 1,000 persons per square kilometers. South Sumatra, South and East Kalimantan, and South, Central and Southeast Sulawesi were designated as the main receiving areas for transmigration settlement. In 1974 the World Bank began to support transmigration

program in Lampung, in southern part of Sumatra.

Although the numerical achievement of the Second Plan was far below the target, the Third Plan (1979-1983) surprisingly increased the target into 500,000 households. The reason for increasing the target, apart from the general euphoria occasioned by the second oil boom, was the economist-technocrats' feeling that the implementation of the program would be improved by the increased support being given by many foreign donor agencies. The second World Bank-assisted transmigration project began in 1979, concentrating on the resettlement of transmigrants in dry-land areas along the new Trans-Sumatra highway. Technical assistance was also provided to the Junior Minister for Transmigration to aid in co-ordination of the overall program. Such assistance was important, given that lack of co-ordination was considered to have been the major problem in the implementation of transmigration under the Second Plan. The focus of the second round of World Bank projects on dry-land and food-crop transmigration schemes also reflects an important new development. It was a significant departure from the Bank's successful first project on tree-crop transmigration schemes. The change constituted an important development in the evolution of World Bank involvement on transmigration for at least two reasons. First, the World Bank had failed to influence the policy makers in directing transmigration policy into more market-oriented types of population settlements. Second, although the economist-technocrat group had played a larger role in reshaping transmigration policy into the so-called 'integrated regional development' mode, the ambitious targets of the Third Plan mirrored the influence of strong forces that continued to view transmigration as a population policy aimed at relieving population pressures in Java through the development of agricultural settlement in the Outer Islands.¹

There is no doubt that the Fourth Plan (1984-1988) reflected the increasing role of the transmigration program within the national development policy. The target number to be resettled was increased to 750,000 households. The claimed successful outcomes of the Third Plan had apparently provided a strong argument for the government to increase the

¹ The central government obsession with promoting population resettlement based on food crop agricultural systems as practiced in Java, according to Dove (1985: 32), is essentially a manifestation of the agro-ecological mythology of the Javanese that has developed on Java and strongly influenced the thinking of many policy makers in the central government.

target to this level. In the Fourth Plan, foreign financial support to the transmigration program, particularly from the World Bank, also increased dramatically. The important role of transmigration for national defense and security was emphasized by the Chief of Armed Forces, General Benny Moerdani, when he delivered a keynote address at the seminar in the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas). According to Moerdani, transmigration policy was the only policy within the economic development framework which had a direct linkage with national security and defense. He argued that it was necessary for the military to be involved in site selection, primarily because transmigration location had a strong relation with the concept of territorial management.²

The transmigration policy in the Fifth Plan (1993-1997), indicated a new orientation toward more spontaneous transmigration schemes, as well as toward promotion of cash crop transmigration settlements. The Fifth Plan set the target of 550,000 families to be achieved within five years, of which only 180,000 families would be fully supported by the government. The remaining 370,000 families were expected to be assisted through various schemes under the spontaneous transmigration program. The Fifth Plan also aimed at rehabilitating the poor conditions of existing transmigration settlements. Implementation of the Fifth Plan proved to be difficult. Beside the fact that the budget allocated for transmigration was obviously limited, another problem also arose as the public image of transmigration had been severely affected by the mismanagement in previous periods. The data on inter-provincial migration revealed by the 1990 population census clearly indicated that many migrants were moved to urban rather than rural areas (Mantra, 1992). It also reflected a remarkable shift from sponsored to voluntary migration in the mid-1980s as new economic growth centers developed in several urban areas outside Java.

In 1993, with the commencement of the Sixth Plan (1993-1998), in a clear move to boost the involvement of the private sector in the transmigration program, the President appointed Siswono Yudohusodo, a successful businessman, to be Minister for Transmigration. Although observers generally regarded transmigration as having lost its rational justification, President Suharto decided to expand the scope of transmigration to include the resettlement of the so-called forest squatters. The department was then renamed,

² *Kompas*, 8 March 1985.

the Department of Transmigration and Resettlement of Forest Squatters. The beginning of the Sixth Plan also marked the President's statement about various groups of people who were living below the poverty line. The state's rhetoric on raising population groups officially considered as below the poverty line conveniently supported the new task of transmigration. Forest squatters, including many isolated tribal groups in the outer islands, had been officially recognized as among those living below the poverty line, and become a new target of the transmigration policy.

Apart from the sponsored migration, the increasing numbers of voluntary migrants to the other islands have apparently resulted in the increase of social tension between migrants and local people. In 1995 conflicts broke out between migrants and local people, in East Timor, Papua and Flores, all in Eastern Indonesia provinces. In January 1997 conflict occurred in Sanggau-Ledo, West Kalimantan, between the Madurese migrants and the indigenous Dayak people. Perception on the increasing economic gap between migrants and local people are the underlying factors of these ethnic group conflicts (Tirtosudarmo, 1997). Social tensions also occurred as transmigration also perceived by the locals as the way the central government to spread Islam in places like Papua. The communal conflicts, often wrongly labeled as ethnic and religious conflicts, between the local population and the migrants that occurred in Sampit (Central Kalimantan) Poso (Central Sulawesi) and in Ambon and Halmahera (Maluku); following the collapsed of Suharto's government in 1998, often associated with the transmigration program. Transmigration that heavily imposed by the central government has easily perceived as the cause of marginalization of the local population as the program symbolically represent the oppressive feature of the central government to the region. The communal conflicts in Sampit, Poso, Ambon and Halmahera, mostly occurred in the urban areas and almost none of Javanese migrants involved in the conflict. The violent conflicts have forced many migrants to leave their settlements, creating a large number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Figure 5.1. show the number of IDPs that occurred between February 200 and December 2003 that approaching 1,4 millions people during its peak. Apart from IDPs that caused by communal conflicts in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku; the figure also includes IDPs caused by arms conflicts in Aceh, East Timor and Papua.

At the end of the Fifth Plan, it was obvious that even though the target had already been set very low, its achievement was generally even lower. The implementation of transmigration policy drastically declined following the collapse of Suharto government in 1998. The rising role of the local government, particularly outside Java, significantly curtailed transmigration as the program perceived as only benefiting migrants and marginalizing local populations. While transmigration program persistently exist in the official policy the number of people moved under this program substantially reduced (Table 2.3). Given the multiple goals and the ideological nature of the program, evaluation result on the overall impacts of the program has always controversial and depending on who make the assessment. Demographically, however, transmigration program have only reduced a small portion of population growth in Java and Bali. While the impact on the place of origin is demographically insignificant, for some places in the destination areas, transmigration have significantly contributed into the growth of the population, most clearly in the southern part of Sumatra, the middle part of Sulawesi, and in the coastal regions in Kalimantan. In several destination areas, particularly where the soil is fertile, such as in Lampung (Sumatra), and Luwu (Sulawesi), transmigration have significantly contributed into the regional economy, particularly through the increase in agriculture production. Politically, transmigration program provides a room for the state to impose their particular need to be served through the program. Evicting unwanted group of people that perceived as the source of problem for the government could channeled through transmigration as the case of moving people who resist the construction of dam in Central Java in the early 1990s. While the state always argued that the program is voluntary, it is difficult to deny, however, that there are some instances that the use of force to move people from one place to the other under the program. The transmigration program inherently posits a source of social tensions between migrant and non migrant groups, as flare ups in destination areas where social relations and local politics is fragile, such as currently occurred in Papua.

Part 3:

Migration and Regional Development

Titus (1978) show that development strategy and foreign economic activities play an important role in affecting interregional population movement in Indonesia. The most favoured of the foreign company investment are the extractive industries, such as: timber and oil industries, as well as assembling and construction industries, followed by commerce and services. Those kind of activities have attracted a great deal of foreign capital. The development of the extractive activities is almost exclusively limited to the islands outside Java, other activities mainly in the urban centers on Java. The capital city of Jakarta alone has attracted some fifty percent of all foreign investment excluding the extractive sectors. According to Titus, the highest mobility together with net in-migration is to be found in the economic boom provinces, of both the center type (Jakarta, North Sumatera) and the relatively developed periphery type (South Sumatera, Riau, East Kalimantan). The lowest mobility and a zero migration balance is to be found in the isolated and still largely self sufficient periphery type of province, i.e. East and West Nusatenggara. The highest mobility together with net out-migration appears in the highly integrated but stagnating peripheral provinces close to center groups (i.e. West Sumatera, Central Java and Jogjakarta).

The decreased availability of land can theoretically be off-set by investing in technology or intensify cultivation. Unfortunately, the modernization of agricultural production in some rural areas in Java has created more unemployment. For example in rural Java the use of the huller and small tractors has drastically reduced the number of farm workers. There has been a shift of labour from agricultural sectors to non agricultural sectors, mainly in urban areas, such as in domestic services or petty trade. Montgomery (1975) showed that new rice strains did not have any effect on agricultural employment because they were only meant to make Java self sufficient in rice. According By 1976 the rural urban disparity in income had increased, especially in Java. The urban-rural disparity in non-food expenditure is much greater than in food expenditure. Within food items, there is very little disparity in expenditure on basic foods, such as cereals and casava. The disparity is greater to the 'medium foods, such as fruits and vegetables and tobacco, and

highest for the superior food as meat, fish, eggs, and milk. Among non-food items in 1970 the disparity in housing expenditure was quite low, while it was very high for miscellaneous items, which include consumer durables. In all cases the urban-rural disparity was higher in Java than outside Java. From 1970 to 1976, as a result of the government monetary stabilization policy and the concentration of development areas, urban incomes have increased much faster, especially in Jakarta and other large cities than in rural areas. Such changes would normally have led to migration from rural to urban areas.

There is no doubt that during the Suharto era many improvements have been made in almost every aspect of social life in Indonesia. In the first five year development plan (1969-1973), the government emphasized the development of infrastructure and communication, i.e. roads, railroads, harbours, airfields. In the social sectors the growth in education was also dramatic. While only about half the children at primary school age was enrolled in schools 15 years ago, now many more children at that age have access to schooling. Each village with a population of around 2000-3000 people has at least one primary school and many have more than two. Health facilities have entered the 50,000 villages with provision of integrated health services for every sub-district. In the beginning of the second half of the 1970s satellite communication was introduced. Later, the government distributed television sets in every sub-district. The combination of the increase in education, health services and the availability of transportation and communication facilities have caused rising hopes and aspirations of rural young people which resulted in the movement to urban centers.

According to the Leknas Migration Survey (Suharso, et al, 1976), more than one half of migrants were not married at the time of the survey and since more had married between the time of migration and the time of survey the proportion who were not married at the time moving was probably much higher. The majority of the migrants had not worked prior to moving, primarily because many were still going to school up the time when they moved. Among the female migrants about one third were married before moving. The education characteristics of migrants to Jakarta and other provinces of Java show a higher educational level than native born residents in these provinces. The reverse

was the case in Sumatera and other islands. This distribution may reflect the fact that the more educated, who are also younger persons, have been involved to a considerable extent in migration to Java. While the migration to Sumatera and other islands consisted to a greater extent of the movement of unskilled workers, presumably the migrants under state sponsored migration programs. The most common occupation for those who were employed was farming, but this accounted for only twelve percent of the total migrants. Although about seventy five percent of the migrants come from rural areas, most were either out of the labor force or employed in non farm work prior to moving (Suharso, et al, 1976).

At the village level, Mantra (1981: 151-154) showed that more males than females wanted to migrate from the *dukuh*. Married women in particular, did not want to leave their local community especially since their attention was generally focused upon the children, close kin and proximate neighbors. The young educated and unmarried people from rural and small cities were groups who were pulled by the extension of job opportunities in the urban centers. In addition, the decreasing of job availability in agricultural sectors has pushed them to seek a job in the cities. The movement of a large group of people from a community usually has dramatic effects on the demographic characteristics of those left behind. The movement also influences the social and economic growth of the place of origin. According to Hugo (1987) in his village study in West Java, remittances made up more than fifty percent of total household income. The bulk of remittances was spent on education or invested in housing. The out migration of people from the village, mostly young, however also produced social problems. Among the problems related to brain drain, such as difficulties in selecting village leaders, and in raising enough labour for various cooperative work projects. The rate of divorce also seemed to be increasing in places from where a large number of males has out migrated.

In the literature, urban destination has received more attention than rural destination. Several migration studies in Jakarta, showed that in-migration was very important in the growth of Jakarta, not only in terms of population growth but also on urban development. History has shown that Jakarta was built by migrants. Undoubtedly the large number of migrants led to increasing demand on public facilities, such as housing,

transportation and hospitals. Montgomery (1975) showed that Indonesia is experiencing a serious urban unemployment problem among the young, although the evidence was based on rough and satisfactory data. Even though there was a high risk of not getting a job, migration to the cities is still taking place. Another impact of large numbers of poor migrants in the cities, which has not received much attention from researchers is the socio-political impact on national political stability. Jones (1977: 37) showed that in the case of Jakarta and Surabaya a true urban proletariat divorced from any rural roots, is likely to develop. The migrant poor will continue to compete for jobs and services with the local-born poor and also with the urban middle classes. It is possible that this situation can lead to social unrest and political conflicts.

After the decline of state's sponsored migration in the mid 1980s, voluntary migration became more influential in the development of the economy in the region. Migration plays a crucial role in human resources development (education, health, employment) where inequalities continuously persisted as the structural context of migration. In this part, special attention will be given to migration in some backward regions, such as Papua, as increasing communal tensions apparently occurring as migrants tend to be more resourceful than the local population. From the beginning of its five-year development plan in 1967, Indonesia gradually sought to integrate its national development into the regional and global capitalist economy. The substantial lack of capital was one of the reasons for the beginning of the open door policy to invite foreign loans and investors into the country. Aided by large inflows of concessional finance and substantial foreign private direct investment from Japan, Indonesia in the 1970s actively exploited its considerable natural resources, the mainstay of which has been oil. The Indonesian economy performed reasonably well during the 1970s; with an average growth rate per capita GDP of 5.4 per cent. This was better than its major ASEAN partners, and approaching those achieved in the NICs.

