Immigration and Human Development: Evidence from Lebanon

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1. August 2009

Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19219/
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Human Development Research Paper 2009/35

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Abstract

This paper takes Lebanon as a case study to examine the relationship between human development and immigration. It examines this issue from both ends: the sending and the receiving countries. The author suggests that by developing the concept of a diasporic civil society and a diasporic public sphere, a significant aspect of the relationship between human development and immigration is illuminated especially at the level of political, social and cultural capitals. The paper also argues that the double impact of the home country and that of destination has a lot to say about the influence of immigration on human development in Lebanon. In examining Australia as a destination country, the paper shows the particular impact that globalisation and September 11 have lately had on the capacity of the Lebanese migrants for human development. Finally, the paper concludes by showing the extent to which the diasporic civil society compensates for the ‘negligent’ character of the Lebanese state in the context of human development.

Keywords: Lebanese diaspora, human development, diasporic civil society, diasporic public sphere, economic and social capitals.
To begin with, it is appropriate to lay out the geographical boundaries of the area which constitutes the main focus of this paper. In this paper, I refer to Mount Lebanon as a primary source of early emigration covering the period between 1870 and 1920, and then deal with present day Lebanon, which was founded in 1920 and became independent in 1943. Mount Lebanon, where most emigration to North and South America first started, included the major coastal cities of Byblos and Jounieh, but excluded Beirut. To the north, it did not include Tripoli and Akkar, nor did it embrace the Beqaa valley and the South of Lebanon (Sidon and Tyre included) as part of its territories. Mount Lebanon became an autonomous administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire in 1860, governed by a Christian Ottoman Pasha appointed by the Supreme Port and selected from outside Mount Lebanon (now called the Mutassarifiya).

The first section of this paper gives a brief account of the history of emigration from Mount Lebanon and present day Lebanon between 1870 and 2007. It discusses the various reasons for emigration and ends up with figures about people who reside in Lebanon and intend to leave their country. The reasons for wanting to emigrate are discussed and their preferred country of destination. The latest data on the attitudes of the Lebanese people regarding emigration and their preferred country of destination is based on a large scale survey conducted by Kasparian, first in 2001 and then updated in 2007\(^1\).

In the second part of this paper, I examine issues of identity, citizenship and transnationalism in the context of Lebanese migrant experience abroad. In this section, the paper explores the connections that Lebanese abroad have maintained with their home country and the different stages these connections have gone through. It also argues that in countries where multiculturalism is adopted and because of globalization, the Lebanese emigrants have developed a transnational diasporic civil society and a diasporic public sphere. This is shown by reference to various organizations and associations that the Lebanese diaspora have created in the host countries and their continuous preoccupation with home related family, social and political issues.

Immediately after the conclusion of this part, the paper addresses the limitations of the contribution that the Lebanese migrant communities make toward human development in their

\(^1\) A summary of the results of 2007 survey is published by *Ma‘loumaat*, no. 58, September 2008.
home country. In this section, I discuss the different types of diasporic associations and organizations that Lebanese abroad have created. I also argue that the excessive and vigorous role played by the Lebanese diasporic organizations is partly due to the chronic absence of the Lebanese state in organizing the relationship between the Lebanese abroad and their home country in an effective and planned manner. I also argue that the contribution of the diaspora to Lebanon’s development has a twofold character: on one hand it consolidates the communal structure of the state by supporting communal organizations and institutions as well as supporting the lopsided structure of the economy, and on the other, it plays a major role in supporting many key aspects of human development, such as caring for the old and the sick, educating family members at home, funding public projects pertaining to the village or home town, donating to philanthropic, charitable and religious associations. In this section of the paper, I will examine a success story about a project initiated by UNDP, called TOKTEN, to show the great contribution that members of the diaspora can make to the process of human development in Lebanon when appropriate planning is secured.

In the last section of this paper, I address the problem of integration faced by Lebanese migrants especially in the wake of globalization and the attendant decline in manufacturing industry in western migration countries, as well as the impact of racism following the Gulf Wars and September 11. I take Australia as a case study to explore these issues and show in particular its differential impact on the Lebanese-Australian Muslims.

Finally, the paper concludes by arguing that the main lesson that can be drawn from the Lebanese experience with migration is that having a ‘negligent’ state run by politicians who lack a national policy toward the diaspora, should not preclude us from seeing the important role the diasporic civil society could play in the context of human development.

**Immigration from Lebanon: First wave**

Unlike other countries in the Middle East, Lebanon has been characterized for more than a century and a half now, with a strong propensity to 'export' inhabitants who seek better fortunes abroad. This reality is largely the combined effect of a lopsided economic development and undemocratic communal politics. It is also due to Lebanon's geographic location in a region
riven with national and international conflicts. The history of Lebanon has been marked by a series of migration waves since the economic disintegration of the _Muqata‘aji_ system (a specific form of centralized feudalism) between 1840 and 1860 in Mount Lebanon and the growing integration of the mountain economy into the expanding market of British and French capitalism. These two transformations at the political and economic level are tightly linked to a never ending process of emigration from Lebanon up to the present day.

Prior to the 1870s, a small number of people emigrated from Mount Lebanon, specifically, the ones who were sent by the Maronite Catholic Church since the seventeenth century to study in Rome and return to Mount Lebanon as learned clergy to serve the Church and its community of believers. In addition, a relatively small number of Christians left Lebanon during this period to “Egypt and the main centres of trade between Europe and the Near East – Livorno, Marseille, Manchester.” (Hourani, p. 5, in Albert Hourani, and Nadim Shehadi, eds. _The Lebanese in the World: A century of Emigration_. London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and Tauris, 1992). Although it is beyond the scope of this report to examine the full impact of the Maronite Church’s linkages with Rome, it would be appropriate to conclude that these early linkages must have left their indelible mark on the perception of the local community about the advanced and attracting character of the “west”.

In any event, the emancipation of the peasants in the mountain of Lebanon by 1860 and the integration of the local economy into the European capitalist market ushered in the second most important phase in the history of emigration from Mount Lebanon. This phase was mainly characterised by a major growth in the population of Mount Lebanon (most reliable figures put the annual rate of growth between 0.7 and 0.8 per cent between 1840 and 1895, see, Charles Issawi, pp. 22-23: 1992). In numerical terms, between 1783 and 1860, the population had risen from 120,000 to about 200,000, and two decades later the population grew to 280,000, and by 1913 there were 414,800 people living in the Mountain, (Khater, p.59:2001). This increase in the number of people living in the Mountain was accompanied by “a growing number of educated men, and a smaller number of women, who looked for opportunity to use their newly acquired skills”. This growth in the number of educated people was the direct result of the spread of schools created by Catholic and Protestant missionaries (Charles Issawi, p. 4:1992). Even more remarkable is that education in Lebanon over this period was also the outcome of social and
economic capital transfer made possible by the first and second waves of migration from Lebanon. On the one hand, churchmen who left for Rome prior to mid-nineteenth century to study and acquire knowledge from Europe, returned to Lebanon and, along side the nuns and other foreign missionaries, played a major role in building schools and educating the population residing in the mountain (for more details on this point, see, Harik, I. Politics and change in a traditional society; Lebanon, 1711-1845, Princeton University Press: 1968). On the other hand, remittances and capital saved by returned migrants during the period between 1860s and 1914 must have contributed also to the education of migrants' children and consequently, improved their skills and their opportunity for work.

Although economic prosperity driven by the development of the silk industry (Charles Issawi, pp.22-27, in Albert Hourani…..) and relative political stability following the civil strife of 1860 created an appropriate environment for the local inhabitants to find work and achieve a reasonable rise in their standard of living, the collapse of the local silk industry by the beginning of the twentieth century forced many Christians to emigrate seeking better economic opportunities abroad. Due to its structural weakness, the local silk industry could not withstand foreign competition from the silk of Japan and China and later on the introduction of artificial fabrics. It is also argued by many historians that the decision of many Christians to emigrate from the mountain was also stirred by increasing urbanisation, the emergence of a middle class and the fear of conscription in the Ottoman army (See, Charles Issawi, pp. 27-30:1992, in Hourani…). Commenting on the post-1860 generation of peasants, Akram Khater had this to say:

Having grown in relative prosperity, these peasants were facing limitations that threatened to send them economically a few steps backward. At the end of the 1880s silk was no longer the golden crop it had been ten or twenty years before. At the same time, rising land prices and shrinking inheritance combined to make the economic future bleak. So it was that many peasants arrived at the year 1887 with a sense of malaise. They did not have much land, and what little they had did not promise to make them a “good” living...Although some villagers did migrate seasonally to neighboring cities (like Aleppo and Bursa), these areas provided limited opportunities as they were experiencing their own economic crises. ...These drawbacks made a number of peasants look for other
ways out of their dilemma—namely, how to make enough money quickly to guarantee their status as landowners and not slip back into the ranks of the landless laborers. About the only option that appeared on the economic horizons was emigration (Khater, pp. 60-61: 2001).

