Democratisation via elections in an African ’narco state’? The case of Guinea-Bissau

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1. December 2009

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23352/
MPRA Paper No. 23352, posted 18. June 2010 16:04 UTC
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Abstract: Recent development cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, focussing on good governance, state-building and conflict prevention, did not contribute to democratization nor to the stabilization of volatile political, military and economic structures. Both the portrayal of Guinea-Bissau as failed 'narco state' as well as Western aid meant to stabilize this state by multi-party elections are based on doubtful concepts and assumptions. Certainly, the impact of drug trafficking could endanger democratization and state-building if continued unchecked. However, the most pressing need is not state-building, facilitated by external aid, yet poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of the country, but nation-building from below as a pre-condition for the creation of viable state institutions.

Keywords: democratization, elections, informal institutions, aid, nation-building, institution building, drug trafficking, Guinea-Bissau, Africa

JEL codes: D72, E26, N47, O17, Z1

1 Thanks for valuable comments go to Gertrud Achinger, Sabine Kurtenbach, Bernd Leber, Isabel Pfaff, Nils Stelling, Michaela Stemplinger, Marina Padrão Temudo, Dario Wachholz and two anonymous referees. The responsibility for any fallacies or inaccuracies in the paper remains with the author.
1. Introduction: Democratization and pacification by elections in Africa?

The quest for democratic transition has been on the agenda of African countries since the beginning of the second wind of change in the early 1990s. Multi-party elections have been propagated by politicians, the global donor community and academic scholars alike as major means to promote democratic change and to stabilize so-called 'weak' or 'failed states'. The question, whether even flawed elections could contribute to stabilization and democratization has been discussed controversially. Though there seems to be a growing consensus among politicians and political scientists that multi-party elections matter, regardless of the quality of their formal procedure. Staffan Lindberg and others extend Rustow's (1970) theory that already democratic behaviour produce democratic values (cf. Lindberg 2006:vii; 2009). The learning-by-doing process of repeated elections is said to improve both stability and quality of democratic institutions in African countries steadily with practice (Lindberg 2006:86; 2008). According to Lindberg, violent breakdowns of states are most likely before and after the first elections, although "even first elections start to create and affect institutions, actors, and processes of change" (Lindberg 2006:119, 121). Contradicting hypotheses of Carothers (2002) and others which maintain that the focus of the international community on elections as means of peaceful democratic transition is misguided, have been summarily refuted (Lindberg 2006: 119, 140).

In my view, these theories on 'democratization by elections' – although possibly reflecting average trends of Africa's democratization process in the past are based to much on sweeping generalizations, essentialism and exceptions to allow for meaningful prognoses and well founded political advice in actual country cases of 'weak states'. The latter seems to be influenced often by the apparent lack of feasible alternative concepts for intervention of the donor community, by wishful thinking, and doubtful dogmas of behavioural science. In order to provide sound political advice based on realistic scholarly analyses there is no other way than to rely on a comprehensive study of each country's history, its formal and informal social, political and economic institutions and networks, which should be based of course on established theoretical concepts and methodology. The case study of Guinea-Bissau presented below serves as a first step in this direction as explorative study for the generation and testing of alternative approaches. My hypotheses, to be tested in the following, run as follows: First, development aid meant to contribute to democratization and stability in African countries by promoting elections, regardless of their democratic quality, is misleading or even counterproductive. The same applies to underlying theories on the general usefulness of
elections mentioned above. Second, conventional concepts of 'weak' or 'failed states' are heavily biased in favour of global Western security interests. They are equally inappropriate guidelines for political action, orientated at a sustainable peaceful democratic transition. Third, development assistance as well as any other international or national political actors who aim at creating stable and democratic conditions in fragile African countries should focus more on bottom-up policies to create and consolidate nation-building instead of trying to reinforce top-down formal state structures.

2. Early elections - A step towards stabilisation?

The political history of independent Guinea-Bissau (RGB) is characterized by an intimate merger of its military and political elite. The military has had a strong historical legitimacy in the view of the people over decades because of its decisive role in the liberation war. The army had in actual fact fought a people's war which greatly contributed to its success. The heroes of the liberation struggle like 'Nino' Vieira continued to be the political and military leaders after their victory over the Portuguese colonial powers in 1974. Yet, whereas the military led the people's struggle for national liberation, it gradually turned into a major factor in destabilizing the democratization process afterwards. Guinea’s politico-military elite became increasingly detached from the population, concerning both democratic legitimation and government revenue. Already in the late 1990s net official development aid constituted about half of the country's GNP (Rudebeck 2001:10-11). In addition, the search for easy money and reliance on external financial resources contributed to the gradual criminalization of state institutions and members of the power elite. First by involvement of rank and file of the army in weapon trafficking, notably with their neighbours in the Casamance, Southern Senegal (cf. ICG 2008); later-on by apparent involvement of fractions of the power elite in global drug cartels, as will be shown in detail further on.

Nevertheless, at the grass-roots, notably in the countryside, the villagers continued to be dedicated to democratization as they saw it: i.e. empowerment and a voice in the control of their own resources (cf. Klute et al 2008; Rudebeck 2001). Certainly, ethnicity (e.g. the question of Balante underrepresentation) played a significant role in the local view, notably because it was instrumentalized by the urban power elite for its own interest. Yet, the vision of the struggle of liberation, carried by ideals of solidarity, equality and multiculturalism, was and still is so deeply engrained in the population that the imaginary of cultural multiplicity as
a major base of nation-building from below still prevails (Rudebeck 2001:29; Temudo 2008); again this point will be engrossed by more detailed analysis in the subsequent sections.

