Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco (1998): The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders. Published in: Iowa State Economic Report No. 44/98
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This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings in which forming coalitions can act as Stackelberg leaders. We de�fine a value function which modi�fies the gamma-value function (Hart & Kurz, 1983, Chander & Tulkens, 1997) by letting members of deviating coalitions move �first in choosing a coordinated strategy. We accordingly defi�ne what we call the phi-core, and characterize the phi-core allocations of a cartel formation game and of a public goods economy.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders|
|Keywords:||Core, Cooperative Games, Oligopoly, Public Goods|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
|Depositing User:||Marco A. Marini|
|Date Deposited:||26 Apr 2010 23:53|
|Last Modified:||27 Sep 2016 05:01|
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