By the time World War I erupted, a third of the Mountain population had already left Lebanon seeking their fortunes in foreign lands. In fact most of them were Christian and had ended up in North and South America. Even the small number of people who ended up in Australia (in 1947, there were 1886 Lebanese-born persons in Australia) prior to the First World War thought they were leaving to Amirka when they took the decision to leave their villages. On average, according to Labaki and Abu Rjaili, the number of people who left Mount Lebanon amounted to 3,000 persons per year between 1860 and 1900, and then it rose sharply to 15,000 per year between 1900 and 1914 (Labaki and Abu Rjaili, 2005: 59).

At this point, it is important to show the particular significance that pre-WWI immigration had on Lebanon’s political and economic development. Apart from the money that they remitted to Lebanon and its impact on the local economy, it is estimated that a third of the emigrants returned to Lebanon (Khater, 2001). These emigrants greatly contributed to the formation of a local middle class that played a major role in the development of the local tertiary sector (i.e. tourism, trading and construction) and the building of the modern Lebanese state. As they returned to Lebanon, they brought with them the necessary economic and cultural capitals that were used in the spreading of a middle class culture (e.g. the emergence of individualism, the right of woman to education and work, etc.), and they created a very dynamic (Christian) middle class which was the driving force behind the invention of modern Lebanon in 1920 (Khater, 2001).

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2 The Ottoman 1914 census shows that the total population of the Mutassarrifiya was 540,000. Muslims constituted 17% of the population in Mount Lebanon. Of course, this figure was highly contested by the Maronites during the Paris Peace Conference that preceded the proclamation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. During this conference, the Maronites argued that the 1914 census intentionally undercounted the Christian population of the Mutassarrifiya (cited Winslow 1996, pp.61-62). Obviously, this number is much higher than the figure arrived at by Khater (2001).
Emigration from Lebanon post-WWII

Between the two World Wars not many people left Lebanon. This is mainly because of the severe depression which hit the world economy by 1929. However, emigration from Lebanon resumed after 1945 and increased considerably in the 1960s and picked up even more after the outbreak of the Arab Israeli war in June 1967.

Between 1950 and 1960, a small number of people emigrated from Lebanon as a result of the strong economic growth it had experienced during that decade: between 1945 and 1960, the annual number of emigrants averaged 3,000 (Labaki, p605: 1992).

The number of emigrants rose again during the period between 1960 and 1974 (according to Labaki{2005: 59}, the average number of people who left Lebanon between 1960 and 1970 was 9,000, and it increased to 10,000 between 1970-1975). This was mainly driven by the demand for labour in the Gulf States which were undergoing a sharp increase in their revenue deriving from their oil industry. At the same time, domestically, the Lebanese economy was affected by the outbreak of the June War (1967) with Israel and its repercussions on the political stability in the country. As the political divisions among the Lebanese people became more acute around the quest for political and economic reforms and the usage of Lebanon as a base for the military operations of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) against the state of Israel, people increasingly felt the need to leave the country. These combined factors resulted in giving ‘the decisive boost to Lebanese emigration, which now averaged 10,000 a year, with a total of 50,000 for the period 1970-4’ (Labaki, pp. 605-6: 1992).

This trend in Lebanese emigration is clearly reflected in the numbers of Lebanese people who arrived in Australia during the same period:

The years 1947-61 saw a net gain of about 400 Lebanese immigrants a year followed by a net intake of about 800 a year during 1961-6. However, following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and continuing conflict in Lebanon, the net intake jumped to 3,000 per year during 1966-71, which then declined a little to 2,200 a year during 1971-6.

3 In order to better appreciate the demographic impact of Lebanese emigration post-1920, I refer the reader to appendix 1.
As a result of this pattern of migration the number of Lebanese–born in Australia grew relatively slowly from 1886 persons in 1947 to 10,668 by 1966. However, this number escalated to 24,218 in 1971 and as many as 33,424 in 1976 (Batrouney, pp.427-8: 1992, in Hourani…).

Between 1975 and 1989, it is estimated that 990,000 people left the country, accounting for 40% of its total population. The fighting which ravaged Lebanon for fourteen years resulted in wholesale destruction of the economy and in rendering large sectors of the economy inoperative. Most importantly, hundred of thousands of people were forced out of their homes, villages and towns. Many civilians ‘lost their resources and become homeless without income or health, social, housing and educational services’. The rate of unemployment rose to 21% by the year 1985, and the minimum monthly salary declined ‘from US$280 at the end of 1983 to US$27 in 1987’ (Labaki, pp.606-607:1992, in Hourani…). In the 1980s there were bouts of renewed fighting where regional and domestic political forces were involved: A large scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 followed by partial withdrawal in 1983, clashes between Syrian army and Palestinian commandoes (1984-5) followed by Shi‘i and Palestinian conflicts (1986) and inter- and intra- communal clashes (1986 and 1989). It is estimated by Labaki that the fighting in 1989 ‘brought the rate of emigration back to its 1975 level’ (Labaki, p. 609:1992, in Hourani).

In parallel to these dramatic developments in Lebanon, Australia and Canada witnessed an unprecedented swell in the number of arrivals from Lebanon: between 1976 and 1981 more than 16,000 Lebanese came to Australia, which raised the number of Lebanese-born in Australia to 51,371. After ten years (1991) the number increased to 68,995 with an almost an equal number (67,453) of second generation Lebanese-Australians. ‘Of all immigrants of Lebanese origin living in Canada in 2001[their number was 144,000], 37% had arrived here between 1991 and 2001, while another 36% had come to Canada in the 1980s. In contrast, 10% had come to Canada before 1971.’ (Lindsay: 9:2001)

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4 For approximate estimations of the number of Lebanese people who left Lebanon to different destinations between 1975-1977 and 1975, 1979 and 1982, see appendix 2.
The religious composition of post-1975 wave of immigrants was a mixture of Muslim and Christian Lebanese coming from not only the north of Lebanon, but also from the south and the Beqa’a valley. Among them there were Maronite and Melkite Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Sunni and Shi’i Muslims and Druze as well.

To sum up, major disruptive events occurred over the period 1975 to 1990: civil war, Arab-Israeli conflicts in Lebanon, Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, war against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon, inter- and intra-communal wars, etc… All these factors combined to create internal displacement of people, disruption of economic activities and insecurity. As a result, a large number of people emigrated from Lebanon drawn from all communities and from different economic occupations. This is reflected in the composition of immigrants who arrived in Australia, Canada, USA, France, Germany and the Gulf States\(^5\).

**Emigration post-1990**

To begin with, it is important to note that since no official statistics on migration in Lebanon are available, and even more remarkable, no official census on the Lebanese population has been conducted since 1943, the year in which Lebanon gained political independence from France, data on recent Lebanese migration has to be extrapolated from different sources, including, but not restricted to, individual studies and census data in the countries of destination.

Since 1990, Lebanon has witnessed more confrontations with Israel culminating in the war of July 2006, and has gone through a period of political instability punctuated by a number of political assassinations and civil strife.