The states' lack of integration into the socio-cultural fabric of the nascent nation was most pronounced and visible in two spheres, which, however, were just two sides of the same coin: First, the fragile formal state structures inherited from colonial times, which hardly improved after independence (for details cf. Forrest 2003; Schiefer 2002; Klute et al. 2008). Second, an ‘uncaptured’ peasantry on the one side and the emergence of a stratum of poverty-ridden urban poor on the other, created last but not least by ill-conceived neo-liberal structural adjustment programs of the Bretton Woods Institutions (cf. Forrest 2003; Rudebeck 2005; 2001).

As a consequence of the growing gap between government and the people, Guinea-Bissau has been ridden by political instability, a bloody civil war (1998-99) and numerous coups or coup attempts (the most recent in April 2010). In fact, there was no elected president in the country's history who served his full mandate (cf. EU EOM 2009:3). The actual degree of this instability was highlighted in the night of first to second March 2009 by the assassination within hours of the army chief, general Batista Tagme Na Waie, and the head of state, João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira. Both, originally highly popular brothers in arms during the liberation war, became arch enemies later on. This most recent political crisis showed to which extent the Guinean state had been undermined and corrupted by longstanding internal feuds of the politico-military power elite, a process obviously stimulated by transnational networks of drug and weapon traffickers.

In order to prevent a power vacuum, the interim government – assisted by the international donor community – was at pains to re-establish law and order by early presidential elections. The prevailing view inside and outside the country was that Guinea-Bissau was in dire need of a functioning state\(^2\). And this not just for the good of the country itself. As will be shown below in more detail, the quest for stable states served at the same time the interest of global Western players in fighting terrorism and in installing stability in the entire West African sub-region, already labelled the Pandora Box of Africa. This was one of the reasons why the European Union and other donors were prepared to finance and observe the elections, meant to legitimize the new government and the formal structures of democracy established with the first multi-party elections in 1994. Even so election assistance

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\(^2\) "Stressing the importance of the upcoming presidential election in Guinea-Bissau of 28 June 2009, and the need to have free, fair and transparent elections as a crucial and necessary step towards the full return to constitutional order, consolidation of democracy and national reconciliation." (UN-SC 2009b, italics DK)
was just one out of a variety of measures of the international donor community in the last
decade, meant to prevent the outbreak of new violent conflicts and to assure a functioning
state, it was all the same seen as essential. This view was underlined by the expertise of
scholars in international relations who argued that free and fair elections were vital for post-
conflict stability and development (cf. introduction and Lindberg 2009; 2006;
Akopari/Azevedo 2007). Unfortunately, there were little if any lessons learnt from the
outcome of previous similar measures, meant to effect a significant turnaround in Guinean
politics. One could rightly ask whether the election, as well as its subsequent legitimization by
several international election observation missions (UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS, UEMOA, IOF,
etc.), was rather an electoral façade without any positive impact on institution building, in
view of the same major political and military actors still involved in the exercise (cf. Monteiro
& Morgado 2009:2). Hitherto, most democratization aid for RGB has been of limited
success: Substantial election assistance of the EU for the last legislative elections in Bissau in
November 2008 for example had apparently little, if any positive impact on the functioning of
the current political system. Just three month after the parliamentary elections, highly praised
by international observers for its exemplary role in assisting democratization (cf. ICG
2009a:5; EU-EOM 2008), the underlying politico-military conflicts culminated in the extra
legal killings of the top ranks in political and military hierarchy of the country, accompanied
by the continuing impunity of the perpetrators.

Nevertheless, the EU extended its programme of electoral assistance for the early
presidential elections in June 2009, apparently following the motto 'business as usual'. On
June 5, 2009, the eve of the start of the electoral campaign, further high ranking politicians,
among them one presidential candidate, were killed, others were abducted or persecuted. The

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3 Cf. also Issa K. Barry: 'Guinée Bissau: Pourquoi ils ont fait tomber le bonnet rouge'. L'Observateur Paalga,
July 31, 2009 (Editorial): "Beaucoup d'observateurs de la scène politique se demandent légitimement à quoi
servira ce passage forcé aux urnes tant qu'il n'y a pas la paix dans les cœurs. Si ce n'est à choisir le prochain
mouton de sacrifice."

4 However, following the attempted coup of 1 April 2010, the EU mission for the reform of the defence and
security sector in Guinea Bissau suspended its mission on 31 May 2010. It conditioned the resumption of the
mission to the liberation of the army head Zamora Induta, imprisoned by the insurgents in Mansoa prison, and to
the prosecution of the coup instigators; cf. Notícias lusófonas: 'UE condiciona apoio a liberação de Zamora
Induta e a novas chefias militares'. 21 May 2010.

