Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance

Chilosi, Alberto and Damiani, Mirella (2007): Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance.

Abstract

The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Department of Economics-Univeristy of Pisa and Department of Economics, Finance, and Statistics-University of Perugia
• Language: English
• Keywords: Stakeholders; Corporate Governance; Varieties of Capitalism
• Subjects: P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance

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