**Recent data on Lebanese immigration and people's attitude to it**

In order to get an idea about the views of people in Lebanon on emigration and a close estimation of those who left the country in recent years, we consulted the most recent study on this topic by S. Kasparian who works at Saint Joseph University. This study (the information in

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\(^5\) It is estimated that in 2001 the total number of Lebanese migrants in Germany was 29,229, and 100,975 in France. In 2003, the number in Saudi Arabia was 150,000, 65,000 in the United Arab Emirates, 34,000 in Kuwait and 17,000 in the remaining Gulf States. This is out of a total population of 3,696,655 in 2006, according to a study published by *Ma'aloumat*, no. 58, September 2008.
the following section is taken from the executive summary of this study rendered into Arabic by *Maaloumat*, a monthly periodical journal, No.58, September 2008) is based on a survey of 8061 families (33958 persons) conducted in 2001 and updated in 2007. This sample included 10,000 young persons between the age of 18 and 35 years old, to find out more about aspects of their life with particular emphasis on their views on migration. In this study, astonishing data on emigration are encountered. Accordingly, it is found that little more than quarter of the youth sample expressed their intention to emigrate from Lebanon, and more than half (67.5 %) of this quarter wanted to emigrate to look for work and better work conditions. Moreover, one in every 4 persons among the group wanting to leave Lebanon started the paper work to emigrate, and the countries of destination for this group are: Gulf countries (25.8%), Western Europe (10%), USA and Canada (31%) and Australia (12.4%). Youth coming from North Lebanon are overrepresented among the group willing to immigrate to Australia (33%). In relation to the question about the factor that will prevent these young people in the sample from immigrating, ¾ of them mentioned that getting a job in Lebanon constitutes the main reason that will prevent them from leaving their home country, and others, in descending order, mentioned security in the country (45%), social services provision (19%), family relations (17.4%), trust in the future of the country (12%).

Of the total number of families with whom the survey was conducted, 45% had at least 1 family member abroad between 1992 and 2007. And the estimated total number of people, who left Lebanon during this period, excluding the ones who didn’t have immediate family members in Lebanon, is 466,000 persons. The sex composition of those who left the country indicates that the male percentage is more than double that of the female (67% in contrast to 33% respectively). More importantly, the share of the Gulf States of the total number who left Lebanon during this period is 35% compared to 22.4% for Europe, 22.2% for USA and Canada, 9% for Australia and 8% for Africa. Last, the survey gives the reader a good indication of the denominational composition of these emigrants: 27.5% are Shiites, 24% are Maronites, 23% are Sunni, 9.2% are Druze, 7.7% are Creek Orthodox, 4.3% are Greek Catholic and 1.7% is Armenian.
Finally, other studies have ventured into giving a close estimation of the number of Lebanese citizens living abroad and showed that in 2000 their number was 1,221,746, compared to 3,451,000 who were living in Lebanon. This estimation was calculated by subtracting the estimated numbers of registered citizens at the end of the year 2000 from the total number of citizens residing in Lebanon\(^6\). On the other hand, Abi Farah’s (2000) study has even gone as far as giving an estimation of all Lebanese and their descendants living abroad. He estimated that their number would be 8,351,359, more than the double of the total number of Lebanese living in Lebanon (3239627 persons. These figures are base of the year 1999).

It is clear from the above brief account of the history of migration in Lebanon that this phenomenon has really began with the process of integrating first Mount Lebanon, and then 'Greater Lebanon', into the ever expanding capitalist market emanating from western Europe. It is also clear that the economically hegemonic class in Lebanon, which has been traditionally fragmented along communal lines, has historically refused to develop its agrarian and industrial sectors. Instead, it has concentrated on the tertiary sector with particular emphasis on trading, tourism, banking and finance. This trend has been reinforced since 1990 by the commitment of the successive governments to neo-liberal economic policies, and has resulted in a limited and a low pay labour market. Politically, the country is organised time and again around the alleged collective interests of the various religious groups. This means recurrent political crises due to incessant attempts by the communal leaders to reorganise the power structure and improve their share of the national cake. Within this context, local and regional actors would benefit from political instability so that they could use it to improve their bargaining position in relation to their political opponents (it is not a sheer coincidence that Lebanon is sandwiched between ‘Israel’ which refuses to recognise its sovereignty and a state which finds it difficult to assign complete legitimacy to its independence in the region).

Locked up in an economic and political system that fails to generate enough work opportunities and a decent standard of living for its inhabitants, and geopolitically immersed in a region ridden with wars and conflicts, Lebanon has been unable since 1967 to put a halt to the increasing number of people who leave or are willing to leave the country for better futures.

The above analysis clearly demonstrates that immigration in Lebanon has been and still is a major social, economical and political phenomenon. However, for the purpose of this paper, it should be mentioned that in the case of Lebanon, immigration has a twofold effect: On one hand, it depletes the country of a major part of its human capital, and on the other, it results in the creation of a worldwide diasporic community which is a main source of foreign currency and provides the local community with a global network that enables Lebanese nationals to be distinctly mobile in the global market.

In the next section, the paper intends to examine the potential and real positive effects of immigration on human development. But before taking this step, I will identify the major patterns of emigration from Lebanon based on data made available by the various writings on the topic.

A brief description of the key patterns of Lebanese migration

In Lebanon, people's decision to emigrate is shaped by many factors including, but not restricted to, political and economic factors as well as social and family networks. In this section, I will try to identify the key patterns of Lebanese emigration to shed more light on the characteristics of Lebanese diaspora and its real and potential links with its country of origin.

In broad terms, Lebanese people have left their country to work and settle abroad in two distinct periods, one generally characterized by both relative political stability and economic difficulties (1870-1914, 1945-1975, 1990- May 2007 and June 2007-2009) and the other by internal conflicts, civil strives and wars with Israel and attendant displacement (1958, 1973, 1975-1990, July 2006 and May 2007). In the former periods, people who emigrated were basically driven by economic factors. They were mainly seeking a better fortune in their country of destination. These included skilled, semi-skilled and skilled laborers whose work opportunities in Lebanon were limited, or did not generate enough income to meet the mounting pressure of ever increasing high cost of living.
In places where settlement and integration in the host countries were possible (Latin American countries, USA, Canada, Australia, etc…), the waves of migration which occurred during these periods have led to chain migration driven basically by family reunion\(^7\). In other countries where integration was extremely difficult due to social and environmental factors (e.g. the Gulf and West African countries), Lebanese migrants have tended to make frequent return visits to Lebanon and generally abstained from the idea of settling permanently in these countries. In the last twenty years or so, Lebanese immigrating to the Gulf States were increasingly coming from a skilled and professional background. This is best explained by the pull factors that these countries have had due to the boom in their oil industry and the recent decision of the gulf governments to embark on large-scale projects to develop their infrastructure and diversify their economies. Periods of civil unrest in Lebanon have also assisted in the process of making this category of professional people to leave Lebanon and work not only in the Gulf, but also in other western developed countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Europe.

Moreover, during these periods of immigration, some Lebanese have left Lebanon to developing (note the early Lebanese migration- late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century- to Mexico and Latin American countries, mainly Argentine, Venezuela and Brazil) and/or underdeveloped countries, especially African countries, driven by the prospects of engaging in commercial activities, including the black market, and consequently making huge money in a short period of time. Also, people migrated to European countries (mainly to France prior to 1975-civil war and to France, Germany, Great Britain and East European countries post-1975. According to Harfoush (1974), in 1970 there were 4200 Lebanese migrants living in Europe, and 2500 out of this number were residing in France). Prior to 1975, these Lebanese emigrants were mainly drawn from the group of professionals and businesspeople. After the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon (1975), they came from a socially and religiously mixed background.

On the other hand, in times of civil strives and conflicts Lebanon has witnessed an increase in the rate of emigration to most of the countries mentioned above. These waves of migration were

\(^7\) The total number of Lebanese who emigrated to USA, Canada, Australia and Europe, (France, Germany and Great Britain) excluding visitors-tourists and businessmen- between 1991-2000 is 53725, 44153, 13937 and 58103 respectively (Information International (2001))
characterized first by the fact that they were family migration and consisted of unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled workers, professionals and business people. Also, they targeted more European and Gulf countries compared to the periods that preceded the outbreak of the 1975-civil war in Lebanon. This type of Lebanese immigration caused by civil unrest and prolonged period of civil strife, witnessed a considerable drop in the number of the Lebanese migrants targeting Latin American countries (when compared to the number of people who left to these destinations during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century) and a considerable increase in the number of people who targeted USA, Canada and Australia. Furthermore, many people were admitted to countries such as Australia, Canada, and other European countries on humanitarian grounds when the internal conflicts becomes so intense or when the Israeli war on Lebanon escalates seriously, as in 1977-8, 1982 and July 2007 (Labaki, 2005).