5 Baciro Dabó, an independent presidential candidate, although PAIGC-member and Minister for Territorial
Administration, was slain at his home in Bissau on the eve of the electoral campaign, allegedly because he
attempted to resist a detention order (cf. here and in the following ICG 2009:6-7; EU-EOM preliminary report
2009:3, 7). In the same vain, Helder Proença, former defence minister, was killed, together with two of his body
guards. Apparently he, together with Dabó, had been accused by José Zamora Induta, the interim army chief, to
be responsible for a coup attempt. Supposedly there were misgivings in high military circles that Dabó, a close
ally of murdered president Vieira, would take the masterminds behind the extra-legal killings of the President
and his army chief to task if he won the elections. A second presidential candidate, Faustino Imbalí, former
Prime Minister, was beaten up and kidnapped by soldiers the same day. A third candidate, Pedro Infanda, leader
attorney general received repeated death threats (the latest in August 2009) because he tried to hunt down the culprits of the March killings; he dared no longer to sleep at home. Apparently unimpressed by this ‘climate of insecurity, intimidation and fear’ (EU EOM 2009:3), or because they thought they had no alternative, the donors, led by the UN and the EU, continued in assisting the formal state structures by financing and supervising the early elections on July 28, 2009. Probably for diplomatic reasons, international election observers shut their eyes and attested not only a well organized, peaceful and orderly voting process, but judged the elections in general as ‘free, fair and transparent’ and as an ‘important step towards achieving political stability and security ’ (UN-SC 2009a:2, 3, 11). They mainly deplored general voter fatigue and the subsequent low turnout (about 60 and 61 percent of the electorate in the first and second round respectively, the lowest since the introduction of multi-party elections in 1994). In the second round (26 July) the candidate of the ruling PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; the former socialist unity party) Malam Bacai Sanha, won with more than 63 percent of the votes, followed by his rival and former president Mohamed Kumba Yalá (candidate of the Partido para a Renovação Socia Social, with 37 percent; cf. EU EOM 2009; UN-SC 2009a). Yet, the question remains whether there exist any lessons learned or alternatives to the conventional way of assistance for formal democratization and state-building.

At least in scholarly international discussion, the general quest for ‘good governance’ and a functioning state in Africa has been a controversial issue. Whereas the majority of the Ecological Party (LIPE), withdrew already on March 23, 2009 after having been intimidated and bashed by soldiers. Paulo Mendonca, still another presidential candidate, demanded in vain the adjournment of the elections in line with constitutional stipulations which foresee a postponement if any of the candidates dies. However, he did not succeed, the Supreme Court rejected his request because of overriding concerns.

6 ECOWAS and AU monitors reported (like the EU-EOM) “Eleições transparentes mas com visível cansaço dos eleitores”. However, they noted “de uma maneira geral que houve um certo cansaço dos eleitores”, tendo acrescentado "porquê votar se a escolha será a mesma?”. A União Africana (UA), com 16 observadores saudou igualmente um escrutínio "livre, transparente e equitativo”. (Noticias Lusofonas, 28.07.09). - Similarly, national radio stations in Bissau justified the low turnout with the lack of credit of the ‘political class’ and the lack of new political concepts in the view of the voters: Campanha eleitoral sem debate de ideias pode aumentar abstenção: “A campanha eleitoral para a segunda volta das presidenciais na Guiné-Bissau está a ser marcada pela ausência do debate de ideias o que pode aumentar a abstenção, referiram à agência Lusa vários directores de rádios guineenses. ...”Há um candidato que se sente confortável com a vitória, fazendo a leitura dos resultados da primeira volta, e não se dá a grandes esforços para tentar convencer o eleitorado com propostas”, referiu. ...Para Nelo Regala, a abstenção representa igualmente que as “pessoas deixaram de acreditar na classe política”...”É o cartão vermelho que o povo está a mostrar aos nossos dirigentes sobre os assassinatos que assistimos na Guiné-Bissau.” <www.noticiaslusofonas.com/>; 20.07.09).

7 “The relative high percentage of invalid votes in the 1st round (3.6 percent, DK) could be explained by the fact that the voting lists still included the names of the two murdered presidential candidates; votes for them counted as ‘invalid’ (cf. EU-EOM 2009 prelim report). – On general voter motivation in RGB cf. also Sangreman et al. 2008.
scientists, politicians and aid experts deplored the weakness of the state in many African countries in general and in RGB in particular, calling for the rapid installation of functioning state structures, others contested this view. Based on concepts of cultural African primordialism (cf. Chabal&Daloz 2006; Bayart et al. 1999; Reno 1998) or of the African 'shadow state' (Ferguson 2006), followers of the latter position point to the fact that apparently political leaders in RGB can be replaced without effecting any political change, rendering Western style democratic elections increasingly inappropriate. In fact, according to these authors not only formal multi-party elections, but the actual state in RGB seems to be irrelevant to the majority of its citizens, notably in the countryside. The state lacks its basic functions and guarantees. It neither assures a monopoly on violence, jurisdiction and prosecution, nor does it provide any other tangible benefits for the people (cf. Bordonaro 2009:36; Vigh 2009). According to this view, a political setting has evolved in RGB which allocates power politics not within or behind state institutions, but outside, in neo-patrimonial political alliances rooted in the country's troubled history as well as in trans-national social spaces, including global drug trafficking (cf. Bordonaro 2009:3; Monteiro&Morgado 2009:2).

Unfortunately, both theoretical positions apparently cover only half of the truth, as will be shown in the following sections of the paper. The advocates of 'failed state' theories on the one hand tend to ignore both informal politics, prevailing all over West Africa, and the Eurocentric background of their concepts propagated as one for all solution, e.g. structural adjustment and formal democratization via multi-party systems and competitive elections. The primordialist position on the other hand (and its equivalent the post-structuralist imaginaire) follows uni-dimensional concepts of path dependency which tend to ignore the development chances provided by innovative cultural traits, last but not least that of cultural nationalism and the cultural base of nation-building. In the last resort they often end in methodological essentialism, based rather on stereotypes than on robust empirical evidence (cf. Meagher 2006 for a more detailed scathing critique of the latter position). Surprisingly enough, grass-root patriotism developed to a considerable extent even in Guinean villages or the diasporas of irregular migrants in European capitals (cf. Gable 2009:175-78) as we shall see further below.

