Migration, Poverty Reduction Strategies and Human Development

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the specific question of how Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) address migration and its potential to enhance human development at the national level. Based on a review of PRSPs completed since 1999, it argues that migration often remains poorly recognised or analysed in poorer countries in terms of its impacts on poverty reduction, whilst attitudes towards migration in these countries are often highly negative and/or based on limited evidence, especially in relation to internal migration. Analysis of how both internal and international migration are treated in PRSPs is also placed in the context of a broader understanding of the purpose of, and constraints faced by the PRS process.

The paper goes on to highlight the extent to which in Sub-Saharan African countries, successive drafts of PRSPs have shown increasing attention to migration. It also considers how analysis of the problems and opportunities associated with different types of migration are converted into policy initiatives, highlighting the lack of good practice in terms of the incorporation of migration into human development policy.

Keywords: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), internal migration, international migration, sub-Saharan Africa, analysis of migration.
Introduction

The last five years has seen a huge growth of interest in the links between migration and development, with institutional interest from the United Nations, the World Bank and donor governments, a number of major new research projects, and a growing number of practical measures on the part of development actors to engage with migrants and capitalise on the resources they have been able to accumulate in host countries and regions. These initiatives have increasingly recognised that migration carries significant potential benefits, as well as risks and costs. However, despite such attention, the extent to which understanding of the significance of migration is present in wider policy debates about poverty reduction remains open to question.

This paper focuses on the specific question of how Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) address migration and its potential to enhance human development at the national level. Based on a review of PRSPs completed since 1999, it argues that migration often remains poorly recognised or analysed in poorer countries in terms of its impacts on poverty reduction, whilst attitudes towards migration in these countries are often highly negative and/or based on limited evidence, especially in relation to internal migration. Analysis of how both internal and international migration are treated in PRSPs is also placed in the context of a broader understanding of the purpose of, and constraints faced by the PRS process.

The paper goes on to highlight the extent to which in Sub-Saharan African countries, successive drafts of PRSPs have shown increasing attention to migration. It also considers how analysis of the problems and opportunities associated with different types of migration are converted into policy initiatives, highlighting the lack of good practice in terms of the incorporation of migration into human development policy.

Background

Debates on ‘migration and development’

There can be little argument that attention to the relationship between migration and development has grown in international policy agendas in recent years. Concern at intergovernmental level is testified by a series of commissions, dialogues and fora. For example,
the Global Commission on International Migration (2005) sought to ‘promote a more coherent, comprehensive and global response to migration issues’\(^1\); the UN High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006 set out to ‘discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its development benefits and minimize its negative impacts’\(^2\); whilst two subsequent meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and Development in 2007 and 2008 have sought to establish a ‘new global process designed to enhance the positive impact of migration on development (and vice versa)’\(^3\), with the latter meeting branded as ‘protecting and empowering migrants for development’\(^4\).

It is also arguable that there has been something of a paradigm shift in the way that migration and development issues have been phrased in international debates over recent years, reflected in part in the mission statements of the international initiatives noted above. In particular, until the end of the 1990s, it was common amongst policy-makers to characterise the relationship between migration and development mainly or exclusively in terms of poverty, and/or a lack of development, being a primary cause of migration, even if some academic evidence – notably from the Mexican Migration Project (Massey et al. 1993) – pointed to more nuanced linkages. The goal of migration and development policy under this paradigm was generally both to stimulate return of migrants so that they could contribute to development, and to promote development in regions and countries with strong migration ‘potential’, in order to reduce the incentive to migrate.

In contrast, since 2000, public debate has shifted substantially, with an increasing number of governments, intergovernmental agencies and academic authors starting to see migration as an opportunity to promote development, or as a route out of poverty. Seminal contributions in promoting this shift of attitudes include a study of the ‘migration-development nexus’ by Van Hear and Nyberg-Sorensen, commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which explored the ‘potential of migration for development at the local, national and international levels’, and the ‘ways in which migration policy and development policy may be made to work

\(^1\) [http://www.gcim.org/en/]
\(^3\) [http://www.gfmd-fmmd.org/]
\(^4\) [http://www.gfmd2008.org/]
with each other’ (Van Hear and Nyberg-Sorensen 2002: 1). Another critical contribution came in the World Bank’s report on *Global Development Finance 2003*, where Bank economist Dilip Ratha pointed to the substantial volume of global remittances, arguing that they constitute an ‘important and stable source of external development finance’ (Ratha 2003: 157).

Core features of this new paradigm are visible in Van Hear and Nyberg-Sorensen’s study and have re-appeared in numerous subsequent volumes: they include a continued focus on return migration, but with attention also to the potential transnational role of diasporas in transferring knowledge, skills and investment in places of origin; a focus on remittances; and a recognition of the place of migration in the livelihood strategies of poor people – including those living in countries affected by conflict. Whilst attention to problems associated with migration has remained – not least the potential for ‘brain drain’ and a lack of rights for migrant workers – international efforts have increasingly focused on institutional structures that would help ‘manage’ such migration towards the goal of development and poverty reduction, rather than towards reducing its necessity.

In addition to the international fora mentioned above, such changing perspectives have been incorporated into policy statements of a number of northern governments. For example, in the UK, a policy paper *Moving out of Poverty* (DFID 2007) refers to remittances reducing poverty, migration influencing social and political development, and diasporas contributing to poverty reduction; in the Netherlands, a recent policy memorandum on *International Migration and Development* (MFA 2008) similarly refers to the development potential, and the socio-cultural and political effects of migration, broadly in positive terms; whilst in France, a new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development has amongst other objectives, an aim to ‘increase migrants’ contribution to development in their regions of origin’ (OECD 2008: 35). Similar approaches are also starting to appear across a number of other donor governments, including Sweden, Finland, Germany and Spain.

This is not to say, however, that this new ‘paradigm’ on migration and development is unchallenged, especially amongst academic commentators and non-government actors. For example, writing in a volume on *Migration and development: perspectives from the south*, Portes (2008: 37) argues that ‘rosy predictions’ of the development benefits of remittances ‘are
exaggerated’, suggesting that there is ‘no precedent that any country has taken the road toward sustained development on the basis of the remittances sent by its expatriates’. For Portes, the key issue is whether migration is cyclical, in which case development benefits may accrue; or whether it leads to permanent settlement in countries of destination, in which case he argues there is potential for depopulation of source areas, and the creation of a second generation of migrants who are at best disadvantaged, or at worse become an ‘impoverished caste-like minority’ (Portes 2008: 20). In relation to donor government policies too, there remains a strong strand of activity that is focused on promoting return, and development in places of origin to avert further migration – not least in the UK where a Foreign and Commonwealth Office team working on promoting return of irregular migrants and failed asylum seekers is currently five times larger than the team focused on migration and development in the Department for International Development.

**Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers**

Whilst it is clear that there has been increasing government attention to migration and development linkages over the past five years, especially amongst donor governments, what is less clear is how far this attention has been translated into concrete shifts in development policy and activity. There are various ways in which such ‘mainstreaming’ could be examined; for example, one approach would be to examine patterns of aid spending by major donors, to explore ways in which this spending has changed as a result of explicit attention to migration issues. However, such a task is complex, given the multiple sources of development assistance, and range of priorities of donor governments. Some indication of a lack of mainstreaming can be gauged from the fact that neither the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness⁵, nor the recent ‘Accra Agenda of Action’⁶, organised by the OECD and World Bank, make any reference to migration at all. Meanwhile, an indicator of the significance of migration and development in donor policies is provided by the fact that even in France, where a dedicated ministry for ‘co-development’ has been established, spending on this issue is estimated to account for less than 2 per cent of France’s bilateral aid. Indeed, French spending on ‘co-development’ in Mali – one of the principal target countries for France’s co-development initiative – accounted for around

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€2.6m from 2003-05, compared to an estimated €200m each year in remittances sent by the Malian diaspora in France to their home country.

