Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly

De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2010): Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly.

Abstract

We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in homogeneous product industry, under effcient rationing, constant marginal cost until full capacity utilization, and identical technology across firms. We solve for the equilibrium and establish its uniqueness for capacity configurations in the mixed strategy region of the capacity space such that the capacities of the largest and smallest firm are sufficiently close.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth competition; mixed strategy equilibrium; almost symmetric oligopoly; Mixed strategy equilibrium
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

References

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