The Role of Search Engine Optimization in Search Rankings

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Abstract

Web sites invest significant resources in trying to influence their visibility in online search results. We study the economic incentives of Web sites to invest in this process known as search engine optimization. We focus on methods that improve sites’ ranking among the search results without affecting their quality. We find that the process is equivalent to an all-pay auction with noise and headstarts. Our results show that in equilibrium, under certain conditions, some positive level of search engine optimization improves the search engine’s ranking and thus the satisfaction of its visitors. In particular, if the quality of sites coincides with their valuation for visitors then search engine optimization serves as a mechanism that improves the ranking by correcting measurement errors. While this benefits consumers and search engines, sites participating in search engine optimization could be worse off unless their valuation for traffic is very high. We also investigate how search engine optimization affects sites’ investment in content and find that it can lead to underinvestment as a result of wasteful spending on search engine optimization.
1 Introduction

Search engine marketing is becoming a dominant form of online advertising. By utilizing search marketing, Web sites that wish to advertise online can reach consumers at the point when they search for a specific keyword. This makes such locations valuable to advertisers who can compete for appearing on the search results page. Most of the search engines allow web sites to submit bids for their so called sponsored links and generally the highest bidders win the most visible links, usually on the top of the list. In this “official” way of search advertising, sites get access to the right side\(^1\) of the search results page.

Many advertisers, however, try to find their way to the top of the organic results list instead of (or in addition to) competing for sponsored links. The collection of different actions that a site can take to improve its position on the organic list is called search engine optimization (SEO). This can be either done by making the site more relevant for consumers, or by investing in different techniques that affect the search engine’s quality ranking process. These two types of SEO techniques are sometimes referred to as white hat SEO and black hat SEO respectively. The important difference is that the latter type only improves the ranking of a site among search results without affecting its quality, whereas the former type changes the site’s ranking by improving its content and by increasing visitors satisfaction. In the rest of the paper we use SEO to refer to the latter type of activities. These activities include techniques of creating external links to the site or changing the html source of the site’s pages to influence the outcome of the automatic process that the search engine uses to evaluate each site’s relevance.

Our goal is to investigate the economics of the SEO process and its effects on consumers, advertisers and search engines. We introduce a model of the SEO process as an all-pay auction of link slots by a search engine to websites. The search engine’s goal is to improve consumer welfare by displaying the most relevant links to visitors, who judge a site’s quality by the relevance of its content. The mechanism used is an asymmetric all-pay auction in which sites can invest to improve their rankings without improving their quality. Our model diverges from traditional rent seeking analysis in two components. First, the existence of noise in the scoring mechanism of the auctioneer results in suboptimal slot allocations when SEO is not allowed. Second,

\(^1\)In some cases the search engine displays sponsored links on top of the organic results as well.
asymmetries among the different sites yield scoring headstarts for each site during the auction. These asymmetries stem from the difference in intrinsic qualities among sites, as well as from the different valuation each site places on visits by consumers.

We find that under certain conditions black hat SEO can be advantageous to the search engine and increases consumer welfare in equilibrium. In particular, if sites’ valuation for traffic is aligned with their relevance for consumers then the search engine is better off when allowing some positive level of SEO than when discouraging SEO. If, on the other hand, there are sites with high valuation for visits, but low relevance for visiting consumers, then SEO is generally detrimental to the search engine and consumer welfare. An example of such a “bad” site, which we call a spam site, is a site that advertises products for a very low price to lure visitors, but later on uses the visitors’ credit card details for fraudulent activities2.

Search engines typically take a strong stance against black hat SEO and consider it cheating (see Google’s remarks about SEO). In some cases they entirely remove sites that are caught conducting such activities from the organic list3. Search engines can also invest significant amounts in reducing the effectiveness of certain SEO activities4. To justify their position, search engines typically claim that allowing for SEO lowers the quality of ranked websites. To analyze this claim, we further investigate how SEO affects investment in content. We find that high effectiveness of SEO might result in underinvestment in content when creating content is relatively expensive.

Despite the apparent importance of the topic there has been very little research done on search engine optimization. At the same time, search engine optimization has grown to become a multi-billion dollar business5. Many papers have focused on the sponsored side of the search page and some on the interaction between the two lists. In all of these cases, however, the ranking of a website in the organic list is given as exogenous, and the possibility of investing in SEO is ignored. One puzzling message that search engines convey is that the auction mechanism for sponsored links

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2 Researchers estimate Benczur et al. (2008) that 10-20% of Web sites constitute spam.
3 BBC News reported that Google has blacklisted BMW.de for breaching its guidelines. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4685750.stm
4 In response to Google’s regular updates of its search algorithm, different sites shuffle up and down wildly in its search rankings. This phenomenon, which happens two or three times a year is called the “Google Dance” by search professionals who give names to these events as they do for hurricanes (see “Dancing with Google’s spiders”, The Economist, March 9, 2006).
5 See the survey conducted by seomoz.com at http://www.seomoz.org/dp/seo-industry-survey-results.
ensures that the best advertisers will obtain the links of highest quality, resulting in higher social and consumer welfare. The comparison is done, however, with respect to random search lists, while it is obvious that organic search results are not random. Is not the case of SEO similar? If the most resourceful sites are the ones providing the best links, why not let them invest in improving their rankings? To explore this question we introduce the notion of an ordered search list. By comparing consumer welfare resulting from searching on different lists, the efficiency of a ranking mechanism can be measured, and different forms of displaying search results can be compared.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes a simplified model of the search process when a search engine displays a single result in response to a search query. We examine how the SEO game affects content investment in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 generalizes our model in several ways to show that our main results are robust, and introduces the notion of an ordered results list for comparison among search ranking mechanisms.

2 Relevant Literature

The advent of online advertising technologies and the rapid growth of the industry led to an increase in the volume of research dedicated to this phenomenon. Works such as those by Rutz and Bucklin (2007) and Ghose and Yang (2009) focus on consumer response to search advertising and the different characteristics that impact advertising efficiency. Another major stream of research, including works by Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) focus mostly on the auction mechanism used by the different search engines to allocate their advertising slots. More recent examples, such as those by Chen and He (2006), Athey and Ellison (2009) and Aggarwal et al. (2008) analyze models that include both consumers and advertisers as active players. A number of recent papers study the interplay between the organic list and the sponsored link. Katona and Sarvary (2010) show that the top organic sites may not have an incentive to bid for sponsored links. Xu et al. (2009) and White (2009) study how the search engine’s advertising revenue from the sponsored links is affected through the organic listings.

Little attention was given to search engine optimization, although the use of SEO techniques is common practice among companies dealing with search marketing. The work of Xing and Lin (2006) resembles ours the most by defining “algorithm quality”
and “algorithm robustness” to describe the search engine’s ability to identify relevant websites and eliminate non-relevant ones. Their paper shows that when advertisers’ valuation for organic links is high enough, providers of SEO services are profitable, while search engines’ profits suffer. Considering our result that using SEO can improve consumer welfare under noisy conditions, these results complement ours in explaining why search engines invest efforts in fighting SEO. An earlier work by Sen (2005) develops a theoretical model that examines the optimal strategy of mixing between investing in SEO and buying ad placements. The model surprisingly shows that SEO should not exist as part of an equilibrium strategy.