During the 1980s, the global oil surplus led to a decline in foreign exchange earnings and a resolve on behalf of government to diversify its export base. Since the early 1980s, a series of reforms has been introduced which are designed to improve economic efficiency and shift the direction of the economy from import-substitution to an export

orientation, with a particular emphasis on non-oil exports. Many economic reforms, including deregulation, have been introduced to facilitate operations in the financial sector, promote foreign trade, encourage investment (particularly foreign investment), streamline customs and shipping, ease regulatory controls on land transport, and improve the country's tax base. From the available evidence, it seems that these reforms have stimulated foreign investment and significantly boosted non-oil exports. By 1995, Indonesia was ranked by the World Bank as a middle income country with a per-capita income of close to US\$1,000, up from less than US\$100 at the time when the New Order began its development planning.³

Among economists, however, there have always been different views on the impact of economic reforms on the distribution of income. These divergent views are partly due to the different approaches and methods used to measure the economic impacts on income distribution. Azis, for example, applying the so-called computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, to the Indonesian case, indicates through both the static and dynamic simulations that the post-reform progress in the country's macroeconomic condition is likely accompanied by worsening--albeit slightly--household income distribution between income groups. The non agricultural sector appears to be the major beneficiary of the reform. From the dynamic simulations, a worsening distribution is also found between rural and urban areas. However, results of both simulations also show that an improved poverty condition is likely achieved following the reform.⁴

Data on recent migration clearly shows that the number of migrants for the period of 1985-1990 is larger than the previous two periods (1975-1980 and 1980-1985). The provinces which have a higher rate of recent migrants increase during the 1985-1990 period compared with the two previous periods are Aceh, Riau, Bengkulu, West Java, Central Java, East Java, East Timor, Central and East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua. In contrast to other parts of the country, the increasing number of recent in-migration to provinces in the eastern part of Indonesia was already occurring in the 1980-

³ Indonesia is labeled by Hill (1996) as Southeast Asia's emerging giant in his recent book which comprehensively assesses the Indonesian economic achievements since 1966.

⁴ See unpublished paper by Iwan J. Azis "Impacts of Economic Reform on Rural-Urban Welfare: A General Equilibrium Framework", Cornell University. No date of publication.

1985 period.⁵ As the government capacity to sponsor population movement through transmigration program became limited, as oil price collapsed, in mid 1980s, the majority of recent migrants in the 1985-1990 periods were most likely to be voluntary migrants. The various economic reforms which have been implemented since the mid-1980s to boost foreign investment apparently have resulted in the opening up of job opportunities in many places, such as Batam Island in Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua. A significant indication that the majority of recent in-migration consist of spontaneous or voluntary migrants is their destinations, which are mostly urban areas compared to rural areas. The process of population mobility change from assisted to voluntary migration was accompanied by the process of labor reallocations from low income agriculture to higher productivity non agricultural employment.

According to Vidyattama (2008), internal migration is an important aspect in Indonesia's provincial economic growth not only because of its magnitude but also because it has been government policy in encouraging economic convergence in Indonesia. Based on the 2000 census data, Vidyattama (2008: 240-241) calculated that around 10 percent of the Indonesian population was not born in the province where they reside and around 3 percent resided in different provinces again five years earlier. Utilising Indonesian provincial population data from the census of 1980, 1990 and 2000; Vidyattama (2008) is able to provide five yearly pattern of population mobility during 1975-2000.⁶ The analysis however does not include lifetime migration, which is indicated by the number of people who lived in a different province where he or she was born, instead is concentrated on the impact of five years migration flows on five years income growth. The lifetime migration, according Vidyattama (2008), represents the stock variable and hence indicates the impact of a migration network more than the impact of migration flow. Three aspects were

⁵ In Indonesia the only source of information on population mobility or migration at the national level is the population census. The population census is taken every ten years and the latest was undertaken in 1990. Information on two types of migrants can be derived from the population census. Lifetime migrants are those people whose province of birth is different from the current province of residence. Recent migrants are those people whose place of residence five years before the census is different from their current province of residence. In many ways, the data on recent migrants provides more accurate pictures on existing population mobility than the data on lifetime migrants.

⁶ Vidyattama (2008) utilised the Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991 and 1995) procedure in examining the impact of migration on the convergence process and using the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimation to examine the impact on provincial growth; those migration pattern than analysed.

specifically analysed, namely income, employment and human capital, in relation to the interprovincial migration pattern during 1975-2000.⁷

The migration flow from low income provinces to medium and high income provinces was still significant in Indonesia during 1975-1980 and 1985-1990, comprising approximately 26 percent of all migration flows. The lower number of migration from lower income provinces was mainly because of the low emigration rate from East and West Nusa Tenggara although the low number of the population in low income provinces was also one of the reasons. Human capital must play a role in determining the low migration rate from West and East Nusa Tenggara, since the migration rate from Maluku or Southeast Sulawesi (where human capital is higher) was still much higher than for the two Nusa Tenggara provinces. However, the number dropped to only 9.3 percent during 1995-2000. Thus drop was a result of the large increase in the migration amongst medium income provinces partly because of the 1997-2000 crises and conflict. As expected, the opposite direction of this flow (i.e., from high and medium income provinces to low income provinces) was low at below 15 percent of all migration, except during 1975-1980, when the flow from medium to low income provinces alone was 14.9 percent. The transmigration program was the main reason for this high flow to low income provinces in that period.

The correlation between net migration rate and initial unemployment rate shows positive signs for the 1980-1985 and 1985-1990 periods, meaning most people migrated to unemployment areas in those periods. In 1980-1985, migration to Jakarta dominated this positive correlation. In addition, the transmigration program to Central Sulawesi and the migrating culture of West Sumatran people also played an important role. In the period 1985-1990, Jakarta began to have negative net migration, but most of these migrants went to surrounding areas in West Java that also had a high unemployment rate (fifth highest in Indonesia). Nevertheless, migration to Riau and East Kalimantan seemed more influential in producing this positive correlation between migration and unemployment since each of

⁷ Information on the impact of migration on human development, such as on income, poverty, education, health and community participation, unfortunately is very sketchy. In an attempt of filling this information gap, a group of researchers from Australia and Indonesia is currently conducting a survey on rural-urban migration in four cities (Tangerang -West Java, Medan-North Sumatra, Makassar-South Sulawesi and Samarinda-East Kalimantan), the result of their analysis however still in progress.

these provinces had more than 5 percent net migration as well as being in the five highest unemployment provinces. The correlation between net migration and the unemployment rate during the period 1990-1995 shows a negative sign because, on average, people were migrating out of high unemployment areas during that period. Further analysis shows this negative correlation was mainly due to increasing negative net migration from Jakarta as well as its unemployment rate. Exclusion of Jakarta from the data range produces a positive correlation between migration and unemployment. Other than Jakarta, this correlation is dominated by big migration flows to East Kalimantan, Riau and West Java.⁸

The correlation between migration and unemployment was weak during 1995-2000. One of the main reasons was the high emigration from Aceh and Maluku due to the conflict there. These two provinces had a relatively medium level of unemployment in 1995 and people fled mainly for safety reasons rather than seeking income. Another reason was the massive increase in migration to Riau at the same time as the rapid industrialisation in that province, especially in Batam. So there were increasing job opportunities in Riau that moderated unemployment before 1995 and an increasing level of services and infrastructure that motivated people to migrate there. As a result, there is no relationship in this case between migration and initial unemployment. The correlation between migration and unemployment was still insignificant in 2000-2005. This is partly because migration outflows from Jakarta, the highest unemployment province, were offset by the fact that the flow was still to West Java, the fourth highest. Meanwhile, migration inflows to Yogyakarta and Bali where unemployment was low combined with inflows to Riau, East Kalimantan, and Papua, where unemployment was high, resulted in no significant correlation between migration and unemployment.

Human capital is another important factor in determining migration's impact on growth. As discussed, the human capital in Indonesia of both emigrants and immigrants is always higher than the average work force human capital (Table 3.6). As a result, migration will have a clear positive impact on human capital if the human capital level of immigrants

⁸ Hardjono (1986) observed the situation in Indonesia where emigrants are strongly attracted to a region's services and infrastructure can explain this mobility toward these areas with better infrastructure, relatively high income and also unemployment.

is higher than emigrants and the province has positive net migration. In contrast, the impact will be negative if the province has negative net migration and in addition, the human capital of emigrants is higher than immigrants. Beside these two conditions, it is hard to measure whether migration will increase or decrease a province's human capital level. There were only a few provinces that have a clear positive or negative impact from migration on their human capital. West Java was the only province that had higher educated immigrants than emigrants for the entire 1980-2000 period, so that migration was highly likely to boost human capital. It also had positive net migration during 1980-2000 (Table 3.5). Jakarta and East Kalimantan were provinces with higher educated immigrants than emigrants until 1995, but Jakarta also had negative net migrants after 1985 that may have caused human capital depletion. Riau, Bali and Yogyakarta all had positive net migrants and higher educated immigrants than emigrants in most of periods especially after 1990.

Yogyakarta has a special role as one of the centres for education in Indonesia besides Jakarta. As a result, Yogyakarta has always had the highest average education for both emigrants and immigrants (Table 3.6). However, in contrast to other periods, the level of education of emigrants was higher than for immigrants during 1985-1990. This is most likely related to the 1986-1992 industrialization period in Indonesia that attracted university graduates to other Java provinces especially from Yogyakarta. Riau and Bali had developed manufacturing and tourism industries, respectively, from the end of the 1970s, but during 1980-1985 and 1985-1990, emigrants' level of education from these two provinces was still higher than for immigrants. In the case of Bali, this was mainly because emigrants' level of education was relatively high especially during 1985-1990. That industrialization in Bali was not as high as their Java neighbours can explain this outflow of educated migrants. This was not the case in Riau where the higher level of emigrants compared to immigrants was mostly due to the relatively low level of education of immigrants. The fact that Riau developed labour intensive palm oil plantations as well as labour intensive manufacturing industry can explain this migration inflow. The more developed manufacturing and tourism industry is a reasonable explanation for why the education of immigrants was higher than that of emigrant in Riau and Bali, respectively since 1990. On the other hand, human capital depletion as a result of migration surely took place in Central Java and West

Sumatra where the education of emigrant was higher than immigrants for the entire 1975-2005 period and there was also net migration outflow at the same time.

Hugo et al. (1987, quoting in Vidyattama, 2008) argue that a long history of population pressure on agricultural resources in Central Java is the main reason for young educated labour seeking job opportunities outside the province. They also argue that the culture of “*merantau*”, i.e., seeking jobs or a life away from their village, is the main reason for young people in West Sumatra going to other provinces. However, a proportion of these migrants tended to return and resettle in their village of origin after their productive age. Despite experiencing depletion from migration, the total human capital level of Central Java and West Sumatra actually increased by 5.2 and 4.4 years of schooling, respectively, during 1975-2005. The potential for labour to successfully migrate and get the job they want is higher if they have some education. This can also increase the motivation to accumulate human capital. Nevertheless, the national policy to increase education launched at the beginning of the 1980s has clearly played a role in the increase of education levels. The relationship between migration and human capital accumulation for Indonesia’s provincial case during 1975-2005 was mostly positive. However, the relationship was negative during 1980-1985 and 1995-2000. During 1980-1985, the negative relationship was mainly affected by Papua owing to a decrease in education level. The transmigration program from Java could be the reason for this negative correlation but the lower education level in 1985 could also have been the result of better coverage in the survey on remote area population. There was no province during 1995-2000 that could be the single reason for the negative correlation. Conflict in Maluku and Aceh clearly contributed to this negative result but even eliminating these provinces would not make the relationship positive.

The trend and pattern of human movement in the eighties apparently continue in the 1990s and 2000s (Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). With the substantial reduction in the government capacity to move people under transmigration policy, migration significantly constitute a function of labor market economy.⁹ In the situation where government only play a little role

⁹ The number of families who were moved under the transmigration program in the post-Suharto era (1999-2007) in total only 130,661 (Table 2.3).

in directly influence human mobility, apart from individual networks, labor recruitment agencies increasing becoming more influential. Labor recruitment agencies or other kind of mediators and brokers, emerging as the major players in the lucrative migration industries of overseas contract workers. The surplus of labor in densely populated areas, particularly in Java, Bali and Lombok, logically become the source of labors for other places, within Indonesia and beyond. Internally, the opening economic opportunities in some places like Papua, and the fact that the local population has relatively low human resource endowment, constitutes the structural inequalities that creates push and pull factors for people's movement (Table 3.6, 3.7) Papua should be particularly given serious attention in the future concerning the development of human movement in this region. As many research reports on the increasing communal tensions as the locals perceived migrants as threatening their resourced economy and cultural identity.¹⁰ In-migration to Papua while in many ways reflects the work of labor market forces, the perception that migrants represent the threats closely related to the local demands for more political recognition. A comprehensive political economy approach, in which freedom of movement will not be jeopardized, is needed to resolve this current increasing communal tension in Papua.

While movement of people from Java to the other islands continue to increase, big cities in Java, particularly Jakarta, Semarang, Bandung and Surabaya, also continue in attracting migrant from all over the place in Indonesia. The latest World Development Report by the World Bank argued the important of the economics of geography and emphasizes the empirical evidence of agglomeration as the engine behind economic growth in the advanced industrializing countries in Western Europe, Northern America and East Asia. In the case of Indonesia's economic development, the expanding tendencies in the public infrastructure investments mainly in Java, in which the current construction of the highways connecting big cities (Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya), certainly will accelerate the agglomeration process in Java. Human movement obviously will be attracted by such a huge concentration of economic activities in Java. Rural to urban and inter-

¹⁰ McGibbon, Rodd, 2004, "Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict". Policy Studies 13, East-West Center Washington. International Crisis Group (ICG), 2008, "Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua", Asia Report , No, 154, 16 June.

islands migration into Java will continue to be the major contributions in the process of agglomeration in Java. While high economic growth might be achieved through such agglomeration processes, as implicated by The World Bank recent report, such a development might also, paradoxically, reflecting a continuation of social and economic inequalities between rural and urban areas, and between Java and the other islands. The archipelagic form of Indonesian geography, and the plurality of its society, should perhaps be reconsidered by the state's planners in order to make the process of agglomeration in Java would not counterproductive to the process of nation building and national integration.

Part 4:

International Migration

As a public issue, cross border movement, mostly for economic reasons, only began to be recognized by the authorities in the early 1980s. The human rights violations and the dire conditions of migrant workers, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, has become the news headlines in the mid 1980s and triggered public attention. The press reports revealed the overseas labor flows that mostly organized by private labor recruiter agencies, operated through the back door of the state authority.¹¹ Increasing demand for domestic labors, have become the strong factors for overseas labor migration and the rising lucrative migration industries. The Indonesian overseas labor migration continues characterized by irregularity, minimum legal protection and the low wages. The irregular manners of cross border migration constitute the difficulties in obtaining the accurate number of their existence. It is estimated that at present there are about four million documented migrant workers from Indonesia. ILO recently estimated that the number of undocumented migrants is two to four times higher than the documented migrants. Approximately seventy two percent of

¹¹ For further discussion on the beginning of overseas labor issues, see Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto and Haning Romdiati, 1997, *"A Needs Assessment Concerning Indonesian Women Migrant Workers to Saudi Arabia: A Report for the International Labor Office in Jakarta"*, Center for Population and Human Resources Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta, November. National Commission for Women, 2003, *Indonesian Migrant Domestic Workers: Their Vulnerabilities and New Initiative for the Protection of Their Rights*. Indonesian Country Report to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants.

Indonesian migrant workers are women, with almost ninety percent of them employed as domestic workers in the Middle East and South-East Asian countries. Most migrant workers from Indonesia have low levels of education and work in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations. Men mostly work in agriculture, construction or manufacturing while the great majority of the women are domestic workers or caregivers. (See Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3).

