Экономическая политика, качество институтов и механизмы "ресурсного проклятия"

Polterovich, Victor and Popov, Vladimir and Tonis, Alexander (2007): Экономическая политика, качество институтов и механизмы "ресурсного проклятия". Published in: Higher School of Economics Publishing House (2007)

Abstract

Sachs, Warner (1995) were among the first to claim that «resource curse» is real and that resource abundant economies do indeed grow more slowly than the others. Hundreds of papers were published since then supporting the «resource curse» thesis and offering new explanations of mechanisms and effects that may inhibit growth in resource rich economies. Several recent papers, however (Alexeev, Conrad, 2005; Stijns, 2005; Brunnschweiler, 2006) question the mere existence of the «resource curse» and make it necessary to reconsider the hypotheses about the impact of resource abundance on economic growth.

This paper compares various theories of «resource curse» with a special focus on models allowing for the varying — positive or negative — impact of resources on development depending on the quality of institutions and economic policies. Several mechanisms leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources are being examined; it is demonstrated that each of these mechanism is associated with market imperfections and can be «corrected» with appropriate government policies.

Empirical evidence seems to suggest that resource abundant countries have on average lower budget deficits and inflation, higher foreign exchange reserves and higher inflows of FDI. Besides, lower domestic fuel prices that are typical for resource rich countries, have a positive effect on long term growth even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy intensity. On top of that resource abundance allows to reduce income inequalities. So, on balance, resource wealth turns out to be conducive to growth, especially in countries with strong institutions. However, resource abundance makes democratic political regimes very unstable — they tend to gravitate towards authoritarianism. A game theoretical model is developed to show that democracy in resource abundant countries is inherently unstable and the empirical evidence on the stability of resource democracies is provided.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Economic Policy, Quality of Institutions, and Mechanisms of Resource Curse
• Language: Russian
• Keywords: resource curse; economic growth
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

References

Волчкова Н. Причины сырьевой зависимости российской экономики: «голландская болезнь» или недостаточно развитые институты // Trade Рolicy and WTO. 2005.

Воробьев М. Роль государства в преодолении ресурсного проклятия // NES Master Thesis. 2006.

Гурвич Е.Т. Макроэкономическая оценка роли российского нефтегазового сектора // Вопросы экономики. 2004. № 10.

Гурвич Е.Т. Формирование и использование Стабилизационного фонда // Вопросы экономики. 2006. № 4.

Дмитриева О. Формирование стабилизационных фондов: предпосылки и следствия // Вопросы экономики. 2006. № 8.

Жукова Н. Изобилие природных ресурсов и экономический рост: роль институтов // NES Master Thesis. 2006.

Карташов Г. Экономический рост и качество институтов ресурсоориентированных стран // NES Master Thesis. 2006.

Кудрин А. Механизмы формирования нефтегазового баланса бюджета России // Вопросы экономики. 2006. № 8.

Милов В. Может ли Россия стать энергетической сверхдержавой? // Вопросы экономики. 2006. № 9.

Полтерович В., Попов В. Эволюционная теория экономической политики. Ч. I. Опыт быстрого развития // Вопросы экономики 2006[а]. № 7. С. 4—23.

Полтерович В.М., Попов В. Эволюционная теория экономической политики. Ч. II. Необходимость своевременного переключения // Вопросы экономики. 2006[b]. № 8. С. 46—64.

Чистяков Е. Природные ресурсы, коррупция и обрабатывающая промышленность в малой открытой экономике // NES Master Thesis. 2006.

Яковлев А.А. Агенты модернизации. М.: Изд. дом ГУ ВШЭ, 2006.

Abidin M.Z. Competitive Industrialization with Natural Resource Abundance: Malaysia // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press. 2001. Р. 147—164.

Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J., Vared P. Income and Democracy: MIT Working Рaper. 2005. N 5.

Ahrend R. How to Sustain Growth in a Resource Based Economy? The Main Concepts and Their Application to the Russian Case: OECD Economics Department Working Paper. 2006. N 478.

Alexeev M., Conrad R. The Elusive Curse of Oil: SAN Working Paper. 2005. N 7.

Auty R.M. Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Improving the Performance of Research/Rich Countries: Research for Action 44. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER, 1998.

Auty R.M. A Growth Collapse with High Rent Point Resources: Saudi Arabia // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press, 2001[a]. P. 193—207.

