Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle

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In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the revelation principle. However, in this paper, we argue that there are serious bugs hidden in their proofs.

Keywords: Revelation principle; Mechanism design; Implementation theory.

1. Introduction

The revelation principle is well-known in the economic literature. It has several versions of representations [1-3]. In Ref. [2], Myerson said: “...the revelation principle tells us that, for any general coordination mechanism, any equilibrium of rational communication strategies for the economic agents can be simulated by an equivalent incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism, where a trustworthy mediator maximally centralizes communication and makes honesty and obedience rational equilibrium strategies for the agents”.

Although the revelation principle is fundamental and essential to the field of mechanism design, in this paper we will argue that there are serious bugs in two versions of proofs. The rest of the paper are organized as follows: In Section 2, we will analyse the bug in Myerson’s proof [1]. Then, we will point out the bug in the proof given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [3].

2. The bug in Myerson’s proof

In this section, the notation is referred to Ref. [1]. The bug will be showed by the following three claims. We use the capital form to emphasize key words.

Claim 1: For each agent $i$, $t_i$ and $d_i$ are his private information.

Proof: See Page 69, Line 26 [1], “...each type $t_i$ in $T_i$ represents a complete description of all the private information $i$ might have about his environment, his abilities and his preferences. Each private decision-option $d_i$ in $D_i$ may represent, for example, a level of effort which agent $i$ might exert in working for the principal, and which the principal cannot observe or control”. Obviously, Claim 1 holds.

Claim 2: For each agent $i$, the two mappings $\rho_i: T_i \rightarrow R_i$ and $\delta_i: M_i \times T_i \rightarrow D_i$ are his private information.

Proof: See Page 71, Line 19 [1], “In the context of this coordination mechanism $((R_i, M_i)_{i=1}^n, \pi)$, each agent $i$ controls his choice of reporting strategy in $R_i$ as a
function of his type, and controls his choice of a decision in $D_i$ as a function of his type and his message received. That is, agent $i$ selects his participation strategy ($\rho_i$, $\delta_i$). Any agent has incentives to report dishonestly and act disobediently whenever doing so is better for him. Therefore, the two mappings $\rho_i : T_i \to R_i$ and $\delta_i : M_i \times T_i \to D_i$, such that $\rho_i(t_i)$ would be agent $i$’s reporting strategy if $i$ were of type $t_i$, and $\delta_i(m_i, t_i)$ would be $i$’s final decision in $D_i$ after he received message $m_i$ if his type were $t_i$.

In a general system, each agent $i$ acts independently and self-interestedly when he selects his participation strategy ($\rho_i$, $\delta_i$). Any agent has incentives to report dishonestly and act disobediently whenever doing so is better for him. Therefore, the two mappings $\rho_i : T_i \to R_i$ and $\delta_i : M_i \times T_i \to D_i$ must be agent $i$’s private information.

Claim 3: There is a bug in Myerson’s proof.

Proof: See Page 74, Line 1 [1], “...Let $\delta^{-1}(d, t)$ be the set of all messages to the agents such that each agent $i$ would respond by choosing decision $d_i$ if his type were $t_i$. That is,

$$\delta^{-1}(d, t) = \{ m | \delta_i(m_i, t_i) = d_i, \text{ for all } i \}.$$"

It is implicit WHO IS ABLE to calculate $\delta^{-1}(d, t)$ for any arbitrarily given $d$ and $t$. We emphasize the ability to do the calculation because anybody who wants to calculate $\delta^{-1}(d, t)$ must be able to get all necessary data. As discussed in Claim 2, the mapping $\delta_i$ is private information of agent $i$ and unknown to the principal. It is impossible for the principal to calculate $\delta^{-1}(d, t)$ when he is given some arbitrary $t \in T_1 \times \cdots \times T_n$ and $d \in D_1 \times \cdots \times D_n$.

See Page 74, Line 5 [1], “Then, define $\pi^* : D \times T \to R$ so that

$$\pi^*(d|t) = \sum_{m \in \delta^{-1}(d, t)} \pi(d_0, m|\rho_1(t_1), \cdots, \rho_n(t_n)).$$

$\pi^*$ is the direct coordination mechanism which simulates the overall effect of the original mechanism with the given participation strategies”.

It is also implicit WHO IS ABLE to calculate $\rho_1(t_1), \cdots, \rho_n(t_n)$ for any arbitrarily given $t_1, \cdots, t_n$. Although in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each agent $i$ has incentives to truthfully report $\rho_i(t_i)$ to the principal if $t_i$ is his true type, it is unreasonable to assume that each agent $i$ has incentives to TRUTHFULLY report $\rho_i(\hat{t}_i)$ to the principal for all possible $\hat{t}_i \in T_i$. Hence, it is impossible for the principal to calculate $\rho_1(t_1), \cdots, \rho_n(t_n)$ for any arbitrarily given $t_1, \cdots, t_n$.

To sum up, the principal cannot calculate $\delta^{-1}(d, t)$ or $\rho_1(t_1), \cdots, \rho_n(t_n)$. Consequently, the principal cannot calculate $\pi^*$. In Page 6, Line 24 [2], Myerson assumed a virtual person (named mediator) to calculate $\pi^*$: “The assumption that perfectly trustworthy mediators are available is essential to the mathematical simplicity of the incentive-compatible set”. Therefore, $\pi^*$ can only be calculated by the assumed mediator, NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL. However, in Page 73, Proposition 2 [1], Myerson said: “... there exists an incentive-compatible direct mechanism $\pi^*$ in which the PRINCIPAL gets the same expected utility...”.

That’s the bug!
3. The bug in the proof by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green

In this section, the notation follows from Ref. [3]. In the derivation of formula (23.D.3), the authors substitute $s_i^*(\hat{\theta}_i)$ for $\hat{s}_i$ appeared in the formula (23.D.2). Since (23.D.2) holds for all $\hat{s}_i \in S_i$, it looks reasonable to do so at the first sight.

As we have pointed out in Section II, for each agent $i$, the strategy $s_i^*$ is his private information. Although in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each agent $i$ has incentives to truthfully report $s_i^*(\theta_i)$ to the principal if agent $i$’s type is $\theta_i$, it is unreasonable to assume that each agent $i$ has incentives to TRUTHFULLY report $s_i^*(\hat{\theta}_i)$ (for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$) to the principal. Hence, the item $s_i^*(\hat{\theta}_i)$ (for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$) is indeed NOT AVAILABLE to the principal. Consequently, the formula (23.D.3) doesn’t hold.

That’s the bug!

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References