The state's response to migration is basically dominated by the political and economic forces of the ruling elites in the country. To comprehend the Indonesian state's response to contemporary migration it is therefore necessary to understand how the ruling elite within the political and bureaucratic systems perceived the population issues, particularly the migration phenomena. In this regard, the legacy of past experiences of the state's response to migration, both during the colonial and post colonial periods, has been crucial in shaping the perception, and in turn the responses, of the current political and bureaucratic systems on migration and population issues in general. Reducing unemployment which is perceived as one of the sources of domestic social and political unrest, and acquiring national revenue, are the twin basic goals of the state's overseas employment policy. In the last three years, remittances clearly become the driving force behind the government policy to improve overseas labor migration. The remittance that transfer through formal channel is estimated around 6 billion USD in 2007, increasing from 5.65 billion USD in 2006 and 5.37 billion USD in 2005. (Figure 4.1). The World Bank study on "The Malaysia-Indonesia Remittance Corridor", found that the use of formal channel was drastically declined by over 30 percent from a high of nearly USD 0.40 billion in 2002 to USD 0.26 in 2006 (Hernandez-Coss, 2008: xiv). According to the study, total remittance coming into Indonesia from Malaysia alone was around USD 2.7 billion in 2006. It is estimated that only nine to ten percent of remittances to Malaysia from Malaysia flow through formal systems. The improvement of formal and transparent remittance systems should be carefully implemented, as suggested by The World Bank. At the end, as the study recommended, improvement in regulation should recognized the migrant workers needs, and their important contribution to the economy.

Between November 2007 and July 2008, ILO office in Jakarta conducted a study on migrant workers' remittances, their utilization, and their needs for and access to financial

services.¹² The study covers 400 returned migrant workers, in five major sending areas: Lampung, West Java, Central Java, East Java and West Nusa Tenggara). For some provinces, the remittances sent by migrant workers are their primary source of income, by far surpassing the national budget transfers. Remittances are a very important source of income at the community level, mostly constituting the main source of income for the family. One of the most important factors determining the country of destination is the cost of placement. The placement fee differs from country to country. Migrant workers have limited financial capacity to pay the placement fees, especially when loans are not available to migrant workers. Consequently migrant workers mostly choose the destination countries with the lowest placement fees, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are among the countries with the lowest placement fees for migrant workers, which reflect the fact that migrant workers' salaries are among the lowest in these countries. With the majority of migrant workers leaving for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, the majority of migrant workers will receive lowest possible pay as migrant workers. Migrant workers then earn less money and have less to send home as remittances. High placement fees and the absence of loans directly lead to lower remittances sent to Indonesia. The need for financing before departure is high among migrant workers. Most migrant workers come from low-income families and financial need is the major reason for their migration. And the recruitment process costs a significant amount of money. Most of the survey respondents had Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as their country of destination and the majority of them paid slightly less than IDR 5,000,000 for the placement fee.

Also, before migration, migrant workers are frequently among the main breadwinners in the family. During the pre-departure period, most migrant workers spend months at the training centers. During this period, the worker cannot contribute to the family, and the family usually has to borrow to pay for the family's daily needs. Migrant workers often have to borrow from informal sources who charge high interest rates to cover daily needs, further indebting the family beyond the placement costs. Migrant workers thus

¹² The findings of the study by ILO presented in this report, all are based on the power point presentation by Lotte Kejser, the head of ILO technical advisor for migrant workers project, at National Stake Holders Consultation Meeting on "Securing and Leveraging Migrant Domestic Workers' Remittances and Their Impact on Economic Development in Indonesia", Jakarta, 25 November 2008.

need loans from financial institutions both for migration-related costs, as well as family subsistence prior to departure. Migrant workers often have very limited options regarding the financing of their migration. Commercial banks require collateral and a formal financial track record in order to approve loans. Migrant workers' families usually cannot fulfill these requirements. Instead, informal sources, including relatives, friends and moneylenders as well as recruitment agencies are the main sources of loans for migrant workers. Both sources often charge high interest rates (about ten percent per month). Expensive loans to pay both the placement fee and for the family's basic needs during the pre-departure and repayment period is a significant financial burden for migrant workers and their families. Indonesian migrant workers need access to credit tailored to their needs at reasonable interest rates from financial institutions.

The low level of education of migrant workers and the lack of explanation by recruitment agencies makes it difficult for most migrant workers to understand or negotiate the financial terms of their contracts. Migrant workers often do not know how much the recruitment agency charged them for placement and have very little say on their salary and benefits. As a result Indonesian migrant workers frequently are overcharged and underpaid, and suffer substantial financial losses during the pre-departure phase and during working abroad. Without clear knowledge regarding wages, benefits, placement fees, fee repayment scheme, etc., it is difficult for workers to develop a financial plan for themselves. Without financial planning, it is difficult for workers to be able to save and remit their earnings. Migrant workers need pre-departure financial education that prepares migrant workers to better understand their work related contract and be able to save and plan for the utilization of their earnings.

More than fifty percent of migrant domestic workers earned between IDR 1-2 million per month. Their wages are deducted for 6-12 months for the repayment of the placement fee. During this period, the workers generally end up receiving only about ten percent of what they actually earn. Migrant domestic workers and their families hope that they can start remitting immediately, because the family depends on the remittances. However, migrant workers must first pay off the placement fee over 6-12 months through salary deductions, before they can start remitting part of their salary. The majority of

migrant domestic workers remit through informal channels, such as currency exchange agents, shops, cargo services, mobile card top ups, acquaintances, or they will carry the money themselves. The reasons why migrant workers prefer informal remittances channels are that the employers often restrict migrant workers' mobility and hold their ID, so migrant workers have difficulties using formal remittances channels, such as commercial banks. Another factor is that formal remittances channels may be more expensive, and do not have networks reaching down to the community level.

Migrant workers' frequency and amount of remittance depended on how long they had been working overseas. Migrant workers who had worked for a longer period of time could usually remit a larger amount & more regularly. Only fifteen percent of migrant workers were able to remit on a monthly basis, whereas more than half (fifty six percent) did not have a fixed schedule for remitting their money, and remitted less frequently. The frequency of remittances transfers also depends on migrant workers' access to transfer channels. In places where they have easy access, migrant workers will remit more frequently.. Migrant workers' degree of satisfaction with the transfer process depends on the cost of transfer and the length of the transfer process. More than half of migrant domestic workers (fifty two percent) reported that the transfer process took more than three days. Migrant workers' remittances depend on what they earn and which expenses they have in the destination country. Eighty three percent of Central Java respondents remitted IDR 3 million or less. Respondents from West Java, Lampung, East Java and West Nusa Tenggara remitted larger amounts but less frequently.

The migrant workers families (parents and spouse) are usually the decision-makers regarding the choice to work abroad and how to use remittances. During deployment overseas, the utilization of remittances is usually decided and managed by the parents and spouse at home. The remittances usually fund family-household expenditures and sometimes a family business. No distinction is made between the family household assets and the migrant workers' assets, and usually migrant workers don't have independent decision-making power over the remittances. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to provide financial education, not only to migrant workers, but also to the families of migrant workers. Migrant workers' families mainly spent remittance on financing routine family

expenditures or basic consumption (sixty five percent). Migrant workers families are highly dependent on remittances for their basic needs. This reflects the poor income levels of migrant workers and their families. When income levels of migrant workers increase, remittances tend to be used for other purposes than for basic consumption. Workers who went to destination countries paying higher salaries were able to also use the remittances for savings, education and buying assets.

ILO study found that there is a clear link between income and utilization of remittances. If income is low due to migration to lower paying countries (which is often due to unaffordable high placement fees to higher paying countries), or income is low due to long periods of debt repayment for recruitment fees, remittances will only be used for daily needs. After basic consumption, the second most popular use of remittances among migrant workers was for buying or improving assets. Seventy nine percent of migrant workers used remittances for some type of asset ownership or improvement. House ownership or renovation and land ownership are among the most common uses of remittances for buying assets. On average (in all surveyed provinces), thirty seven percent of the migrant domestic worker families were totally dependent on remittances for their family income. The highest dependency on remittances for total family income was in West Nusa Tenggara where eighty six percent of the migrant domestic worker's families depended on remittances for all of their household income, due to lower household income levels in West Nusa Tenggara. It is a typical practice among families who run micro businesses that the money used for the business is not separated from the family money used for daily expenditures. Therefore the percentage of remittances used to finance the business is difficult to estimate. Although migrant workers' remittances finance the business, migrant workers usually do not own the business. Businesses management and ownership are usually with the parents or spouses. The income from businesses is utilized mainly for the needs of the family.

Based on the household survey on the impact of remittance in three provinces (East Java, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara), Sukamdi et.al. (2004) show that most of the remittances are used for "unproductive" activities, such as consumptions or paying the debts. According to the study, most ex-migrants after spending on subsistence needs

such as food, clothing, education and health care, they spent remittances on expensive non-subsistent items, such as unusually modern houses and expensive consumer goods. Sukamdi et.al, however, argued that the term “unproductive” should be carefully understood, and located within the rural household economy contexts. The ability to pay off debts, for example, actually indicates an improvement of welfare and security feelings among the household members. Spending the money for the improvement of the physical condition of the house, or for buying the better clothing and food qualities, and even for paying education or health care, are activities that indirectly demonstrate human capital investment. What is lacking in the study on remittance, so far, is the measurement of social costs that migrant workers and their families have to pay in order to support the overseas migration. The domination of economic perspective in the study of international migration overlooks the social aspects of human movements.

The placement cost for an overseas migrant worker is very crucial in determining the whole process of labor migration in Indonesia. The placement cost, that in paper should be free, in practice become the major burden for the migrant worker and constitute the irregular structure of the overseas labor system in Indonesia. A study by Institute of Ecosoc Rights (2008) estimated the placement fees that should be paid by the migrant workers according to the destination countries: (1) Hong Kong, 21 to 26 million IDR (equivalent to 8 months salaries), (2) Taiwan, 36 million IDR (equivalent to 14 months salaries), (3) Saudi Arabia, 1 to 3,5 million IDR (cash), (4) Malaysia (800 thousand to 8 million IDR (equivalent to 6 to 8 months salaries), (5) Singapore, 1500 to 2,000 SGD (equivalent to 6 to 8 months salaries), (6) South Korea, 15 to 20 million IDR (cash). The type of jobs that Indonesian migrant workers are employed varied according to the receiving countries. Domestic helpers, around 80 percent of total Indonesian migrant workers, are exported to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and the Middle East. Construction and plantation workers mostly employed in Malaysia, while manufacturing laborers are employed in South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. Japan have a bilateral agreement with Indonesia on the so called trainee program, in which Indonesian youth were recruited to work in manufacturing industries with the salary below the minimum wage of the Japanese laborers. Japan also received the young female to be employed in the entertainment

industries. Only recently Indonesia sends female nurse to Japan, Middle East and Europe. A bilateral agreement between Indonesia and New Zealand recently created for agriculture laborers.

The overseas labor regulation in 2004 emphasizes the authority on overseas labor policy on Minister of Labor and the Indonesian embassy in the receiving countries. The labor recruiter agencies operate both in the receiving country and in Indonesia. After the labor recruiter agency in the receiving country obtain a job order, namely the letter stating the list of labor demand, they have to obtain an approval letter from the Indonesian embassy office before sending the job order to their labor recruiter counterpart in Indonesia. The Indonesian labor recruiter bring the job order to the ministry of Labor to obtain approval letter and the number or the quota of labor that they could recruit in a certain time. It should be noted that only Ministry of Labor could authorize the permit for the labor recruiter agencies. This authorization process is the beginning of the corrupt practices in the long process of overseas labor policy. The second corrupt practices are occurred at the time when the labor recruiter agencies submit their request to get the letter of approval and the quota of labor that they could recruit. Based on the approval letter and the quota that the labor recruiter agencies obtain from the Ministry of Labor, the process of recruitment and placement officially begin. In practice however, the various form of labor brokers have already operated in the country to recruit prospective laborers from places that known as the major source for overseas migrant workers. The labor brokers, that constitute a several layer of actors, from village, district, province to Jakarta, operate to serve the national labor recruiter agencies in recruiting and processing the migrant according to the formal bureaucratic requirements, ranging from personal identification, supporting letter from family, approval letter from the village head, the health certificate, and the passport. In this stage of documentation processes, falsification and bribing the officials occurred without any possible noticed and controlled from the public.

After potential migrant workers are “collected” they are accommodated in the holding center, mostly located in Jakarta, firstly to be trained, and secondly to wait for placement abroad. In this stage, a waiting time for the migrant workers to be placed in destination country could be unlimited. In this uncertain circumstance, potential migrant

workers have literally imprisoned and treated as merely an economic commodity by the labor recruitment agency. Migrant workers have no power to negotiate and their employment prospect lies in the hand of the brokers that operates on behalf of the recruiting agency. Extortion, bribing, sexual harassment, forced labor; could happened to the potential migrant workers at this waiting stage. The labor recruitment agency and its brokers, while having an approval letter and the legitimate number of quota, practically only used such letters as the legitimacy to recruits potential migrant workers as much as they can, to be traded, often with other agencies, both within Indonesia and in the receiving countries. The potential migrant workers, which the majority is female, have no possibility to leave the holding center as they will be charged, for room and meals, according to the duration of their stay in the holding centers. The labor agencies create indebtedness that restrict the human right of the potential migrant workers. The migration irregularity and the practice of human trafficking could occur along the process of placement that ironically is authorized by the state. (See Appendix at the back of this paper, on the chart to schematize the systematic processes of structural exploitation experienced by the migrant workers, and the necessary steps to improve the situation, in Indonesia)

In the past, the inward looking character of the migration policy in Indonesia is reflected in the political-bureaucratic structure which sets political stability and national integration as the national priority. Economic development planning, initiated by the economists-technocrats since the beginning of the New Order, apparently has not yet been integrated with the issue of foreign employment policy. Several policy attempts have been introduced in the last three years to tap the potential revenue from the overseas migrant workers. Lack of coordination among state's institutions dealing with overseas labor migration, particularly between Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for instance, have caused a lack of policy coherence and bureaucratic inefficiency that contributing irregular migration. In 2004 for example a National Law on Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers. This law is aimed at: bringing about better migration management, including improving the qualifications of workers and reducing the number of illegal and undocumented workers; establishing institutional mechanisms for the placement and protection of migrant workers; conducting advocacy on their behalf; and

applying administrative and penal sanctions for breaches of its provisions.