Our focus here is less on donor nations, and more on changing policies of developing countries that are generally the countries of origin of international migrants, and where evidence increasingly suggests migration of various kinds is a key livelihood strategy for poor people. To gauge the extent of mainstreaming of migration in national development strategies of developing countries, we focus on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), one of a number of national statements of development and poverty-reduction policy that are available, but crucially one that takes a similar format across a wide range of developing nations.

In focusing on PRSPs, our intention is not to suggest that these are a definitive or completely comparable statement of national development policy. As a World Bank review in 2005 noted, the process in each country that has adopted a PRSP is different (World Bank 2005: v). They are often pulled together in the context of significant data, time and capacity constraints, with the drafters working under pressure not to be too lengthy on any particular topic. Also, although PRSPs are supposed to be ‘country-driven’, and have been described as such by some migration scholars (Martin 2008), it is clear that PRSPs themselves emerged as a result of donor pressure, since as Wiens (2004) notes, they are required for any country wishing to qualify for World Bank or IMF concessional assistance. As a result, there is a danger that they may represent – at least in some countries – a somewhat mechanical or even superficial process completed in order to qualify for aid, or worse, a document compiled with an eye to donor priorities in order to convince donor governments of the seriousness of a country’s poverty-reduction policies, without necessarily having any buy-in or agreement from national actors (Dembele 2003). Moreover, with ministries of finance or the office of the president or prime minister often in the lead, and inter-ministerial coordination a challenge at best, it would not be surprising if a topic as specific as migration were treated unevenly.

Nonetheless, there are some good reasons for focusing on PRSPs. First, in principle, PRSPs are not simply statements of government policy; rather, they also involve contributions from – or partnerships with – national civil society actors, and are intended to be based on participatory poverty assessments (Goetz and Gaventa 2001). PRSPs are also linked to Medium Term
Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), meaning that they should be medium to long term in perspective, and have an impact on developing countries’ budget priorities (Morrison and Singer 2007). In addition, a total of 59 developing countries have produced a PRSP\(^7\) since 2000, providing a basis for broad comparison of approaches across Africa, Asia, the Balkans and Latin America. Moreover, with some 25 countries publishing a second PRSP within the period 2000-08, there is an opportunity for these countries at least to explore changing approaches to migration in PRSPs over time.

Migration and development in PRSPs: existing findings

In considering the role of migration in PRSPs, a first important point to make is that initial literature on the emergence of PRSPs barely makes reference to migration. For example, a significant collection of papers on whether PRSPs make a difference in Africa published in Development Policy Review which covers PRSPs in seven African countries – Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania – does not mention migration at all (Booth 2003). However, there is a small emerging literature that more recently has explicitly sought to explore the ways in which migration is dealt with in PRSPs. In particular, a contribution by the World Bank to the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Brussels in 2007 provided a starting point for analysis, which was built upon by Jobbins (2008), Martin (2008) and ISIM (2008) in papers for the 2008 Global Forum in Manila.

ISIM’s analysis for the ‘government days’ of the forum explores 16 PRSPs completed in 2007-08, as well as countries’ mid-term reports on achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in order to assess the level of policy coherence between migration and development policies. It suggests that there are four main ways in which poverty reduction strategies and national development plans address migration and development: (1) recognising the importance of migration to development; (2) addressing (lack of) development as a cause of migration; (3) capitalising on migration for development – mainly by reaching out to the ‘diaspora’ as sources of revenue (remittances) and technical expertise; and (4) by addressing the impact of immigration. The paper documents a large number of statements, initiatives and policies both

\(^7\) This figure, and subsequent analysis, includes only countries that have produced a ‘full’ PRSP, rather than an ‘interim’ or draft document at time of writing.
within and outside PRSPs, noting that whilst attention has been paid to the economic impact of migration, less attention has been paid to impacts captured in the Human Development Index, such as educational attainment, literacy, life expectancy, per capita GDP, and/or other dimensions of human development such as good governance or the rule of law.

ISIM’s analysis paints a broadly up-beat view of attention to migration issues in PRSPs, although it argues that a major challenge remains in translating policy goals into practical action. For example, the authors note that many existing migration and development policies are small scale pilot programmes, and that challenges remain to assess effectiveness and replicability. The view that there is a growing consensus in PRSPs on the importance of migration and development linkages is reinforced by the comment of the lead author of the ISIM paper, Susan Martin, in a separate paper for the Civil Society Days of the Manila Global Forum, that ‘there has been considerable progress in integrating migration and development into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ (Martin 2008: 2). This paper cites the same four dimensions in which migration and development is treated in PRSPs, concluding that ‘(d)eveloping countries generally see the benefits of migration for development in two principal forms – as sources of revenue … and as sources of technical expertise’ (ibid.: 2).

Jobbins (2008) adopts a more structured methodology in analysing the treatment of migration in 33 PRSPs completed between 2001 and 2008. He constructs an index to assess the degree of emphasis on migration based on the number of references, paragraphs and sections of the PRSP focused on migration, the number of migration topics covered, the number of policy recommendations, whether demographic or economic statistics are provided, and a subjective assessment of importance of migration within the PRSP as a whole. On this basis, Jobbins concludes that countries issuing their first PRSP since 2007 showed a ‘strong commitment to including migration’, whilst ‘many countries develop a more comprehensive policy in their second paper’ (Jobbins 2008: i). Attention to migration in PRSPs is seen by Jobbins as encompassing both recognition of the development benefits of migration (with diasporas representing a source of revenue and technical expertise) and problems, such as rising inequality, brain drain, pressure on urban areas and problems associated with the hosting of refugees. Like Martin, Jobbins suggests that ‘translating analysis into policy remains a challenge’.
There are three elements of Jobbins’ (and Martin’s) analysis of the treatment of migration and development in PRSPs that are particularly useful to take into account in further analysis. First, both Jobbins and Martin consider whether the approach to migration in PRSPs has changed over time; second, Jobbins considers whether PRSPs present evidence on how migration relates to development; and third, Jobbins asks whether migration is simply mentioned in PRSPs, or whether this is translated into specific policy proposals.

On the question of the changing approach of PRSPs to migration and development over time, both papers conclude that there has been some sort of ‘progress’, although in both cases, this conclusion appears to be based on the volume of references to migration, rather than analysis of the way in which migration and development relationships are treated – for example whether migration is viewed as broadly positive or negative for development. In practice, even if a numerical approach is taken to the treatment of migration in PRSPs, a simple tabulation of the average number of references to ‘migration’ and a range of other migration-related search terms in PRSPs each year since 1999 provides a somewhat more ambiguous picture than Jobbins and Martin would suggest (Figure 1), with spikes in reference to ‘migration’ in 2005 and 2007, and to all search terms combined in 2004 and 2008, but little evidence of any underlying trend.

Figure 1: References to ‘migra*’ and other migration-related search terms in PRSPs, 2000-08

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8 The search terms used were: migra*, diaspor*, remit*, mobil*, urbani*, repatria*, border, traffick*, brain drain, return.
One problem with such analysis is that it is highly sensitive to extensive treatment of migration and related issues in a small number of PRSPs in certain years, which skew the average ‘hit’ score. In particular, the spikes in 2004 and 2008 reflect disproportionate treatment of the issue of refugee return in the PRSPs for Bosnia & Herzegovina and Afghanistan in these two years. If these two outliers are removed, the top five PRSPs in terms of reference to migration appear relatively well-spread out over the nine-year period (Table 1). Another problem is the relatively short period – eight years – over which it is possible to analyse any trend, and the relatively small number of countries involved. There is also no reliable data to show how migration itself changed over this time period for the countries involved.