A primary feature of our model is the use of an all-pay auction to describe the game websites are playing when competing for a location on a search engine’s organic results list. A rent seeking process such as this is similar to the process of lobbying and other processes described and analyzed in Hillman and Riley (1987) and other works. An extension of the all-pay model to multiple players and multiple items is analyzed in Barut and Kovenock (1998), Baye et al. (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). For a survey of the literature on contests under different information conditions and contest success functions, see Konrad (2007).

Our use of all-pay auctions takes into account initial asymmetries among sites resulting from measurement error and different website qualities. The different qualities, measured as a relevance measure for consumers translate into a headstart in the initial score calculated by the search engine to determine the auction winners. The existence of such a headstart, which in many cases is analogous to differences in abilities of the players, results in different equilibria as described in Kirkegaard (2009) and analyzed under more general conditions in Siegel (2009). Our application is unique in that it considers the cases where the initial headstart is biased by noise inherent in the quality measurement process. Krishna (2007) is one of the few examples taking noise into consideration in an auction setting. This noise is the main reason for the initially inefficient allocation of organic link slots, which can be corrected by allowing for SEO.

3 Model

A search engine (SE) is a website that provides the following service to its visitors: they enter queries (search phrases) into a search form and the SE returns a number of
results for this query displaying them in an ordered list. This list contains a number of
to other websites in the order of the relevance of their content for the given search
phrase. In our model, we focus on a single keyword and we assume that the relevance,
or quality, of a search result is essentially the probability that a consumer is satisfied
with the site once clicking on the link\(^6\). We further assume that, for the purpose of
ordering the search results, the SE’s objective is to maximize the expected consumer
satisfaction\(^7\) hence its goal is to present the most relevant results to its visitors, and
its utility is equal to the expected satisfaction level of consumers.

In order to rank websites, the search engine uses information gathered from crawling
algorithms and data mining methods on the Internet. Let \(q_i\) denote the relevance of
site \(i\) in the context of a given keyword. It is reasonable to assume that the search
engine can only measure quality with an error, and cannot observe it directly. The
initial quality score that the SE assigns to a site \(i\) is thus \(s_i^S = q_i + \sigma \varepsilon_i\), where \(\varepsilon_i\) are
assumed to be independent and are drawn from the same distribution. If the Web sites
do not take any action the results will be ordered according to the \(s_i^S\)’s as assigned by
the search engine. If, however, Web sites can invest in SEO, they have the option to
influence their position after observing the initial scores. The effectiveness of SEO is
measured by the parameter \(\alpha\) in the following way. If site \(i\) invests \(b_i\) in SEO, its final
score becomes \(s_i^F = s_i^S + \alpha b_i\). That is, depending on the effectiveness of SEO, sites
can influence their scores which determines their final location in the organic list of
search results. We assume that there are \(n\) websites providing information or products
to consumers and that those sites derive some utility from the visiting consumers. The
sites’ profits primarily depend on their traffic. We assume that site \(i\) derives utility
\(v_i(t)\) of having \(t\) customers click its link in a given time period.

The behavior of the unit mass of consumers in our model is relatively simple. If
consumers are presented with one link, they click on it, and are satisfied with proba-
bility \(q_i\), receiving a utility normalized to 1 if satisfied. If there are \(k > 1\) links, the
consumers traverse the list of links in a sequential order. When a consumer is satisfied
with the site visited, the searching ends. When a consumer is dissatisfied with a site

\(^{\dagger}\)Modeling consumer satisfaction as a 0-1 variable is relatively simple, but captures the essence. In
Section 5 we will discuss alternative formulations where \(q_i\) is the average utility that a consumer gains
after clicking on link \(i\).

\(^{\ddagger}\)Since providing these results is typically the search engines core service to consumers its reputation
and long term profits strongly depend on the quality of this service.

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visited, he continues to the next link with probability $c_i$. We provide full details of the search sequence by consumers in Section 6.2 dealing with multiple search results.

The sequence of the game is as following. First the search engine measures the relevance of each website and publishes $s^S_i = q_i + \sigma \varepsilon_i$. Next, the websites, after observing $s^S_i$, simultaneously decide how much they want to invest in SEO, changing the scores to $s^F_i = s^S_i + \alpha \cdot b_i$. The search engine then recalculates the scores and displays an ordered list of search results sorted in a decreasing order of the final site scores $s^F_i$. Finally, visitors click on the results according to their order until being satisfied, and payoffs are realized at the end. Our assumption on the timing of the above events is somewhat simplistic, but it is the most plausible way of capturing Web sites’ reactions to their ranking results and their subsequent investment in SEO.

We start our analysis by examining a simple case that illustrates the main forces governing SEO. In this case, we assume that there is one organic link displayed on the SE ($k = 1$) and that there are two bidders ($n = 2$) with $q_1 > q_2$. We then generalize to the case of $n > 2$ sites, and multiple $k > 1$ links. To illustrate the effect of SEO we also compare the equilibrium case to one in which sites can choose to invest in improving their content, thus increasing their quality $q_i$.

## 4 SEO Equilibrium - One link

We assume that there is one organic link, and that the utility sites derive from incoming traffic is linear in traffic, such that $v_i(t) = v_i t$ and $v_1 > v_2$. Since there is a unit mass of consumers that click on the link displayed in the search result, the valuation that sites have for the appearing on the list is $v_1$ and $v_2$, respectively. We set the distribution of $\varepsilon_i$ to take the value of either 1 or $-1$ with equal probabilities. We assume $\sigma > |q_1 - q_2|/2$ to ensure that the error can affect the ordering of sites.

First, as a benchmark, let us examine the case in which there is no search engine optimization possible, i.e. when $\alpha = 0$. In this case sites cannot influence their position among the search results. The SE’s expected utility is then $\frac{3}{4}q_1 + \frac{1}{4}q_2$. The effect of the error in the SE’s measurement process is clear. With a certain probability (1/4 in this case), the order will be suboptimal leading to a drop in expected utility compared to the first best case of $q_1$.

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8Otherwise the order remains the same and the setup is equivalent to one with no error
When search engine optimization is effective, i.e., when \( \alpha > 0 \), websites have a tool to influence the order of results. The ability to influence, however, is typically asymmetric, since sites have different starting scores \( s^S_i \). A site that is in the first position in the SE’s initial ranking has a headstart and hence can remain the first even if it invests less in SEO than its competitor. Another characteristic of the game sites play is that their SEO investment is sunk no matter what the outcome of the game is. That is, sites essentially participate in an all-pay auction with headstarts (Kirkegaard 2009). These games are generalizations of basic all-pay auctions without a headstart. In these auctions players submit bids for an object that they have different valuations for. The player with the highest bid wins the object, but all players have to pay their bid to the auctioneer (hence the “all-pay auction” term). If players have headstarts then the winner is the player with the highest sum of bid plus headstart.

The level of headstarts depends in our model on the starting scores and hence on the error. For example, if \( q_1 > q_2 \) and \( \varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2 = 1 \), the error does not affect the order nor the difference between the starting scores and the headstart of site 1 is \( \frac{q_1 - q_2}{\alpha} \). As the size of the headstart decreases with \( \alpha \), the more effective SEO is, the less the initial difference in scores matters. Even if site 1 is more relevant than site 2, it is not always the case that it has a headstart. If \( \varepsilon_1 = -1 \) and \( \varepsilon_2 = 1 \) then \( s^S_1 = q_1 - \sigma < s^S_2 = q_2 + \sigma \) given our assumption on the lower bound on \( \sigma \). Thus, player 2 has a headstart of \( \frac{q_2 + 2\sigma - q_1}{\alpha} \). By analyzing the outcome of the all-pay auction given the starting scores, we can determine the expected utility of the SE and the websites.