The Government is also working to enhance support services in destination countries, develop a more accessible mechanism for support services, improve data collection and improve cooperation among Government agencies. The implementation of this national law on overseas labor migration however suffered from serious lack of coordination between the different agencies that supposed to be involved, both from the government as well from the public sectors, namely the labor recruitment agencies. The institution that should enforce the law, like the police and the immigration, operates without clear supervision and control. The lack of law enforcement has in turn manifested in the bureaucratic inertia and inefficiency and rampant corruption. In an attempt to solve the bureaucratic inertia, in 2006 the government created a non departmental institution specifically in charge of managing the overseas labor migration, namely National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia – BNP2TKI). The agency is mandated to provide direct services, coordinate, and oversee documentation, pre-deployment information and orientation, deployment and return, information dissemination, welfare and protection. After two years since its inception, this national agency however has suffered from its internal rift as well as conflicting policy with the Ministry of Labor. The internal rift that occurred within this new agency is mainly because while the head of this agency is recruited from outside the Ministry of Labor, the majority of the staff is recruited from the bureaucracy, mostly from the Ministry of Labor. The domination of labor ministry bureaucrats within this agency apparently resulted in the “business as usual” approach to the overseas labor policy. Some observers also noted the different agendas in exploiting the lucrative overseas labor industry, as the two parties are coming from different political groups (The Jakarta Post, 17 March 2008).

The dualistic leadership in handling the overseas labor, between the Head of BNP2TKI, Mr. Jumhur Hidayat and the Ministry of Labor, Mr. Erman Soeparno, seems unavoidable, which only resulted in the worsening of coordination within the overseas labor policy. The intention to improve the recruitment process and to enhance the migrant worker’s protection is therefore unmet even getting worse. The unclear delineation of

authority between the head of BNP2TKI and the Minister of Labor is likely the source of conflict. The last clear example of the rivalry is the recent Ministry's decision to give the regional government an authority in the process of labor recruitment. This decision (Ministerial decree no 22, 2008) obviously reduced the role of BNP2TKI in the process of labor recruitment (The Jakarta Post, 17 February 2009). The dispute between the Ministry of Labor and the Head of BNP2TKI only reflect the incompetent of the state in implementing a proper overseas labor policy. The failure of Indonesian government to improve the bilateral agreement with Malaysia also an indication that both the Ministry of Labor and the BNP2TKI play insignificant role in enhancing protection of Indonesian laborers in Malaysia. In fact, the Indonesian delegation in the bilateral meeting with the Malaysian government was headed by the president himself with Ministry of Foreign Affair as the leading agency, but at the end without any significant result in the improvement of the labor agreement. The recent massive deportation Indonesian laborers from Malaysia also indicating the weakness of Indonesian position to its close neighboring country.

The issue of overseas labor migration has become a topic of public concern and several non-government organizations took up this case as their cause *vis-a'-vis* the state which formally controls the policy and regulation. While the NGOs obviously take a critical stance on behalf of the powerless migrant workers, the other non-state actors namely the labor recruiters and suppliers have long been very influential in the business of overseas labor. It is these business people who in fact have strongly controlled the movement of workers abroad, both as mediator with the state or by unlawfully providing assistance to the prospective migrants. The tension that is developing between the actors involved in attempts to influence the regulations on overseas migrant workers is changing slightly after the collapse of Suharto's regime as the state is no longer able to continue suppressing the strong demand to provide a legal basis for the protection of the overseas migrant workers. Yet, the more fundamental problems currently facing the state and the nation to consolidate the disillusioned democracy and to recover the national economy would probably hamper any chances of instituting clear policy on overseas migrant workers in the near future. With the state being incapable of delivering institutional and legal protection for overseas migrant workers, on the one hand, and the likelihood of increasing

demand for unskilled overseas migrant labors, on the other hand, will likely increased irregular migration and human trafficking. Looking at the main features of human trafficking in Indonesia, it is highly likely that human trafficking is operating within the system of overseas labor migration. Human trafficking is perhaps only a new name for an old social phenomenon of human movement in Southeast Asia. Human trafficking has increased in tandem with the increasing demand for labor while the policy is weak and corrupt. As shown in table 5.1 and figure 5.2, from March 2005 to October 2008, there are more than three thousands victims of trafficking, where the majority is adult female. The provinces of origin of the traffic persons also reflect the major source of overseas migrant workers, such as West Java, Central Java, East Java and East Nusatenggara. The highest number of human trafficking originated from West Kalimantan most likely because West Kalimantan is the major transit area for human trafficking to Malaysia (Figure 5.4). The destination countries where the victims of the human trafficking were transported also parallel with the destination of the overseas labor migration, most particularly Malaysia. (Figure 5.5.).

Migrant workers issues, particularly its lack of protection and social insurance, increasingly attracted civil society movements to involve. As the coming general election is approaching, some political parties also began to use the migrant worker issues in their campaign. The significant contribution of remittances to the national revenue, only second after the gas and oil, attracts migrant workers as popular issues in the national political agenda. The numbers of national and local NGOs advocating the improvement of migrant workers rights flourish rapidly in the last five years. In 2003 a migrant workers trade unions was established, and now claimed as having more than three thousands ex-overseas migrant workers in various places in Indonesia. Currently, the government and the parliament is working on the revision of 2004 National Law on Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers, that is considered by the current government as flaws and therefore should be amended. Closed and public meetings are conducted both by the government, parliament, migrant workers related NGOs, migrant workers trade union, labor recruiters associations, and civil society organization in general, to voice their opinions in attempt to influence the formulation of the new law on migrant workers.

While labor migration clearly involved member countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), where Indonesia and Philippine are the largest labor source countries, and Malaysia and Singapore are the major labor destination countries, yet regional agreement concerning the protection and migrant rights is absent. Cross border labor movement is arranged mainly through bilateral agreement between sending and destination countries without any binding instruments that should be the regaling umbrella at the regional level. Cross border labor movement apparently is regarded as a sensitive issue among the governments in Southeast Asia and there is a tendency to discuss the issue in an exclusive manner between respected countries to avoid irritating reactions from the public.

Part 5:

Labor Migration and Financial Crises

Indonesia was a country that strongly hit by the contagion effect of regional monetary crises in East and Southeast Asia that began in the mid 1997. The crises that start by the fall of Thai's bath against the US dollar indicate the fragile fundamentals of the country's financial institutions. The Southeast Asian economy and Indonesia in the last years of Suharto regime, proven to be weak and failed to contained the incoming monetary crises. As many observers have predicted, the effect of monetary crises would be most severely felt in 1998 and 1999, and the affected countries would need at least five years to rebuild their economies to pre-crisis level. The report compiled by Asian Migrant Center (AMC) that is based in Hong Kong, demonstrate that over 24 million workers from eight countries become jobless in 1998, and over 3.5 million of them lost their jobs in the first year of the crises (1997). By the end of 1998, it is estimated that at least 900,000 migrant workers were dismissed or deported from destination countries, such as Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

Among the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia was the most severely devastated by the crisis. Inflation soared to 61% in 1998 from less than 8% in 1996. The 8% economic

growth in 1996 plunged to -14% in 1997, one of the deepest recession ever experienced in the region. Per capita GDP was almost halved from US\$ 1,155 in 1996 to US\$665 by end of 1998. The government believes that Indonesia's poverty incidence drastically drop from 11% to 40%, putting almost 80 million below poverty line. This extreme economic situation, among others, resulted in panic food-buying and numerous riots and looting in various parts of Indonesia in 1998. An in-depth socio-economic study by Breman and Wiradi (2002) in two villages in the north coast of West Java, show deep impact of the crisis in the daily livelihood and the economic strategy adopted the people in the village. The belief that economic growth has brought prosperity to the poor in Java, according to this study, proven to be a myth, as the 1997 financial crises push back the urban poor to return to their rural community in the villages with most often only limited savings. The few job opportunities in the villages that seasonally forced them out to seek jobs in the informal sectors in the cities, now becoming more contested as the village economy constituted the safety net for these return migrants. These seasonal or circular migrants, according to Breman and Wiradi (2003) most likely were unrecorded by the statistic office and perceived by the authority as rural dwellers.

The two villages have also involved in the business of international migration, particularly for the women as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia. In 1998 the two villages have 58 females as migrant workers abroad. Although the formal requirements, such as 18 years as the minimum age, if marriage have no children below 12 months. These formal requirement in practice, however easily avoided. The study also reported former sex workers also working as domestic workers abroad. In the aftermath of crisis, the study reported the increasing pressure for the female to take jobs as domestic helpers abroad to substitute their husbands or father who were push back from the city. Despite the facts that destination countries, such as Malaysia have also suffered from the financial crisis and laid off and deported foreign migrant workers, working abroad still very attractive for the female in the village, particularly to Middle East, Breman and Wiradi found that remittances constitutes the major economic source for the people in the two village studies. The study shows how the brokers have entered into the village to recruits the female to send to Middle East for domestic workers. In one village interestingly, the village head even

have become the brokers that work for the labor recruitment agency in the city.

While the financial crisis in 1997-1998 only affected mainly East and Southeast Asian countries, the recent crisis affected all countries. The crisis that began in the United States of America in October 2008 rapidly affected other countries as the US constitutes the largest economy in the world. The crisis reflects a global economic downturn that resulted in the reduction of economic activity and production. The crisis mostly affected manufacturing industries. Indonesian migrant workers that mostly suffered from the financial crisis are from South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. A government source estimated that at least 600,000 overseas migrant workers will lose their jobs abroad by July 2009. Until February 2009 it was reported that 27,587 migrant workers have been laid off from their job in several destination countries, some of them have returned home. The return of overseas migrant workers as caused by the financial global crisis will contribute to the already burgeoning number of unemployed workers in the country.

Conclusion

In this report, human movement is perceived as an individual choice in response to structural changes in the society. Apart from the tradition, people also move as a result of the state's intervention. It can be argued that migration in Indonesia has always been the outcomes of a combination of factors: mobility traditions, market economy and state interventions. Human movement is part of the people's culture in the Indonesian archipelago and in Southeast Asia in general. Ethnic migration is common among the mobile ethnic groups, such as the Madurese, Bugis, Makasarese, Baweanese, Banjarese as well as the Javanese. The arriving of foreign traders, such as the Chinese and the Europeans, further expand the human mobility in the region. Under the European colonialism movement of people intensified and new forms of human movement introduced, particularly the state's sponsored migration as well as the movement of contract workers. The development of port cities and urban areas also introduced rural-urban type of migration, which continues until today.

The state, both the colonial and after independent, have always interested to use migration as a devices to control the economy and politics. The colonial government views that migration is part of the capitalist economy, particularly as cheap labors that can be relocated to support plantation and extractive industries. The post-colonial governments, especially during the New Order, not only perceive the movement of people as important factor to develop the regions outside Java, but more importantly as critical factor in the process of national integration. Human movement however will never be confined within the state control policy. Individual and social networks that are embedded in the economy and culture will continue to provide human agencies to improve their human welfare conditions. The process of interaction between migrant and local population often create tensions and conflicts. The shift from social tensions into violent conflicts occurred when the perceived inequality overlap with the different communal identities between migrant and local populations. The heated local politics, as currently exist in Papua for example constitutes the structural contexts that strongly contribute the shift from tensions into open conflicts.

The increasing labor movement across the state borders, while in many instances facilitated by the labor recruitment agencies or in the worst situation organized by human traffickers, ironically reflects the state incapacity to properly manage the economics of human migration. Human trafficking apparently embedded within the system of labor recruitment and placement of overseas labor. The high demand for female domestic helpers abroad contribute the burgeoning practice of false recruitment and human trafficking. The state clearly plagued by the inability to install a coherent overseas labor policy that assured security protection and improving welfare for the migrants. While the state should improve the current overseas migration policy, it should not loose sight that such a policy is only a partial solution to the domestic economic problem that needs a long-term and viable national development strategy. The lack of coherent overseas labor policy resulted from the state incompetent in minimizing the corrupt bureaucracy and the vested interests, certainly cannot be isolated from the wider problem of lack of democratic accountability in Indonesia.

International labor movement increased, on the one hand as caused by continue

state failure to provide jobs for its growing labor force, and on the other hand as the strong demand for labor seemingly unrestrained abroad. Apart from various institutional and structural constraints, both internal and international, serious threats also stemmed from migrant vulnerabilities from regional and global financial crises. Movement of people, voluntary or involuntary, internal or cross the state border, reflect both individual and social endeavors to expand human capacities and people's choices. Putting human development as the priority agenda within the migration policy could widen the people's choice and prosper the society. Human development embedded within movement of people in unending processes of social change and political transformation. As a nation in the making, human movement constitutes an important element in the process of social formation and economic development in Indonesia.

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
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Map of Indonesia



Appendix: The Schematic Structural Exploitation Frame Work of Indonesian Migrant Workers



Source: Based on published and unpublished materials. The author would like to thank Ms. Aulia Hadi for the assistance in preparing this chart.