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9 This problem may be exacerbated if hit scores for search terms are used, compared with Jobbins’ additional analysis of the number of paragraphs and sections devoted to migration issues, although another explanation for the difference between the two analyses may be the fact that the analysis here covers all 59 countries with a PRSP since 1999, compared to Jobbins’ analysis which appears to cover only 33 PRSPs.
Table 1: Top five PRSPs in terms of reference to migration, 2000-08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top five PRSPs in terms of references to all search terms</th>
<th>Number of references</th>
<th>Top five PRSPs in terms of references to 'migra*'</th>
<th>Number of references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh 2005</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic 2007</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania 2008</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Bangladesh 2005</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic 2007</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Zambia 2007</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia 2002</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Albania 2001</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka 2002</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Cape Verde 2005</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations

It is worth noting from Table 1 that three countries – Bangladesh, Albania and the Kyrgyz Republic – appear in both ‘top five’ lists, albeit that different versions of the Albania PRSP appear in the two parts of the table. In practice, all three of these countries pay substantive attention to the consequences of emigration for development, as does the 2002 PRSP for Sri Lanka, and the 2005 PRSP for Cape Verde. In contrast, the 2007 PRSP for Zambia is mostly concerned with addressing the (negative) consequences of immigration, whilst the 2002 PRSP for Cambodia is mostly concerned with issues relating to border management and human trafficking.

These differences reinforce the point that analysing ‘hits’ for migration search terms across PRSPs is a blunt instrument in terms of determining how much attention is paid to the subject. In particular, we turn our attention below not simply to the number of references to migration, but the way in which the topic is tackled, and the extent to which this interest translates into practical policy measures.

On this point, Jobbins does also pay attention to whether statements about migration and development in PRSPs are based on evidence, basing one element of his index on the number of demographic and economic migration statistics presented. However, again, his analysis does not explicitly consider the reliability or indeed relevance of such statistics – a case in point being de Haas’ (2006) analysis of migration and development in Nigeria, which notes that the Nigeria
PRSP cites a statistic that 2 million mostly highly-educated Nigerians are living in Europe and North America, despite the lack of any firm empirical basis for this claim.\(^\text{10}\)

Here, it is striking to note that there is no significant correlation between the number of references to migration across the PRSPs reviewed, and any of the most obvious measures of migration. Overall, the volume of references to migration was found to be inversely related to the percentage of the population living abroad, the level of remittances in both absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, and the rate of urbanisation, and positively related only to the share of tertiary educated people who had left the country. In other words, in countries where migration is more important, PRSPs generally appear to pay less attention to the issue, although in no case was this relationship statistically significant.\(^\text{11}\)

The third element of Jobbins’ analysis is that he considers whether PRSPs simply formulate migration as an issue, or whether specific policy initiatives are elaborated. However, the analysis does not formally consider whether such policies are themselves rooted in a specific analysis of evidence on how migration and development are linked, nor does he consider specifically whether such policies translated into practical action – beyond making the general point that they may not be.

With that in mind, the following sections attempt to develop a typology of countries based on their PRSPs’ treatment of international migration, internal migration, and immigration respectively. Our focus is on whether this treatment frames migration as broadly ‘positive’ – representing migration as an opportunity for development and poverty reduction – or broadly ‘negative’ – representing migration as a problem that must be overcome, or as a negative by-product of development. Once this analysis is completed, we return to the question of changing treatment of migration over time, paying attention both to the quality of treatment, and the changing extent of policy measures that are recommended or reported.

\(^{10}\) De Haas also cites a much higher estimate of 5 million from Hernandez-Coss et al. (2006), although data from the Global Migrant Origin Database (www.migrationdrc.org) suggest the figure may be much lower, at around 1.3 million. In part, these different estimates also depend on the definition of a ‘diaspora’.

\(^{11}\) At the 5 per cent level, using Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient. There was an inverse correlation between volume of references to migration and both remittances (as a percentage of GDP) and total emigration (as a percentage of the population) at the 10 per cent confidence level.
A critical element in this analysis is our categorisation of the treatment of migration as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in each country’s PRSP. It is important to stress that in the use of these terms, we are not making a judgement about whether migration itself is positive or negative for development; rather, we are seeking to assess whether the PRSPs view migration in broadly positive or negative terms – in other words, whether they adopt elements of the new ‘paradigm’ of migration and development that itself increasingly sees migration as posing opportunities for development, or whether they are consistent with an older paradigm that treats migration primarily as either reflecting or contributing to underdevelopment. In this context, broadly ‘positive’ references are seen as those which highlight opportunities for development associated with remittances, migration-related trade, the skills and resources of diaspora populations, or the potential for advancement of human capital through the export of labour. In contrast, broadly ‘negative’ references include a range of examples in which migration is seen as constituting a problem, whether through constraining growth, increasing inequality, or being linked to human trafficking, pressure on urban settlements, crime, malnutrition, poverty, unemployment, HIV/AIDS, or the growth of slums.

The review below also deals separately with three aspects of migration affecting developing countries – internal migration, emigration, and immigration. There is growing evidence that internal migration – particularly seasonal migration over short distances – has different implications for poverty and poor people compared to international migration. In addition, for many commentators, immigration and emigration are seen as posing quite different problems. Our analysis seeks to respect these differences, rather than assuming that migration is a single process; in doing so, it also confirms that the approach of PRSPs towards these different types of migration also vary quite significantly.

Analysis

Emigration in PRSPs

Turning first to the treatment of emigration in PRSPs, there is some evidence of PRSPs adopting a positive view of the potential for international migrants to contribute to development, with some indication that this emphasis has increased marginally over time (Figure 2), although much
depends on the balance between positive and negative comments in PRSPs whose attitudes towards migration are categorised as ‘mixed’. Thus a total of 36 countries’ most recent PRSP mention positive elements of international migration in terms of impact on development and/or poverty reduction; in contrast 16 refer to emigration only as a problem, whilst six do not deal with the issue of emigration at all. In general, PRSPs treat emigration as having both positive and negative impacts on development – the most recent PRSP of just four countries frames emigration only as an opportunity, without mentioning associated problems.

Figure 2: Treatment of emigration in PRSPs, by year

![Figure 2: Treatment of emigration in PRSPs, by year](image)

Source: Authors’ calculations, based on all 84 full PRSPs since 2000

It is worth noting however that the vast bulk of this attention is focused on remittances, with few countries dealing with other potentially positive aspects of emigration highlighted in the literature, such as trade links or the potential for advancement of human capital. For example, Yemen (2002), Burkina Faso (2005) and Albania (2008) are the only PRSPs reviewed to

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12 Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, DR Congo, Dominica, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau Kyrgyz Republic, Lao DPR, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Serbia & Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Uzbekistan, Yemen
13 Azerbaijan, Djibouti, Guyana, Malawi, Cambodia, Gambia, Haiti, Kenya, Honduras, Madagascar, Maldives, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Uganda, Zambia
14 Bolivia, Chad, Guinea, Mongolia, Mozambique, Vietnam
15 Ethiopia, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Senegal
mention the (potential) role of migration and/or diasporas in stimulating trade, whilst none directly report that there is a net gain in human capital as a result of migration.