With respect to return migration, there are no figures to establish their exact number, especially the number of those who left the country during periods of intense hostilities (the latest being June 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon). However, evidence from newspaper reports indicate that only a small proportion of those who emigrated eventually decided to return to Lebanon, and during periods of economic prosperity and political stability the rate of return migration increases notoriously. That said, we should indicate that political and economic instability in Lebanon since the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 has resulted in a considerable increase in the number of Lebanese citizens who left Lebanon and were drawn increasingly from Muslim and urban background. Historically, Christians and to a lesser degree Druses from rural areas have made up the pool from which the vast majority of migrants were drawn, but with the outbreak of consecutive conflicts in 1975, the demographic of Lebanese migrants have changed considerably: more urban dwellers were forced to leave the country and more Lebanese (Sunni and Shiite) Muslims began to leave to western countries. This was facilitated by the fact that major Lebanese cities were the battleground of the warring parties and south Lebanon, which is predominantly rural and inhabited by Shiites, was regularly attacked and at times occupied by the Israeli army. These new developments have led Shiite and Sunni Lebanese (residing mainly in cities of Tripoli, Beirut and Saidon) to diversify more their countries of destination resulting in unprecedented increase in the number of those who left to western countries, such as Australia,
Canada, USA and many European countries. Having said this, the impact of immigration on the human development of the Lebanese living in Lebanon and those abroad has become geographically and confessionally more widespread. In this context, it is not anymore the case, for instance, that new mansions roofed with red tiles are encountered in predominantly Christian villages located in Mount Lebanon, but rather are also found in almost all villages spreading all over the rural areas in Lebanon. By the same token, an increasing number of the Muslim middle and upper classes has its origin in previous migration.

To sum up, in times of relative peace and economic hardship, we notice the following:

1- Early Lebanese migration headed mainly to USA, Mexico, and Latin American countries. This was mainly an economic migration leading to permanent settlement and integration in the host countries. People who have migrated were semi-skilled and unskilled, and were also driven by the prospects of commercial activities.

2- Post-WWII witnessed the same pattern of migration but with a change or a broadening in the range of countries of destination. Apart from the above mentioned countries, these included Australia, New Zealand, France, West African countries and the Gulf States.

3- Post-1975-1990 civil war, a substantial number of skilled migrants have left Lebanon, and particularly, professional people were emigrating to western countries and the Gulf States. This was also characterized by an increasing rate of family reunion and permanent settlement in the host countries.

During the period of war and intense conflicts, emigration from Lebanon was characterized by:

1- A sharp increase in emigration to all countries mentioned above except for West African and Latin American countries. The emigrants are drawn from all social categories (different religious and age groups, lower and middle classes).

2- A large number of people are given the right to emigrate based on humanitarian grounds. During this period, more people were also granted visas to Western countries as refugees and seekers of political asylum.

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8 In its recent report, Information International (2001) shows the geographical and confessional diversification of the Lebanese who left the country between 1991 and 2000 seeking work abroad: “South Lebanon (including Nabatieh) constitutes the largest source of those working abroad (39.2%), followed by Mount Lebanon (27.5%), the Bekaa Valley (12.8%), North Lebanon (11.1%) and Beirut (9.4%)” (Information International, 2001).
3- A sharp increase of people immigrating to western (France, Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, Denmark and Sweden) and eastern European (Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Moldova, Lithuania, etc.) countries. In the case of Western European countries, the Lebanese migration has mainly been facilitated by their relaxed policies on refugees and political asylum seekers at the time. On the other hand, those who migrated to East European countries benefitted from the collapse of the soviet regimes in the 1990s and the economic liberalization of their economies. Previous emigration of Lebanese young people to East European countries driven mainly by the availability of free tertiary education has also contributed to the presence of Lebanese migrants in this part of Europe. After the dismantling of the socialist regimes, many of these students remained in East European countries, established their businesses and later on sponsored their relatives to emigrate and join them in their new country of settlement. As a result of these developments, many of the Lebanese migrants who are presently in East European countries are professionals and business people (in contrast, France has traditionally attracted students of better socio-economic background as well as Christian Lebanese who culturally identified more with this country because of its decisive role in the formation of Grand Liban).⁹

Identity, Citizenship and Transnationalism

The social, economic and political conditions encountered by Lebanese migrants in the country of destination shape to a large degree their relationship with their home country. Broadly speaking, there is a tendency for the forces of globalization and the further democratization of some countries of destination in the west, e.g. the implementation of multiculturalism in Canada and Australia, to encourage first generation migrants to express more freely their concern about their ethnicity and their home politics and, to awaken dormant second- and third-generation members of the Lebanese diaspora for the same purpose.

Even prior to the emergence of multiculturalism in the 1970s and the growing influence of globalization, and in countries where multiculturalism is still unaccepted to manage cultural

⁹ Labiki (2005) gives an idea about the immigration of Lebanese to France and Greece between April 1975 and April 1977. He indicates that the numbers are 21,126 and 15,002 respectively. He also adds that the total number who left to European countries between 1975 and 1980 was 10,000.
diversity, Lebanese migrants have increasingly showed an interest in the public affairs of their
country of origin for various reasons: family networks, civil wars, political instability and
economic hardship. This was evidenced in return migration, home visiting, financial support to
family relatives and public works in village of origin, business investments and financial support
to religious institutions and political parties.

In brief, throughout the history of their migration, Lebanese diaspora did not completely stop
maintaining their social, economic and political linkages with their country of origin. However,
the intensity, the volume and the character of this connectedness have most certainly changed
considerably since the advent of globalization and the promulgation of multicultural policies in
some western countries of migration. Globalisation defined as time-space compression has
brought about faster and greater exchange of goods, capital, labour and culture, and along with
these developments fixed and seemingly frozen national identities have been pluralized (see box
below).
Multiculturalism in Australia and its impact on transnationalism

In 1972, Australians voted to power a labor government led by Gough Whitlam, after 23 years of Liberal-Country party government. This event initiated a long but radical process of changing Australia into a multicultural society. In 1973, the newly elected government implemented a series of amendments leading to the abolition of all racial aspects of the immigration law, and in 1975, the government passed the Racial Discrimination Act, which made racially-based selection criteria illegal. Other important steps were taken to officially turn Australia into a multicultural country. These included introducing language programs for non-English speaking Australians, and emphasizing the right to be culturally different but equal at the same time.

This radical change in the official policy of the Australian government regarding its treatment of non-European and non-Anglo-Saxon communities ushered in a new phase in the development of the cultural identity of the Lebanese community in Australia and its community infrastructure. A large amount of funding was provided by successive governments to develop the community resources in the field of welfare, legal, health, cultural and educational services. As a result, the Lebanese diaspora in Australia became in a better position to reproduce its cultural identity and even invent specific elements pertaining to their experience in their new ‘homeland’. There are, for instance, a large number of pre-schools, primary and secondary schools which have received huge government financial support for their foundation and their development at a later stage. These schools are bi-lingual and their curricula always includes the teaching of Lebanese and religious culture. They are also mostly owned and run by religious institutions and associations. This and other community developments under the umbrella of multicultural policies have resulted in a massive increase in the volume of social capital that members of the Lebanese diaspora can count upon. They also have a great impact on developing a strong sense of belonging and attachment to Lebanon and to their counterparts in their country of origin, especially among second-generation Lebanese youth.

It is on the basis of reproducing this (transformed) sense of belonging engendered to a large extent by multicultural policies that the Lebanese diaspora keeps connecting with their homeland in a personal (family) as well as a communal sense. At the personal level, this connectedness is translated into regular remittances to members of their families and return visits to Lebanon as well as building houses in their village of origin. At the communal level, the sense of belonging to Lebanon is manifested by their regular contribution to community projects that contribute to the human (e.g. sponsoring poor students for education) and economic development (e.g. the opening of a road to make their village more accessible) of their ‘homeland’ community.
It is within this context that migrant identity is being shaped and citizenship pertaining to a single nation-state is being undermined. Instead, dual citizenship\textsuperscript{10} and transnational identity are being forged and the Lebanese migrants are increasingly engaging in long-distance nationalist or transnational activities.

\textbf{Long-distant nationalism and the Lebanese diaspora}

As shown elsewhere (Tabar, 2009), Lebanese abroad have always maintained some sort of a link with Lebanon especially in the domain relating to family and village support, philanthropy, charity and politics. Although these activities may not have been continuous, but they certainly became more intense in times of family and national crisis. Recent evidence in support of this claim is abundant especially since the outbreak of the civil war in April, 1975. Though it is difficult to get the exact figures of the money received by the warring parties during the fifteen years of civil strife in Lebanon (1975-1990), political, social and religious groups in the diaspora have always donated money to the warring parties as a result of political mobilization of their supporters in the diaspora. More often than not, representatives of the ‘warlords’ have taken part in these campaigns by paying direct visits to their supporters abroad. Further evidence of the same trend was in the making in the lead up to the general elections in Lebanon in June, 2009. People affiliated with the two major political alliances in Lebanon (i.e. 14 and 8 March) have reported to me about their plans to bring members of the diaspora to Lebanon during the upcoming parliamentary elections to participate in the voting for their candidates. This was done specifically for winning highly competitive seats in electoral districts such as Zghortah, Becharre, al-Koura and Batroun, where the winning margins were expected to be small (this is corroborated by my observation of the field in Sydney, during my last visit in December 2008)\textsuperscript{11}.