Part I : Tables/Figures

Table 1.1. Indonesia: Human Development Index (HDI) 1999-2005

| Province | Live Expectancy | | | | Literacy Rate | | | | Mean Years of Schooling | | | | Adjusted per capita real expenditure | | | | HDI | | | | Rank | | | | Shortfall Reduction | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|------|------|------|---------------|------|------|------|-------------------------|------|------|------|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------------------|------|------|------|-----------|
| | 1999 | 2002 | 2004 | 2005 | 1999 | 2002 | 2004 | 2005 | 1999 | 2002 | 2004 | 2005 | 1999 | 2002 | 2004 | 2005 | 1999 | 2002 | 2004 | 2005 | 1999 | 2002 | 2004 | 2005 | 1999 | 2002 | 2004 | 2005 | 1999-2002 |
| 11. Nangroe Aceh Darussalam | 67.6 | 67.7 | 67.9 | 68.0 | 93.1 | 95.8 | 95.7 | 96.0 | 7.2 | 7.8 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 562.8 | 557.5 | 585.8 | 588.9 | 65.3 | 66.0 | 68.7 | 69.0 | 12 | 15 | 18 | 18 | 1.3 | 1.0 | | | |
| 12. Sumatera Utara | 67.1 | 67.3 | 68.2 | 68.7 | 95.8 | 96.1 | 96.6 | 97.0 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 8.5 | 568.7 | 589.2 | 616.0 | 618.0 | 66.6 | 68.8 | 71.4 | 72.0 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 1.9 | 2.1 | | | |
| 13. Sumatera Barat | 65.5 | 66.1 | 67.6 | 68.2 | 94.7 | 95.1 | 95.7 | 96.0 | 7.4 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 577.3 | 589.0 | 615.7 | 618.2 | 65.8 | 67.5 | 70.5 | 71.2 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 1.7 | 2.3 | | | |
| 14. Riau | 67.8 | 68.1 | 69.8 | 70.7 | 95.5 | 96.5 | 96.4 | 97.8 | 7.3 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 579.6 | 588.3 | 616.6 | 623.2 | 67.3 | 69.1 | 72.2 | 73.6 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1.8 | 5.2 | | | |
| 15. Jambi | 66.6 | 66.9 | 67.6 | 68.1 | 93.7 | 94.7 | 95.8 | 96.0 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 7.5 | 574.3 | 585.6 | 615.1 | 620.8 | 65.4 | 67.1 | 70.1 | 71.0 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 1.7 | 2.9 | | | |
| 16. Sumatera Selatan | 65.5 | 65.7 | 67.7 | 68.3 | 93.4 | 94.1 | 95.7 | 95.9 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.4 | 7.5 | 564.5 | 582.9 | 608.4 | 610.3 | 63.9 | 66.0 | 69.6 | 70.2 | 16 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 1.8 | 2.1 | | | |
| 17. Bengkulu | 65.2 | 65.4 | 67.4 | 68.8 | 92.7 | 93.0 | 94.2 | 94.7 | 7.0 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 576.6 | 586.6 | 615.5 | 617.1 | 64.8 | 66.2 | 69.9 | 71.1 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 10 | 1.6 | 3.8 | | | |
| 18. Lampung | 65.9 | 66.1 | 67.6 | 68.0 | 91.8 | 93.0 | 93.1 | 93.5 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 567.0 | 583.3 | 604.8 | 605.1 | 63.0 | 65.8 | 68.4 | 68.8 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 2.0 | 1.5 | | | |
| 19. Bangka Belitung | | 65.6 | 67.2 | 68.1 | | 91.7 | 93.5 | 95.4 | | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.6 | | 588.2 | 627.2 | 628.0 | | 65.4 | 69.6 | 70.7 | | 20 | 12 | 12 | | | 3.5 | | |
| 20. Kepulauan Riau | | | 68.8 | 69.5 | | | 94.7 | 96.0 | | | 8.0 | 8.1 | | | 613.0 | 621.9 | | | 70.8 | 72.2 | | | 8 | 7 | | | 4.8 | | |
| 31. DKI Jakarta | 71.1 | 72.3 | 72.4 | 72.5 | 97.8 | 98.2 | 98.3 | 98.3 | 9.7 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.6 | 593.4 | 616.9 | 618.1 | 619.5 | 72.5 | 75.6 | 75.8 | 76.1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2.2 | 1.3 | | | |
| 32. Jawa Barat | 64.3 | 64.5 | 66.7 | 67.2 | 92.1 | 93.1 | 94.0 | 94.6 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 584.2 | 592.0 | 616.1 | 619.7 | 64.6 | 65.8 | 69.1 | 69.9 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 14 | 1.5 | 2.6 | | | |
| 33. Jawa Tengah | 68.3 | 68.9 | 69.7 | 70.6 | 84.8 | 85.7 | 86.7 | 87.4 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 583.8 | 594.2 | 618.7 | 621.4 | 64.6 | 66.3 | 68.9 | 69.8 | 14 | 13 | 17 | 16 | 1.7 | 2.9 | | | |
| 34. D. I. Yogyakarta | 70.9 | 72.4 | 72.6 | 72.9 | 85.5 | 85.9 | 85.8 | 86.7 | 7.9 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 597.8 | 611.3 | 636.7 | 638.0 | 68.7 | 70.8 | 72.9 | 73.5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1.9 | 2.2 | | | |
| 35. Jawa Timur | 65.5 | 66.0 | 67.2 | 68.5 | 81.3 | 83.2 | 84.5 | 85.8 | 5.9 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 579.0 | 593.8 | 616.6 | 622.2 | 61.8 | 64.1 | 66.8 | 68.4 | 22 | 25 | 23 | 22 | 1.8 | 4.7 | | | |
| 36. Banten | | 62.4 | 63.3 | 64.0 | | 93.8 | 94.0 | 95.6 | | 7.9 | 7.9 | 8.0 | | 608.7 | 618.0 | 619.2 | | 66.6 | 67.9 | 68.8 | | 11 | 20 | 20 | | | 2.8 | | |
| 51. Bali | 69.5 | 70.0 | 70.2 | 70.4 | 82.7 | 84.2 | 85.5 | 86.2 | 6.8 | 7.6 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 578.9 | 596.3 | 614.8 | 618.2 | 65.7 | 67.5 | 69.1 | 69.8 | 10 | 9 | 15 | 15 | 1.7 | 2.1 | | | |
| 52. Nusa Tenggara Barat | 57.8 | 59.3 | 59.4 | 60.5 | 72.8 | 77.8 | 78.3 | 78.8 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 565.9 | 583.1 | 611.0 | 623.2 | 54.2 | 57.8 | 60.6 | 62.4 | 26 | 30 | 33 | 32 | 2.0 | 4.6 | | | |
| 53. Nusa Tenggara Timur | 63.6 | 63.8 | 64.4 | 64.9 | 81.2 | 84.1 | 85.2 | 85.6 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 576.9 | 563.1 | 585.1 | 589.8 | 60.4 | 60.3 | 62.7 | 63.6 | 24 | 28 | 31 | 31 | -0.7 | 2.3 | | | |
| 61. Kalimantan Barat | 64.1 | 64.4 | 64.8 | 65.2 | 83.2 | 86.9 | 88.2 | 89.0 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 571.2 | 580.4 | 606.7 | 609.6 | 60.6 | 62.9 | 65.4 | 66.2 | 23 | 27 | 27 | 28 | 1.8 | 2.3 | | | |
| 62. Kalimantan Tengah | 69.2 | 69.4 | 69.8 | 70.7 | 94.8 | 96.4 | 96.2 | 97.5 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 565.4 | 585.8 | 615.5 | 623.6 | 66.7 | 69.1 | 71.7 | 73.2 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 1.9 | 5.3 | | | |
| 63. Kalimantan Selatan | 61.0 | 61.3 | 61.6 | 62.1 | 92.8 | 93.3 | 94.8 | 95.3 | 6.6 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 576.7 | 596.2 | 619.8 | 622.7 | 62.2 | 64.3 | 66.7 | 67.4 | 21 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 1.8 | 2.1 | | | |
| 64. Kalimantan Timur | 69.0 | 69.4 | 69.7 | 70.3 | 93.5 | 95.2 | 95.0 | 95.3 | 7.8 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 578.1 | 591.6 | 620.2 | 621.4 | 67.8 | 70.0 | 72.2 | 72.9 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 1.9 | 2.5 | | | |
| 71. Sulawesi Utara | 68.1 | 70.9 | 71.0 | 71.7 | 97.2 | 98.8 | 99.1 | 99.3 | 7.6 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 578.3 | 587.9 | 611.9 | 616.1 | 67.1 | 71.3 | 73.4 | 74.2 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2.3 | 3.1 | | | |
| 72. Sulawesi Tengah | 62.7 | 63.3 | 64.6 | 65.4 | 92.6 | 93.3 | 94.4 | 94.9 | 7.0 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 569.0 | 580.2 | 604.4 | 610.3 | 62.8 | 64.4 | 67.3 | 68.5 | 20 | 22 | 22 | 21 | 1.6 | 3.5 | | | |
| 73. Sulawesi Selatan | 68.3 | 68.6 | 68.7 | 68.7 | 83.2 | 83.5 | 84.5 | 84.6 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 571.0 | 586.7 | 615.2 | 616.8 | 63.6 | 65.3 | 67.8 | 68.1 | 17 | 21 | 21 | 23 | 1.7 | 0.9 | | | |
| 74. Sulawesi Tenggara | 65.0 | 65.1 | 66.0 | 66.8 | 87.1 | 88.2 | 90.7 | 91.3 | 6.8 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 571.8 | 577.9 | 596.1 | 598.9 | 62.9 | 64.1 | 66.7 | 67.5 | 19 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 1.5 | 2.5 | | | |
| 75. Gorontalo | | 64.2 | 64.5 | 65.0 | | 95.2 | 94.7 | 95.0 | | 6.5 | 6.8 | 6.8 | | 573.3 | 585.9 | 607.8 | | 64.1 | 65.4 | 67.5 | | 24 | 28 | 25 | | | 6.0 | | |
| 76. Sulawesi Barat | | | 66.3 | 66.4 | | | 82.9 | 83.4 | | | 5.9 | 6.0 | | | 602.2 | 616.3 | | | 64.4 | 65.7 | | | 29 | 29 | | | 3.8 | | |
| 81. Maluku | 67.4 | 65.5 | 66.2 | 66.2 | 95.8 | 96.3 | 97.8 | 98.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 8.5 | 576.9 | 576.3 | 596.1 | 597.3 | 67.2 | 66.5 | 69.0 | 69.2 | 5 | 12 | 16 | 17 | -1.3 | 0.7 | | | |
| 82. Maluku Utara | | 63.0 | 63.3 | 64.2 | | 95.8 | 95.2 | 95.2 | | 8.4 | 8.5 | 8.5 | | 583.4 | 588.9 | 590.3 | | 65.8 | 66.4 | 67.0 | | 19 | 26 | 27 | | | 1.8 | | |
| 91. Papua Barat | | | 66.8 | 66.9 | | | 85.1 | 85.4 | | | 7.1 | 7.2 | | | 571.5 | 584.0 | | | 63.7 | 64.8 | | | 30 | 30 | | | 3.2 | | |
| 94. Papua | 64.5 | 65.2 | 65.8 | 67.3 | 71.2 | 74.4 | 74.2 | 74.9 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 579.9 | 578.2 | 583.8 | 585.2 | 58.8 | 60.1 | 60.9 | 62.1 | 25 | 29 | 32 | 33 | 1.5 | 3.0 | | | |
| Indonesia ¹⁾ | 66.2 | 66.2 | 67.6 | 68.1 | 88.4 | 89.5 | 90.4 | 90.9 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 578.8 | 591.2 | 614.1 | 619.9 | 64.3 | 65.8 | 68.7 | 69.6 | | | | | 1.6 | 2.8 | | | |

Note : For the year 2002, the data of NAD, Maluku, Maluku Utara and Papua using the 2003 data

1) Indonesian figures is weighted average from provinces figures with population as the weight . SOURCE: <http://www.bps.go.id/sector/ipm/table1.shtml>

Table 1.2. Indonesia: Ethnic Group Composition, 1930 and 2000

| 1930 | | | 2000 | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-------------|------------|---------------------------|--------|-------------|-------------------------|--------|------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|
| No. | Number | Percentage | BPS Official Publication* | | | Authors Recalculation** | | | | | |
| | | | No. | Number | Percentage | No. | Number | Percentage | | | |
| 1 | Javanese | 27,808,623 | 47.02 | 1 | Javanese | 83,752,853 | 41.65 | 1 | Japanese | 83,865,724 | 41.71 |
| 2 | Sundanese | 8,594,834 | 14.53 | 2 | Sundanese | 30,978,404 | 15.41 | 2 | Sundanese | 30,978,404 | 15.41 |
| 3 | Madurese | 4,305,862 | 7.28 | 3 | Madurese | 6,771,727 | 3.37 | 3 | Malay | 6,946,040 | 3.45 |
| 4 | Minangkabau | 1,988,648 | 3.36 | 4 | Minangkabau | 5,475,145 | 2.72 | 4 | Madurese | 6,771,727 | 3.37 |
| 5 | Buginese | 1,533,035 | 2.59 | 5 | Betawi | 5,041,688 | 2.51 | 5 | Batak | 6,076,440 | 3.02 |
| | Chinese | 1,233,000 | 2.03 | 6 | Buginese | 5,010,423 | 2.49 | 6 | Minangkabau | 5,475,145 | 2.72 |
| 6 | Batak | 1,207,514 | 2.04 | 7 | Bantenese | 4,113,162 | 2.05 | 7 | Betawi | 5,041,688 | 2.51 |
| 7 | Balinese | 1,111,659 | 1.88 | 8 | Banjanese | 3,496,273 | 1.74 | 8 | Buginese | 5,010,421 | 2.49 |
| 8 | Betawi | 980,863 | 1.66 | 9 | Others | 56,452,563 | 28.07 | 9 | Bantenese | 4,113,162 | 2.05 |
| 9 | Malay | 953,397 | 1.61 | | | | | 10 | Banjarese | 3,496,273 | 1.74 |
| 10 | Banjarese | 898,884 | 1.52 | | | | | 11 | Balinese | 3,027,525 | 1.51 |
| 11 | Acehnese | 831,321 | 1.41 | | | | | 12 | Sasak | 2,611,059 | 1.30 |
| 12 | Palembang | 770,917 | 1.30 | | | | | 13 | Makassarese | 1,982,187 | 0.99 |
| 13 | Sasak | 659,477 | 1.12 | | | | | 14 | Cirebon | 1,890,102 | 0.94 |
| 14 | Dayak | 651,391 | 1.10 | | | | | 15 | Chinese | 1,738,936 | 0.86 |
| 15 | Makassarese | 642,720 | 1.09 | | | | | 16 | Gorontalo/Hulandaloa | 974,175 | 0.48 |
| 16 | Toraja | 557,590 | 0.94 | | | | | 17 | Acehnese | 871,944 | 0.43 |
| 17 | Others | 5,641,332 | 9.54 | | | | | 18 | Toraja | 750,828 | 0.37 |
| | | | | | | | | 19 | Others | 29,857,346 | 14.66 |
| Total | | 59138067 | 100.00 | Total | | 201,092,238 | 100.00 | Total | | 201,092,238 | 100.00 |

* Eighth largest ethnic groups as listed in the census volume on Indonesia as a whole (Badan Pusat Statistik 2001a)


** Compiled and calculated from the 30 publications on the provinces (badan Pusat Statistik 2001b-2001ac)

*** In the 1930 census, the ethnic Chinese, regardless of their "nationalities", were classified as "foreign oriental", and they were calculated separately from the "indigenous population". The number of ethnic Chinese was 1,233,000, constituting 2.03% of the total population in colonial Indonesia (see Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, 1934). When calculating the percentages of each "indigenous" ethnic group, however, the total number of the Indonesian population used was that of the "indigenous population", hence the Batak formed 2.04% of the Indonesian population although its number was only 1,207,514, i.e., fewer than that of the ethnic Chinese.

*** We have been able to reduce the percentage of "others" to 6.95% (see Table 1.2.1).

SOURCE: Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 12)

Figure 1.1. Indonesia: Ethnic Group Composition 1930 and 2000



SOURCE : Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 13).

Table 1.3. Indonesia: Number, Percentage, and the Growth Rate of Religious Followers, 1971 and 2000

| Region Follower | 1971 | | 2000 | | Annual Growth Rate % |
|-----------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------------|
| | Number | % | Number | % | |
| Muslims | 103,579,496 | 87.51 | 177,528,772 | 88.22 | 1.86 |
| Christians | 8,741,706 | 7.39 | 17,954,977 | 8.92 | 2.48 |
| Hindus | 2,296,299 | 1.94 | 3,651,939 | 1.81 | 1.60 |
| Buddists | 1,092,314 | 0.92 | 1,694,682 | 0.84 | 1.51 |
| Confucians | 972,133 | 0.82 | - | - | - |
| Others | 1,685,902 | 1.42 | 411,629 | 0.20 | (4.86) |
| TOTAL | 118,367,850 | 100.00 | 201,241,999 | 100.00 | |

Source: Compiled and calculated from Biro Pusat Statistik (1975) and Badan Pusat Statistik (2001a)

SOURCE:: Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 104).

Figure 1.2. Indonesia: Religion Composition, 1991





Figure 1.3. Indonesia: Religion Composition, 2000



SOURCE: Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 105).