In addition, surprisingly few countries’ PRSPs deal in any detail with the skills and resources of diaspora populations, beyond their obvious role as a source of remittances to families and investment income. Indeed, few even attempt to estimate the size of their diaspora populations\textsuperscript{16}, whilst only two report that diaspora organisations were involved in the preparation of the PRSP.\textsuperscript{17} In one of the few examples where an actual impact of diaspora engagement in development is recorded, the 2008 Cape Verde PRSP reports that the diaspora have acted to drive consumer standards up to international levels, as well as engaging more broadly in the political and social life of the country. In turn, the Liberia PRSP notes the significant role played in national life by returning members of the diaspora, citing the example of the country’s President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, as well as other prominent returnees. However, more broadly, return attracts surprisingly little attention across PRSPs as a whole.

Even in relation to remittances, the way in which PRSPs deal with the issue varies widely. Thus only in eight countries is there even reference to data on the volume of international remittances\textsuperscript{18}, whilst just four deal with specific estimates of how these flows have changed, or are likely to change over time.\textsuperscript{19} In turn, relatively few PRSPs go into any detail on how remittances might impact the receiving country. At a micro-level, the positive effect on household incomes and/or expenditure is noted explicitly only in a small number of countries\textsuperscript{20},

\text\textsuperscript{16} Exceptions include Burundi, Dominica, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal
\text\textsuperscript{17} Those that did consult with diaspora groups were Afghanistan and Armenia; it is possible that this occurred in other countries but is not reported.
\text\textsuperscript{18} Those that do quote figures on the volume of remittances include: Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Dominica, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. However, the figures quoted are often poorly referenced, or not referenced at all.
\text\textsuperscript{19} The only PRSPs that quote data showing how remittances have changed over time are Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh and Lesotho. The Cape Verde 2005 PRSP mentions a rise, then fall in remittances, but this information is not quantified in 2005, and left out of the country’s revised PRSP in 2008. PRSPs for Nigeria (2005) and Ghana (2006) report that remittances are of growing importance; the PRSP for Nepal (2003) reports that remittances trebled from 1997 to 2001; the PRSP for Sri Lanka (2002) reports that remittances doubled in the 1990s; the Yemen (2002) PRSP talks of the continuous decline of remittances over time; whilst the PRSP for Pakistan (2004) reports that remittances are likely to ‘decelerate’; but none of these provide actual remittance totals from one year to another as support for their statements.
\text\textsuperscript{20} Sri Lanka and Yemen (2002), Benin (2004), Senegal (2007) and Uzbekistan (2008) all explicitly mention the importance of remittances to household income, whilst the Bhutan (2004) PRSP mentions remittances are used to buy food, and the Rwanda (2008) PRSP classifies households that do not have either a son or daughter living at home, or income from remittances, as ‘most vulnerable’.
although micro-economic benefits for households are often implicitly recognised. In turn, although a number of countries mention a macro-economic impact of remittances, there is little agreement on what these might be.\textsuperscript{21} Some countries also see remittances as having negative effects, for example through increasing inequality (Bhutan 2004, Bangladesh 2005) dependence on imports (cited in the 2001 Albania PRSP, but not in the 2008 revised version), or vulnerability to external shocks (Cape Verde 2008). However, more commonly, the negative effects of international migration are seen more as associated either with the loss of skilled professionals\textsuperscript{22}, or with human trafficking\textsuperscript{23}, although a range of other problems are mentioned.\textsuperscript{24} Just four countries – Bosnia & Herzegovina (2004), Guinea-Bissau (2007), Pakistan (2004) and Senegal (2007) – refer to emigration as being caused by a lack of development.

Nor are PRSPs necessarily internally consistent: for example, the 2006 PRSP for Dominica cites emigration both as one of the causes of poverty in the country (p.23), and as contributing to poverty alleviation (p.84), whilst the 2002 Sri Lanka PRSP states both that remittances have led to a ‘significant’ decline in the current account deficit (p.31), and that the current account deficit has ‘almost doubled’ (p.33). Somewhat unusually, the 2003 Armenia PRSP reports that emigration has reduced by a quarter the number of pensioners living in the country, although the impact of this demographic shift on development is not discussed.

\textsuperscript{21} A positive effect of remittances is highlighted on the balance of payments in Pakistan (2004), Burkina Faso (2005), Dominica (2006) and Tanzania (2006); on aggregate poverty reduction in Sri Lanka and Yemen (2002), Georgia (2003), Pakistan (2004), Dominica (2006), the Kyrgyz Republic (2007), and Benin (2008) and Uzbekistan (2008); on domestic demand in Timor Leste (2003); on the current account deficit in Sri Lanka (2002); on foreign exchange by Dominica (2006); on international reserves by Nicaragua (2006); on the service account by Ethiopia (2002); on national savings by Nepal (2003), Bangladesh (2005), Guinea-Bissau (2007) and Rwanda (2008); on expansion of investment in \textsuperscript{22}mentioned by Albania, Armenia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Sri Lanka and Timor Leste
\textsuperscript{23}mentioned by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Nigeria and Tanzania
\textsuperscript{24}Demographic imbalances are mentioned by Armenia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia and Lesotho; other issues include a rise in HIV/AIDS (Burkina Faso 2005), domestic violence (Lesotho 2006), teenage pregnancies (Sri Lanka 2002) and poverty (Dominica 2006); negative consequences for family life (Dominica 2006); increased juvenile delinquency, homelessness, begging and prostitution (Georgia 2003); and reduced primary school attendance (Nicaragua 2006).
Internal migration in PRSPs

In contrast to emigration, internal migration is discussed in much more negative terms in PRSPs, in spite of the fact that it is the form of migration that is most accessible to poor people, and in many cases is likely to be that which is the most relevant to poverty reduction (Figure 3). Thus just 14 countries’ most recent PRSPs identify any potential benefits of internal migration in terms of development and poverty reduction\textsuperscript{25}, with all of these, and 37 others also citing a number of problems or challenges posed by internal migration. The remaining eight PRSPs do not mention internal migration at all.\textsuperscript{26} There is little evidence of any trend in attitudes over time.

Discussion of the problems associated with internal migration can be divided into three categories: the negative relationship between migration and rural poverty; the pressure of rural-urban migration on urban centres; and problems associated with forced internal displacement. The last of these is clearly cited primarily in countries that are, or have recently been affected by conflict\textsuperscript{27}, but is also linked in Afghanistan and Bolivia to natural disasters. In contrast, hardly any PRSPs talk about barriers to internal mobility, an exception being Sri Lanka (2002), which refers to ‘rigid labor laws, public land ownership and other factor market distortions (which) tend to discourage urbanization’ (p.51).

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\textsuperscript{25} Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, DR Congo, Honduras, Lao DPR, Maldives, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Vietnam

\textsuperscript{26} Benin, Dominica, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Moldova, Nepal, Uzbekistan

\textsuperscript{27} Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, DR Congo, Georgia, Liberia, Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste and Uganda
In terms of rural poverty, the standard approach taken in many PRSPs is either to explicitly state that rural poverty or underdevelopment causes migration out of rural areas, or more commonly to imply this by stressing the need for rural development projects to stem rural out-migration. Thus whilst PRSPs for Serbia & Montenegro (2004), Sri Lanka (2002) and Yemen (2002) focus specifically on economic and cultural stagnation, a lack of clear property rights in land and water scarcity respectively as causes of rural out-migration, some 16 PRSPs make explicit recommendations that rural development initiatives should be promoted to limit such migration (see section on policies below).

In turn, a number of PRSPs highlight perceived problems of rural out-migration in terms of its impact on rural areas; these include concerns about shortages of farm labour (Bhutan 2004, Bolivia 2001, Yemen 2002); loss of better-educated people (Mozambique 2007, Nigeria 2005, Serbia & Montenegro 2004); population ageing (Nigeria 2005, Yemen 2002); and a rise in the number of female-headed households and female smallholders, leading to increased adolescent maternity rates (Honduras 2001) constrained access to land, credit, information and markets (Kenya 2005); and an increased burden on women (Yemen 2002). Two PRSPs (Ethiopia 2002,
Honduras 2001) focus instead on rural-rural resettlement, and its negative consequences for natural resources.