\textsuperscript{10} Most countries targeted by the Lebanese migrants (e.g. USA, Canada, Central and South American countries, Australia, France, Britain, Greece, etc...) allow their migrants to hold a dual citizenship, except for the Gulf States, Denmark and Switzerland. In any case, the presence of the Lebanese in the last two countries is not significant, but not in the Gulf States.

\textsuperscript{11} Al-Akhbar newspaper estimated that 120 thousands Lebanese expatriates returned to Lebanon to participate in the June 7, 2009 general elections (June 4, 2009). See, also Ensor (2009), for another report on the massive influx of expats from North America, the Gulf, Australia and Europe.
These diasporic activities clearly point out to what Brah (1996) and Werbner (2002) call the ‘diasporic public sphere’. This public sphere has been in the making for a long time throughout the lengthy history of Lebanese migration, but it has certainly acquired a distinct character and become more diverse especially with the onset of globalization since the 1980s. Nowadays, Lebanese abroad and their descendants can readily listen and watch the events as they unfold in their place of origin. More importantly, Lebanese TV programs are invading the lounges of an increasing number of migrant Lebanese households due to the revolution in communication technology that came about with the onset of the 1980s. In Australia alone, for example, there are four Lebanese newspapers published in Sydney, and no less than ten community and national radio stations. Almost all Lebanese TV stations (e.g. LBCI, FTV, TL, OTV) and many Arab ones are readily accessible to the diaspora via the satellite.

The increasingly intense connections with the homeland and their diverse character are certainly impacting on human development of the Lebanese at home and abroad. Abroad because of the greater work opportunity that the Lebanese diaspora encounter in the countries of destination, and at home because of the positive effects that this diaspora is having on the people they have left behind. In broad terms, members of the Lebanese diaspora have been benefiting from the better opportunities that they encounter abroad, especially in western developed countries of destination, e.g. western European countries, Canada, USA, and Australia whereby Lebanese migrants have had the chance to acquire new skills and gain professional experience not available at home. In the domain of educational attainment, for instance, the census in Canada (2001) shows that 21.4% of Canadians aged 15 and over of Lebanese origin were university graduates compared to 15.4% being the percentage at the national level (Statistics Canada, retrieved from www.statcan.ca)

The general improvement in the human development experienced by the Lebanese abroad is leading, to the improvement of human development in the home country. Evidence in support of this claim includes: remittances received by the natives, investments of migrant capital in the homeland, return migration and their impact on the local economy, social mobility and renewing political elite. Further evidence is clearly indicated by the percentages of money transfer to Lebanon by the Lebanese diaspora over the last three decades, which ranges between 17% and 46% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This means that it is equivalent to 1/3 of the GDP.
and it is not a transient phenomenon but rather a historical one (*Ma`a loumaat*: 2008. Also, see appendix 3).

More importantly, arguing that '[r]emittances are a significant contributor to the GDP of many countries' (ESCWA, 2006) is certainly true in the case of Lebanon. In 1990, when Lebanon was just emerging from a protracted civil war, 'remittances represented over 60 per cent [64.7 per cent equivalent to 1.818 billions US dollars] of GDP'. When the economy started to recover, the share of remittances in GDP declined, 'passing from 15 per cent in 1995 to 13.5 [2.7 billions US dollars] per cent in 2004' (ibid). In 2006, it peaked again reaching 25.8 per cent of GDP (Charara, 2009). Studies have shown that 'remittances can reduce the incidence and severity of poverty in low-income countries.' (ibid) It is suggested by experts that 'remittances have been instrumental in keeping poverty levels low.' (Page and van Gelder (2002) cited in ESCWA, 2006)\(^\text{12}\).

Furthermore, a careful study of capitalist development in Lebanon shows the indelible effects of return migration on the formation of the middle class and the upper class in Lebanon (on the bourgeoisification of the Christians and the Shiites, see, Khater, 2001, and Nasr, 1984, respectively). Analysis that does not take this factor on board will always be less than complete.

Take, for example, the case of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. The class transformation of this community over the last 60 years from a predominantly agrarian community to a community immersed in capitalist economic activities cannot be understood if the impact of Shiite immigration on this transformation is not considered. The direct impact on human development is also manifested in the process of political elite formation in Lebanon. Traditional leaders are strongly supported and new political leaders are created with a decisive or partial help coming from the impact of migration. It is common knowledge in Lebanon that the political campaigns of the traditional family leadership of Frangieh and Junblat, for instance, are funded to a large degree by Lebanese wealthy migrants. More recently, important Lebanese political leaders were able to join the political elite after the Tae'ef Accord (1989) due to the great wealth they have accumulated abroad (e.g. late Hariri and his heir Saad Harairi, ex-prime minister, Najib Meqati, ex-prime minister, Najib Meqati).

\(^{12}\) It is expected that the amount of remittances received by Lebanon in 2009 will drop due the global economic crisis and its impact on the financial status of the Lebanese diaspora. To my knowledge, however, no study has yet been published on this topic.
current cabinet member, Mohammad Safadi, ex-cabinet member, Issam Faris, etc…) [for more details see, Tabar (2002)].

It is estimated that huge amount of money (again there are no official figures to support this claim) is sent every year to welfare, charitable and philanthropic institutions. This money is most certainly consolidating the ability of ‘civil society’ to endure the lack of proper social and welfare services in Lebanon. Diasporic money is channeled into building schools, colleges, hospitals, clinics, roads, and community halls. More recently, Lebanese diaspora of Muslim (Sunni and Shiite) background are increasingly sending donations to their religious authorities in fulfillment of one of their basic religious duty, the payment of the zakat (alms-giving). This ranges from 1/10 to 1/5 of one’s yearly income. This is a clear outcome of increasing religiosity and the rise of political Islam among diasporic Muslim communities. In addition, one should never neglect the huge donations given by individual migrants towards particular project in his/her village/town of origin. Oftentimes these donations can amount to tens of thousands of US dollars.

Put briefly, immigration contributes greatly towards the development of Lebanese migrant communities who, in their turn, take part in the development in their home country, including its human resources. But more than that, the consolidation of the connections of Lebanese migrants to their country of origin due to the impact of globalization is resulting in greater contribution made by the expatriates toward the development of that country (for a good example, see, box below).
A success story about human development and migration

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is basically behind the initiation of the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program. This program was inspired by UNDP work in Turkey and was formally set up in 1977.

'Since 1994, the programme has come under the umbrella of the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme.' (Retrieved from TOKTEN website on February 21, 2009: http://www.toktenlebanon.org/)

Currently, UNDP works very closely with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a public authority unit established by the Lebanese government responsible for development and reconstruction. In fact, CDR is "the executing agency of the TOKTEN project on behalf of the Government. The CDR acts as the National Counterpart Agency for the TOKTEN Lebanese project... In addition, the CDR ensures the promotion of the TOKTEN Lebanese Project throughout Lebanese Ministries and public institutions, coordinates with line ministries and undertakes, with UNDP support, fund raising efforts for the TOKTEN project" (ibid). It is claimed that, 'In the twenty years since the programme's inception, 5,000 TOKTEN volunteers have been completed assignments in 49 developing countries in a wide spectrum of fields. Nearly all areas are covered, from public administration to management of enterprises, from agricultural research to computer technology.' (ibid)

Viewed from the perspective of the adverse effects of immigration on developing countries, TOKTEN aims at reducing these effects, especially reversing 'brain drain' into a 'brain gain'. TOKTEN aims 'to ask expatriate professional nationals, often motivated by a desire to play a role in the development process of their country of origin, to volunteer their services, for
short term consultancy assignments in their country of origin (Lebanon), at modest cost (volunteerism).

'In the case of Lebanon, TOKTEN demonstrated its relevance due to the large number of highly skilled Lebanese professionals that migrated and settled abroad in the past years, and due to the country needs of all the advanced skills and high level capabilities it can mobilize.