All-pay auctions with complete information typically do not have pure-strategy Nash-equilibria, but the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is very intuitive. In a simple auction with two players (with valuations \( v_1 > v_2 \)) both players mix between 0 and \( v_2 \) with different distributions\(^9\). The player with the higher valuation (player 1) wins with the higher probability: \( v_1/2v_2 \) and the other player’s surplus is 0. Thus, only the player with the highest valuation makes a positive profit in expectation, but the chance of winning gives an incentive to the other player to submit positive bids. In the case of an all-pay auction with headstarts the equilibrium is very similar and the player with the highest sum of valuation plus headstart wins with higher probability and the other player’s expected surplus is 0. The winner’s expected surplus is equal to the sum of differences in valuations and headstarts.

\(^9\)See the Appendix for detailed bidding distributions.
4.1 The effect of SEO on efficiency and consumer welfare

To examine the outcomes of the SEO game, we use $E(\alpha) = E(\alpha; \sigma, v_1, v_2, q_1, q_2)$ to denote the efficiency of the auction. In this case it is simply the probability that the player with the more relevant link wins the auction (that is, player 1). Note that the efficiency coincides with the search engine’s objective function as it wants the more relevant link to come up first. The payoff of the search engine is a linear function of the efficiency:

$$\pi_{SE} = q_2 + (q_1 - q_2)E(\alpha)$$

If there is no SEO, that is when $\alpha = 0$ (and $\sigma > |q_1 - q_2|/2$), we have $E(0) = 3/4$. Our goal is therefore to determine whether the efficiency exceeds this value for positive $\alpha$, SEO effectiveness levels. It is useful, however, to begin with analyzing how the efficiency depends on valuations and qualities for given $\alpha$ and $\sigma$ values. The following Lemma summarizes our initial results.

**Lemma 1** For any fixed $\alpha$ and $\sigma$, $E(\alpha; \sigma, v_1, v_2, q_1, q_2)$ is increasing in $v_1$ and $q_1$ and is decreasing in $v_2$ and $q_2$.

Thus, the efficiency of the ranking increases when the most relevant site becomes even more relevant and also when its valuation for clicks increases. When there is not SEO, that is $\alpha = 0$, the Lemma holds because the efficiency simply does not change with $v_1, v_2, q_1, q_2$, but when $\alpha > 0$ the efficiency strictly increases and decreases in the respective variables. In essence the Lemma tells us that no matter how effective SEO is, the less sites valuations are aligned with their relevance levels, the less efficient the rankings are.

The following proposition summarizes the main result of our paper, showing how SEO affects the efficiency of the ranking.

**Proposition 1**

1. For any $\sigma > |q_1 - q_2|/2$, there exists a positive $\hat{\alpha} = \hat{\alpha}(\sigma, v_1, v_2, q_1, q_2)$ SEO effectiveness level such that $E(\hat{\alpha}) \geq E(0)$.

2. If $v_1/v_2 > 3/2$ then for any $\sigma > |q_1 - q_2|/2$, there exists a positive $\hat{\alpha} = \hat{\alpha}(\sigma, v_1, v_2, q_1, q_2)$ such that $E(\hat{\alpha}) > E(0)$. 

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3. There always exist $\bar{\sigma}$ and $\bar{\alpha}$ such that $E(\bar{\alpha}; \bar{\sigma}, v_1, v_2, q_1, q_2) > E(0; \bar{\sigma}, v_1, v_2, q_1, q_2)$.

The first part of the proposition tells us that for any level of error there is a positive level of SEO that does not reduce the efficiency of the ranking. Practically, if the level of SEO is not too high then firms will not invest enough to alter the rankings.

The latter parts yield more interesting results. Essentially, they show that positive levels of search engine optimization do improve the efficiency of the ranking in some cases. When high quality sites value visitors relatively high compared to lower quality sites, SEO is beneficial to both the search engine and consumers regardless of the level of error. If valuations are closer to each other or if valuations are misaligned with qualities, then this only holds for small levels of error.

The intuition is as follows. The SEO mechanism favors bidders with high valuations. Since the SE cannot perfectly measure site qualities, this mechanism corrects some of the error when valuations increase monotonically in quality. When lower quality sites have high valuation for traffic, however, SEO creates incentives that are not compatible with the utilities of consumers or the search engine. In this latter case, the high valuation sites which are not relevant can get ahead by investing in SEO. Examples are cases of “spammer” sites that mislead consumers. In these cases consumers do not gain any utility from visiting such sites, but the sites may profit from consumer visits. Arguably, such cases of misalignment are rare, since sites that make more money from their visitors can afford to offer higher quality content.

The fact the SE is better off allowing some positive level of SEO does not clarify what the optimal level of SEO is. In particular, how does it depend on the variance of the measurement error? To answer this, let $\hat{A}(\sigma)$ denote the set of $\alpha$ SEO effectiveness levels that maximize the search engine’s utility function. For two sets $A_1 \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ and $A_2 \subseteq \mathbb{R}$, we say that $A_1 \succeq A_2$ if and only if for any $\alpha_1 \in A_1$ there is an $\alpha_2 \in A_2$ such that $\alpha_2 \leq \alpha_1$ and for any $\alpha'_2 \in A_2$ there is an $\alpha'_1 \in A_1$ such that $\alpha'_1 \geq \alpha'_2$.

**Corollary 1** If $v_1/v_2 > 3/2$, then the optimal SEO effectiveness is increasing as the variance of the measurement error increases. In particular, for any $\sigma_1 > \sigma_2 > 0$, we have $\hat{A}(\sigma_1) \succeq \hat{A}(\sigma_2)$.

We have already shown that SEO can be beneficial because it can serve as a mechanism correcting the search engine’s error when measuring how relevant sites are. The
above corollary tells us that if the error is higher more effective SEO is required to correct the error.

4.2 The effect of SEO on advertiser profits

When there is a positive level of SEO effectiveness, sites have a natural incentive to invest in SEO, which they do not have when $\alpha = 0$. In the extreme case of $\alpha \to \infty$ the difference in initial scores dissipates and the game becomes a regular all-pay auction. If, for example, $v_1 > v_2$ then player 1’s expected payoff is $v_1 - v_2$, whereas player 2 makes nothing in expectation. Comparing this to the case in which there is no SEO - player 2 making $v_2/4$ and player 1 making $3v_1/4$ - reveals that player 2 is worse off with SEO whereas player 1 is better off iff $v_1 > 4v_2$. This implies that high levels of SEO only increase profits for sites with outstanding valuations. The following corollary provides detailed results on the sites’ payoffs.

Corollary 2

1. If $v_1 > v_2$ then Player 2’s payoff is decreasing in $\alpha$.

2. If $v_1 > v_2$ there always exists an $\alpha^* > 0$ such that Player 1 is better off with an SEO effectiveness level of $\alpha = \alpha^*$ than with $\alpha = 0$. If $v_1 > 4v_2$ or $\sigma < \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{v_2}$ then Player 1 is strictly better off.