However, by far the most common concern of PRSPs about internal migration relates to pressure on urban areas. Here, a particular concern is the growth of informal, slum or squatter settlements which are seen as sites of poverty\textsuperscript{28}, although some PRSPs argue more generally that rural-urban migration simply transmits rural poverty to urban areas.\textsuperscript{29}

In addition, a number of more specific points are raised about the consequences of rural-urban migration; on the one hand, there are some assertions that migrants themselves become more vulnerable in cities, as in the case of Sierra Leone (2005), or the Afghanistan 2008 PRSP which notes the collapse of traditional safety nets in urban areas. More commonly, concern focuses on conditions not only for migrants themselves, but for the urban population more generally, with PRSPs variously describing rural-urban migration as a cause of, or contributor to violence, crime and/or insecurity\textsuperscript{30}; general pressure on infrastructures and urban services\textsuperscript{31}; pressure on housing\textsuperscript{32}; increased unemployment or creation of more precarious employment conditions\textsuperscript{33}; environmental deterioration and/or sanitation problems\textsuperscript{34}; ill health\textsuperscript{35}; congestion\textsuperscript{36}; and prostitution.\textsuperscript{37} Two PRSPs – DR Congo (2007) and Rwanda (2008) – argue that rural-urban migration constrains national economic growth.

Not all PRSP references to internal migration are negative or cast it as a problem. Most obviously, three PRSPs point out simply that internal migration allows poor people access to

\textsuperscript{28} Noted by PRSPs in Afghanistan, Albania, Bolivia, Cameroon, Ghana, Haiti, Liberia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Sao Tome & Principe and Sri Lanka
\textsuperscript{29} This kind of assertion characterises the PRSPs of Bhutan, Niger, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Yemen
\textsuperscript{35} Burkina Faso 2005, Cameroon 2003, Honduras 2001
\textsuperscript{36} Bangladesh 2005
\textsuperscript{37} Sao Tome & Principe 2005
employment or better paid work\textsuperscript{38}, whilst seven go further and explicitly argue (or state) either that this leads to an aggregate reduction of poverty\textsuperscript{39}, or to rural development more widely.\textsuperscript{40} The 2008 PRSP for the Maldives also cites internal migration as necessary in reducing vulnerability to natural hazards.

\textit{Immigration in PRSPs}

In relation to immigration, it is perhaps unsurprising that relatively fewer than half of the countries reviewed deal at all with this topic in their most recent PRSP, given that most poor countries either are, or perceive themselves as countries of emigration rather than immigration. In total, 25 countries’ most recent PRSPs refer to problems associated with immigration, whilst just 12 deal with immigration in a more neutral or positive way, either in terms of importing skilled labour, or the signing of multilateral or bilateral agreements that allow for increased movement of people between neighbouring countries. Some 32 do not mention immigration at all, although there does appear to be increasing attention to the issue over time (Figure 4).

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{38} Mauritania, Pakistan and Senegal
\textsuperscript{39} Bangladesh, Bolivia, Honduras, Niger and Sri Lanka
\textsuperscript{40} Afghanistan and Lao DPR
\end{flushleft}
Negative aspects of immigration cited revolve particularly around the need to combat illegal immigration; the perceived negative side-effects of immigration, especially increased exposure to poverty and disease, including HIV/AIDS; and the burdens posed by immigration of refugees.

**Policy approaches to migration**

**Policies on international migration**

Discussion so far has focused primarily on the *identification* of problems and opportunities associated with migration in PRSPs, and not so much on policies that might better link migration and development. In practice, a wide range of policy initiatives are identified in relation to international migration (Table 3) across the various PRSPs reviewed – although these are often based on little prior analysis of what the key migration and development issues are, whilst no one policy is discussed by more than a fifth of all PRSPs. In line with the division of references to
migration between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, Table 2 distinguishes policies that are broadly ‘proactive/facilitative’ and those which are focused on ‘regulation/control’

Table 2: Policy measures aimed at international migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proactive/facilitative policies</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Regulation/control policies</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engage diaspora</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Combat trafficking</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export labour</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Simplify/modernise customs</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate remittances</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Strengthen border control</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign bilateral agreements</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Combat illegal migration</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote investment by diasporas</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Promote refugee return</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve labour conditions abroad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tackle the 'brain drain'</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-departure training</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Participate in RCPs\textsuperscript{41}</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import skills</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Promote more research/monitoring</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote student mobility</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Support return</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop consular services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Promote refugee integration</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage legal remittance channels</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Combat HIV/AIDS amongst migrants</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulate recruitment industry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Re-integrate trafficking</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate portability of pensions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Build institutional capacity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage female migration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sign readmission agreements</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations

\textsuperscript{41} Participation in RCPs is placed in the ‘regulation/control’ side of the table to reflect this historic focus of many RCPs on matters of border management (c.f. Düvell 2005). However, it is acknowledged that a number of RCP agendas are shifting towards a more facilitative approach to migration.
In terms of policy measures on international migration, the dominance of measures associated with regulation and/or control – combating trafficking, modernising and strengthening immigration and customs services, and combating illegal migration – is striking. In contrast, fewer countries mention policies in their PRSPs designed to stimulate the flow of remittances, encourage the use of formal channels to transfer money, or maximise the benefits of remittances for the wider economy or society, whilst these are often poorly elaborated, suggesting a policy aspiration rather than the existence of a worked-out strategy.

Box 1: Bangladesh

In contrast to the majority of PRSPs reviewed for this paper, the recent Bangladesh PRSP has a wide range of references to migration – both internal and international – as well as some clear policy responses.

In relation to remittances, the PRSP provides figures on changing aggregate flows over the previous decade, provides projections into the future, and highlights their importance in contributing to household incomes, savings, rural non-farm activities and demand in rural market centres. The paper also reflects on why remittance flows have both risen and fallen over time – including factors such as currency depreciation and the availability of safe remittance channels. The paper concludes that there is a need to enhance remittance flows, whilst reflecting on the impact of previous policy measures in this area. These measures are quite detailed – they include efforts to reduce money laundering, support the establishment of banking facilities overseas, and the establishment of an office to deal with complaints from those remitting money. There is also recognition in the paper that remittances can increase inequality, at the same time as they contribute to reducing poverty.

Additional policy measures on international migration mentioned in the PRSP also include actions to identify external labour market opportunities, with a view to intensifying and diversifying overseas employment, as well as improving its quality. This includes projections of feasible labour demand overseas in different regions and sectors; the development of training in areas where there are specific skill demands; and the establishment of institutions that would publicise information on job prospects and skill requirements overseas. Targeted support is

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42 Exceptions include Bangladesh (2005 – see box 1); and Pakistan (2004) and Timor Leste (2003) which both report plans to negotiate agreements for labour export specifically to promote remittance flows. Other countries referring to a policy objective of increasing remittance flows include Ghana (2006), DR Congo (2007), and Lao PDR, Liberia and Uzbekistan (2008).

43 Exceptions again include Bangladesh (2005), which sets a policy goal of encouraging flows of remittances through legal channels (p.70); also Ghana (2006), which talks of ‘reducing the cost of remittances’ and ‘channelling remittances through the formal sector’ (p.67); and Liberia (2008), which talks about ‘improving access to remittance services’ (p.117).

44 Countries that mention policies to promote investment of remittances from the diaspora in businesses and employment creation include Serbia & Montenegro (2004), Burkina Faso (2005), Dominica (2006), Senegal (2007) and Albania, Afghanistan and Benin (2008). Uzbekistan’s PRSP in 2008 refers to the potential for expansion of micro-credit organizations and credit unions based around the remittance market.
also proposed for pre-departure training, and for return migrant associations, with the aim of encouraging safe migration, and the investment of accumulated savings after return.