The TOKTEN objective is to obtain the technical expertise of Lebanese expatriates, in order to reinforce national development efforts and transfer their skills and know-how.' (ibid)

Although TOKTEN started in Lebanon since 1995 and stopped in 2000, its productive phase began in 2006. Since then, TOKTEN implemented 12 projects with government ministries, including the Ministry of Industry (2006 and 2007), the Ministry of Tourism (2006), the Ministry of Public Works and Transports (2007), the Ministry of Public Health (2007 and 2008), the Ministry of Agricultural (2007 and 2008), Ministry of Labor (2007), the Ministry of Energy and Water and the Ministry of Economy and Trade. It also carried two projects with government related institutions concerning energy conservation and oil exploration, as well as an initiative with two private universities (Notre Dame University and the Lebanese American University) involving expatriates visiting Lebanon and contributing to Higher Education by sharing their professional experience and knowledge with students and faculty of these two universities (Interview via email with Ariane Elmas, Project Manager of TOKTEN, February 5, 2009).

Contribution of Lebanese Migrants to Human Development: Major Restraining Factors

Migrant contribution to human development at home is not mobilized and used to its full potential for two major reasons. On the one hand, there is the fact that money that Lebanese migrants spend in their home country is mainly channelled to enhance consumption and prop up the service sector of the economy. This means that it feeds into the already lopsided structure of
the Lebanese economy and, as a result, helps maintaining its underdeveloped character and reinforces its structural limitations to create new job opportunities (Maaloumat, ibid.)\(^{13}\). More significantly, in the absence of the state as a centralized welfare agency, and due to the predominance of sub-national groupings, such as family, provincial and denominational associations, the diasporic money received by these groups consolidates their influence in the fragmentation of the Lebanese along ‘primordial’ lines and undermines the role of the state as a unitary authority. On the other hand, the fact that the state itself is framed (e.g. the Ta’ef Accord enshrined in the constitution the confessional basis of power sharing in the Lebanese state) to facilitate its control by the dominant economic and fragmentary political forces means that diasporic input into the development of human resources in Lebanon could not be harnessed to nationally devise social and economic policies aimed at a balanced economic and human development\(^{14}\).

A broad investigation of the state’s handling of the migrants abroad clearly demonstrates the validity of this claim. Since Lebanon’s independence in 1943, the successive Lebanese governments did not devise nor pursued actively a clear and systematic policy on how to maintain links with the Lebanese diaspora abroad. Since 1943 the state did not manage to ensure that all the descendants of Lebanese migrants abroad (including the descendants of those who left Lebanon prior to its formation in 1920) are provided with a Lebanese citizenship. In addition, throughout the same period, no economic policy has been devised to make more effective use of the migrant capital and its transfer to Lebanon. In April 1993, no sooner a decision has been taken to create an independent ministry for the expatriates, than it was

\(^{13}\) According to Nassib Ghobril, head of research at Saradar Investment House SAL, Beirut, ‘remittances are mainly used by individuals and families for consumption and to raise their standard of living. Remittances peak generally between the third and fifth year after emigration of the family member and then stabilize. Remittances decrease from the second to the third generation and then usually stop’ (cited in Barendse, et al, 2005: 116). Also, according to 41 mini surveys conducted by the same authors on how remittances are used: ‘56% of respondents mentioned as main usage ‘daily expenses’, 24 % payment of school fees and 5 % the building of a house. 10% answered that remittances were used for investments (company and other). 5% of the answers was related to divergent utilization.’ (ibid)

\(^{14}\) In a recent in-depth interview I have conducted with a Shiite migrant businessman who makes regular visits to Lebanon, I asked him why he didn’t invest in Lebanon at a time when he has a long experience in industrial investment and owns a large number of factories in West African and European countries. In response, the informant mockingly smiled at me and said: ‘Why should I invest in Lebanon if the country is politically unstable and the state does not develop the required infrastructure for such an investment? Look at the energy bill, for example. It’s extremely expensive and energy is not supplied on a regular basis. In addition, suppose I decided to open a factory in Lebanon, the ruling elite would not let me free to run my business the way I see fit, they would force me to employ their clients and probably would ask for a share of the profit in return for their imposed membership of the factory’s board of management.’ (interview conducted in May, 2009)
cancelled in August 1999 for political disagreement on its jurisdiction and its overlap with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (See, `Akl, 2002). The granting of the right to absent voting to the Lebanese abroad is only recently agreed upon, effective in 2013 general elections. Last but not least, the World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU), which was founded initially (in 1960) and sponsored by the state to constitute a firm bridge linking the Lebanese abroad with their country of origin, has never been strongly supported by the various Lebanese governments, and is presently divided due to the political divisions currently prevalent in Lebanon.

In short, more efforts must be exerted by the Lebanese state to devise more effective policies on improving the conditions (legal, political, economic and social)\(^{15}\) for the Lebanese abroad to take a stronger and more systematic role in the process of human development in Lebanon. Otherwise, the money that the Lebanese diaspora spends in Lebanon will continue to be spent mainly on consumption and the tertiary sector. This reality will ensure that Lebanon will keep on missing its chance to utilize remittances for the sake of enhancing human development and to channel them to the more productive sectors of the economy.

This being said, one should not ignore the vital role played by the diaspora in the general process of human development in Lebanon. But more than that, we would argue that the weak and restrained role of the Lebanese state in dealing with its citizens and their descendants abroad, as indicated previously, has demonstrated by default the extent to which the diasporic civil society can prove to be essential in the process of human development in its country of origin. At this point, we would remiss if we ignore the positive role of primordial relations (i.e. family, regional and religious) in motivating members of the diaspora to lend family and community support to their counterparts in Lebanon. On many occasions, the Lebanese diasporic communities joined their efforts as one community in support of a particular philanthropic or humanitarian cause.

\(^{15}\) In order to provide institutional support and incentive schemes for more efficient use of remittances, Ghobril (cited in Barendse, 2005: 115) recommends that the government should take a more proactive approach towards remittances and should implement measures to promote and channel flows of remittances, improve the investment climate, explore securitization of remittance flows, rule out taxation of remittances, introduce tax deferrals for retirement and pension plans, increase transparency, provide incentives to channel development projects as is done in Mexico, sign agreements with the USA, Saudi Arabia and the OECD countries for example to avoid double taxation and Bilateral Investment Treaties, and to facilitate voting in absentia.'
The lesson that can be drawn from this experience indicates we should never lose trust in the ability of civil society to attend to the needs and problems of human development despite the weak and negligent character of the state concerned.

Migration and Human Development: the case of Australia

In broad terms, Lebanese immigration to Australia could be divided into three phases, each characterised by a number of features which are specifically relevant to the topic discussed in this report. The first phase, starting in the 1860s and lasting until the end of World War II, is known to have produced a relatively small number of Lebanese migrants coming to Australia (in 1947, the number of ‘Syrian’ population in Australia was 1886, out of which 1118 were settling in NSW, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, total population by birthplace of States and Territories of the Commonwealth, 1891-1947). Early migrants mainly settled in Sydney and rural towns in the state of NSW. And despite the hardship that they faced during this period (the White Australia policy was in place throughout this time), Lebanese early settlers, including those who became successful businessmen in the retail industry, were a small and vibrant community fully determined to improve their financial status and send their kids to schools to ensure their upward social mobility through their higher education and, consequently, their entry into the professional middle class in Australia. ‘Descendants of these first arrivals include the current governor of New South Wales, Professor Marie Bashir, who is respected for her work in mental and Indigenous health, and her husband, Sir Nicholas Shehadie, a former Lord Mayor of Sydney who also played rugby union football for Australia’ (Inglis, Christine, On the beach: Racial Confrontation in Australia, 2006, Migration Information Source)

The second phase, beginning in the late 1940s up till 1975, witnessed a considerable increase in the number of Lebanese migrants in Australia driven basically by the need of the local manufacturing sector for unskilled labourers (according to the 1976 census the total number of Australian population born in Lebanon was 33,424). As in the previous pattern of settlement, 70% of these migrants lived in New South Wales, and although they mostly came from rural background and were unskilled or semi-skilled, these migrants were reasonably integrated into the local economy in the 1950s and the 1960s since the still prosperous industrial sector provided ample employment for them. By the beginning of the 1970s, Australian authorities were still
guided by an assimilationist policy based on an entrenched belief in keeping Australia ‘culturally homogeneous … based on British values and institutions’ (Castles et al, 1988:p.46). However, availability of work within a developing and a seemingly robust economy countervailed the potential communal tensions emanating from this policy. This was aided by the fact that a middle class was still emerging within the community of Lebanese migrants who settled in Australia in the 1950s and the 1960s. Throughout the last phase of Lebanese immigration to Australia (1975 to the present) this middle class grew in number and proved to be highly significant in articulating the grievances of Lebanese immigrant communities as they witnessed their deteriorating economic and social conditions.