The player with the lower valuation is therefore worse off with higher SEO. Player 1, on the other hand, is better off with a certain positive level of SEO, especially if its valuation is much higher than its competitor’s and if the measurement error is small. The intuition from the former follows from the fact that higher levels of SEO emphasize the differences in valuations, and the higher the difference the more likely that the higher valuation wins. For the latter condition, smaller measurement errors make it easier for the player with the higher starting score to win and to take advantage of SEO. The corollary shows that the player with the higher valuation is generally happy with some positive level of SEO, but further analysis (see the proof) suggests that it is not clear whether Player 1 or the search engine prefer a higher level of SEO.
5 Investing in Quality of Content and SEO

So far we have focused on the investment that sites can make to improve their ranking without affecting their relevance. We now consider the possibility that before investing in SEO, sites can make an investment that improves their quality of content and therefore the relevance of the link that the search engine is considering to display. We extend the game and add a content investment stage before the SEO stage. In this first round, sites can decide how much they want to spend on improving their quality of content and given these quality levels they decide how much to invest in SEO as in Section 4. All other assumptions are the same: two sites are competing for one organic link. Let $c$ denote the marginal cost of increasing quality\(^{10}\).

Before exploring the details of this setup let us discuss how we define quality of content. In our basic setup $q_i$ was simply the probability of a visitor clicking on a link being satisfied with the content she finds. Here, we treat quality in a more general way by assuming that $q_i$ is the expected utility a consumer derives by clicking on site $i$’s link. Note that if consumer satisfaction is a $0−1$ variable then the expected utility is equal to the probability of satisfaction. There are two ways how an investment in content quality could affect sites in the SEO stage. First, it increases the chance of the link being displayed on the top of the organic list by the search engine, with or without SEO. Second, it can change sites valuation of visitors. In our basic setup $v$ denotes the valuation for the link, but given that the search engine has a unit mass of visitors that all click on the first link, this is strictly proportional to the average profit per individual visitor that the sites makes (including both satisfied and non-satisfied visitors). It is reasonable to assume that an investment in the quality of content increases this quantity by improving customer satisfaction levels. Therefore the investment can also increase the valuation of the site getting the top link. We first ignore this effect and focus on the case in which valuation is not affected by the quality investment.

\(^{10}\)We assume that content costs are linearly increasing, however, a convex cost function would yield similar results
5.1 Fixed Valuations

Here, we solve a game in which sites’ valuations for getting in the top position is fixed and not affected by the quality investment. As a benchmark, let us consider the case when there is no SEO, i.e. $\alpha = 0$. For simplicity we also assume that $\sigma = 0$, that is, there is no measurement error. Then the game becomes a one-shot game, essentially an all-pay auction, where the winner gets all the benefits. As we mentioned before, these games do not have pure-strategy equilibria, but the mixed strategy equilibria are very intuitive. The site with the higher valuation (e.g. player 1) wins the auction with a higher probability $(1 - v_2/2v_1)$ and has an expected payoff of $v_1 - v_2$, whereas the other player had an expected payoff 0. To make the analysis simple, we examine the case when $v_1 = v_2 = v$. In this case the players win with equal probability, make 0 payoff and each invest $v/2c$ in expectation.

Now let us examine the case in which sites first have the option of investing in content, then in SEO. The exhaustive description of the equilibria would be too complex, therefore we focus on the symmetric sub-game perfect equilibria with pure strategies in the first stage. This allows us to point out the differences that the content investment stage makes without determining all the mixed strategy equilibria.

Proposition 2 The only possible equilibria with pure strategies in the first stage is the one in which sites do not invest in content but will invest in SEO and earn an expected payoff of $\min(\sigma/2\alpha, v/4)$. The above mentioned is an equilibrium if and only if ($c > \frac{v\alpha - 5\sigma}{2v\alpha - 4\sigma} \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha}$ and $\sigma < v\alpha/4$) or ($c > \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha}$ and $v\alpha/4 \leq \sigma < v\alpha/2$) or ($c > \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha}$ and $v\alpha/2 \leq \sigma$).

Generally, if the cost of investing in content is high relative to the effectiveness of SEO then sites will give up on their investments in quality and instead will focus on search engine optimization. Note that this critical cost level is decreasing in SEO effectiveness, therefore the more effective search engine optimization is the more likely that sites will not improve their content. In all the cases if $c > 1/\alpha$ then we get the no investment equilibrium. Since the inverse of SEO effectiveness is essentially its cost we obtain the result that if content is more expensive than SEO then sites will not invest in it$^{11}$. If content costs are low then sites will naturally improve their content, but there

\footnote{Note that this is not a binding condition. The Proposition shows that in many cases even if content is cheaper than SEO sites will not in it.}
are generally no equilibria with pure strategies in the first stage. The intuition behind the results is straightforward. If the cost of content is high compared to SEO then sites will not attempt to get a headstart for the SEO game, they will instead compete with their SEO investments directly. If, on the other hand, content costs are low, they may engage in investing in content to get a headstart for the SEO game, where they do not have to invest heavily. We do not explore in detail what happens if $c$ is low because of the complexity of the game. There are certainly no equilibria with pure strategies in the first case, but the game becomes similar to an all-pay auction where, presumably, an equilibrium in mixed strategies exist with positive expected content investment.

5.2 Valuations Increasing with Quality

We proceed with analyzing the case when an investment in content also increases sites' valuation for the top link. There are several possible functional forms to capture this relationship. We employ the most parsimonious form by assuming that $v_i = \underline{v} + q_i m$, where $\underline{v}$ and $m$ are site-independent positive parameters. $\underline{v}$ can be interpreted as the sites' baseline valuation of customers, whereas $m$ corresponds to the margin gained on a satisfied customers.

**Proposition 3** When $v_i = \underline{v} + q_i m$, the only possible equilibria with pure strategies in the first stage is the one in which sites do not invest in content. The above mentioned is an equilibrium if $c > \frac{1}{\alpha} + m$).

These results are very similar to that of the case with fixed valuations in that if content quality is expensive enough then sites will forfeit the opportunity of investing in it. An important difference is that since the quality investment will also change valuations, sites will take that into account when comparing its costs to SEO. It is useful to note that the critical value for $c$ above which this happens is generally decreasing and often lower than $\frac{1}{\alpha} + m$. Therefore the more effective SEO sites expect in the second stage the more reluctant they will be to invest in content because of anticipating the wasteful spending on SEO.

In summary, this sections results highlight that search engines should be careful when allowing some level of SEO activity to take advantage of its forces that improve the ranking, because at the same time it could discourage sites from investing in content, hurting consumer satisfaction in the long run.
6 Model Generalizations

6.1 Single link, multiple sites and arbitrary error distribution

In this section we show that our main results are robust under more general assumptions. First, we relax the assumption on the distribution of the search engine’s measurement error and allow more than two sites to compete for one organic link. We assume that there are \( n \) websites that are considered by the search engine for inclusion in the organic list (consisting of one link) with \( q_1 > q_2 > \ldots > q_n \). All the other assumptions are identical to those in Section 4. Regarding the error \( \varepsilon_i \), we allow its distribution to be arbitrary with a mean of zero and a finite variance normalized to 1. Similarly to Section 4, we assume that the error is large enough that it makes a difference, that is, we assume that \( \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2 \) can take a value of less than \( q_2 - q_1 \) with positive probability. The following proposition shows that even in this case SEO can improve the efficiency of the auction if the valuations of the most relevant sites are high enough.