Attention is also paid to the international migration of women, in the context of a ban on low-skilled female migration from Bangladesh at the time the paper was written. Policy objectives here include a lifting of the ban, the provision of training, welfare services and other measures to ensure safe work for women overseas. An additional policy objective mentioned is improved regulation of the recruitment industry, in a context where the bulk of Bangladeshi overseas migrants use private recruiters.

Of particular interest in the Bangladesh PRSP are its mention of the need for ‘innovative ways to finance the initial cost’ of migration, via NGOs (p.106), and its quite lengthy discussion of internal migration, including the observation that ‘in general urbanisation appears to have been a force for poverty reduction with urban poverty declining much faster than rural poverty’ (p.20). However, policy conclusions on internal migration are more cautious, with the paper veering between support for urbanisation, and a stress on the promotion of rural and decentralised development.

Source: Bangladesh PRSP (2005)

This lack of attention of most PRSPs’ policy matrices to remittances is surprising, given the number of countries that identify the significance of remittances to both households and the wider macro-economy. Even more surprising is the much greater number of countries whose PRSPs mention policy on other forms of engagement with the diaspora, in spite of the lack of concrete evidence in PRSPs of diasporas’ non-financial contributions.

However, there remains something of a disjunction between expressing an intention to develop a policy on diaspora, and reporting on a substantial policy initiative. Thus seven countries do little more than express an intention to attract the skills, knowledge or participation of the diaspora, whilst three others report actions primarily focused on two international programmes for diaspora engagement, MIDA and TOKTEN. In addition to these ten countries, the 2005 Burkina Faso PRSP simply reports an intention to restructure the ‘High Council for Burkinabé Citizens Abroad’, without providing much detail on how or why. Worse, although at least seven

46 The DR Congo (2007) and Rwanda (2008) PRSPs report on engagement with IOM’s MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa) programme; whilst both Rwanda and the Liberia (2008) PRSPs report on participation in the TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) – although Liberia’s own civil service ‘Senior Executive Service (SES)’ programme includes recruitment from within the Liberian diaspora.
Sub-Saharan African countries have ministries or departments devoted to diaspora affairs, Burkina Faso and Benin are the only two where these are included in the PRSP\(^{47}\), suggesting that elsewhere such ministries may be somewhat marginal to broader development policy. In fairness to countries, international policy documents are also generally not particularly clear on best practice in terms of concrete initiatives to mobilise diasporas.

There are some countries that have more substantial and/or innovative programmes to link with their diaspora. As noted above, Benin’s 2008 PRSP develops quite a comprehensive set of proposals for reaching out to the Beninese diaspora, as part of a ‘Beninese Diaspora Organised for National Development’ approach. This links with the French idea of ‘co-development’, and includes actions to carry out a census of Beninese abroad, as well as monitoring and publicising their ‘humanitarian and socio-community actions’. In contrast, the 2008 Cape Verde PRSP reports on the development of a ‘youth card’ programme, and creation of a ‘Cape Verdean Youth Festival’, to encourage mobility and exchange between youth in the diaspora and at home. Other countries where more substantive policies are articulated towards mobilising and/or engaging with their diasporas include Albania (2008 – see box 2), Dominica (2006) and Senegal (2007).

In addition, just five countries – all of them in Asia – explicitly discuss the scope to integrate training of workers with international labour recruitment, in order to derive greater benefit from migration by effectively ‘exporting’ workers.\(^{48}\) The 2005 Bangladesh PRSP in particular focuses on the potential to increase emigration of women, and along with Sri Lanka (2002), is the only PRSP to consider the gendered nature of international labour markets.

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**Box 2: Albania**

The most recent PRSP for Albania notes a steady increase in *remittances*, providing data on past trends and projections, and highlights their significance as a share of GDP, and in improving the country’s balance of payments. It also notes that closer *European integration* will ‘ease and formalise the movement of people’, reflecting the countries relatively unique position on the borders of the EU.

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\(^{47}\) The PRSPs for Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal do not mention the existence of a specialised Ministry or Department for the diaspora.

Perhaps reflecting this closeness to the EU, and consequent pressure exerted by EU states, a large number of
measures included in the PRSP are focused on border control and surveillance, action against trafficking and
illegal migration, the introduction of an identity card system, and cross-border cooperation.

However, the latest Albanian PRSP does include substantial reference to making migration work towards the
development of the country, including through the direction of remittances towards business investment; the
improvement of Albanian consular services abroad; the protection of the rights of Albanians abroad; and the
‘mobilisation’ and ‘organisation’ of overseas Albanian communities.

In turn, Albania has benefited in practice in recent years from UNDP and other international funding to reach out to
its migrant diaspora, particularly those who are more highly skilled. This includes a ‘TOKTEN’ programme that
seeks to employ the skills of expatriate nationals in higher education, to support reform of the sector. It is also
implementing, with support from IOM, a ‘National Action Strategy on Migration’, which, in addition to measures
focused on migration and development, also includes institutional and legislative change, and support to
‘readmission’, return and reintegration of Albanian nationals abroad.

Source: Albania PRSP (2008)

**Policies on internal migration**

Turning to internal migration, a rather smaller range of policies are evident in PRSPs (Table 3). Indeed, if we put to one side policies on forced internal displacement, there are two principal
types of policy – on the one hand, rural development initiatives to discourage rural out-
migration; and on the other, policies to promote better planning in urban areas (including
measures to ease urban congestion). The former outweigh the latter by around two to one,
although both types of policy are present, sometimes in the same countries. Only three PRSPs
mention policies to encourage internal migration, and in none of these cases does the policy
involve dismantling barriers to internal movement.

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Table 3: Policy measures aimed at internal migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proactive/facilitative policies</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Regulation/control policies</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban planning</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Rural development to limit out-migration</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to ease urban congestion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Protect IDPs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage rural-urban flows</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Address land problems in rural areas</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve position of rural women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reduce youth unemployment</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve access of migrants to urban services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Promote more research/monitoring</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promote internal resettlement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improve security</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations.

One difficulty here is that rural poverty clearly is significant in many or even most of the countries for which there are PRSPs, making policies to promote rural development important in their own right. However, what is striking here is both the diversity (and lack of overlap) of rural development initiatives proposed by different countries as a way of addressing internal migration⁵⁰, and the lack of evidence cited to demonstrate that such policies are in practice likely

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⁵⁰ They include proposals for basic infrastructure projects (Cambodia 2006, Timor Leste 2003, Vietnam 2006), construction of rural tele-centres and other income generating activities (Cameroon 2003), improvement of living conditions (Gambia 2007) and the position of rural women (Kenya 2005), accelerated agricultural development projects (Ghana 2006); micro-lending projects (Guinea-Bissau 2007), construction of decentralised industrial estates (Guyana 2002); support for micro, small and medium enterprises (Honduras 2001); the promotion of job opportunities in remote mountainous regions (Kyrgyz Republic 2007); the development of rural growth centres (Malawi 2006, Senegal 2007) and road construction (Malawi 2006); better integration of young people into social life, and the development of ‘job-seeking aptitudes’ (Mali 2008); promotion of accessible financial services in rural areas (Mongolia 2003); development of employment-intensive programmes and a national community work agency (Niger 2008); support for integrated rural development, including ‘model rural communities and farm settlements’ ... ‘to provide a wholesome rural life’ (Nigeria 2005); rural electrification (Pakistan 2004); upgrading human resources (Senegal 2007); programmes of sedentarisation (Vietnam 2006); and the drilling and equipping wells (Yemen 2002).
to limit migration. Indeed, a number of initiatives mentioned, such as road-building and rural electrification, have been associated in the literature with accelerating rural out-migration (c.f. Beauchemin and Schoumaker, 2005, on roads).