Table 1.4. Indonesia: Javanese Concentration by Province, 2000


| Rank | Province | Number of Indonesian Citizens | Javanese | | |
|-------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|
| | | | Number | Distribution | Concentration |
| 1 | Central Java | 30,917,006 | 30,287,197 | 36.16 | 97.96 |
| 2 | Yogyakarta | 3,119,397 | 3,020,157 | 3.61 | 96.82 |
| 3 | East Java | 34,756,400 | 27,232,103 | 32.51 | 78.35 |
| 4 | Lampung | 6,646,890 | 4,113,731 | 4.91 | 61.89 |
| 5 | Jakarta | 8,324,707 | 2,927,340 | 3.50 | 35.16 |
| 6 | North Sumatra | 11,506,577 | 3,753,947 | 4.48 | 32.62 |
| 7 | East Kalimantan | 2,441,533 | 721,351 | 0.86 | 29.55 |
| 8 | Jambi | 2,405,378 | 664,931 | 0.79 | 27.64 |
| 9 | South Sumatra | 6,856,258 | 1,851,589 | 2.21 | 27.01 |
| 10 | Riau | 4,750,068 | 1,190,015 | 1.42 | 25.05 |
| 11 | Bengkulu | 1,561,852 | 348,505 | 0.42 | 22.31 |
| 12 | Central Kalimantan | 1,800,713 | 325,160 | 0.39 | 18.06 |
| 13 | Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam | 1,732,627 | 274,926 | 0.33 | 15.87 |
| 14 | South Kalimantan | 2,975,440 | 391,030 | 0.47 | 13.14 |
| 15 | Papua | 1,695,932 | 211,663 | 0.25 | 12.48 |
| 16 | Banten | 8,079,938 | 986,146 | 1.18 | 12.20 |
| 17 | West Java | 35,668,374 | 3,939,465 | 4.70 | 11.04 |
| 18 | West Kalimantan | 3,732,419 | 341,173 | 0.41 | 9.14 |
| 19 | Central Sulawesi | 2,011,298 | 166,013 | 0.20 | 8.25 |
| 20 | Southeast Sulawesi | 1,776,278 | 124,686 | 0.15 | 7.02 |
| 21 | Bali | 3,145,368 | 214,598 | 0.26 | 6.82 |
| 22 | Bangka Belitung | 898,889 | 52,314 | 0.06 | 5.82 |
| 23 | Maluku | 1,148,294 | 53,552 | 0.06 | 4.66 |
| 24 | West Sumatera | 4,241,256 | 176,023 | 0.21 | 4.15 |
| 25 | North Maluku | 668,837 | 21,211 | 0.03 | 3.17 |
| 26 | South Sulawesi | 7,794,923 | 212,273 | 0.25 | 2.72 |
| 27 | Gorontalo | 829,948 | 20,427 | 0.02 | 2.46 |
| 28 | North Sulawesi | 1,972,738 | 44,192 | 0.05 | 2.24 |
| 29 | West Nusa Tenggara | 3,829,905 | 56,340 | 0.07 | 1.47 |
| 30 | East Nusa Tenggara | 3,802,995 | 30,795 | 0.04 | 0.81 |
| TOTAL | | 201,092,238 | 83,752,853 | 100.00 | 41.65 |

Note: The population is limited to Indonesia citizen. The Number of Javanese living in Indonesia with foreign citizenship is highly likely to be in signification.

Source: Compiled and calculated from Tables 09.3, 09.6 and 09.9 in Population of Indonesia, Results of the 2000 Population Census (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2001a)

SOURCE:: Suryadinata et.al. (2003: 34)

Figure 1.4. Indonesia: Javanese Concentration by Province, 2000



SOURCE: Suryadinata et.al (2003: 35)

Part II : Tables/Figures

Table 2.1. Indonesia: Five-Year Plans I-VI: Transmigrant Families Moved, by Province of Origin

| Province | First Plan 1969/70-1973/74 | | Second Plan 1974/75 -1978/79 | | Third Plan 1979/80-1983/84 | | Fourth Plan 1984/85-1988/89 | | Fifth Plan 1989/90-1993/94 | | Sixth Plan 1993/94-1996/97 | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|
| | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| Jakarta | 750 | 2 | 2405 | 4 | 4412 | 1 | 2937 | 1 | 6343 | 3 | 5171 | 2 |
| West Java | 4941 | 13 | 7230 | 13 | 60003 | 16 | 37196 | 16 | 36997 | 15 | 23846 | 10 |
| Central Java | 10966 | 29 | 20148 | 37 | 96099 | 26 | 45851 | 20 | 40754 | 16 | 24707 | 11 |
| Yogyakarta | 5260 | 13 | 5150 | 9 | 19998 | 5 | 8950 | 19 | 10352 | 4 | 5761 | 3 |
| East Java | 12044 | 31 | 15390 | 28 | 93314 | 25 | 44512 | 60 | 37783 | 15 | 24451 | 11 |
| Java (subtotals) | 33961 | 88 | 50323 | 91 | 273826 | 75 | 139446 | 2 | 132229 | 53 | 83936 | 37 |
| Bali | 5100 | 13 | 3060 | 6 | 14735 | 4 | 4369 | 2 | 6673 | 3 | 4362 | 2 |
| NTB (W. Nusatenggara) | 300 | 1 | 1700 | 3 | 12718 | 3 | 4236 | 1 | 8292 | 3 | 7045 | 3 |
| NTT (E. Nusatenggara) | | | | | | | 3300 | | 3864 | 2 | 3561 | 1 |
| Lampung | | | | | | | 787 | | | | | |
| APPDT | 75 | | | | 22284 | 6 | 43531 | 19 | 95942 | 39 | 53567 | 23 |
| Resettlement | | | | | 42414 | 12 | 26896 | 12 | | | 76513 | 34 |
| Relocation | | | | | | | 5857 | 3 | | | | |
| General Transmigrants | 39436 | 100 | 55083 | 100 | 365977 | 100 | 228422 | 100 | 247000 | 100 | 228984 | 100 |
| Unassisted/Party Ass't Transmigrants | | | 7281 | | 169497 | | 521728 | | | | | |
| Total | 39436 | | 62364 | | 535474 | | 750150 | | 247000 | | 228984 | |

Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

Source: Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1985: XII/48-50); Presidential Address, 16 August 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1989: XII/692-5); Presidential Address, August 1993 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1993: XII/18-18); Presidential Address, 16 August 1997 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1997: XIII/34-37).

SOURCE: Tirtosudarmo (2001: 211)

Table 2.2. Indonesia: Five-Year Plans I-VI: General Transmigrant Families Moved, by Province of Destination

| Province | First Plan 1969/70-1973/74 | | Second Plan 1974/75 -1978/79 | | Third Plan 1979/80-1983/84 | | Fourth Plan 1984/85-1988/89 | | Fifth Plan 1989/90-1993/94 | | Sixth Plan 1993/94-1996/97 | |
|---|----------------------------|-----|------------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|
| | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| Aceh | | | 800 | 1 | 10771 | 3 | 7084 | 3 | 9312 | 4 | 9507 | 4 |
| N. Sumatra | 200 | | 500 | 1 | 8006 | 2 | 3651 | 2 | 4828 | 2 | 6063 | 3 |
| W. Sumatera | 450 | 1 | 3950 | 7 | 7603 | 2 | 9185 | 4 | 6952 | 3 | 5737 | 3 |
| Riau | 500 | 1 | 662 | 1 | 37522 | 10 | 27300 | 12 | 39074 | 16 | 26994 | 12 |
| Jambi | 2450 | 6 | 10362 | 19 | 16682 | 5 | 19737 | 9 | 16529 | 7 | 14748 | 6 |
| S. Sumatera | 6254 | 16 | 6598 | 12 | 91340 | 25 | 24446 | 11 | 24832 | 10 | 14965 | 7 |
| Bengkulu | 1300 | 3 | 3600 | 7 | 12187 | 3 | 9076 | 4 | 12591 | 5 | 9535 | 4 |
| Lampung | 11397 | 29 | 4500 | 8 | 42876 | 12 | 17893 | 9 | 12515 | 5 | 8412 | 4 |
| Sumatra (subtotals) | 22551 | 56 | 30972 | 56 | 227047 | 62 | 119372 | 54 | 112633 | 52 | 95961 | 43 |
| W. Kalimantan | 952 | 2 | 2100 | 4 | 15141 | 4 | 19684 | 9 | 24143 | 10 | 24945 | 11 |
| C. Kalimantan | 1253 | 3 | 700 | 1 | 28221 | 8 | 17907 | 8 | 12880 | 5 | 17117 | 7 |
| S. Kalimantan | 1490 | 4 | 4300 | 8 | 15374 | 4 | 13922 | 7 | 7744 | 3 | 8985 | 4 |
| E. Kalimantan | 1775 | 5 | 3311 | 6 | 11878 | 3 | 15179 | 7 | 16525 | 7 | 14054 | 6 |
| Kalimantan (subtotals) | 5470 | 14 | 10411 | 19 | 70614 | 19 | 66692 | 30 | 61292 | 25 | 65101 | 28 |
| N. Sulawesi | 1060 | 3 | 950 | 2 | 4154 | 1 | 2811 | 1 | 1312 | 1 | 1016 | |
| C. Sulawesi | 3452 | 9 | 5700 | 10 | 15740 | 4 | 10441 | 5 | 13293 | 5 | 11404 | 5 |
| S. Sulawesi | 4441 | 11 | 3300 | 6 | 3607 | 1 | 5325 | 2 | 10262 | 4 | 6713 | 3 |
| E. Sulawesi | 2012 | 5 | 3250 | 6 | 19225 | 5 | 7002 | 3 | 5412 | 2 | 2786 | 1 |
| Sulawesi (subtotals) | 10965 | 28 | 13200 | 24 | 42726 | 11 | 25579 | 11 | 30279 | 12 | 21919 | 9 |
| Maluku | 350 | 1 | 200 | | 7635 | 2 | 3270 | 1 | 5789 | 2 | 13450 | 6 |
| Irian Jaya | 100 | | 300 | | 16616 | 5 | 12598 | 6 | 18373 | 7 | 23991 | 10 |
| NTB (W. Nusatenggara) | | | | | 1289 | | 977 | | 2254 | 1 | 2047 | 1 |
| NTT (E. Nusatenggara) | | | | | | | | | 830 | | 1915 | 1 |
| East Timor | | | | | 50 | | 934 | | 1550 | 1 | 4600 | 2 |
| Eastern Indonesia Provinces (subtotals) | | | | | | | | | 28796 | | 46003 | 20 |
| Totals | 39436 | 100 | 55083 | 100 | 365977 | 100 | 228422 | 100 | 233000 | 100 | 228984 | 100 |

Note: Due to rounding the totals may not add up exactly.

Source: Presidential Address, 16 August 1985 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1985: XII/49); Presidential Address, 16 August 1989 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1989: XII/693); Presidential Address, August 1993 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1993: XII/17-18); Presidential Address, 16 August 1997 (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1997: XIII/34-37). SOURCE: Tirtosudarmo (2001: 212)

Table 2.3. Indonesia: Number of Transmigrants, 1999/ - 2007 (Post-Suharto Period)

| No. | Year | No of Families |
|-----|-------|----------------|
| 1. | 1999 | 24.383 |
| 2. | 2000 | 6.756 |
| 3. | 2001 | 22.609 |
| 4. | 2002 | 23.907 |
| 5. | 2003 | 19.678 |
| 6. | 2004 | 4.090 |
| 7. | 2005 | 4.590 |
| 8. | 2006 | 14.398 |
| 9. | 2007 | 10.250 |
| | Total | 130.661 |

Source: R&D, Ministry of Transmigration, 2006

Part III : Tables/Figures

Table 3.1. Indonesia: Population Distribution and Growth (1971-2000) by Province

| | Population (% of total) | | Population growth (%) | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | 1971 | 2000 | 1971-2000 | 1971-1980 | 1980-1990 | 1990-2000 |
| Aceh | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 1.6 |
| North Sumatra | 5.5 | 5.6 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 1.2 |
| West Sumatra | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 0.6 |
| Riau | 1.4 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 3.8 |
| Jambi | 0.8 | 1.2 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 1.8 |
| South Sumatra | 2.9 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 2.1 |
| Bengkulu | 0.4 | 0.8 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 2.9 |
| Lampung | 2.3 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 5.9 | 2.7 | 1.0 |
| Jakarta | 3.8 | 4.1 | 2.1 | 4.0 | 2.4 | 0.1 |
| West Java | 18.2 | 21.5 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.2 |
| Central Java | 18.3 | 15.2 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.8 |
| Yogyakarta | 2.1 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| East Java | 21.4 | 17.0 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| Bali | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| West Nusa Tenggara | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.3 |
| East Nusa Tenggara | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.5 |
| West Kalimantan | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 1.5 |
| Central Kalimantan | 0.6 | 0.9 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 2.6 |
| South Kalimantan | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.4 |
| East Kalimantan | 0.6 | 1.2 | 4.2 | 5.8 | 4.4 | 2.7 |
| North Sulawesi | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.2 |
| Central Sulawesi | 0.8 | 1.0 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 2.8 | 1.7 |
| South Sulawesi | 4.3 | 3.8 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| Southeast Sulawesi | 0.6 | 0.9 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 2.8 |
| Maluku | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.8 | -0.2 |
| Papua | 0.8 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 2.6 |
| Indonesia | 100 | 100 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.3 |
| (million) | 119.3 | 203.9 | | | | |

Source: Population census 1971, 1980, 1990, 2000.

Note: Number in first and second column set as a comparison to Indonesia level = 100.