**Proposition 4** For any \( \sigma \) there exist a \( \hat{v}(\sigma) > v_2 \) and an \( \hat{\alpha}(\sigma) > 0 \) such that if \( v_1 > \hat{v} \) and \( v_2 > v_i \) for every \( i \geq 3 \) then \( E(\hat{\alpha}) > E(0) \).

This result generalizes our results in Proposition 1. If the valuations of the two most relevant sites are high enough then the rest of the sites are in double disadvantage due to the low starting scores and their lower valuations. This will lead to only the first two sites investing in SEO for high enough effectiveness levels. The competition of these two sites is similar to that in Section 4: If the error does not reverse their starting scores compared to their true relevance, then site 1 has a high chance to win keeping the right order. If, however, the ranking is reversed due to the error then although site 2 might have a good chance to get into the first position, for high SEO effectiveness levels the higher valuation of site 1 limits this probability.

6.2 Multiple links

The case of multiple links showing multiple sites on the search results page requires an analysis of consumer behavior and welfare when presented with such a list. Suppose the search engine assigns \( n \) websites with qualities \( q_1 > q_2 > \ldots > q_n \) to \( n \) links, and presents an ordered list to consumers. If the bidding actions of sites were fully
observable, an optimally designed assignment mechanism would allow the search engine
to sort the list according to the order statistics of site qualities. Previous research
by Athey and Ellison (2009) and Chen and He (2006) show that consumer surplus
increases when presented with a fully sorted list compared to a randomly ordered list,
while Aggarwal et al. (2008) show that under a Markovian consumer search model,
similar monotonic click probabilities arise in the optimal assignment.

The ranked list produced by the search engine in the SEO game is different in two
important manners. First, the fact that the search engine has errors in its calculation
of scores inhibits its ability to fully rank sites according to their qualities, and second,
when SEO is not effective ($\alpha = 0$), the resulting list is not completely random.

Formally, we define a structure on ordered lists that allows a measurement of their
distance from being optimally sorted. Let $q^{[k]}$ denote the $k$’th order statistic of the
$n$ site qualities. An ordered list of $n$ items is a collection of $n$ random variables
$Q = (f_1, \ldots, f_n)$. The variable $f_j$ contains the distribution of quality order statistics
appearing in location $j$ in the list. In a completely random list, for example, $f_j(q^{[k]}) =
1/n$ for every $j$ and $k$, while in a fully sorted list, which we denote $Q^S$, $f_j^S(q^{[k]}) = 1$ for
$j = k$ and zero otherwise.

When SEO is not effective in our game, the distribution of scores for each site has
a different mean, where sites with higher qualities have higher score means, and thus
higher probability of appearing higher on the ranked list. The result is that the initial
ordered list displayed by the search engine in not completely random. When SEO is
effective, however, more relevant sites have an even higher probability of appearing
higher on the ranked list, as is shown below. The result is an ordered list that is, in
a sense, closer to the first best fully sorted list, but can never match it because of the
noisy process. A common claim in the literature is that sponsored link auctions improve
social and consumer welfare tremendously. We believe the benchmark case for such
auctions should not be randomly ordered lists, but rather lists resulting from organic
search rankings. Given these lists are not random, the change in welfare decreases. We
leave exploration of the magnitude of this welfare change for further research.

The structural representation of ordered lists allows for a comparison of two lists
according to their distance from the fully sorted list in terms of the expected consumer
surplus generated by a search on each list. The actual calculation and comparison

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12 We use the convention that $q^{[1]}$ is the highest order statistic
of the surpluses, however, is complex for general distributions of errors, values and qualities. A more natural measure of distance of ordered lists is to sum the sum-square distances of each $f_j$ from the fully sorted $f_j$ for all $j$, yielding

$$\delta = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{l=1}^{n} [f_j(q[l]) - f_j^S(q[l])]^2.$$

We conjecture that lists with a smaller distance measure yield higher expected consumer surplus. In what follows, we use several simplifications to show that consumer surplus increases when SEO is effective.

We assume consumers traverse ordered lists in a sequential manner, starting with the link at location 1. When encountering a link in position $j$, consumers click it and visit the page it leads to, being satisfied with probability $\bar{q}_j = E(f_j)$. If the consumers are not satisfied with the result, they move on to the next link with probability $0 < c_j < 1$, or stop otherwise. The next link is then clicked, and the consumer is satisfied with probability $\bar{q}_{j+1}$ and so forth. The consumer’s expected utility from traversing the first $k$ links is thus

$$E_k(Q) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} [c_j \cdot E(f_j) \cdot Pr(z_1 = \ldots = z_{j-1} = 0)]$$

when $z_j$ is the probability that link $j$ was searched and was found unsatisfying.

The ranking process, followed by the search process, is analogous to the search engine performing a sequential all-pay auction of the links as described in Clark and Riis (1998), where in each stage a single link is auctioned using the game described in section 3, and is presented to the visitor. If the visitor is not satisfied with the result, the winning website of the previous auction is removed from the list of competitors, and the auction of another link commences again. We impose two simplifications to analyze the game. First, we assume that the search engine picks a website to display for link $j$ from $f_j$ independently. This would mean that the case of a website being displayed twice in a ranked search process might happen with some probability. This probability decreases with the SEO effectiveness parameter. Second, we assume that in the auction process for link $j$, only the weights on $q[j]$ and $q[j+1]$ are updated, both for the distribution $f_j$ and the distributions of lower links on the list, $f_{j+1} \ldots f_n$.

Proposition 5 extends our previous results to the multiple links case, and shows that when noise exists in the ranking mechanism, SEO can improve consumer’s welfare:
Proposition 5 Let $Q(\alpha) = (f_1(\alpha), \ldots, f_n(\alpha))$ be the ranked list resulting from $n$ sequential all-pay auctions with effectiveness level $\alpha$, where in auction $j$ the sites with quality scores $q^{[j]}$ and $q^{[j+1]}$ are the sole competitors, then for any $\sigma$ and for any $\varepsilon_i \sim i.i.d(0,\sigma), 1 \leq i \leq n$ there exists a $\Delta_v(\sigma) > 0$ and a positive $\hat{\alpha}(\sigma)$ such that if $v_i > v_{i+1} + \Delta_v(\sigma)$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$ then $E_k(Q(\hat{\alpha})) > E_k(Q(0))$ for every $1 \leq k \leq n$.

An interesting result of our formulation is that consumer welfare increases no matter how many links are searched before stopping. In a fully sorted list, however, assuming that a consumer would always search through the first $k$ links means that any order of the first $k$ links will yield the same consumer welfare, as these are $k$ independent Bernoulli trials. There is significant evidence, however, that a consumer’s probability of visiting a site (also called a click-through-rate, or CTR) is dependent on the site’s location on the ranked list, as well as on other results displayed on the list. Several theoretical models explain this phenomenon, but typically show that the probability of visiting any site is monotonically decreasing in its distance from the top of the list. Using empirical data, Ghose and Yang (2009), Jeziorski and Segal (2009) and others have shown that this dependence is not straightforward, and that CTRs do not necessarily decrease in a monotonic way across a ranked list. Our assumption that consumers flip a coin after unsuccessful searches to decide whether to continue or not consolidates the majority of the evidence with our improved efficiency result.