A much smaller number of PRSPs discuss the need for better urban planning, although in most cases this discussion does not go to the level of outlining specific initiatives or programmes. One exception is Afghanistan (2008), where the PRSP highlights the development of eight major ‘City Development Plans’ as part of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), whereby two million urban residents have benefited from 2002-07 from investments in water supply, and just under 1 million from investment in improved sanitation. However, it is worth noting that the ANDS itself does not mention migration or urbanisation. The only other PRSP to set out a substantive approach to urban planning in the context of urbanisation is Sri Lanka (2002), which places an emphasis on ‘pro-poor urbanisation’ (see Box 3).

Box 3: Sri Lanka

A key element of the Sri Lanka PRSP (2002) is a policy to mainstream poverty reduction into the promotion of overseas employment. The paper notes that it is government policy already to promote overseas employment, whilst ensuring the safety of migrants. This reflects the fact that over 700,000 low income Sri Lankans were estimated to be working abroad at the time the paper was written, sending back around $1bn each year in remittances.

Whilst the mention of migration having benefits for poverty reduction is not unique to Sri Lanka, the paper is noteworthy for the level of detailed discussion of policies in this area. It mentions the need for legislative and institutional reform to ensure legal support for migrants abroad, and skills development for those planning to leave, the latter to be provided through public-private partnerships. It also highlights the need for investment in worker insurance, housing credit and self-employment credit schemes, whilst in contrast to Bangladesh, it calls for the partial deregulation of the private recruitment sector, perhaps reflecting differences in the existing regulatory situation in the two countries. Support for housing of migrant workers families includes mention of discretionary financing for vulnerable groups.

The PRSP is also notable for its emphasis on the need for a planned and **pro-poor urbanisation** as part of a strategy to reduce poverty in rural areas. This includes specific emphasis on infrastructure, including water, sanitation and roads; the need for improved local government capacity to manage urban infrastructure and service delivery; and the promotion of industrialisation in areas of competitive advantage.


Two countries – Maldives (2008) and Tajikistan (2002) – mention the need for policies to promote resettlement from areas that are environmentally vulnerable. However, the 2002 PRSP for Ethiopia, a country which already has a very substantial resettlement programme taking people from the northern highlands to southern lowlands, notes only that internal migration should be ‘conducted according to a well-conceived plan and with a well-coordinated government support’ (p.56), rather than occurring in a spontaneous manner.

**The case of sub-Saharan Africa: changing attention over time**

The previous sections have sought to provide typologies of how PRSPs deal with migration and development issues in general, as well as the kind of policies that have been developed. This section returns to the question of how treatment of these issues has changed over time, focusing on a sub-set of sub-Saharan African countries that have issued more than one PRSP over the period since 2000. Table 4 identifies five distinct groups of countries, depending on whether there has been change at all, and if so, whether this has involved a lower or greater degree of focus on migration over time.
Table 4: Changing approaches to migration in PRSPs in sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in approach to migration</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasing attention</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention for first time</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention in both PRSPs, but little change</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or no attention in either PRSP</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining attention</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ review

In practice, Table 4 does not provide a particularly convincing view of increasing attention to migration within PRSPs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Out of the 14 countries in the region that have had more than one PRSP since 2000, six have either not seen increasing attention to migration, or in one case has actually seen the topic treated less extensively in the second of the two PRSPs to be published. In two cases, Mozambique and Madagascar, the treatment of migration is extremely limited in both PRSPs. In the case of Mali, the 2008 PRSP notes that in the earlier
PRSP in 2002, the ‘crucial problem of external and internal migratory flows, as well as transfers of funds by Malians from abroad’ were under-discussed; however it does not go on to discuss these issues in any greater detail. Meanwhile, the 2002 PRSP for Guinea talks of the need to ‘reassure investors and Guineans established abroad and wishing to repatriate their savings’, whilst also touching briefly on the issues of child trafficking and the need to harmonize immigration and customs with other ECOWAS nations; yet the 2008 PRSP for Guinea mentions none of these issues.

In the case of Burkina Faso, both the 2000 and 2005 PRSPs do cover both international and internal migration, describing the former in broadly positive terms, the latter in largely negative terms. However, there is little difference in discussion in the two documents, beyond the citing of more evidence on the volume of international remittances, and an overall much more negative description of the consequences of rural-urban migration in the 2005 PRSP, even though this description is not supported by new evidence.

In turn, whereas the 2002 PRSP for Niger cites Household Livelihood Security Surveys as showing the significance of remittances for poor households in Niger, the 2008 PRSP does not mention remittances at all. Instead, it chooses to focus on ‘unlawful occupancy’ in suburban areas by internal migrants, (p.22, p.44), and speaks of youth being ‘prey to a multidimensional crisis characterized by unemployment, under-employment, illiteracy, begging, delinquency, exodus, immigration and low participation in development activities, various diseases, including STI/HIV/AIDS, violence, etc.’ (p.55) – even though the survey evidence it cites suggests living standards have increased (p.21).

Meanwhile, whilst eight countries do pay more attention to migration in the second of two PRSPs – in four of these cases coming to the issue for the first time – the depth and sophistication of this engagement is highly varied. In only two cases – Senegal and Benin – is there evidence of ‘good practice’ in the sense of an expanding coverage of migration-development linkages. In the former case, the 2002 PRSP mentions the potential for emigrants to invest in agricultural production, but does not go into detail on this. In contrast, the 2007 Senegal PRSP provides evidence on the scale of emigration, cites a broader range of ways in which this emigration is significant for Senegal, and crucially sets out a series of concrete policy
measures that need to be taken to increase engagement with the Senegalese diaspora; it also mentions the growth of internal migration, particularly from regional urban centres to the capital, Dakar. In the case of Benin, the 2008 PRSP includes extensive discussion of engaging the Beninese Diaspora through a number of concrete policy measures. The PRSP also notes a positive relationship between migration and poverty reduction, based on a 2006 country-level study. Neither of these were present in the 2002 Benin PRSP, which only briefly mentioned the need to incorporate international migration into national development, as well as highlighting child migration as a feature of poverty in the country.

In contrast, in the case of Ghana, whilst the 2003 PRSP mentions both highly-skilled emigration (especially of health professionals) and internal migration, referring to the former as a problem, but that latter as potentially positive, in reducing rural poverty in sending areas, as well as negative, in terms of the poverty and poor working conditions of migrants in rural destination areas, the way the 2006 PRSP deals with migration is almost entirely reversed. Thus the latter does not mention rural-rural migration, and refers to rural-urban migration in entirely negative terms; yet on the other hand, it mentions some of the positive consequences of emigration, such as investment in roads and real estate. Similarly, the 2008 Rwanda PRSP has expanded discussion of emigration and diaspora issues, but less on refugee return and internal resettlement issues, which dominate discussion in the 2002 PRSP.

