Tan, Jonathan H.W. and Breitmoser, Yves and Bolle, Friedel (2010): Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent.
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We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experiment, inexperienced subjects contribute high in consent games and low in dissent games, but behavior converges toward equilibrium predictions over time and eventually experienced subjects contribute as predicted: low in consent games and high in dissent games. Observed deviations from equilibrium in consent games are best explained by level-k reasoning, and those in dissent games are best explained by hierarchical reasoning formalized as nested logit equilibrium.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent|
|Keywords:||public good, contribution game, bounded rationality, mechanism|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics > C44 - Operations Research ; Statistical Decision Theory
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
|Depositing User:||Yves Breitmoser|
|Date Deposited:||13. Apr 2010 02:08|
|Last Modified:||21. Feb 2013 07:16|
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