7 Conclusion

We model search engine optimization as an all-pay auction where sites can invest in improving their search ranking without changing their link’s relevance. We find that some level of SEO can be useful to the search engine, because it acts as a mechanism that improves the rankings by placing sites with high valuations for the links high. In general, if sites’ valuations for consumers are aligned with how consumers value them then SEO is beneficial to both the search engine and consumers. However, sites might be worse off as they carry the extra burden of having to invest in SEO, whereas if search engine optimization does not exist they do not have to make additional effort. We further investigate how the presence of SEO affects sites incentives to invest in quality improvement. We find that if the marginal cost of content is high then sites may underinvest as a consequence of the presence of SEO. This phenomenon of
underinvestment is more likely with higher SEO effectiveness levels.

Our paper has interesting practical implications. Contrary to the popular belief, allowing sites to invest in improving their ranking without improving their relevance can be beneficial to the search engine and the consumers, but can hurt the top sites even if they end up high eventually. Nevertheless, search engines seem to work very hard to reduce the possibility and effectiveness of these investments to zero and to discourage sites from these activities. Our results suggest this is not always necessary and that these activities do not necessarily compromise the results. However, search engines should be careful not to make SEO too effective, so that sites do not invest in SEO instead of content. In this case consumer welfare is hurt in the long run as the funds sites spend on SEO are not transferred to consumers in matters of content improvement.
Appendix

We introduce several notations used in the following proofs. We decompose the final scores of both sites into a headstart $h$ and a bid as follows: $\tilde{s}^F_1 = h + b_1$ and $\tilde{s}^F_2 = b_2$ where $h = \frac{q_1 - q_2}{\alpha}$. The decomposed scores have the property that for every $b_1, b_2$ $\tilde{s}^F_1 \geq \tilde{s}^F_2 \iff s^F_1 \geq s^F_2$ and thus preserve the outcome of the SEO game.

The generic two player all-pay auction with headstarts has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium where player 1 wins the auction with the following probabilities:

\[
W_1(h) = Pr(1 \text{ wins} | h \geq 0) = \begin{cases} 
1 - \frac{v_2}{2v_1} + \frac{h^2}{2v_1v_2} & h \leq v_2 \\
1 - \frac{v_2}{2v_1} + \frac{h}{2v_1} - \frac{v_2 - h}{2v_1v_2} & -v_1 \leq h < v_2 - v_1 \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
W_1(h) = Pr(1 \text{ wins} | h < 0) = \begin{cases} 
0 & b \leq 0 \\
h - v_2 & b \in (0, v_2 - h] \\
h - v_2 - h & b \in (v_2 - h, v_2) \\
1 & b > v_2
\end{cases}
\]

For completeness, we specify the players’ cumulative bidding distributions. When $h$ is positive,

\[
F_1(b) = \begin{cases} 
0 & b \leq 0 \\
h - b & b \in [0, v_2 - h] \\
1 & b > v_2 - h
\end{cases}
\]

\[
F_2(b) = \begin{cases} 
0 & b \leq 0 \\
1 - \frac{b - h}{v_1} & b \in (0, h] \\
1 & b > h
\end{cases}
\]

When $h$ is negative,

\[
F_1(b) = \begin{cases} 
0 & b \leq h \\
1 - \frac{b - h}{v_2} & b \in (h, v_2 + h] \\
1 & b > v_2 + h
\end{cases}
\]

\[
F_2(b) = \begin{cases} 
0 & b \leq 0 \\
1 - \frac{b}{v_1} & b \in (0, v_2] \\
1 & b > v_2
\end{cases}
\]

The value of the headstart is determined by the different realizations of the errors $\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2$. There are four possible realizations with equal probability: $h_1 = h_2 = \frac{q_1 - q_2}{\alpha}, h_3 = \frac{q_1 - q_2 + 2\sigma}{\alpha}$ and $h_4 = \frac{q_1 - q_2 - 2\sigma}{\alpha}$.

Recall, that we use $E(\alpha; \sigma) = E[Pr(1 \text{ wins})]$ to denote the efficiency of the ranking, which matches the search engine’s utility function, with $E(\alpha) = 3/4$ in the benchmark case.

**Proof of Lemma 1:** Since $E(\alpha) = \frac{1}{2}W_1(h_1) + \frac{1}{4}W_1(h_3) + \frac{1}{4}W_1(h_4)$ and the headstart does not depend on $v_1$ and $v_2$, it is enough to show that $W_1(\cdot)$ is increasing in $v_1$ and decreasing in $v_2$. These easily follow from the definition of $W_1(\cdot)$. The results on $q_1$
and \( q_2 \) follow from the fact that \( h_1, h_3, h_4 \) are all increasing in \( q_1 \) and decreasing in \( q_2 \), and \( W_1(\cdot) \) depend on them only through \( h \) in which it is increasing.

\[ \square \]

**Proof of Proposition 1:** We use the notation \( P_i = \Pr(1 \text{ wins}|h_i) \). Given the above described equilibrium of the two-player all-pay auctions we have \( P_i = W_1(h_i) \).

We further define \( \alpha_1 = \frac{q_1 - q_2}{v_2}, \alpha_3 = \frac{q_1 - q_2 + 2\sigma}{v_2}, \alpha_4 = \frac{q_2 - q_1 + 2\sigma}{v_1}, \alpha'_4 = \frac{q_2 - q_1 + 2\sigma}{v_1 - v_2} \). Note that \( P_1 = P_2 \), since the headstarts in the first two case are equal. Thus \( E(\alpha) = \frac{1}{2}P_1 + \frac{1}{4}P_3 + \frac{1}{4}P_4 \), and \( P_1 = 1 \) iff \( \alpha \leq \alpha_1 \), \( P_3 = 1 \) iff \( \alpha \leq \alpha_3 \), \( P_4 = 1 - \frac{\sigma}{2v_1} \) iff \( \alpha \geq \alpha'_4 \).

Furthermore, it is easy to check that \( \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_3, \alpha_4 \leq \alpha_3, \) and \( \alpha_4 \leq \alpha'_4 \).

We proceed by separating the three parts of the proposition:

- **Part 1:** By setting \( \alpha = \alpha_1 \), we have \( P_1 = P_3 = 1 \), and thus \( E(\alpha) \geq 3/4 \forall \sigma \).

- **Part 3:** Similarly to Part 1, we set \( \tilde{\alpha} = \alpha_1 \) and we get \( P_1 = P_3 = 1 \). Then, if \( \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} < \tilde{\sigma} < \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} + \delta \) with a small enough \( \delta > 0 \) then \( P_4 > 0 \) as \( h_4 > -v_1 \), therefore \( E(\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\sigma}) > 3/4 \).