8 “…But as the experiences of Nino Vieira and Luiz Cabral [and Kumba Yala, D.K.] showed, the main risk to the country’s stability came from the practice of governing outside the country’s institutional frameworks.” (ICG 2008:15).
In my view the most pressing need is not state-building, facilitated by external aid, yet poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of the country, but nation-building from below as a pre-condition for the creation of viable state institutions. Over the past decades a new nationalism developed in RGB and elsewhere in Africa. It shows remarkable differences both in its roots and its impact, compared with that of the national independence movements, as has been shown in detail already elsewhere (cf. Kohnert 2009; 2008a). Contrary to the 'first' nationalism, the 'second' is less prone to include, tending rather to exclude populations; alienation, xenophobia and its political instrumentalization are its curse. The new nationalism has been shaped decisively by the consequences of globalisation and by the increasing cleavage between the poor and the rich (cf. Barry et al. 2007 on poverty and income distribution). Nowadays, structures of nationalism and nation-states differ more than in the past. Frequently, the new nationalism is rooted in populist grass-root movements which do not necessarily share the same interests as the ruling class or the state. This makes for its extraordinary political and social ambiguity and brisance. In short, nation-building is a base for sustainable state-building, it is basically a question of democratic sequencing. However, this should not be interpreted as rigid path dependency, but rather as interrelated factors which can reinforce one another under favourable conditions and block development under adverse circumstances. In any case, neither the sequence- nor a gradual- or twin-tracked simultaneous approach should rely too much on formal conditions of democracy, most notably 'good governance' and rule of law, or on other formal democratic institutions as promoted by Western development aid, backed by scholarly expertise (cf. Branch/Cheeseman, 2009). This holds particularly for the initial take-off phase. Rather it should encompass and exploit the wealth of endogenous socio-cultural heritage as founding stone of nation-building and enduring democracy, as will be explained in the final section of the paper.

3. Is Guinea-Bissau a ‘narco-state”? Drug trafficking and its impact on politics, economy and society

In the past decade, West African governments were challenged by an upsurge in transnational drug trafficking from Latin America destined for European markets. The trafficking often follows already established routes of migration or of illegal international small arms trade. It is periodically adapted to changing requirements of camouflage, avoidance of international observation and persecution of transnational criminal trade. This is related, among other
reasons, to a gradual shift of the cocaine market from the USA to Europe, notably from Colombia, via Brazil and Venezuela, to Western Africa, due to higher profits for trafficking with Europe (cf. Bybee 2009: 6, 11-13). Cocaine entered European markets mainly via Spain and Portugal because of its long coastline and its linguistic and historic ties with Latin America. At least 33 tons were seized – often accidentally – on the West African route to Europe between 2005 and 2007 (cf. Johansen 2008: 4-5; UNODC 2007a; Mazzitelli 2007: 1075, 1087; Labrousse et al. 2008: 10-11; UNODC 2007: 9-15). Almost certainly, this was only the tip of the iceberg. Because of its clandestine nature the trade is difficult to quantify. UNDOC estimated that some 40 tons, or 27 percent of cocaine consumed in Europe annually until 2007, was transiting West Africa (cf. Johansen 2008: 5).

On 4 June 2010 the Gambian police, assisted by the UK’s Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), discovered a huge drug smuggling ring in Gambia. In a raid on a Lebanese timer factory 45 km outside the capital Banjul they seized 85 bags of pure cocaine, worth €121m, equivalent to over US $ 1 bn at street value level, besides arms and € 210.000 in cash. This was one of the biggest ever cocaine catches in West Africa, according to the deputy director of SOCA, Neil Giles (cf. Gharbi 2010). It had already suspected for a long time that

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9 This is mainly due to decreasing effective demand in the USA and the depreciation of the US$ exchange rate relative to the Euro. “According to U.N. figures, two pounds of uncut cocaine can now fetch as much as $45,000 on the streets of Europe, as opposed to less than half that price ($22,000) in the U.S.” (Kirschke 2008).

10 In 2009 it was said that cocaine trafficking through the West African region probably decreased since 2007 by about 50 percent. This was traced back to increasing awareness of national and international authorities and subsequent measures of control. However, this apparent reduction was just due to redirected deliveries, either via neighbouring Gambia and Guinea-Conacry (cf. UN-SC 2009a:6) or towards new lucrative transit hubs in the middle of nowhere in the Saharan desert as most recent evidence from Mali indicates (cf. Boisbouvier, C. "Le Boeing de la coke." Jeune Afrique, 22 November 2009:35). In any case, even amounts of some 20 tons (valued at about one billion. US$ at destination) would still have a destabilizing impact on regional security and economy. (UNODC 2009: 17). - Just one year later, the representative of the UN Drugs and Crime Office in West Africa, Alexandre Schmidt, had to admit that drug trafficking via Guinea-Bissau had resumed again on an unprecedented scale, apparently unchecked by Guinean security forces (cf. Notícias lusófonas (2010): Guineé Bissau: Tráfico de drogas voltou fortemente ao país, dizem EUA e ONU. 5 June 2010.