Auty R.M. Large Resource/Abundant Countries Squander Their Size Advantage: Mexico and Argentina // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press, 2001 [b]. P. 208—222. Auty R.M. (ed.). Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford University Press, 2001.

Auty R.M., Evia J.L. A Growth Collapse with Point Resources: Bolivia // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press, 2001. P. 179—192.

Auty R.M., Gelb A.H. Political Economy of Resource/Abundant States // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press, 2001. P. 126—144.

Auty R.M., Kiiski S. Natural Resources, Capital Accumulation, Structural Change, and Welfare // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press, 2001. P. 19—35.

Baldwin R.E. Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Regions // Manchester School of Social and Economic Studies. 1956. Vol. 24. P. 161—179.

Barro R.J. Democracy and Growth // Journal of Economic Growth. 1996[a]. Vol. 1. P. 1—27.

Barro R.J. Determinants of Economic Growth: А Cross-Country Empirical Study: NBER Working Paper. 1996[b]. N 5698.

Barro R.J. Determinants of Democracy // Journal of Political Economy. 1999. Vol. 107. P. S6, S158—29.

Ben-David D. Trade and Convergence Among Countries // Journal of International Economics. 1996. Vol. 40. P. 459—472.

Bienen H. Nigeria: From Windfall Gains to Welfarew Losses? // Gelb A. et al. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? N.Y.: World Bank Research Publication, 1988. P. 227—261.

Boyce J.R., Emery J.C.H. A Hotelling Explanation for the «Curse of Natural Resources»: University of Calgary, Department of Economics Discussion Paper. 2005. N 6.

Brunnschweiler C.N. Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and Economic Growth: ETH Economics Working Paper. 2006. N 51.

Bulte E.H., Damania R., Deacon R. Resource Abundance, Poverty, and Development: University of California, Department of Economics Working Рaper. 2003. N 21/04.

Bulte E.H., Damania R., Deacon R.T. Resource Abundance, Poverty and Development. 2003

Chang H.J. Kicking Away the Ladder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Conway P. Algeria: Windfalls in a Socialist Economy // Gelb A. Et al. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? N.Y.: World Bank Research Publication, 1988. P. 147—169.

Corden M., Neary J.P. Booming Sector and De/Industrialization in a Small Open Economy // Economic Journal. 1982. Vol. 92. P. 825—848.

Corden M., Neary J.P. Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices. Burear of Economic and Business Affaires, US Department of State, 2002.

Davis J., Ossowski R., Daniel J., Barnett S. Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources. Experience and Fiscal Policy Implications. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2001.

Deacon R., Mueller B. Political Economy and Natural Resource Use: UCSB, Department of Economics Working Paper. 2004. N 01/04.

Egorov G., Guriev S., Sonin K. Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse: CEDI Working Paper. 2006. N 10.

Findlay R., Lundahl M. Natural Resources and Economic Development: The 1870—1914 Experience // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press, 2001. P. 95—112.

Gaddy C.G., Ickes B.W. Resource Rents and the Russian Economy // Eurasian Geography and Economics. 2005. Vol. 46. P. 559—583.

Gelb A. et al. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? N.Y.: World Bank Research Publication, 1988.

Glassburner B. Indonesia: Windfall in a Pure Rural Economy // Gelb A. et al. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? N.Y.: World Bank Research Publication. P. 197—226.

Gylfason T. Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development // European Economic Review. 2001[a]. Vol. 45. P. 847—859.

Gylfason T. Nordic Perspective on Natural Resources Abundance // Resource Abundance and Economic Development / R.M. Auty (ed.). Oxford University Press, 2001[b]. P. 296—311.

Gylfason T.G., Zoega G. Inequality and Economic Growth: Do Natural Resources Matter?: CESifo Working Paper Series. 2002. N 712.

Gylfason T. Natural Resources and Economic Growth: From Dependence to Diversification: CEPR Discussion Paper. 2004. N 4804.

Hirshman A.O. A Generalized Linkage Approach to Development, with Special Reference to Staples // Essays on Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honor of Bert F. Hoselitz / M. Nash (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. P. 67—98.

Innis H.A. The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954.

Katzmann K. Kuwait: Post-Saddam Issues and U.S. Policy: CRS Report for Congress, 2005

Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Zoido-Lobaton P. Governance Matters: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 1999. N 2196.