- **Part 2:**

In order to prove this part, we determine the \( \alpha \) value that yields the highest efficiency level for a given \( \sigma \) if \( v_1/v_2 > 3/2 \). As noted above \( E(\alpha) \) is a linear combination of \( W_1(h_1), W_1(h_3), W_1(h_4) \). Since \( W_1(\cdot) \) is continuous and \( h_1, h_3, h_4 \) are all continuous in \( \alpha \), it follows that \( E(\alpha) \) is continuous in \( \alpha \). However, \( E(\alpha) \) is not differentiable everywhere, but there are only a finite number of points where it is not. Therefore it suffices to examine the sign of \( E'(\alpha) \) to determine whether it is increasing or not. This requires tedious analysis, since depending on the value of \( \sigma \) the formula describing \( E(\alpha) \) is different in up to five intervals. We identify five different formulas that \( E(\alpha) \) can take in different intervals and take
their derivatives:

\[
E'(\alpha) = E'_1(\alpha) = \frac{(q_1 - q_2 - 2\sigma)^2}{4\alpha^3v_1v_2} \text{ if } \alpha_4 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_1 \& \alpha'_4,
\]

\[
E'(\alpha) = E'_2(\alpha) = -\frac{(q_1 - q_2)^2}{2\alpha^3v_1v_2} \text{ if } \alpha_1 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_4,
\]

\[
E'(\alpha) = E'_3(\alpha) = -\frac{2(q_1 - q_2)^2 + (q_1 - q_2 - 2\sigma)^2}{4\alpha^3v_1v_2} \text{ if } \alpha_3 \& \alpha_4 \leq \alpha,
\]

\[
E'(\alpha) = E'_4(\alpha) = \frac{4\sigma^2 - (q_1 - q_2)(4\sigma + q_1 - q_2)}{4\alpha^3v_1v_2} \text{ if } \alpha_1 \& \alpha_4 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha'_4,
\]

\[
E'(\alpha) = E'_5(\alpha) = -\frac{(q_1 - q_2)(4\sigma + q_1 - q_2)}{2\alpha^3v_1v_2} \text{ if } \alpha_3 \& \alpha'_4 \leq \alpha.
\]

In any other range the derivative of \(E(\alpha)\) is 0. It is clear from the above formulas that \(E'_1(\alpha)\) is always positive and that \(E'_2(\alpha), E'_3(\alpha),\) and \(E'_5(\alpha)\) are always negative. Furthermore, one can show that

\[
E'_4(\alpha) > 0 \text{ iff } \sigma > \frac{1 + \sqrt{2}}{2}(q_1 - q_2).
\]

This allows us to determine the maximal \(E(\alpha)\) for different values of \(\sigma\) in four different cases.

1. If \(\frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{\frac{1}{v_2} + \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2}}{2}\) then \(\alpha_4 \leq \alpha'_4 \leq \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_3\) and the derivative of \(E(\alpha)\) takes the following values in the five intervals respectively: 0, \(E'_1(\alpha)\), 0, \(E'_2(\alpha), E'_3(\alpha)\). Therefore \(E(\alpha)\) is first constant, then increasing, then constant again and then strictly decreasing. Thus, any value between \(\alpha'_4\) and \(\alpha_1\) maximizes \(E(\alpha)\). Using the notation of Corollary 1, \(\hat{A}(\sigma) = [\alpha'_4, \alpha_1]\).

2. If \(\frac{\frac{1}{v_2} + \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2}}{2} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{\frac{1}{v_2} + \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2}}{2}\) then \(\alpha_4 \leq \alpha_1 \leq \alpha'_4 \leq \alpha_3\) and the derivative of \(E(\alpha)\) takes the following values in the five intervals respectively: 0, \(E'_1(\alpha), E'_4(\alpha), E'_2(\alpha), E'_3(\alpha)\). Therefore \(E(\alpha)\) is first constant, then decreasing, then strictly increasing, then depending on the sign of \(E'_4(\alpha)\) increasing or decreasing, and finally strictly decreasing. Therefore if \(\sigma < \frac{1 + \sqrt{2}}{2}(q_1 - q_2)\) then \(\alpha_1\) maximizes \(E(\alpha)\), that is \(\hat{A}(\sigma) = \{\alpha_1\}\). If \(\sigma = \frac{1 + \sqrt{2}}{2}(q_1 - q_2)\) then \(E(\alpha)\) is constant between \(\alpha_1\) and \(\alpha'_4\), that is \(\hat{A}(\sigma) = [\alpha_1, \alpha'_4]\). Finally, if \(\sigma = \frac{1 + \sqrt{2}}{2}(q_1 - q_2)\) then \(\hat{A}(\sigma) = \{\alpha'_4\}\).

3. If \(\frac{\frac{1}{v_2} + \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2}}{2} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{\frac{1}{v_1} + \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2}}{2}\) then \(\alpha_1 \leq \alpha_4 \leq \alpha'_4 \leq \alpha_3\) and the derivative of \(E(\alpha)\) takes the following values in the five intervals respectively:
0, \( E_2'(\alpha) \), \( E_4'(\alpha) \), \( E_5'(\alpha) \). In this case \( E_4'(\alpha) > 0 \) since \( \sigma \geq \frac{v_1 + v_2}{v_2} \varrho - \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \geq (1 + \frac{3}{2}) \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} > (1 + \sqrt{2}) \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \). Therefore \( E(\alpha) \) is first constant, then decreasing, then strictly increasing again and finally strictly decreasing. Thus, there are two candidates for the argmax: \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_4' \). One can show that \( E_4(\alpha_4') > E_2(\alpha_1) \) iff \( v_1 > \sqrt{2}v_2 \), therefore \( \alpha_4' \) maximizes \( E(\alpha) \) in this case.

4. If \( \frac{v_1}{2v_2} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \) then \( \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_4 \leq \alpha_3 \leq \alpha_4' \) and the derivative of \( E(\alpha) \) takes the following values in the five intervals respectively: \( 0, E_2'(\alpha), E_4'(\alpha), E_5'(\alpha), E_3'(\alpha) \).

Similarly to the previous case \( E_4'(\alpha) > 0 \), therefore \( E(\alpha) \) is first constant, then decreasing, then strictly increasing again and finally strictly decreasing.

Comparing the two candidates for the argmax yields that \( E_4(\alpha_3) > E_2(\alpha_1) \) iff \( v_1 > (3/2)v_2 \), that is \( \alpha_3 \) maximizes \( E(\alpha) \) in this case.

In each of the cases above, it is clear that the maximum is higher than \( E(0) = 3/4 \). In cases 1 and 2 \( E(\alpha) \) is strictly increasing after a constant value of \( 3/4 \) and in cases 3 and 4 we directly compared to \( E_2(\alpha_1) = 3/4 \). This completes the proof of Part 2 and the entire proposition.

\[ \square \]

**Proof of Corollary 1:** In the proof of Proposition 1, we determined the values of \( \alpha \) that maximizes \( E(\alpha) \) for different \( \sigma \)'s. In summary:

\[
\hat{A}(\sigma) = \begin{cases} 
[\alpha_1, \alpha_4] & \text{if } \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{v_1}{v_2} \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
[\alpha_1, \alpha_4'] & \text{if } \frac{v_1}{v_2} \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \leq \sigma \leq (1 + \sqrt{2}) \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
[\alpha_1, \alpha_4'] & \text{if } \sigma = (1 + \sqrt{2}) \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
[\alpha_4', \alpha_4] & \text{if } (1 + \sqrt{2}) \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{v_1 + v_2}{v_2} \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
[\alpha_3, \alpha_4'] & \text{if } \frac{v_1 + v_2}{v_2} \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{v_1}{2v_2 - v_1} \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
[\alpha_3, \alpha_4'] & \text{if } \frac{v_1}{2v_2 - v_1} \frac{q_1 - q_2}{2} \leq \sigma 
\end{cases}
\]

