Spanjer, Aldo (2006): European gas regulation: a change of focus. Published in: Department of Economics Research Memorandum No. 2006.04 (2006): pp. 1-14.
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This paper confronts the current European gas regulation with the emerging new energy paradigm. It argues that due to a lack of policy credibility, the hold-up problem is a serious threat that will undermine the workings of the future EU gas market. This paper explores how one could from a theoretical perspective, given the characteristics of the EU gas markets, try to solve the hold-up problem. Two conclusions are 1) that hold-up will not be solved completely and 2) that in order to solve the hold-up problem as much as possible, the underlying assumption of energy policy should be changed. More specifically, the regulatory focus should no longer emphasize predominantly the consumer interests, but should instead more explicitly recognize producer interests. This implies that the current European gas regulation requires a change of focus.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||European gas regulation: a change of focus|
|Keywords:||gas regulation, hold-up, regulation theory, new energy paradigm|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L95 - Gas Utilities ; Pipelines ; Water Utilities
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q48 - Government Policy
|Depositing User:||Koen Caminada|
|Date Deposited:||07. Mar 2010 02:55|
|Last Modified:||30. Dec 2015 07:54|
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