SOURCE: Vidyattama (2008: 107)

Table 3.2. Recent Inter-Provincial In- and Out-Migrants: Indonesia, 1975 - 2005 (in thousands)

| Province | In-migrants | | | | Out-migrants | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | 1975-1980a | 1985-1990a | 1995-2000b | 2000-2005c | 1975-1980a | 1985-1990a | 1995-2000b | 2000-2005c |
| Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam | 51.2 | 56.3 | 15.4 | na | 28.2 | 49.4 | 161.6 | na |
| North Sumatera | 95.6 | 107.9 | 139.9 | 107.3 | 177.3 | 277.6 | 358.5 | 201.9 |
| West Sumatera | 93.1 | 129.0 | 109.0 | 108.3 | 153.2 | 173.2 | 233.9 | 128.8 |
| Riau | 98.7 | 245.5 | 526.7 | 213.9 | 53.8 | 92.9 | 91.3 | 98.8 |
| Jambi | 107.3 | 136.4 | 109.5 | 66.3 | 36.2 | 64.0 | 83.3 | 51.4 |
| South Sumatera | 221.2 | 212.2 | 163.3 | 66.0 | 132.0 | 198.8 | 152.0 | 106.8 |
| Bangka Belitung | - | - | 36.5 | 19.9 | - | - | 33.8 | 17.8 |
| Bengkulu | 66.9 | 82.8 | 68.8 | 32.7 | 15.9 | 28.6 | 35.8 | 30.0 |
| Lampung | 507.8 | 212.3 | 149.0 | 91.9 | 45.6 | 135.9 | 149.3 | 110.9 |
| Riau Archipelago | - | - | - | 154.3 | - | - | - | 8.6 |
| Jakarta | 766.4 | 833.0 | 702.2 | 575.2 | 382.3 | 993.4 | 850.3 | 734.6 |
| West Java | 552.0 | 1,350.6 | 1,097.0 | 730.9 | 468.4 | 495.7 | 631.8 | 443.0 |
| Banten | - | - | 620.3 | 290.9 | - | - | 207.4 | 132.9 |
| Central Java | 183.8 | 384.8 | 354.2 | 327.6 | 908.3 | 1,159.7 | 1,017.5 | 662.2 |
| Yogyakarta | 98.9 | 161.7 | 196.6 | 189.9 | 72.9 | 120.8 | 129.5 | 87.7 |
| East Java | 203.2 | 328.6 | 186.0 | 250.2 | 570.6 | 647.3 | 529.0 | 344.3 |
| Bali | 37.3 | 66.0 | 87.2 | 76.6 | 52.4 | 56.1 | 47.4 | 39.0 |
| West Nusa Tenggara | 26.2 | 37.4 | 60.0 | 26.9 | 39.0 | 36.9 | 50.7 | 32.3 |
| East Nusa Tenggara | 26.0 | 27.1 | 69.9 | 33.3 | 34.7 | 45.6 | 55.0 | 30.2 |
| West Kalimantan | 39.4 | 43.8 | 49.2 | 16.4 | 28.4 | 44.7 | 45.7 | 33.0 |
| Central Kalimantan | 49.7 | 78.8 | 124.4 | 31.5 | 16.0 | 37.0 | 24.9 | 47.3 |
| South Kalimantan | 61.7 | 98.3 | 89.3 | 62.6 | 46.1 | 76.4 | 62.6 | 41.8 |
| East Kalimantan | 112.6 | 194.5 | 155.5 | 149.3 | 20.3 | 68.2 | 42.8 | 47.5 |
| North Sulawesi | 45.5 | 34.7 | 54.5 | 28.9 | 38.3 | 51.3 | 38.8 | 31.8 |
| Gorontalo | - | - | 9.3 | 11.1 | - | - | 33.4 | 15.6 |
| Central Sulawesi | 83.6 | 70.0 | 75.3 | 52.3 | 17.3 | 28.0 | 30.6 | 27.5 |
| South Sulawesi | 65.2 | 119.5 | 79.8 | 103.2 | 147.9 | 161.1 | 169.7 | 139.3 |
| Southeast Sulawesi | 51.0 | 71.1 | 110.3 | 40.7 | 29.6 | 36.7 | 22.3 | 30.7 |
| Maluku | 46.9 | 68.7 | 18.7 | 9.6 | 27.0 | 38.9 | 92.8 | 30.4 |
| North Maluku | - | - | 14.8 | 10.4 | - | - | 28.5 | 16.5 |
| Papua | 33.4 | 73.8 | 63.8 | 51.6 | 16.2 | 31.6 | 30.2 | 33.9 |
| Total | 3,724.6 | 5,224.8 | 5,536.3 | 3,929.6 | 3,557.9 | 5,149.8 | 5,440.2 | 3,756.3 |

Source: a Compiled from Muhidin (2002), Table 2.21.

b. Compiled and calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik, (2001), Table 12a.9.

c. Compiled and calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (2006a).

SOURCE:: Ananta and Arifin (2008: 57).

Table 3.3. Types of Recent Migrants by Province: Indonesia, 1995-2000

| Province | Percentage | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|
| | Inter province | Intra-provincial | Total Migrants | Inter province | Intra-provincial | Total Migrants |
| Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam | 15,369 | 47,741 | 63,110 | 24.35 | 75.65 | 100.00 |
| North Sumatra | 139,887 | 388,329 | 528,216 | 26.48 | 73.52 | 100.00 |
| West Sumatra | 109,016 | 103,800 | 212,816 | 51.23 | 48.77 | 100.00 |
| Riau | 526,711 | 333,001 | 859,712 | 61.27 | 38.73 | 100.00 |
| Jambi | 109,534 | 74,510 | 184,044 | 59.52 | 40.48 | 100.00 |
| South Sumatra | 163,250 | 136,807 | 300,057 | 54.41 | 45.59 | 100.00 |
| Bengkulu | 68,832 | 27,568 | 96,400 | 71.40 | 28.60 | 100.00 |
| Lampung | 149,013 | 278,907 | 427,920 | 34.82 | 65.18 | 100.00 |
| Bangka Belitung | 36,536 | 5,938 | 42,474 | 86.02 | 13.98 | 100.00 |
| Jakarta | 702,202 | 173,924 | 876,126 | 80.15 | 19.85 | 100.00 |
| West Java | 1,097,021 | 979,997 | 2,077,018 | 52.82 | 47.18 | 100.00 |
| Central Java | 354,204 | 673,355 | 1,027,559 | 34.47 | 65.53 | 100.00 |
| Yogyakarta | 196,586 | 67,019 | 263,605 | 74.58 | 25.42 | 100.00 |
| East Java | 185,966 | 597,411 | 783,377 | 23.74 | 76.26 | 100.00 |
| Banten | 620,299 | 89,513 | 709,812 | 87.39 | 12.61 | 100.00 |
| Bali | 87,225 | 96,957 | 184,182 | 47.36 | 52.64 | 100.00 |
| West Nusa Tenggara | 59,964 | 56,858 | 116,822 | 51.33 | 48.67 | 100.00 |
| East Nusa Tenggara | 69,910 | 77,656 | 147,566 | 47.38 | 52.62 | 100.00 |
| West Kalimantan | 49,202 | 106,428 | 155,630 | 31.61 | 68.39 | 100.00 |
| Central Kalimantan | 124,387 | 24,855 | 149,242 | 83.35 | 16.65 | 100.00 |
| South Kalimantan | 89,320 | 93,576 | 182,896 | 48.84 | 51.16 | 100.00 |
| East Kalimantan | 155,498 | 92,382 | 247,880 | 62.73 | 37.27 | 100.00 |
| North Sulawesi | 54,504 | 43,602 | 98,106 | 55.56 | 44.44 | 100.00 |
| Central Sulawesi | 75,328 | 87,028 | 162,356 | 46.40 | 53.60 | 100.00 |
| South Sulawesi | 79,757 | 297,675 | 377,432 | 21.13 | 78.87 | 100.00 |
| Southeast Sulawesi | 110,289 | 30,852 | 141,141 | 78.14 | 21.86 | 100.00 |
| Gorontalo | 9,257 | 61,557 | 70,814 | 13.07 | 86.93 | 100.00 |
| Maluku | 18,657 | 37,094 | 55,751 | 33.46 | 66.54 | 100.00 |
| North Maluku | 14,764 | 42,871 | 57,635 | 25.62 | 74.38 | 100.00 |
| Papua | 63,829 | 39,501 | 103,330 | 61.77 | 38.23 | 100.00 |
| TOTAL | 5,536,317 | 5,166,712 | 10,703,029 | 51.73 | 48.27 | 100.00 |

Source: Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata (2004) .

Table 3.4 Provincial Migration Rates, 1980, 1990 and 2000 (%)

| | 1975-1980 | | 1985-1990 | | 1995-2000 | |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Immigrant | Emigrant | Immigrant | Emigrant | Immigrant | Emigrant |
| Aceh | 2.25 | 1.29 | 1.88 | 1.68 | 1.00 | 9.56 |
| North Sumatra | 1.22 | 2.51 | 1.21 | 3.08 | 1.37 | 3.45 |
| West Sumatra | 3.14 | 5.20 | 3.60 | 4.88 | 2.90 | 6.02 |
| Riau | 5.20 | 3.05 | 8.59 | 3.48 | 12.55 | 2.43 |
| Jambi | 8.78 | 3.19 | 7.73 | 3.82 | 5.12 | 3.94 |
| South Sumatra | 5.60 | 3.50 | 3.85 | 3.66 | 2.55 | 2.35 |
| Bengkulu | 10.17 | 2.72 | 8.08 | 2.97 | 4.97 | 2.65 |
| Lampung | 12.91 | 1.35 | 3.99 | 2.64 | 2.50 | 2.51 |
| Jakarta | 13.55 | 7.46 | 11.08 | 13.14 | 9.20 | 10.92 |
| West Java | 2.18 | 2.02 | 4.30 | 1.64 | 3.61 | 1.39 |
| Central Java | 0.79 | 4.01 | 1.49 | 4.43 | 1.26 | 3.54 |
| Yogyakarta | 3.82 | 3.00 | 5.97 | 4.57 | 6.79 | 4.58 |
| East Java | 0.75 | 2.19 | 1.09 | 2.18 | 0.58 | 1.64 |
| Bali | 1.67 | 2.41 | 2.57 | 2.23 | 3.05 | 1.68 |
| West Nusa Tenggara | 0.99 | 1.71 | 1.21 | 1.28 | 1.76 | 1.50 |
| East Nusa Tenggara | 1.00 | 1.49 | 0.85 | 1.62 | 2.12 | 1.67 |
| West Kalimantan | 1.81 | 1.37 | 1.54 | 1.61 | 1.49 | 1.38 |
| Central Kalimantan | 6.05 | 2.11 | 6.47 | 3.18 | 7.77 | 1.66 |
| South Kalimantan | 3.38 | 2.63 | 4.18 | 3.36 | 3.34 | 2.36 |
| East Kalimantan | 10.59 | 2.18 | 11.59 | 4.50 | 7.17 | 2.08 |
| North Sulawesi | 2.43 | 2.12 | 1.52 | 2.29 | 1.86 | 2.19 |
| Central Sulawesi | 7.52 | 1.72 | 4.64 | 1.95 | 4.26 | 1.77 |
| South Sulawesi | 1.10 | 2.81 | 1.83 | 2.60 | 1.15 | 2.41 |
| Southeast Sulawesi | 6.35 | 3.91 | 6.15 | 3.32 | 7.13 | 1.52 |
| Maluku | 3.75 | 2.35 | 4.27 | 2.51 | 1.49 | 6.67 |
| Papua | 3.41 | 1.79 | 5.12 | 2.38 | 4.31 | 2.09 |
| TOTAL | 2.83 | 2.83 | 3.26 | 3.26 | 2.82 | 2.82 |

Source: Population census (BPS) 1980, 1990, 2000.

Note: Emigration rate is the ratio of emigrants to total population five years previously while Immigration rate is the ratio of immigrants to total population above five years old of age currently.

SOURCE: Vidyattama (2008: 245).

Table 3.5. Provincial Migration Rates, 1985, 1995, and 2005 (%)

| | 1980-1985 | | 1990-1995 | | 2000-2005 | |
|--------------------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| | Immigrant | Emigrant | Immigrant | Emigrant | Immigrant | Emigrant |
| Aceh | 1.48 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 1.42 | 1.17 | 1.53 |
| North Sumatra | 0.74 | 2.02 | 1.03 | 2.01 | 1.02 | 1.90 |
| West Sumatra | 2.38 | 4.14 | 3.55 | 3.77 | 2.65 | 3.14 |
| Riau | 4.2 | 2.17 | 4.28 | 3.7 | 6.76 | 1.86 |
| Jambi | 3.56 | 2.2 | 2.69 | 2.52 | 2.81 | 2.19 |
| South Sumatra | 2.29 | 2.44 | 2 | 2.9 | 1.04 | 1.57 |
| Bengkulu | 4.15 | 1.79 | 5.25 | 2.94 | 2.33 | 2.14 |
| Lampung | 2.52 | 1.71 | 1.93 | 2.78 | 1.42 | 1.71 |
| Jakarta | 9.88 | 6.03 | 7.12 | 9.62 | 7.08 | 8.87 |
| West Java | 2.1 | 1.33 | 3.17 | 1.31 | 2.05 | 1.04 |
| Central Java | 0.72 | 2.51 | 1.3 | 2.7 | 1.11 | 2.23 |
| Yogyakarta | 4.23 | 3.88 | 6.09 | 4.2 | 6.08 | 2.90 |
| East Java | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.31 | 1.33 | 0.75 | 1.03 |
| Bali | 0.98 | 1.12 | 2.2 | 1.72 | 2.49 | 1.28 |
| West Nusa Tenggara | 1.06 | 0.63 | 1.13 | 1.1 | 0.72 | 0.87 |
| East Nusa Tenggara | 0.67 | 0.94 | 0.81 | 1.4 | 0.90 | 0.82 |
| West Kalimantan | 0.81 | 0.78 | 1.35 | 1.06 | 0.45 | 0.90 |
| Central Kalimantan | 3.52 | 1.96 | 2.51 | 2.95 | 1.81 | 2.69 |
| South Kalimantan | 2.8 | 2.56 | 2.63 | 2.19 | 2.12 | 1.43 |
| East Kalimantan | 6.52 | 2.47 | 6.75 | 3.83 | 5.87 | 1.94 |
| North Sulawesi | 0.72 | 1.47 | 0.89 | 2.01 | 1.03 | 1.30 |
| Central Sulawesi | 2.17 | 0.94 | 4.11 | 1.67 | 2.59 | 1.38 |
| South Sulawesi | 0.8 | 1.55 | 1.84 | 2.22 | 1.36 | 1.83 |
| Southeast Sulawesi | 7.46 | 1.47 | 3.97 | 2.85 | 2.35 | 1.78 |
| Maluku | 1.75 | 1.83 | 1.25 | 2.49 | 0.95 | 2.34 |
| Papua | 4.66 | 1.71 | 3.18 | 1.61 | 2.36 | 1.56 |
| TOTAL | 1.95 | 1.95 | 2.39 | 2.39 | 1.94 | 1.94 |

Source: SUPAS (BPS) 1985, 1995, 2005

Note: Emigration rate is the ratio of emigrants to total population five years previously while Immigration rate is the ratio of immigrants to total population above five years old of age currently. The number for Aceh in 2005 is estimated based on the data of other provinces.

SOURCE: Vidyattama (2008: 247-248).