Post-1975, Lebanese immigration to Australia more than doubled (in 2006 the total number of Australian population born in Lebanon was 74,850 compared to 33,424 in 1976 as mentioned previously), and the pattern of settlement did not change compared to that of previous phases. More importantly, this phase of Lebanese immigration has witnessed a clear distribution of migrants of Lebanese background in specific parts of Sydney, the city with the largest Lebanese immigrant population. The vast majority are now settling in inner western suburbs of Sydney (i.e. Bankstown, Canterbury and Marrickville local government areas) with a considerable number distributed among north-west (Parramatta and Holroyd), and south-east (Rockdale, Hurstville, Kogarah and Sutherland) parts of Sydney. However, this period coincided with a number of economic crises (1974, 1980 and 1990) leading to a considerable downsizing of the industrial sector and a significant growth of the tertiary sector. This has resulted in increasing unemployment which mostly hit the recent migrants including the Lebanese, the Turks and the Vietnamese. In the words of Inglis: ‘During the 1970s, the newly arrived Lebanese, together with those from Vietnam and Turkey, were seen as exemplifying the difficulties confronting immigrants, especially those whose educational, economic, and cultural resources or “capital” did not match those of Australian society.’ (ibid) Economic disadvantage has continued to be a major problem for the Lebanese-born and their children well into the beginning of the twenty-first century. Studies, based on 2001 census, have shown that: ‘whereas by the second generation, the Australian-born children from other large immigrant communities are performing as well, if not better, in school and the labour market than those born in Australia to Australian-born parents, this was not true for second-generation Lebanese men and women.’ (ibid)
Furthermore, what is distinctive about this phase in the Lebanese immigration to Australia is the drastic change in the religious composition of those who arrived. According to the 2001 census, Muslims make up 41 percent of the Lebanese-born population. This percentage remained almost the same according to the 2006 census (i.e. 40.5%). This is particularly important when situated in the context of the growing conflicts between the ‘West’ and the Arab and Muslim world, and the imminent threat of terrorism.

Faced with ‘White Australia’ policy and a strong expectation by the host society to assimilate, the Lebanese in Australia reacted differently depending on their numerical size and the degree of residential concentration. During the first phase of their migration (1860s-1945), they were small in number and highly scattered in different regions of Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria (as mentioned before, the total number of Lebanese-born was 1886 by 1947). ‘Most were from farming stock and they gave their loyalty to their extended family and second to other members of their village, who typically shared their religion.’ (Batrouney, T. and Evert, H.: 1994) The descendants of these early pioneer migrants have mostly assimilated into the ‘Australian way of life’ without necessarily losing their family traditions which were manifested in the building of their social networks, their pattern of marriage, their cuisine and their religious practices (though many of them were lost to the Latin Catholic Church or the Church of England). The majority of them married from their own community or brought their spouses from Lebanon. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, they were able to preserve their religious affiliations by establishing their own churches (the first Lebanese church in Australia was established by the Melkite Catholics in 1895, followed by a Maronite church in 1897. The Orthodox built their church in Melbourne in 1931). In the words of Batrouney and Evert: ‘The lack of any cohesive religious or national identity [note that Lebanon as an independent state was created in 1920], along with the pressures for Anglo conformity and assimilation, resulted in the family being the principal focus of Lebanese ethnicity. However, the descendants of first-wave Lebanese settlers now extend to five or six generations and, in general, have experienced a significant decline in traditional Lebanese values and practices during the 100 years and more of their settlement in Australia.’ (ibid)
During the second phase of Lebanese migration to Australia (1945-1975), the number of Lebanese born reached 33,424 in 1976. The net intake was 3000 per year during 1966-1971, and during next four years (1971-76), it declined a little to 2200 a year (Price, C. 1984, Lebanese in Australia: Demographic Aspects, Department of Demography, Australian National University, Canberra.) During this phase, Lebanese emigrants were able to find work in the booming manufacturing industry which has sprung immediately after the end of the Second World War. Few years later, many of them ventured into their own small businesses (e.g. opening a milk bar and a coffee lounge). Even more remarkable during this period is the role played by emigrant women in the domain of paid work. These women, who mostly came from a conservative agrarian background, found themselves able to enter for the first time in their life a capitalist labour market in the form of factory workers or as owners and runners of small businesses.

Furthermore, during this period Lebanese emigrants were able to build and expand their community infrastructure (i.e. churches, mosques, schools, village associations, political parties, newspapers, community organizations and halls, etc…) because of the higher concentration in their pattern of residential settlement and the overall increase in their number and resources. Most Lebanese settled in Sydney, Melbourne and to a much lesser degree in Adelaide (the only exception is the Druse community in Australia whose total number in 1991 census was 4000, and half of them lived in Adelaide). In terms of human development index, ‘[Second-wave Lebanese-Australian families] present an example of substantial upward mobility in terms of both educational progress and occupational achievement, with some members of the second generation gaining access to professional and managerial positions’ (ibid. based on Birrel, and Khoo: 1994).

During the third phase of Lebanese immigration to Australia (1975-onward), important changes have happened that would have an essential impact on the process of human development among the Lebanese Australians. The size and religious composition of the Lebanese Australian community have changed considerably. The latest census in 2006 recorded 74,850 Lebanon-born in Australia, more than double the number in 1976. Out of this total number, 49.1% were Christian (i.e. 39% Catholic and 10.1% Orthodox), and 40.5% were Muslim\(^\text{16}\). By 1975,

\(^{16}\) The Census of Population and Housing conducted on 7 August 2001 counted 18,972,350 people in Australia on Census Night. The largest overseas born group in 2001 comprised people born in United Kingdom and Ireland at
Australian government and society became more tolerant towards non-Anglo communities, and the state officially adopted the policy of multiculturalism. This has created a more conducive environment to further develop the infrastructure of the Lebanese-Australian community. More community organizations have emerged and existing community institutions, especially religious ones, have expanded and become more consolidated. Community members have now the opportunity to learn their ethnic language in mainstream schools. Additional Arabic newspapers have been published, and more Arabic radio and TV stations have become available for Arabic-speaking listeners in Australia. Many Lebanese Australians are now able to engage in Lebanese politics whether by protest or lobbying the government of the day in support of their political views in relation to the unfolding events in their home country. As mentioned previously, the intensity and the volume of interaction between the Lebanese diapsora in Australia (and elsewhere) and their home country have risen considerably leading to a Lebanese ‘diasporic public sphere’.

However, two significant developments occurred since the 1980s and resulted in negatively affecting the process of human development among the Lebanese-Australians (and other Lebanese diapsoric communities especially in the ‘west’): firstly, the decline of the manufacturing industry in Australia since the late 1970s due to globalization and attendant neo-liberal economic policy by the state, and the rise of racism against non-Anglo communities especially the Muslims.

Neo-liberal economic policies resulted in drastic restructuring of the Australian economy leading to a drastic loss of employment especially for unskilled migrant workers. This affected many Lebanese families who have entered the manufacturing industry as unskilled labourers in the 1970s and early 1980s. The labour market in Australia since the late 1970s has increasingly steered away from generating manual unskilled and semi-skilled work and headed more toward creating work opportunities in the developing tertiary and IT sectors.

5.8%, followed by New Zealand at 1.9%, Lebanon at 1.7% and Italy at 1.2%. There were 71,310 Lebanese-born people in Australia at the 2001 Census, making up 1.7% of the overseas-born population and 0.4% of the total Australian population. No other country accounted for one or more percent. However, when asked about their ancestries in 2001, 0.9% stated their ancestry to be Lebanese followed by the Dutch (1.5%), the Greek (2.2%), the Scottish (3.1%), the Chinese (3.2%), the German (4.3%), the Italian (4.6%), the Irish (11.01%), the English (36.56%) and the Australian (38.76%).
A close examination of the available statistics on Lebanese Australians show key aspects of the human development they are experiencing in Australia. The census in 1996 shows that 27% of Lebanon-born persons (compared to 42.3% of all Australians in the same age bracket) aged 15 years and over held some form of educational or occupational qualification. In addition, the proportion of Lebanon-born with higher qualifications was 7.4%, compared to 16.7% for the total Australian population, and the proportion of Lebanese-born who had attained skilled or basic vocational training was 7.9% and 13.6% for all Australians.