11 Further 60 empty bags of cocaine were found in the hideaway, indicating that this was a major redistribution centre of drugs, that apparently only a fraction of the drugs trafficked had been discovered. The company, the Muktharr Trading Store, situated between Bonito village and Pirang in Kombo East District, Western Region of Gambia, was owned by a Lebanese born businessman Mukharr, a close associate of the Gambian Head of State, Jahya Jammeh; cf. Gibba, Bakary (2010): Major cocaine ‘catch’ in Gambia: Lebanese timber factory transformed into a cocaine zone. Freedom Newspaper Radio, June 08, 2010. – In another big haul on 28 May 2010, seven foreign nationals, from Russia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana, were arrested because of drug trafficking in Liberia. Drug enforcement officials seized four tons (out of 6 tons which were planned to be shipped via Monrovia to the USA) of Colombian cocaine with a street value of $100-million in Monrovia, shipped from Venezuela to Liberia for further distribution, mainly to the United States. The arrested member of the drug ring were accused of trying to bribe high-level Liberian officials, including the son of President Ellen Sirleaf (who had worked as undercover agent of the US Drug Enforcement Agency), to protect the trafficking (cf. "US cocaine sting breaks up 100 million dollar Liberia plot", AFP/Breitbart@com, 1 June 2010).
Gambia had become another safe-haven for international drug cartels from South America and their West African counterparts, beside Guinea-Bissau.

Whereas Nigeria and Ghana were renowned centres of drug trafficking in the 1990s, during the past five years Guinea-Bissau apparently became one of the hubs of cocaine trade in this region. Three outstanding seizures aroused the attention of international observers: In September 2006, the police arrested two Colombians in Bissau accused of being involved in trafficking 670 kg of cocaine, found at their home. Within hours after the arrest, military officers forced the police to hand over the confiscated drugs in order to transfer it to a crumbling Treasury building, were the consignment disappeared some days later. The accused were released on the orders of the Attorney General by the local judge without a legal explanation, and the case was filed. It was resumed one year later because of the alleged involvement of high ranking officers of the army and senior government officials in the disappearance of the drugs (cf. UNDOC 2007: 6). In April 2007, another consignment of 635 kg was seized in a vehicle accompanied by two soldiers and a civilian. But the traffickers escaped with the rest believed to amount to 2.5 tons which had been landed in an abandoned military airstrip at Cufar near Catio in the southern parts of the country. The soldiers were released because they were allegedly considered as hitch-hikers who were “simply in the wrong place at the wrong time”, as the army spokesman Colonel Asenio Balde declared later on (cf. Vulliamy 2008: 4). On July 12, 2008, another clandestine plane from Venezuela landed at Bissau international airport and was immediately cordoned off by military personnel. Its cargo was loaded onto vehicles and driven to an unknown destination. The army again blocked any judicial investigation (cf. US-HRR 2009).

In short, cocaine in transit had obviously been stockpiled in Guinea-Bissau on an increasing scale by Colombian drug cartels since 2004, apparently with the consent of and in close cooperation with parts of the army and high ranking politicians. Later on it was shipped to Europe, either by boat or overland via Morocco, or flown in by ‘mules’, i.e. couriers with about 0.8 kg each hidden in their stomach or luggage. Often the latter applied the so-called ‘shotgun’ method in order to overcome law enforcement personnel at departure and destination. Thus in December 2006, the police at Shiphol airport, Amsterdam, detected 32 ‘mules’ in a single flight, mostly Nigerians, with cocaine from Guinea-Bissau (cf. Vulliamy

13 For detailed accounts of these and other outstanding cases cf. Dabo (2007); Walt (2007); Pinto/Pereira (2007); Vulliamy/Ferrett (2008); cf. also Vincent (2007); IRIN (2007); Vernaschi (2009).
In August 2007, the Guinean air force announced closer surveillance and the deployment of anti-aircraft artillery to some of the 88 islands of the Bijagos archipelago, supposed to be a hot spot of cocaine transit, in view of its remote location, the lack of surveillance and reports on the landing of unidentified small aircraft suspected of drug transporting (cf. UNDOC 2007: 9). However, high ranking officers of the armed forces continued to intervene in narcotics investigations conducted by the judicial police. In 2008, the minister of justice, the attorney general and the director of the judicial police received death threats in response to their stance against drug trafficking (cf. US-HRR 2009: 1). José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, the navy chief of staff who was suspected of being involved in the trafficking, was suspended in August 2008 after an alleged coup attempt. He was kept under house arrest but subsequently escaped to neighbouring Gambia.

The 2009 political crisis following the murders of the chief of defence staff, General Batista Tagme Na Wai, and of the Head of State, João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira, a few hours later, on March 1, 2009, was mainly due to increasing factionalism in the military. Yet, it was probably also linked to the surge of organised drug trafficking, in which apparently the former navy chief Na Tchuto, living in self-imposed exile in Gambia in view of accusations of his involvement in a coup attempt, had been involved, too (cf. ICG 2009: 1, 3-4). Hardly a year later, drug cartels based in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau were once more suspected of involvement in another abortive coup in Bissau on 1 April 2010. Among the supposed instigators of the coup attempt was again former Guinean navy chief Na Tchuto. He had clandestinely returned from his exile in Banjul to Bissau in December 2009, taking refuge at the local UN mission. End of May, Na Tchuto, who had resumed apparently his position as a key figure in the Guinean army, was acquitted of the charge of an attempted coup in 2008 by a military tribunal (cf. RFI, 1 June 2010).

