Ghosh, Saibal (2010): Affiliation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Indian Business Groups. Published in: The Manchester School , Vol. 78, No. 3 (June 2010): pp. 183-200.
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Using data on a sample of Indian firms from 1996-2006, we examine the effect of group affiliation on firm performance. After controlling for the differences in firm size, growth opportunities and leverage, the findings indicate that group affiliation exerts a salutary impact on firm performance, measured in terms of adjusted Q or RoA. Moreover, the evidence indicates that tunneling is not an important factor driving the valuation and profitability effect of group affiliation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Affiliation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Indian Business Groups|
|Keywords:||Business groups; Adjusted Q; RoA; Tunneling; Promoter’s share; India|
|Subjects:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill|
|Depositing User:||Saibal Ghosh|
|Date Deposited:||09. Aug 2010 10:10|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 00:59|
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