Finally, all of the four countries which came fresh to the subject in their latest PRSP deal with it in largely negative terms, citing the negative consequences of rural-urban migration on urban areas which are seen as including pressure on housing (Zambia 2005 and Tanzania 2006), increased poverty, poor sanitation (Uganda 2005, Tanzania 2006), crime (Uganda 2005, Zambia 2007), malnutrition (Gambia 2007), the brain drain of professionals (Zambia 2007, Gambia 2007) and/or problems associated with immigration and/or the influx of refugees that are seen as including the spread of STDs (Uganda 2005), negative effects on fisheries (Gambia 2007), and criminality (Zambia 2007). Little or no empirical evidence is cited to support these perspectives.
**Policy implementation: indicators for monitoring**

Whilst this review so far has noted that a number of PRSPs refer to migration and development, or that a variety of policy positions are also elaborated, it is far from clear whether these policies are actually implemented in practice. An assessment of the level of implementation of migration and development policies is difficult to make from analysis of the PRSPs themselves, whilst the task involved in following up on implementation across 59 countries would be substantial indeed. Nonetheless, some sense of implementation can be gleaned from PRSPs by considering the extent to which indicators are included, against which policy progress could be measured. In practice, we have considered the extent of indicators developed across the ten countries with most references to migration, on the principle that it is in these countries that we would most expect implementation of migration and development policy to take place.

In some countries, M&E indicators relating to migration and development are indeed elaborated. Perhaps the best example of good practice in this regard is Bangladesh (Table 5). Elsewhere, in Sri Lanka (2002), the PRSP specifically targets an increase urban share of population by 5-10 per cent by 2005, whilst the paper’s M&E annex also includes measures to better integrate poverty reduction with overseas migration, by introducing migrant housing, insurance and self-employment schemes, although these have no target date. In Moldova (2008), objectives are also set out fairly clearly, and include the inclusion of a migration module in the Labour Force Survey in 2008, the opening of three migration information centres in 2009, and measures to modernise border control with the EU, and sign bilateral labour agreements with five EU countries by 2011. Meanwhile, the Afghanistan (2008) PRSP includes an annual review of urban-rural population densities, whilst Timor Leste (2003) set a goal of improving significantly the lives of slum dwellers by 2015, as well as increasing the size of the border patrol; developing immigration legislation to regulate flows of people into of the country; and developing a plan to export 1,000 labourers a year.
Table 5: Policy objectives and indicators, Bangladesh PRSP (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy objective</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Facilitating remittances through legal channels</td>
<td>• Remittances a proportion of GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Informational programmes about the risks associated with child migration and</td>
<td>• Number of women/children trafficked,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trafficking of women and children</td>
<td>• Proportion of victims reintegrated into society,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Percentage of poor women/children covered by safety net programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>designed to bring women increased social protection,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Number of children infected with STDs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Promoting overseas female migration by providing diversified training</td>
<td>• Remittances by female migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programme and one-stop migration services for women</td>
<td>• Number of women overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Skills training for both domestic and international markets for men/women, but</td>
<td>• Enrolment rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>especially women and disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>• Size of skilled labour force,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Employment generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Income generation</td>
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</table>

Source: Bangladesh PRSP (2005)

However, in other countries the picture is much more patchy. For example, in Laos (2004) and Albania (2008), indicators relate only to reductions in the trafficking of women; whilst in Bosnia & Herzegovina (2004), Cape Verde (2005) and the Kyrgyz Republic (2007) there are no M&E indicators directly related to migration.

**Conclusion: is migration integrated into national development?**

This paper has focused on the integration of migration issues into national development, as seen through the lens of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The evidence cited suggests that many PRSPs include reference to migration, although claims that such attention is increasing are not easy to substantiate. What is clear, however, is that in so far as there has been a ‘paradigm shift’ in the way that migration and development linkages are dealt with in academic and international policy circles, there is little evidence of this shift in PRSPs. With the exception of attention to
the contribution of remittances to development – itself poorly referenced or substantiated – most PRSPs continue to focus on how a lack of development stimulates migration, and/or on negative consequences of migration for development, especially internal migration.

In addition, in relation to international migration, there remains something of a disjuncture between ‘analysis’ of how migration and development might be linked, and policies designed to promote a positive link between migration and development. Specifically, although the major positive feature of international migration is seen as workers’ remittances, policies to promote these or steer them to development outcomes remain highly limited. With few exceptions, policies on other issues – engagement with diasporas, or the development of urban planning to cope with rural-urban migration – are also poorly developed. Indeed, although PRSPs are supposed themselves to be in part about decentralising donor funding to local level (Craig and Porter 2003), hardly any migration and development policies referred to in PRSPs are articulated as this level.

In particular, relatively few PRSPs discuss the positive development impacts of internal migration, even though it has been shown to be the most important type of migration for poor people. This represents a major shortcoming of PRSPs’ treatment of the migration-development nexus. In the case of PRSPs in sub-Saharan Africa, the overwhelming focus in this area is on undertaking rural development projects aimed at stemming rural-urban migration flows. In many cases, improvements in rural infrastructure may be sorely needed – yet this approach is doubly flawed, as it ignores the importance of internal migration as a livelihood strategy for the poor, as well the fact that increased mobility may be a natural product of rural development measures.

One obvious question arising from this analysis is to ask why this should be so – why do PRSPs apparently deal so weakly with migration and development, adopting little of the ‘new paradigm’ that has emerged in higher-level policy reports? In part, this may reflect the apparent lack of involvement of migrant and diaspora groups in the development of PRSPs – given that reference to such involvement is made in only two of the PRSPs reviewed in this study. It also certainly reflects the complexity of migration and associated issues, the political sensitivity of the topic, and the wide area of potential policy debate. It is also probably true that empirical evidence on
the relationship between migration and development in many poor countries remains limited, or at least inaccessible to those involved in the PRSP process.

However, it is also important to note the limitations of a focus on PRSPs. For example, although in principle these represent consensus documents, with ‘buy-in’ from both government and civil society, and onward links to government spending priorities, in practice, who writes them, why, and how they are connected to real policy measures is highly varied. It has also been argued that PRSPs obscure power relations, local political economies and sectoral local opportunities (Craig & Porter 2003), and as such represent only a partial view on development; worse, they are regarded by some analysts simply as a failure (Morrison & Singer 2007).

In addition, there is something of a lack of correspondence between poor countries’ policies as recorded in PRSPs, and those reported by the UN Population Division in one of the few comparable global reviews of national policies on migration. Thus the UN’s *International Migration 2006* wall-chart records countries’ policy positions on emigration and return, categorising countries as to whether they seek to ‘raise’, ‘maintain’ or ‘lower’ emigration and return, or have a policy of ‘no intervention’. Of the 59 countries for which PRSPs are reviewed in this paper, five are recorded by the UN as having a policy objective to raise emigration, eight to maintain emigration levels, and 13 to lower them. Yet in 14 of these 26 countries, there is no clear policy objective mentioned in the PRSP. Similarly, there are 19 countries whose most recent PRSP gives a clear indication of whether the policy objective is to increase, maintain or lower emigration, yet eight of these countries are recorded by the UN as having a policy of ‘no intervention’. The difference between the two is slightly less pronounced for return policies, although even here, ten out of 27 countries reported by the UN as having a policy to promote return do not report such a policy in their PRSP.

All of this means that a search for examples of ‘good practice’ of the incorporation of migration and development concerns in national development through analysis of PRSPs is far from easy. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of migration and development linkages consistent

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52 Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam, Yemen
53 Albania, Cape Verde, Chad, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan
54 Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Benin, Bhutan, Ghana, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Mali, Serbia, Zambia
with the ‘new paradigm’ outlined in this paper is Bangladesh, although the most recent PRSPs for Albania, the Kyrgyz Republic and Sri Lanka also deal substantively with migration-development linkages in a fairly broad way (see Boxes 1-3).

Amongst sub-Saharan African countries, there is no single example of ‘best practice’, although there are some positive signs, most of which revolve around international migration – through acknowledgement of the role remittances can play in poverty reduction; the prospect of return/circular migration of, or knowledge transfer with, skilled expatriates; and attempts to attract development investments from wealthy members of the diaspora. However, there remains a substantial task both to improve the evidence base for such observations, and to translate these observations into practical policy measures.

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