The ‘narco-state’: facts and fiction of a biased concept

Under these conditions, Guinea-Bissau had seemingly become the African country the most completely immersed in the drug trade (cf. Ellis 2009: 191). For some scholars and politicians it has even become the textbook example of the first African ‘narco-state’ (cf. Kirschke, 2008: 1; Bybee 2009; Johansen 2008: 4). State failure has been identified as the key problem

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14 A ‘narco-state’ has been defined as “‘an area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent’, it is hard to deny that Guinea-Bissau is Africa’s first ‘Narco-State’.” (cf. Bybee 2009: 18). A detailed description of the structures of a ‘narco state’ is given by West (2006: 10-11), taking the example of Tajikistan.
of the country. The grossly insufficient administrative and political structures which impede the effective control of the territory and the combat of drug trafficking endangered not only the peace consolidation process in Guinea-Bissau. For the US-government, other global players, the UN and concerned international NGOs, this posed a potential new global security threat, last but not least because drug money is said to be closely linked to small arms proliferation and to financing international terrorism. Organised crime, drug trafficking and terrorism are seen as the “new Achilles’ heel of West Africa” (cf. Andrés 2008). Hence, on June 25, 2008, the UN Security Council urged the government in Bissau to stop the trafficking and to “strengthen its international and regional cooperation to fight the narcotics trade and organised crime plaguing the country” (Panapress, 7 July 2008). For the International Crisis Group (ICG, Brussels), one of the leading Think Tanks on conflict analysis and prevention, state failure is the core weakness at the root of the recurrent political crises and the proliferation of criminal networks in Guinea-Bissau. The ICG sees a real risk for the country becoming a ‘narco-state’, attractive to drug barons as well as terrorist networks in the Maghreb. According to its analysis, no political leader has really tried to establish the necessary structures for a functioning democratic state since independence in 1974. Yet, the ICG experts hold that only the implementation of effective state institutions and the regulation of political competition, no longer entrenched in the guerrilla mentality generated by the struggle for liberation, but built upon a functioning multiparty system, could end the current political crisis and provide a basis for sustainable development in Guinea-Bissau. Consequently, ICG strongly advised the international donor community to urgently support efforts to consolidate democracy, reform the security sector and construct viable state structures (cf. ICG 2008: 1, 24; ICG 2009).

However, international endeavours to assist RGB’s democratization process, guided by the ‘failed’ or ‘narco-state’ concept, are likely to fail as well. An increasingly critical scholarly review of the concept revealed that it is heavily biased in several aspects (cf. Call

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15 According to the renowned Brooking Index of State Weakness, RGB belongs to the most vulnerable countries worldwide, liable to pose serious transnational security threats. In fact, the country ranks in the lowest 20 percent of the so-called ‘critical weak states’ (rank 18 out of 141 developing countries, placed between Burma and Ethiopia, (cf. Rice/Patrick 2008: 16-17)). The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy initiative ranked RGB as 27th out of 37 states indexed as ‘failed states’ with an acute security alert in 2009 (cf. Fund for Peace 2009).

16 According to Antonio Mazzitelli, the West African representative of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, trafficking is only part of the menace. “Certainly the major threat that drug trafficking or all other transnational organized crime introduces into the West African scenario at large is the possibility of hijacking and influencing the democratic process. […] Thanks to the enormous financial and corruptive power of this money, this is a major concern in a country like Guinea-Bissau.” (Latham 2009; cf. Mazzitelli 2007: 1087).
2008; Hameiri 2007; Bøås/Jennings 2007; Groves 2008; Hagmann/Hoehne 2009). First, its political use is often inherently based on the global player’s perception of security. Notably those states (like Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia) have been labelled as ‘failed’ where the breakdown of formal institutions was perceived as a threat to Western security interests. Others with similar deficiencies (like Angola and Ivory Coast) were even assisted and hedged, as far as they continued to provide an enabling environment for international capital or hegemonic foreign policies. Second, the focus of the ‘failed state’ concept on state capacity, notably on order and security, as represented by the assumed five ‘core institutions’ of the state (military, police, civil service, justice and government), without due regard to other equally important political factors, such as equality, empowerment or human rights, disregards important possible tensions and trade-offs in promoting state-building (cf. Call 2008: 1496-1497). If state reconstruction is analysed in technocratic terms, concentrating on a single fit-for-all remedy (namely ‘order’) for quite different illnesses, it is likely to ignore the political economy and social nature of state- and nation-building, as reflected in the different nature of regimes (cf. Hameiri 2007: 122; Call 2008: 1497-1498).