If we compare the figures for the second generation Lebanese-Australians (defined as persons with one or both parents born in Lebanon), we realize there is an improvement in the attainment of qualifications among this group (34.4% had attained some form of educational or occupational qualification, and 12%.5% had obtained higher qualification- higher qualification means a university degree, undergraduate or associate diploma) (McDonald, 2000)

These figures are given as an example of the qualification status of the Lebanese diaspora in a typical western society. They show that Lebanon-born population score lower percentages compared to the population of the host society, but this percentage improves slightly with the second generation and is expected to improve even more with later generations. This is true not only with education and qualifications, but also with employment, occupational structure, income level and life expectancy.

**Differential impact of Social disadvantage on Lebanese Muslims in Australia**

Like the previous waves of emigration from Lebanon, the post-1975 wave is composed predominantly of emigrants from the rural regions of Lebanon. However, the crucial difference between those who came after 1975 and those who arrived prior to this date relates to their religious composition and the economic conditions that prevailed at the time. While immigrants from the earlier phase were predominantly Christian from the villages in the northern part of Mount Lebanon, the later ones drawn from both Christian and Muslim (Sunni and Shi `i) villages stretching from the north to the south and extending to the Bekaa Valley, east of Lebanon.
This is significant because it largely explains the differential impact that the economic and social development in Australia since the 1970s had had on the Lebanese immigrants who arrived in Australia during the same period. In brief, Christian Lebanese migrants who arrived during this period were received by an older generation of Christian migrants who were economically well established and had developed community institutions (led primarily by the Church) which proved to be very helpful in the settlement process of the post-1975 wave of emigrants. On the other hand, the newly arrived Muslims had to grapple on their own with their settlement difficulties.

More importantly, during the late seventies the Australian economy was undergoing a structural change which eventually led to the expansion of the tertiary sector and the shrinking of the industrial sector which traditionally accommodated the employment of unskilled and semi-skilled ethnic minority workers. This, added to discrimination in the labour market, has resulted in a high degree of unemployment among Lebanese immigrants, which by far exceeded that of the national level — consistently by a factor of four, over decades (Antonios, 1995).

Given the lack of community support to the Lebanese Muslims who arrived in Australia post-1975 similar to their Christian counterparts, the decline in job opportunities for manual workers in the manufacturing sector and the growing discrimination and racism against Muslim Australians since the second Gulf war and more remarkably after September 11, all these factors combined to produce a worse impact on the living conditions of the Lebanese Muslims in Australia (for more details on this point see the excellent study by Betts and Healy, 2006).

In addition, as the host society became more and more xenophobic in response to the general deterioration in its economic and social stability, it projected its feelings of insecurities onto immigrant ‘others’. This is making the chances for further human developments among Lebanese Muslims in Australia (and other western countries) even more difficult compared to their Christian counterparts.

**Conclusion**

Assessing the impact of emigration on human development in Lebanon and abroad is not a straightforward task. In reality, immigration has a twofold effect on the Lebanese people at
home and abroad: In as much as it has a restraining impact on the Lebanese economy and the people themselves, it can also contribute to the human development of those who leave their country and their descendants and on the people who are left behind. More particularly, the Lebanese people are paying a high opportunity cost for not having a state and ruling elite that properly relate to the Lebanese diaspora and benefit from its rich resources to further develop the country’s economy and its inhabitants. However, this is partly offset by the vibrant civil society that the Lebanese in Lebanon and abroad have managed to develop to provide individual and community support for each other.

In addition, there are three significant characteristics that make the impact of Lebanese immigration on human development even more peculiar: Firstly, the fact that the long history of Lebanese immigration falls in parallel with the modern history of Lebanon as a nation and as a capitalist economy. As shown above, a substantial number of Lebanese have always existed and worked abroad, at a time when the Lebanese state and economy were constructed. In this context, Lebanese migrants have contributed a lot to the development of the Lebanese economy (mainly remittances) and had even taken a significant part in its class formation and mobility, i.e. the formation of a native middle (and to a lesser extent upper) class. Secondly, the number of emigrants and their descendants is more than double that of those residing in Lebanon, and finally, the near to global distribution of the Lebanese diaspora and their significant presence in advanced capitalist countries, such as USA, Canada, Australia, France, Germany and Britain. Both these factors enable the Lebanese abroad to benefit from the economic, social and cultural opportunities that these countries offer to them (without discounting the impact of economic crises and racism on reducing these opportunities in some instances). In addition, these factors have always provided the Lebanese at home and abroad with a resourceful network of support that covers most of the globe, and could be mobilized in time of need.

Finally, in order to improve the contribution of the Lebanese diaspora in the development of their home country, the Lebanese state should seriously consider the introduction of a new national policy to better organize its relationship with the Lebanese diaspora and use its financial, social and cultural resources for the development of the human and economic capital in Lebanon and abroad.
### Appendix 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Method of Computation</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>census</td>
<td>Himadeh, 1936: 408-409</td>
<td>335,668</td>
<td>273,366</td>
<td>609,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>census</td>
<td>Himadeh, 1936:408-409</td>
<td>392,544</td>
<td>383,180</td>
<td>785,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>official estimate</td>
<td>Hourani, 1946, cited in Chamie, 1977:14</td>
<td>544,822</td>
<td>495,003</td>
<td>1,046,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>estimate</td>
<td>Tabbarah, 1954, cited in Chamie, 1980:177</td>
<td>700,154</td>
<td>571,109</td>
<td>1,303,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>estimate</td>
<td>Hudson, 1968:22; Soffer, 1986:22</td>
<td>787,000</td>
<td>624,000</td>
<td>1,411,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>estimate</td>
<td>IRFED Mission, cited in Chamie, 1977:14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,626,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>survey</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning, cited in Courbages &amp; Fargues, 1974:24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,179,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>survey</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning, cited in UN-ECWA, 1980:4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,126,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>adjusted survey total</td>
<td>Courbages &amp; Fargues, 1974:24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,265,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>estimate</td>
<td>UN-ECWA, 1980:4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,550,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total population includes members of the small religious groups such as Jews and Bahais.

Table 1: Lebanese Population by Religion: 1922-1975. (Faour, 1991:632)
Appendix 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Citizens Who Left Lebanon</th>
<th>Number of Citizens Who Returned to Lebanon</th>
<th>Total Number of Emigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>193,588</td>
<td>120,338</td>
<td>73,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Gulf States</td>
<td>97,890</td>
<td>56,943</td>
<td>40,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>86,150</td>
<td>54,830</td>
<td>31,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>48,977</td>
<td>27,851</td>
<td>21,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>36,975</td>
<td>21,973</td>
<td>15,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>34,934</td>
<td>19,305</td>
<td>15,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>26,544</td>
<td>5,847</td>
<td>20,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>17,860</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>14,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>82,842</td>
<td>42,828</td>
<td>40,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Amount</strong></td>
<td><strong>625,760</strong></td>
<td><strong>353,260</strong></td>
<td><strong>272,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Lebanese emigration between April 1975 and April 1977 (cited by Labaki et al., 2005:62).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab World</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>123.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>210.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>246.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The number of the Lebanese emigrant workforce by country during the years 1975, 1979 and 1982 (cited by Labaki et al., 2005: 68).
### Table 3: Emigration from North Lebanon during the first three years of the Lebanese Civil War according to different categories (cited by Labaki et al., 2005: 76).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total Number of Emigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers and Artisans</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Workers</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading and Tradespeople</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>60,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4: The total number of Lebanese emigrants compared to the total amount of the Lebanese emigrant workforce to the Arab World from 1975 to 1985 (cited by Labaki et al., 2005: 79).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Lebanese Emigrants</td>
<td>115,726</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>286,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Lebanese Emigrant Workforce</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances (in USD Millions)</th>
<th>GNP (in USD Millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of Remittances in GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>3,492</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>3,567</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>3,830</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>4,912</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>4,528</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>4,570</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>4,860</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2,940</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>3,296</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>3,883</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Remittances to Lebanon and the GNP from the year 1970 to the year 1988 (cited by Labaki and Abu Rjaili, 2005: 87).
References


Wehbeh, M. ‘120 Thousands are coming to Beirut …for the elections’, in Al-Akhbar, June 5, 2009 (retrieved on June 6, 2009 from http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/139536/print