Table 3.6. Educations of Migrants, 1990 and 2000

| | 1985-1990 | | | 1990-2000 | | |
|--------------------|------------|----------|-----------|------------|----------|-----------|
| | Population | Emigrant | Immigrant | Population | Emigrant | Immigrant |
| Aceh | 4.63 | 7.39 | 7.47 | 5.95 | 6.35 | 7.56 |
| North Sumatra | 5.05 | 8.06 | 7.57 | 6.14 | 8.29 | 7.37 |
| West Sumatra | 4.69 | 8.05 | 6.87 | 5.57 | 8.26 | 7.47 |
| Riau | 4.29 | 7.07 | 6.87 | 5.95 | 7.65 | 8.15 |
| Jambi | 4.04 | 6.36 | 6.63 | 5.26 | 6.77 | 6.75 |
| South Sumatra | 4.02 | 7.03 | 6.49 | 5.26 | 8.06 | 6.31 |
| Bengkulu | 4.25 | 7.66 | 6.90 | 5.46 | 7.43 | 7.18 |
| Lampung | 3.72 | 6.65 | 6.63 | 5.08 | 7.42 | 6.46 |
| Jakarta | 7.13 | 7.72 | 7.93 | 8.37 | 9.11 | 8.85 |
| West Java | 4.15 | 7.23 | 8.01 | 5.48 | 7.40 | 8.33 |
| Central Java | 3.74 | 7.55 | 6.99 | 5.02 | 11.69 | 7.52 |
| Yogyakarta | 5.14 | 9.69 | 9.34 | 6.58 | 9.49 | 10.57 |
| East Java | 3.81 | 7.58 | 8.00 | 5.14 | 8.16 | 7.95 |
| Bali | 4.44 | 8.83 | 8.63 | 5.88 | 7.20 | 8.71 |
| West Nusa Tenggara | 3.03 | 8.65 | 8.78 | 3.90 | 7.22 | 6.74 |
| East Nusa Tenggara | 3.19 | 7.84 | 8.60 | 4.04 | 7.77 | 6.44 |
| West Kalimantan | 2.92 | 7.35 | 8.22 | 4.27 | 7.46 | 6.87 |
| Central Kalimantan | 4.36 | 7.02 | 6.74 | 5.43 | 7.28 | 6.25 |
| South Kalimantan | 4.09 | 6.96 | 7.04 | 5.08 | 7.11 | 7.12 |
| East Kalimantan | 4.99 | 7.18 | 7.63 | 6.33 | 8.32 | 7.78 |
| North Sulawesi | 4.86 | 8.89 | 8.29 | 6.02 | 8.02 | 8.13 |
| Central Sulawesi | 4.40 | 7.52 | 6.95 | 5.27 | 7.31 | 6.14 |
| South Sulawesi | 4.08 | 7.84 | 7.73 | 4.90 | 7.04 | 7.83 |
| Southeast Sulawesi | 4.10 | 7.54 | 7.15 | 4.90 | 7.72 | 5.37 |
| Maluku | 4.72 | 8.33 | 7.62 | 5.59 | 6.50 | 6.87 |
| Papua | 3.44 | 7.80 | 7.95 | 4.28 | 8.09 | 7.23 |

Source: Population census (BPS) 1990 and 2000.

Note: The numbers in the table represent the average years of schooling for people above ten years of age.

SOURCE: Vidyattama (2008: 257).

Table 3.7. Provincial Income per capita: Growth 1975- 2005 (%)

| | GRDP per capita | | | non mining GRDP per capita | | | Household Expenditure per capita | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| | 1975-1992 | 1992-2005 | 1975-2005 | 1975-1992 | 1992-2005 | 1975-2005 | 1983-1992 | 1992-2005 | 1983-2005 |
| Aceh | 8.9 | -1.3 | 3.5 | 7.5 | -0.5 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 5.0 |
| North Sumatra | 5.6 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 3.5 | 4.9 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 3.5 |
| West Sumatra | 6.1 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 3.3 | 5.1 | 4.4 |
| Riau | -4.4 | -1.0 | -2.9 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 3.1 | 2.3 |
| Jambi | 2.7 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 5.0 | 4.7 |
| South Sumatra | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 4.0 | 3.4 |
| Bengkulu | 5.7 | 2.4 | 4.3 | 5.6 | 2.4 | 4.2 | 0.2 | 3.7 | 2.3 |
| Lampung | 4.5 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 3.9 |
| Jakarta | 6.2 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 6.2 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 2.7 | 4.6 | 3.8 |
| West Java | 5.5 | 2.6 | 4.2 | 5.7 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.7 |
| Central Java | 6.6 | 2.9 | 5.0 | 6.6 | 2.9 | 5.0 | 2.8 | 4.8 | 4.0 |
| Yogyakarta | 4.6 | 2.7 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 2.7 | 3.8 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 1.7 |
| East Java | 6.0 | 2.9 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 2.9 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 3.9 | 4.6 |
| Bali | 8.6 | 3.0 | 6.1 | 8.6 | 3.0 | 6.1 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 2.1 |
| West Nusa Tenggara | 5.1 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| East Nusa Tenggara | 4.9 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 3.9 |
| West Kalimantan | 5.5 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 5.5 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 2.2 | 3.1 |
| Central Kalimantan | 5.5 | 1.5 | 3.8 | 5.5 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 3.1 |
| South Kalimantan | 4.8 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 2.7 | 3.7 | 1.2 | 5.6 | 3.8 |
| East Kalimantan | 3.3 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 5.8 | 1.6 | 4.0 | 0.2 | 4.6 | 2.8 |
| North Sulawesi | 5.4 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 5.1 | 4.8 |
| Central Sulawesi | 5.1 | 3.2 | 4.3 | 5.0 | 3.2 | 4.2 | 1.5 | 4.1 | 3.0 |
| South Sulawesi | 5.3 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 5.1 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| Southeast Sulawesi | 6.1 | 2.3 | 4.4 | 7.3 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| Maluku | 5.3 | -0.3 | 2.8 | 5.1 | -0.1 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.4 |
| Papua | 1.1 | 3.2 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 3.8 | 3.1 |
| Indonesia | 4.7 | 2.6 | 3.8 | 5.9 | 2.8 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 3.8 |

Source: Estimated from Regional Account by Industry and expenditure (BPS) based on 1993 constant price.

Note: Formula to define annual growth rate: $\text{growth } 76-90 = 100 \times \left(\left(\frac{1}{(90-75)} \right)^{\frac{1}{15}} \sqrt[15]{\frac{y_{90}}{y_{75}}} - 1 \right)$.

SOURCE: Vidyattama (2008: 95).

Part IV : Tables/Figures

Table 4.1. Annual Indonesian Workers Sent Overseas by Destination Economy: Indonesia, 2001-2007

| No. | Economy of Destination | 2001a | 2002a | 2003a | 2004a | 2005a | 2006b | 2007c |
|-------------|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| I. | Asia | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Brunei Darussalam | 5,773 | 8,502 | 1,146 | 6,503 | 4,978 | 7,431 | 4,321 |
| 2 | Singapore | 34,295 | 16,071 | 6,103 | 9,131 | 25,087 | 28,545 | 23,613 |
| 3 | Hong Kong | 23,929 | 20,431 | 3,509 | 14,183 | 12,143 | 19,211 | 21,282 |
| 4 | Taiwan | 38,119 | 35,922 | 1,930 | 969 | 48,576 | 40,923 | 35,222 |
| 5 | Malaysia | 110,490 | 152,680 | 89,439 | 127,175 | 201,887 | 207,426 | 151,998 |
| 6 | South Korea | 3,391 | 4,273 | 7,495 | 2,924 | 4,506 | 5,959 | 2,175 |
| 7 | Thailand | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | Sri Lanka | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | Macau | na | na | na | na | na | na | 102 |
| | Total | 216,012 | 237,880 | 109,622 | 160,885 | 297,177 | 309,495 | 238,713 |
| II. | Middle East and Africa | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Saudi Arabia | 103,235 | 213,603 | 169,038 | 196,342 | 150,235 | 268,202 | na |
| 2 | Uni Emirate Arab | 11,027 | 7,779 | 1,475 | 7,237 | 5,622 | 22,190 | na |
| 3 | Kuwait | 3,343 | 16,418 | 12,268 | 15,989 | 16,842 | 22,630 | na |
| 4 | Bahrain | 1,558 | 666 | 88 | 0 | 21 | 639 | na |
| 5 | Qatar | 1,029 | 916 | 180 | 62 | 1,002 | 7,546 | na |
| 6 | Jordan | 379 | 1,233 | 226 | 68 | 2,081 | 10,352 | na |
| 7 | Others* | 609 | 1,346 | 495 | 1 | 1,216 | 4,962 | na |
| | Total | 121,180 | 241,961 | 183,770 | 219,699 | 177,019 | 336,521 | 353,264 |
| III. | Japan/Europe/USA | 1,800 | 552 | 302 | 106 | 114 | 532 | 910 |
| | Others | na | na | na | na | na | na | 137 |
| | Total | 338,992 | 480,393 | 293,694 | 380,690 | 474,310 | 646,548 | 593,024 |

Notes: a = Ananta and Arifin, 2007

b = downloaded on 12 Nov 2007;

c = downloaded on 12 February 2008

* Others consists of those sent to Oman, Tunisia, Turkey etc.

Source : Compiled and calculated from Depnakertrans, Ditjen PPTKLN,
http://www.nakertrans.go.id/pusdatinnaker/tki/index_tki.php

SOURCE: Ananta and Arifin (2008: 60)

Table 4.2. Annual Indonesian Workers Sent Overseas by Destination Economy and Sex:
2001 and 2005

| No. | Economy of Destination | 2001 | | 2005 | |
|------------|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| I. | Asia | | | | |
| 1 | Malaysia | 44,260 | 66,230 | 126,706 | 75,181 |
| 2 | Singapore | 3,397 | 30,898 | 0 | 25087 |
| 3 | Brunei Darussalam | 1,582 | 4,191 | 2412 | 2566 |
| 4 | Hong Kong | 2 | 23,927 | 2 | 12141 |
| 5 | Taiwan | 2,418 | 35,701 | 4050 | 44526 |
| 6 | South Korea | 2,814 | 577 | 4020 | 486 |
| 7 | Thailand | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | Sri Lanka | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sub-Total | 54,488 | 161,524 | 137,190 | 159,987 |
| II. | Middle East & Africa | | | | |
| 1 | Saudi Arabia | 9,817 | 93,418 | 11,367 | 138,868 |
| 2 | United Arab Emirate | 268 | 10,759 | 101 | 5,521 |
| 3 | Kuwait | 125 | 3,218 | 25 | 16,817 |
| 4 | Bahrain | 2 | 1,556 | 5 | 16 |
| 5 | Qatar | 28 | 1,001 | 154 | 848 |
| 6 | Jordan | 29 | 350 | 0 | 2,081 |
| 7 | Others (Oman, Turkey, etc) | 22 | 587 | 321 | 895 |
| | Sub-Total | 10,291 | 110,889 | 11,973 | 165,046 |
| | Japan/Europe/USA | 1,785 | 15 | 102 | 12 |
| | Total | 66,564 | 272,428 | 149,265 | 325,045 |

Source : Compiled and calculated from Depnakertrans, Ditjen PPTKLN,
http://www.nakertrans.go.id/pusdatinnaker/tki/index_tki.php, downloaded on 26 March 2006.

SOURCE: Ananta and arifin (2008: 61)


Table 4.3. Foreign Workers by Citizenship: Indonesia, 2001-2004

| Country of Citizenship | | Number | | | | Percentage | | | |
|------------------------|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| 1 | America | 2,465 | 2,476 | 1,606 | 1,580 | 10.14 | 9.63 | 8.85 | 7.90 |
| 2 | Australia | 2,258 | 2,500 | 1,533 | 1,614 | 9.28 | 9.72 | 8.45 | 8.07 |
| 3 | Netherlands | 541 | 494 | 350 | 344 | 2.22 | 1.92 | 1.93 | 1.72 |
| 4 | Hong Kong | 128 | 108 | 71 | 36 | 0.53 | 0.42 | 0.39 | 0.18 |
| 5 | India | 1,664 | 1,944 | 1,278 | 1,426 | 6.84 | 7.56 | 7.05 | 7.13 |
| 6 | United Kingdom | 2,209 | 2,392 | 1,367 | 1,354 | 9.08 | 9.30 | 7.54 | 6.77 |
| 7 | Japan | 3,700 | 3,640 | 2,644 | 3,451 | 15.21 | 14.16 | 14.58 | 17.25 |
| 8 | German | 560 | 534 | 479 | 539 | 2.30 | 2.08 | 2.64 | 2.69 |
| 9 | South Korea | 2,465 | 2,461 | 1,729 | 1,903 | 10.14 | 9.57 | 9.53 | 9.51 |
| 10 | Canada | 786 | 877 | 532 | 429 | 3.23 | 3.41 | 2.93 | 2.14 |
| 11 | Malaysia | 968 | 1,076 | 894 | 1,361 | 3.98 | 4.18 | 4.93 | 6.80 |
| 12 | Thailand | 253 | 275 | 230 | 376 | 1.04 | 1.07 | 1.27 | 1.88 |
| 13 | France | 684 | 782 | 516 | 460 | 2.81 | 3.04 | 2.84 | 2.30 |
| 14 | Philippine | 949 | 1,011 | 817 | 860 | 3.90 | 3.93 | 4.50 | 4.30 |
| 15 | New Zealand | 417 | 422 | 236 | 254 | 1.71 | 1.64 | 1.30 | 1.27 |
| 16 | Singapore | 570 | 646 | 509 | 578 | 2.34 | 2.51 | 2.81 | 2.89 |
| 17 | Taiwan | 1,090 | 1,056 | 677 | 750 | 4.48 | 4.11 | 3.73 | 3.75 |
| 18 | China | 1,030 | 1,303 | 1,167 | 1,340 | 4.24 | 5.07 | 6.43 | 6.70 |
| Others | | 1,582 | 1,716 | 1,503 | 1,353 | 6.51 | 6.67 | 8.29 | 6.76 |
| Total | | 24,319 | 25,713 | 18,138 | 20,008 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

Source : Ministry of Manpower & Transmigration, DG of Employment Training Development
<http://www.nakertrans.go.id/ENGLISHVERSION/expatriate.php>, downloaded on 12 Feb 2008.


SOURCE: Ananta and Arifin (2008: 64).

**Figure 4.1. Inflow of Remittances
(in USD Billion)**



Source: Economic and Monetary Statistical Section, Bank of Indonesia

Figure 4.2. Reported AIDS cases in Indonesia – cumulative total and new cases reported through end 2005




Source: Indonesia Directorate General of Communicable Disease Control and Environmental Health (CDC; 2005).

SOURCE:: Mboi and Smith (2006: 97)

Part V : Tables/Figures

**Figure 5.1. Conflict-induced displacement in Indonesia
(February 2000 – December 2003)**



Source: The Global IDP Project, 2004

Note: This graph shows the variation of IDPs number from February 2000 to December 2003. The figures are based on the WFP/VAM Unit monthly "IDP Source and Recipient Regions" maps up to October 2002. The May 2003 figures reflects the findings of the joint Bakornas PBP-OCHA missions conducted from December 2002 to May 2003. This figure has been reduced to 586,769 during the June 2003 workshop and later in the year to 535,000.

Source of the following table and figures is IOM Jakarta Office, CTU Statistics, Dec 2008.

Table 5.1. Victims of Trafficking (VOTs) March 2005-October 2008

| Sex | Age of VOTs | | | Total |
|--------------|-------------|------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Infants | Children | Adults | |
| Female | 5 | 666 | 2,202 | 2,873 |
| Male | 0 | 142 | 207 | 349 |
| Total | 5 | 808 | 2,409 | 3,222 |

Figure 5.2. Breakdown of VOTs based on gender




Figure 5.3. Breakdown of VOTs based on age group




Figure 5.4. Number of VOTs based on Provinces of Origin




Figure 5.5. Number of VOTs based on Destination where They were Trafficked