Alternative, methodological approaches of statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa centre around concepts of the ‘shadow state’ (Ellis 2009: 195), of ‘para-statal institutions’ (cf. Trotha 2000), and the (re-)emergence of non-state political orders (Klute et al. 2008:.17-19); all inseparably interwoven with more or less stable forms of the ‘modern’ state. Yet, only the latter corresponds to the generalized notion of statehood, still prevailing in Western concepts of ‘failed states’. The alternative concepts mentioned above refer to the particular history of state-building in Africa. Notably the age-old dualism between customary and colonial rule, reinforced by the practice of indirect rule and its repercussions to be felt up to now, particularly in Anglophone Africa: this implies also trans-national informal power networks and institutions of governance on all levels, from the district council to the state house in the capital. Most often these deeply rooted, but clouded political structures are hidden from Western politicians’ view, and accidentally from that of many scholars, too. Nevertheless,

17 Since 2002, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was a remarkable shift in the US National Security Strategy which concludes: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones.” (quoted by Call 2008: 1491).
they are by no means a relict of the past, restricted to remote rural areas, but very much alive, continually transforming and inventing itself anew.19

4. Increased aid - The most promising way to turn around failed (narco) states?

Even the introduction of multiparty democracy along with relatively strong core state institutions would not guarantee peace and sustainable development in RGB. Similar to the failure of the socialist development path, applauded and heavily assisted without avail by so-called progressive donors in the 1980s (cf. Schiefer 2002; Kohnert 1988), democratization is also likely to fail if primordial informal politics are allowed to prevail unchecked. This has been shown even in the model case of Benin Republic, the highly praised ‘lighthouse’ of democratic renewal in Africa, that showed the futility of formal democratization if pursued within the deeply rooted and revered socio-cultural framework of patronage and rent-seeking (cf. Bierschenk 2009). Under these conditions, additional development assistance (ODA) in countries that are already highly aid-dependent as RGB20 (also called ‘aid orphans’) could be easily transformed into a ‘sovereign rent’21 for the politico-administrative and military elite. In fact, Guinea’s power elite increasingly relied on sovereign rents from aid and illicit trade, e.g. fishery, drugs, weapons, in the past decades (cf. Schiefer 2002). Thus, in the worst case scenario, well-meant but ill-applied aid could exert (and probably did wield already) similar devastating effects on the democratization process like sovereign resource rents (including illicit rents from criminal networks and drug trafficking) by making patronage politics financially feasible and thus derailing the democratization process (cf. Collier 2006: 1484).

Paul Collier and others, however, maintain that aid does not constitute a sovereign rent and therefore is not likely to have effects akin to resource rents. Therefore, they consider international technical assistance, closely supervised within the framework of political conditioning, as the most promising way to fund ‘turnarounds’ and to address the problem of ‘failing states’ (cf. Collier 2006: 1492-1496). Yet, there is no robust proof that aid could not

20 About 80 percent of Bissau’s state budget is derived from ODA (cf. Einarsson 2007: 105). The country is second only to the Comoros on the list of most dependent countries worldwide, receiving on average (1970-1999) the equivalent of almost 14 percent of GDP as aid (cf. Djankov et al. 2008: 173).
act in a way comparable to resource rents. All depends on the aims and methods of implementation of aid, meant to increase the empowerment of the people. Even ex ante governance conditionality of aid utterly failed because it did not sufficiently consider the informal structures of the ‘shadow state’. This applies also, but not uniquely, to the case of RGB where aid has been misused over decades as a sovereign rent, not controlled by any political system of checks and balances on the part of Guinean citizens (cf. Djankov et al. 2008; Schiefer 2002; Kohnert 1988). Although international donors’ rhetoric of aid conditionality stressed time and again the need to curb aid for poor performers like RGB, the provision of ODA continued on a substantial scale. The donor community was increasingly concerned about the opportunity cost of non-intervention (cf. Einarsdóttir 2007: 107-108). And this not just with respect to felt needs and interest of the local population, but also in view of Western global security and regional stability concerns (cf. above). Aid strategies based on these interests, focussed on rather technocratic aspects of formal institution building, do not necessarily have the desired impact on empowerment or democratization from below which is the ne plus ultra of sustainable development in Africa (cf. Crawford 2009).

**Nation-building as a pre-condition of state-building?**

Therefore, the international call for the building of a (strong) state in RGB (cf. ICG 2008) misses the point in the actual situation: As said above, the most pressing need is not state-building without regard to its firm anchorage in society and economy, but nation-building from below as base of duly legitimized sustainable democratic state institutions. The regime created and sustained by Nino Vieira was detached from the majority of the population and based on ‘narrow power networks’ faithful to the ruler (cf. Forrest 2002:261; Temudo 2008:248). Yet, it should be underlined again: there exists no unilateral path dependency or sequencing. Africa’s new nationalism22 has been shaped decisively by the consequences of globalization (last but not least by transnational networks of drug and weapon trafficking) and by the increasing cleavages between the poor and the rich (cf. Dorman et al. 2007).

Nation-building is the formation of a political community and its struggle for freedom, justice and democracy with the ultimate end of conquering the commanding heights of state power as the political sovereign. Therefore, nation-building often precedes state-building. By the way, it is doubtful whether development or nation-building have ever been on the agenda

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of African states in the first place (cf. Chipkin 2007:35). Whereas nation-building was certainly a major point on the agenda of Amilcar Cabral and Guinea’s liberation movement in the early 1970s, it was surely not one of the priorities of the subsequent heads of states in Bissau. Nevertheless, quite independently from official politics, new national identities, including a common Creole language and a truly national Guinean culture, developed from below in RGB (cf. Mourao 2009: 95-100; Augel 2007; Rudebeck 2001; Augel/Cardoso 1996). The Guinean people still share a basic feeling of national identity, reinforced by the armed struggle against colonial domination, and based on a common and unifying tradition, including shared language, culture, custom and religion, in short the basic cultural infrastructure of belonging to a nation (cf. Chipkin 2007:200-205; Rudebeck 2001).