It is straightforward to check that all of \( \alpha_1 \), \( \alpha_3 \), and \( \alpha_4' \) are increasing in \( \sigma \) and that the \( \hat{A}(\sigma) \) is increasing over the entire range. \[ \square \]

**Proof of Corollary 2:** First, we describe the payoffs of the two players in an all-pay auction with headstarts. When players follow the mixed strategies described in (1) and (2), player 1’s payoff is:

\[
\pi_1(h) = \begin{cases} 
0 & h \leq v_2 - v_1 \\
v_1 - v_2 + h & v_2 - v_1 < h < v_2 \\
1 & h \geq v_2
\end{cases}
\]
where \( h \) is the headstart of player 1. The payoff of player 2 can be obtained from the same formula by changing the roles. Then, we get player \( i \)'s total payoff by mixing the above quantities:

\[
\pi_i = \frac{1}{2}\pi_1(h_1) + \frac{1}{4}\pi_1(h_3) + \frac{1}{4}\pi_1(h_4)
\]

Then following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can determine the values of \( \alpha \) that maximizes Player 1’s payoff for different \( \sigma \)'s. We get the following results. If \( v_1 \leq 3v_2 \) then

\[
\arg\max_\alpha \pi_1 = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_1 & \text{if } \sigma \leq \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{v_2} < \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
[0, \alpha_1] & \text{if } \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{v_2} < \sigma
\end{cases}
\]

In case of \( 3v_2 < v_1 \leq 4v_2 \)

\[
\arg\max_\alpha \pi_1 = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_1 & \text{if } \sigma \leq \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{v_2} < \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
\alpha_3 & \text{if } \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{v_2} < \sigma \leq \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{4v_2 - v_1} - \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
[0, \alpha_1] & \text{if } \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{4v_2 - v_1} - \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{2} < \sigma
\end{cases}
\]

Finally, when \( v_1 \leq 4v_2 \) we have

\[
\arg\max_\alpha \pi_1 = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_1 & \text{if } \sigma \leq \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{v_2} < \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{2} \\
\alpha_3 & \text{if } \frac{v_1 q_1 - q_2}{v_2} < \sigma
\end{cases}
\]

It is easy to see that with exception of the two cases when the optimal \( \alpha \) is anywhere between 0 and \( \alpha_1 \), Player 1 is strictly better off with a particular positive level of SEO than without it.

**Proof of Proposition 2:** Recall that we can determine Player 1’s payoff as

\[
\pi_1 = \frac{1}{2}\pi_1(h_1) + \frac{1}{4}\pi_1(h_3) + \frac{1}{4}\pi_1(h_4),
\]

whereas Player 2’s payoff is given by reversing the roles. Examining the above formula shows that each players payoff only depends on \( q_1 - q_2 \) and not the individual qualities and is a continuous function which is linear with different slopes in different intervals. The function takes 3 different forms in the cases of \( v_\alpha/2 \geq \sigma \), \( v_\alpha/4 \geq \sigma < v_\alpha/2 \), \( \sigma < v_\alpha/4 \). In all cases the slope is less than or equal to \( \frac{1}{s} \) for \( q_1 - q_2 < 0 \). In the first two cases the slope is decreasing for \( q_1 - q_2 > 0 \) with a slope of \( \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \frac{3}{4} \) above zero, respectively in the two cases. In the third case the slope above zero is first \( \frac{3}{4} \) then \( \frac{1}{4} \). First we show that only \((0,0)\) can be a pure strategy equilibrium in the first stage.
Since the slope below zero is quiet shallow, if the marginal cost of content \( c > \frac{11}{4s} \) then sites have an incentive to decrease the investment. If, on the other hand \( c \leq \frac{11}{4s} \) then sites have an incentive to invest more since the slope above zero is always higher than this. To show when \((0,0)\) is an equilibrium fix \( q_2 = 0 \) and consider when Player 1 has an incentive invest more than 0. In the first two cases the critical value of \( c \) will just be the slope of Player 1’s payoff function above zero: \( \frac{11}{2s} \) and \( \frac{31}{4s} \), respectively. Player 1 does not have an incentive to deviate from zero iff \( c \) is higher than the respective slope. In the third case determining the critical value requires more detailed analysis since the slope increases. The analysis reveals that the best player 1 can do is achieve a payoff of \( v - 2\sigma/s - \sigma/(2s) \) with an investment of \( vs - 2\sigma \) yielding the critical value for \( c \) and completing the proof.  

Proof of Proposition 3: Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2 we can determine the payoffs as a function of each players quality investment. The same logic shows that the only possible pure strategy equilibrium is the one in which players do not invest in content. One can then separate three cases in which the payoff functions take different forms and show that the slope is always at most \( \frac{1}{\alpha} + m \). 

Proof of Proposition 4: First, we derive the efficiency of the ranking process given the error term. Let \( f_{\Delta}(.) \) be the density function of the distribution of \( \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2 \). If \( \alpha \) is high enough then the headstarts diminish and the sum of the valuation and the headstart for sites 3 and below will be lower than for 1 and 2. In an all-pay auction this leads to only the first two site’s participation. Then using the notation of the proof of Proposition 1 we have

\[
\Pr(1 \text{ wins}) = E(s) = \mathbb{E}_1 \left( \frac{q_1 - q_2 + \sigma \varepsilon_1 - \sigma \varepsilon_2}{\alpha} \right) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} W_1(h) f_{\Delta} \left( \left( \frac{h - q_1 + q_2}{\sigma} \right) \alpha \right) dh.
\]

Note that for positive \( h \) the value of \( W_1(h) \) is strictly higher than \( 1 - v_1/2v_2 \) and for \( h > v_2 - v_1 \) it is exactly \( 1 - v_2/2v_1 \). Furthermore if \( \alpha \) is high enough then for an arbitrary small \( \delta \) we have

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{v_2-v_1} f_{\Delta} \left( \left( \frac{h - q_1 + q_2}{\sigma} \right) \alpha \right) dh < \delta.
\]

Let \( \hat{\alpha} \) denote such a high \( \alpha \) and let \( \delta \) be smaller than \( 1 - E(0) > 0 \). Then \( E(\hat{\alpha}) > (1 - v_2/2v_1)(1 - \delta) \). Finally, let \( \hat{v} = \frac{v_2}{2(1-E(0))/(1-\delta)} \). Then \( v_1 > \hat{v} \) yields \( E(\hat{\alpha}) > E(0) \).  

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Proof of Proposition 5: Our proof uses an induction on \( k \), the number of links searched by the consumer. When \( k = 1 \), proposition 4 gives the necessary conditions and result. Given the independence assumption on choice of links to display in each auction the expected utility of the consumer from searching \( k \) links is

\[
E_k = E_{k-1} + (1 - E_{k-1})c_k\bar{q}_k > E_{k-1}.
\]

By the induction hypothesis, there exists an \( \hat{\alpha}(\sigma) \) and a \( \Delta_v(\sigma) \) such that if \( v_i > v_{i+1} + \Delta_v(\sigma) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq k - 1 \) then \( \Delta E_{k-1} = E_{k-1}(Q(\hat{\alpha})) - E_{k-1}(Q(0)) > 0 \).

Suppose \( v_k > v_{k+1} + \Delta_v(\sigma) \). Since \( E_k > E_{k-1} \) for every \( k \) and every \( \alpha \), it must be that \( \Delta E_k \geq \Delta E_{k-1} > 0 \) which concludes the proof.
References