However, the political history of citizenship is closely and increasingly linked with accelerated mobility and migration enforced by globalisation. This provides also the base for counteracting ‘politics of belonging’, instrumentalized by particular political elites to their own advantage. There are several examples from other African countries, as shown by the recurrent outbursts of xenophobia in South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere. Bissau is certainly not spared from this risk, as the rancour against bi-national Capverdians after independence, or more recent cleavages between Gambian and Senegalese petty traders and their Guinean counterparts demonstrated. States may even entirely collapse without disappearing as nations from the social imaginary, as Crawford Young rightly observed in his theoretical contribution to a reader edited by Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent (2007:241).

5. Conclusions: Guinea-Bissau in need of nation-building from below as base of the reconciliation of the warring factions of the urban power elite

A reorientation of aid and transnational norm-building networks aiming at empowerment of the people could have considerable impact on nation building and reconciliation of warring factions of the political and military elite in Bissau. However, increased technical assistance of the international donor community does not necessarily foster the required turnaround. To be sustainable, aid needs to be not just massive, rapid and effective. It requires a reorientation of overall aims of development assistance in RGB. Global concerns about stability and security should be outbalanced against the pressing need of nation-building by bottom-up democratization and integration of cherished informal political and economic institutions into
an essentially revised state structure. A piecemeal but painstaking democratization of the fabric of informal politics, including chieftaincy and a meaningful decentralization policy from below (cf. Crawford 2009; Klute et al 2008), would be required to lay a sustainable base for a functioning democracy at the grass-root level, which could eventually lead to a more responsive government. In short, there is nothing which could replace political struggle for real democracy from below.

As Lars Rudebeck (2001) aptly summarised in his study on democracy’s sustainability in RGB, more complex power structures need to be addressed, far beyond the multi-party system and conventional election procedures. In this respect a Sovereign National Conference, following the Benin model (cf. Adamon 1995; Banégas 1995; Heilbrunn 1993), could serve as ignition point of a true democratization process concerning its substantial and innovative social and political impetus to empowerment.\(^23\) However, this would hold only if the political class and civil society institutions in Bissau take all necessary precautions to avoid the salient negative aftermath of the betrayal of the results of the Sovereign National Conferences in Lomé by the ruling class in the 1990s (cf. Nwajiaku 1994). Due consideration should be paid also to the lessons learned from a similar but less sustainable Guinean exercise of a National Conference after the civil war in 1999. In this respect, the most recent endeavour of the Guinean Parliament, backed by the UN, the National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP, Bissau) and the Portuguese branch of the international NGO Interpeace (Aliança Internacional para a Consolidação da Paz) to create civic peace initiatives (Voz di Paz, created in 2007)\(^24\), and to convey a National Conference of Reconciliation, could be a step in the right direction. On its agenda are the identification of the causes of conflicts in RGB, the contradictions between state and civic institutions, and conflict prevention strategies. Besides representatives from various government departments, civic and religious organisations, veterans, women, youth and the media are meant to participate, too (cf. UN-SC 2009a: 2, 11). However, the National Conference as outlined above, apparently will not be sovereign, and therefore risks to end as futile as innumerable other eloquent but aloof top

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\(^{23}\) A Sovereign National Conference as a basis for meaningful democratization and stabilization should not be confused with the pledges to install a “national conference” by established political leaders, issued for example by the acting president Malam Bacai Sanhá of the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in the election campaign of the presidential elections of 2009 (cf. resolutions and demands of the Conferência Nacional de Diálogo, Bissau, 25 to 26 May 2009 (Lusa, 26.05.09; ‘Declaração de Bissau’). The latter runs the risk of rather serving to consolidate established political structures, as demonstrated by similar events in the history of independent RGB.

down measures for democratic transition or reconciliation in the history of independent Guinea-Bissau.

Yet, a successful take-off would require not just 'good governance' in the sense of international donors concerns, but also the incorporation of democratic discourse and institutions at the local level. In order to be sustainable, this must be accompanied by substantial economic improvements in the livelihood of ordinary citizens. Democratization alone will not satisfy the basic needs of the people; as there is no guarantee that it will lead automatically to pro-poor economic growth (cf. Robinson 1994:610). Altogether, the proposed new focus of aid and national politics would probably be more efficient to install enduring peace, security and democratization than the pursuit of multiparty democracy and formal institution-building by foreign aid, without due regard to the underlying informal political setting and its vested hidden interests. This is not to say that economic post-conflict recovery strategies would be useless. Yet, they make sense only as complementary measures, and they should differ from standard approaches of economic development and poverty reduction in that they give a premium to reintegration of ex-combatants, job creation for young men, and deep cuts in military spending (cf. Collier 2009).

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25 The cost of rice, a basic staple food in RGB, increased on average by 20 to 30 percent over the past year (cf. UNSC-2009a.8), although the government has tried in vain since decades to provide affordable supply of basic food for the poorer sections of the population.

26 For recent examples of studies on the linkage of democratization and economic development with an focus on Africa cf. Rodrik / Wacziarg 2005; Nel 2005; Ndulu et al 2008. Yet, robust quantitative evidence on the linkage is lacking. In view of the predominance of informal political and economic institutions in West Africa, hypotheses or theoretical substantiation on this linkage, based on chronically imperfect quantitative data on economic growth in Africa, are challenged out of methodological reasons (cf. Kohnert 2008 for more details).


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